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Kathavatthu Chapter 5[]
301. Ambiguity of the Term 173
1. Of Emancipation.
Controverted Point. — That the knowledge of emancipation has itself the quality of emancipation.
From the Commentary . — Four sorts of knowledge (or insight, n an a) are grouped under knowledge of emancipation, to wit, insight or intui- tion, path-knowledge, fruit-knowledge, reflective knowledge. In other words, emancipation considered as (1) freedom from perceiving things as permanent or persisting, or through perceiving the opposite ; (2) the severance and renunciation effected by the Paths; (3) the peace of fruition 1 ; (4) contemplation of emancipation as such. Now only the peace of fruition is abstract, unqualified emancipation. The rest cannot be called emancipated things. But the Andhakas say that all four are such.
[1] Th. — Does not your proposition imply that any knowledge of emancipation whatever has the quality of emancipation? For instance, has reflective knowledge 2 that quality? Is such knowledge of emancipation as is
' possessed by one who has attained to the stage of Ariyan adoption 3 of that quality? You deny both. [Then your proposition is too general.]
[2] Again, it includes that knowledge of emancipation possessed by one who is practising in order to realize the Fruit of the First, Second, Third, Fourth Paths. 4 But do you mean to convey that the knowledge of one in the
1 Phalar) patipassaddhi-vimutti.
2 Or retrospective. Of. Compendium , 58, 69 ; 132, n. 6 ; 207, n. 7.
3 G-otrabhu puggalo; cf. AngtUtara-Nih., iv. 373; v. 28;
Compendium,, 55, 215, n. 5 ; the preparatory stage to the First Path.
On this wider extension of the term cf. III. 3 and 4.
K174
Of Emancipation
V. 1.
First Path is equal to the knowledge of one who has won,
acquired, arrived at, realized the Fruit of that Path, and so
for the Second, Third, and Fourth ? Of course you deny.
[3] Conversely, do you mean to convey that, if the knowledge of emancipation belonging to one who possesses the Fruition of a Path has the quality of emancipation, the knowledge of emancipation of one who is only practising in order to realize that Fruition has the same quality ? Of course you deny.
[4] Or in other words, let us assume, as you say, that when a person has realized the fruition of any of the Four Paths his knowledge of emancipation has itself the quality or nature of emancipation. Now you admit that the knowledge in question is the knowledge of one who has won the Fruit, do you not ?
But do you maintain as much, if the person has not yet realized, but is only practising to realize a given fruition ? Of course you deny. . . .
2. Of the Knowledge of an Adept 1
Controverted Point. — That a learner has the insight of an adept.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion of the Uttarapatkakas, namely, that learners, as Ananda and others were, showed by their confessions about the Exalted One, etc., that they knew who were adepts, [and therefore understood that knowledge, the possession of which made them adepts].
[1] Th.— Then you imply that the learner knows, sees 2 the ideas of the adept, lives in the attainment of having seen, known, realized them, lives in personal contact there- with. If not — and you do deny this — then you cannot maintain your proposition.
[2] We grant of course that the adept knows, sees khe ideas of the adept, lives in the attainment . . , and so oil.
1 A-sekha, literally, non-learner, proficient, expert ; in this cast-,
an Arahant. S e k h a is one who is being ‘trained.’ i
2 This idiom applies to those who arrive at their knowledge joy themselves. — Corny.
304-05. The Reach of the Learncr\' Insight 175
But, as you have admitted, you cannot impute this know- ledge to the learner. 1
Your position then is, that you credit the learner with the insight of an adept, yet you deny that the learner knows, sees the ideas of the adept, etc. But, the adept having also of course the insight of the adept, if he be as to insight on a level only with the learner, you must add of the adept also that he knows not, sees not the ideas of the adept, does not live in the attainment of having seen, known, realized them, does not live in personal contact therewith. Which is absurd, as you by your denial admit.
[3] You are ready to deny that a person in a lower Stage of the Path has the insight as yet of the nest higher Stage, or that one who is adopted 2 has yet the insight of even the First Stage. How then can you ascribe the insight of those who have finally attained to those wdio as yet have not ?
[4] U . — If my proposition is wrong, then how is it that a learner, as Ananda was, knew the sublimity of the Exalted One, or of the Elder Sariputta, or of the Elder Moggallana the Great ?
