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Kathavatthu Chapter1[]
Points of Controversy OR Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE
KATHAVATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A AND MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
1915
POINTS OF CONTROVERSY;
OR
SUBJECTS OF DISCOURSE
(KATHAVATTHU)
THE COMMENTATOR’S INTRODUCTION.
Honour to the Exalted One Arahant Buddha Supreme.
Seated in heavenly mansions, by devas surrounded, Teacher of earth and of heaven, Person unrivalled, Skilled in the term and the concept, ending his discourse Called the ‘ Description of Persons1 , he, supreme Person, Set forth in outline the Book of the ‘Subjects of Discourse’ Giving account of the ‘ soul ’ and such points controverted. By the mere heads thus laid down in delectable mansions Moggali’s son filled out, here on earth, the full detail. Now inasmuch as achieved is the way for the comment, I will discourse on the matter. Listen attentive !
Now when he had wrought the Twin-Miracle, the Exalted One went for the rains to the City of the Thrice Ten (x10 million) Devas(angels). And there beneath the Coral Tree, seated on the Pandukambala Rock, making his mother chief witness, he discoursed to the assembly of Devas on matters philo-
1 Puggala-Pannatti. Pannatti signifies both the idea or concept of any cognizable thing or group of things, and also the verbal expression of the same. See Compendium of Philosophy , p. 4 L, 198, 264.
2 Points of Controversy
sophical [Abhidhamma-katha]. After he had taught them the Dhamma-Sangani, the Vibhanga, the Dhatu-Katha, and the Puggala-Pannatti, he thought : — "When in the future the turn for setting forth the Kathavatthu shall have arrived, my disciple, the greatly wise Elder, Tissa son of Moggall, will purge the blemishes that have arisen in the Religion, 1 and calling a Third Council, will, seated in the midst of the Order, divide this compilation into a thousand sections, 2 five hundred being assigned to our views, five hundred to views of others/ For this occasion, beginning with an eight-sectioned inquiry into the theory of person or soul, in four questions each of two fivefold divisions, he drew up, with respect to the course to be adopted in all the discourses, a list of heads in a text uncompleted by just one section for recitation. Then delivering in detail the remainder of the Abhi- dhamma discourse, 3 his rains-season sojourn being over, he descended by the jewelled stairway that was in the midst of the gold and silver stairways from the deva world to the city of Sankassa, 4 and so accomplishing the welfare of all beings and establishing it as long as he lived, he completed existence, leaving no remaining basis of future life.
Thereupon the company of his adherents, headed by Great Kassapa, made friendship with Ajatasattu the king, and drew up a compendium of the body of Doctrine and Discipline. 5 After a hundred years had expired, the Vajji-puttaka bhikkhus declared for the ‘ ten bases ’ of relaxation of rules. When they heard of this, Elder Yasa, son of the brahmin Kakandaka, making friend- ship with the king named Asoka, son of Susunaga, selected seven hundred from among the twelve thousand
1 S a s a n a, meaning practically what ‘ in the Church ’ or ‘in the Faith ’ or ‘ in Doctrine ’ would mean for Christendom.
2 Suttani.
3 This can only refer to the two last books Yamaka and Patthana.
4 Vin. Texts, iii. 396.
5 Dhamma-Vinaya-sarirai), not -kayap, as we might have expected (cf. 24, n. 2), But the term was preempted; see Dlgha-Nik, iii. 84.
Commentator's Introduction
3
bhikkhus, and quashing the ten bases, drew up a com-
pendium of the body of Doctrine and Discipline- Re-
futed by those Elders who had performed this task, ten
thousand of the Yajjiputtaka bhikkhus seeking adherents,
and gaining but a weak following among themselves,
formed the school called (1) Mahasanghika. 1 From this
arose the secession of two other schools: — the (2) Gokulikas
and the (3) Ekabboharikas. From the former of these
arose the secession of yet two other schools (4) Pannat-
tivadins and (5) Bahulikas, or as they were also called,
Bahussutikas- Among just these arose other teachers :
—the (6) Cetiyavadins. Thus from the school of the
Mahasanghikas, in the- second century, five schools arose,
making with the Mahasanghikas sis.
In that second century only two schools seceded from the Theravada : — (i.) Mahirjsasakas and (ii.) Yajjiputtakas.
Now 7 , from the Yajjiputtakas four other seceding schools arose, to wit, the (iii.) Dhammuttariyas, the (iv.) Bhadra- yanikas, the (v.) Channagarikas, and the (vi.) Sammitiyas. Again, from the Mahiijsasakas, in the second century only, two seceding schools arose : — the (vii.) Sabbatthivadins and the (viii.) Dhammaguttikas. From the Sabbatthivadins in their turn the (is.) Kassapikas split off, and the Kassapikas again, splitting later in two, the (x.) Sankanti- kas were formed, and yet again, the Sankantikas splitting in two, the (si.) Suttavadins.
Thus from the Theravada arose these eleven seceding bodies, making twelve in all. And thus these twelve, together w 7 ith the six schools of the Mahasanghikas, con- stitute