3. Of Perverted Perception or Hallucination (in Jhdna).
Controverted Point. — That in one who has attained Jhana through the earth-artifice, etc., 3 knowledge [of what is seen] is perverted.
From the Commentary. — It is a belief among the Andhakas, that when anyone has induced Jhana by the [self-hypnotizing] process of gazing on [a portion of] earth and being conscious of earth, the content of consciousness becoming other than earth [though his gaze is still fixed thereon], his cognition may he called perverted, seeing one thing, namely, the physical earth, and being conscious of something else, to wit, the percept, or concept. 4 The Theravadin’s position is the
1 The PTS edition should read a negative reply here and at the
end of this section. 2 G o t r a b h ii, Y. 1, § 1.
3 This, as heading the list of ‘ artifices 5 (k a s i n a) for self-hypnosis, is always cited as representing artifice in general. See p. 121 ; also Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 48, and passim ; Vibhanga, 171, 178.
1 The opponent’s position is that the subject is really conscious of an idea, which is never the original object, the mind being referred to
that by a process of hallucination.
176 Of Perverted Perception V. 3.
specialization of the meaning of ‘earth.’ It may mean the ultimate quality of extension, physical (literally, structural) earth, a percept or concept, a [nature-] (leva. The only real perversion of cognition is to see permanence, persistence in the impermanent. There is no hallucination or illusion, etc., properly so called, in Jhana. 1
[1] Th. — If your proposition is right, then do you imply that this ‘perversion’ is the same as that involved in seeing the permanent in the impermanent, happiness in 111, a soul in what is not soul, the beautiful in the ugly ? Of course you deny.
[2] Again, you imply that such a person’s knowledge during Jhana is not proficient. But you do not wish to imply this, but the opposite.
[3] You admit that the reversal of judgment which sees permanence in impermanence is a bad judgment, and those other judgments above-stated also. Yet you will not admit that cognition during Jhana is badly accomplished.
[4] You hold on the contrary that it is well accomplished. Yet a similar perversion in the case of those other four judgments you consider bad.
[5] If it were an Arahant who so accomplished Jhana, would you claim a perverted cognition for him? You could not. [6] Or, if you could, you would have to make him liable to reversals of perception, consciousness, and views in general. 2
[7] A. — But if my proposition is wrong, do you hold that, when any one attains Jhana by earth-cognition, everything becomes earth to him ? 3 No, you reply. Then surely his judgment is upset.
1 Because, when the subject is conscious of the percept or concept of earth, the content of his consciousness is just that percept or concept.
2 Of. Compendium, p. 216, n. 4; 67. Vipariyesa, viparita here used are tantamount to the term [preferred in later idiom] ‘vipallasa.’
3 There is even now a tendency among Burmese Buddhists, if not well trained, to believe that Jhanic practice by any given ‘ artifice - say earth-gazing — is only successful when every external thing seems to become earth. This would be true hallucination. But here the opponent thinks that the mind of the Jhanic subject is upset, because the Theravadin’s denial in general includes the specific denial that the content of consciousness becomes ‘earth.’
307.
Insight and Entrance
177
[8] Th . — Bat you will admit that the earth is there,
and that the subject enters Jhana by regarding earth as
■earth ? Where then is the perversion of cognition ?
You say that the earth is actually there, and that in entering Jhana by the consciousness of earth as earth, perception is perverted. Substitute for earth Nibbana: would you still say that perception was perverted ? . . .
4. Of Assurance.
Controverted Point . — That one who has not made sure has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance. 1
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Uttarapathakas, at present hold this view on these grounds : The Exalted One judged that ‘ anyone who will enter on the right Path of Assurance 2 is capable of pene- trating the Truths.’ Therefore only the average worldling who has not made sure has the religious insight requisite for entering.
. [1] Th. — If one who has not made sure has the insight ■for entering the Path of Assurance, then his opposite — one who has made sure — must have the insight for not entering it. 3 If you deny, your proposition falls through. If, by it, you maintain that one who has made sure has not the in- sight for not entering that Path, then you imply that one who has not made sure has not the insight for entering thereon. Which, by your proposition, is wrong.
[2] Again, if one who has not made sure has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance, do you then admit that one who has made sure is in the same intellectual stage ? 4 You deny. And if you admit, on the contrary, that one who has made sure has not [i.e., no longer] the insight
1 1 Assurance (niyama) is a synonym of the Path ’ [to Arahant- Ahip]. — Corny. The expression ‘made sure, 1 niyato, is applied to those who have entered on it, and are ‘ assured of ’ eventual attainment.
2 S a m m a 1 1 a - n i y a m a . Of. Sagytotta-Nik.^ iii. 225 (the last clause is different) ; and Anguttara-Nik., i. 121.
3 Literally, for entering the opposite path of non-assurance.
4 ‘Inasmuch as for the initial purpose of the Path he no longer needs the requisite insight.’- — Corny .
T.S. V.
12
Of Assurance
178
Y. 4.
for entering, then you must surely deny that insight also
to one who has not made sure.
[3] Again, in affirming that one who has not made sure has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance, do you admit that he has also the insight for not entering it? You deny, that is, you affirm he has not the insight for not entering it. Do you equally admit then that he has not the insight for entering it ? You deny. . . A
[4] Does your proposition mean that there is a Path of Assurance for one who has not made sure of entering? 2 You deny. Yet you admit that there is insight for enter- ing upon it ! Does this insight consist in applications of mindfulness and all the other factors of Enlightenment ? You must deny, and [5] affirm that there is no such Assurance, How then can your proposition stand ?
[6] You do not grant to one who is only in the prior stage of adoption 3 the insight of the First Path? Or to one who is practising for the insight of the First . . . Fourth Fruition the insight of that Fruition ? How then can you allow the insight of entering on the Path of Assurance to one who has not made sure ?
[7] U. — If I am wrong, you must on the other hand admit that the Exalted One knows that a person, M or N, will enter the true Path of Assurance, and is capable of penetrating the Truths.
1 We have given a full, if slightly free, rendering of this curious, hout of ancient dialectic. At the end of each section the sectary is brought up against the same rejoinder, compelling him either to- contradict his proposition or to withdraw it. This may be shown diagrammatically, A=one-who-has-made-sure ; B, entering-on-the- ‘Path’; C, insight-for ; a, b, c standing for the respective contradictories* We then get,
aBC (thesis)
faBC
T.aBG
AbC
§ oj ABC
e Q abC § 3 jabc
Abe
§ 2 lABc
aBe
[aBe
[aBe
2 The Path proper being reserved for one who has made sure.
3 Gotrabhu puggalo. See V. 1, § L;
309-10.
All Knowledge is not Analytic
179
5. Of Analytic Insight. 1
Controverted Point. — That all knowledge is analytic.
From the Commentary . — It is a belief of the Andhakas that in an Ariyan (that is, one who has ‘ made sure, 3 is in some Stage of the Path or Way) all 1 knowledge 5 whatsoever is supramundane or transcendental. 2 Hence they conclude that it is also analytic.
[1] Th . — Then you must admit that popular knowledge is analytic — which you deny. For if you assent, then all who have popular, conventional knowledge, have also acquired analytic insight — which you deny. The same argument holds good if ‘knowledge in discerning the thought of another ’ be substituted for ‘ popular . . . knowledge.’ 3
[2] Again, if all knowledge is analytic, then a fortiori all discernment is analytic. Or, if you can assent to that, you must therewith admit that the discernment of one who attains Jhana by any of the elemental, or colour ‘artifices,’ who attains any of the four more abstract Jhanas, who gives donations, who gives to the Order any of the four necessaries of life, is analytic. But this you deny.
[3] A. — If I am wrong, you admit that there is such a thing as [spiritual or] supramundane discernment ; is that not analytic ?
Th . — That I do not deny. 4
A. — Then my proposition is true. 6
1 Patisambhida, or analysis; literally, ‘resolving, continued breaking-up. 3 On the four branches in this organon, see Appendix : Patisambhida.
2 See p. 1S4, n. 4.
3 See pp. 180, 181.
4 The Thera vadin does not of course mean that all ‘ supramundane ’ knowledge is analytic. There is analytic, and there is intuitive supra- mundane knowledge.
5 Namely, for Ariyans. This is another little joust of logomachy What is the extension of the term h a n a, knowledge (see II. 2) ? And what is the nature of an ‘ Ariyan ’ ?
180
Of Popular Knowledge
Y. 6.
6. Of Popular Knowledge.
Controverted Point. — That it is wrong to say : Popular knowledge has only truth as its object and nothing else.
From the Commentary. — This discourse is to purge the incorrect tenet held by the Andhakas, that the word 1 truth 5 is to be applied without any distinction being drawn between popular and philo- sophical truth. 1
[1] Andhaka. — You admit, do you not, that one who attains Jhana by way of the earth-artifice, has knowledge ? Does not that earth-artifice come under popular truth ?
Th.~ Yes.
A . — Then why exempt popular knowledge from the search for truth ?
[2] The same argument applies to the other artifices, and to gifts as stated above (Y. 5).
[8] Th. — Then according to you, popular knowledge has only Truth as its object. But is it the object of popular knowledge to understand the fact and nature of 111, to put away the Cause, to realize the Cessation, to develop the Path thereto ? You must deny. (Hence the need for a distinction between truths.)
7. Of the Mental Object in Telepathy.
Controverted Point . — That insight into the thoughts of another has no object beyond bare other-consciousness as such. 2
1 Literally, truth in the highest or ultimate sense. On this ancient Buddhist distinction, see above, p. 63, n. 2 ; also Ledi Sadaw’s exposi- tion, JPTS, 1914, 129 1, and note : Paramattha.
2 ‘ Of another ’ is filled in, the supernormal power in question being one of the six so-called abnormal knowledges, chal-abhinna, attainable by gifted disciples. The Buddha is frequently shown, in the Suttas, exercising it. See also Psalms of the Brethren, passim ; Compendium , 63, 209. The psychological point can only be followed.
311-13. Pieacling Another’s Mind 181
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas at present, have held this view, deriving it from just the [technical] expression ‘ insight into a limited portion of the consciousness of another].’ 1 But this is untenable, since in knowing consciousness as lustful and so on, the object becomes essentially complex.
[1] Th . — You admit, do you not, that one may discern a ‘lust-ridden consciousness,’ and so on 2 as such? Then this disposes of your proposition.
[2] Again, you cannot deny that, in thought-discerning, insight can have as its object contact, feeling, etc. [or any of the concomitants of consciousness]. Where then is bare consciousness as sole object ?
[3] Or do you dispute the statement that insight having contact, or feeling, or the rest as its object, comes into thought-discerning? ‘Yes’ you say? 8 But does not thought-discerning include discerning the course of con- tact, feeling, etc. ? This you now deny. 4
[4] A . — You say my proposition is wrong. But is not this thought-discerning insight limited to a portion of the course of thought [in others] ? Then surely I am right.
if the Buddhist distinction between (a) a bare continuum of conscious
moments, (6) various concomitants or coefficients of that bare con-
sciousness be kept in mind. See Compendium, 18. Thus the dispute
is really on the meaning or context of the term citta: bare fact of
consciousness, or the concrete, complex psychic unit as understood
in European psychology. The discussion is therefore of more than
antiquarian interest. See Buddhist Psychology , 6 f., 175.
1 Ceto pariyaye ha nap is usually so rendered, in this con- nection, by Burmese translators. The opponent misconstrues ‘ limited, ’ holding that thought-reading is limited to the bare flux of conscious- ness, without its factors.
2 The quoted phrase heads the list usually given in the Nikayas when the thought-reading power is stated— e.g., Dialogues, i. 89 f.
3 Because, he holds, one cannot make a mental object of more than one factor [at onee]. — Corny.
4 ‘Because there is no Sutta-passage about it.’ — Corny.
182
Of Knowledge of the Future
V. 8.
8. Of Insight into the Future.
Controverted Point . — That there is knowledge of the future.
From the Commentary. — The future includes both what will happen proximately and what is not just proximate. Concerning the former there is absolutely no knowledge, any more than there is of what is in - eluded in a single track or moment of cognition. But some, like the Andhakas, incline to a belief that knowledge concerning any part of •the future is possible.
[1] Th. — If we can know about the future [in general], it must be [as in other knowledge] through knowing its root; condition, cause, source, origin, upspringing, support, 1 basis, correlation, genesis. But you deny that we know the future thus. . . . 2
[2] And it must be [as in other knowledge] through knowing how it will be correlated by condition, base, pre- dominance, contiguity, and immediate contiguity. 3 But you deny here again. . . .
. [3] Again, if you are right, one in the stage of adoption has insight into the First Path, one in the First Path has insight into the First Fruition, and so on. But you deny here again. . . .
[4] A . — If I am wrong, is there not a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said : ‘ To Patna, Ananda, three disasters will happen : by fire or by ivater or by rupture of friend- ship ’ i 4 Surely then the future may be known.
1 Literally, ‘food.’
2 Presumably, the belief was in an intuitive vision, and not in a process of inference. The ten terms are the ‘ root ’ and its nine synonyms of the First Book in the Yamaha, I, p. 13.
3 These are the time-relations assigned in the doctrine of Relations detailed in the Patthana , or last book of the A bhidhamma-Pitaka.
4 Dialogues, ii. 92. The orthodox position seems to have been, that whereas events indefinitely future may be foretold through a super- man’s intuition, the exact nature of molecular, or psychical, vital change at any given moment is unpredictable. Cf. M. Bergson on this point : Creative Evolution, ch. i., p. 6 passim.
314-15. Knowledge oj the Present is Retrospective 183
9. Of Knowledge of the Present.
Controverted Point. — That the present may be known.
From the Commentary. — Because of the Word : When all pheno- mena are seen to be impermanent, the insight itself, as a phenomenon, is also seen to be impermanent, some, as the Andhakas, have the opinion that there is knowledge of the entire present, without distinc- tion. Now if there be such knowledge, it [as present] must take place at the present instant through itself. But because two knowledges cannot be simultaneous in the one self-conscious subject, knowledge of the present cannot be known by the same act of knowledge . 1
[1] Th. — If there be a knowledge of the present, does one know that knowledge by the same act of knowledge ? If you deny, your proposition must fall. If you assent, I ask : Does one know that he knows the present by that same act of knowledge? You deny, and your previous assertion falls. If you assent, I ask : Is the conscious act of knowing the object of the knowledge ? You deny, and your previous assertion falls. If you assent, then you imply that one touches contact by the contact, feels feeling by that feeling, wills volition by that volition. So for the initial and the sustained application of thought. So for zest, for mindfulness, for understanding. You imply that one cuts a sword with that sword ; an axe with that axe ; a knife with that knife ; an adze with that adze ; that one sews a needle with that needle ; handles the tip of a finger with that finger ; kisses the tip of the nose with that nose ; handles the head with that head ; washes off impurity with that impurity.
[2] A. — I am wrong then? But when all things are seen as impermanent, is not that knowledge also seen as impermanent ? Surely then I am right.
1 In other words, self-consciousness is really an act of retrospection, and its object is not present, but past.
184
Of Knowing Others’ Fruition
V. 10.
10. Of Knowing Others’ Fruition.
Controverted Point. — That a disciple can have knowledge concerning fruition.
From the Coonnientary. — Some, like the Andbakas, have held that, since it was said that both the Bnddhas and their disciples teach beings the doctrine of the attainment of Ariyan fruition, disciples can. like the Buddhas, state that this or that being has won some Bruit. Now if that were so, they could also, by their insight, give details concerning that attainment. But they cannot.
[1] Tli. — This implies that a disciple can make known the property of each fruit j 1 that he possesses a knowledge of the different degrees of development in fruitions, control- ling powers, personalities ; [2] that he possesses a concep- tion of aggregates, sense-fields, elements, truths, controlling powers, personality ; [8] that he is a Conqueror, a Teacher, a Buddha Supreme, omniscient, all-seeing, Master of the Norm, the Norm-Judge of appeal ; [4] that he is one who causes a Way to spring up where no Way was, one who engenders a Way not engendered ; proclaims a Path not proclaimed, knows the Path, is conversant with the Path, is expert in the Path. All of which of course you deny. . . .
[5] A. — Yet you deny that the disciple lacks insight. Surely then he may have insight into others’ fruition.
1 Bead phala-ssakatap. In line 5, for pahnapetiti read the atthiti of the controverted proposition.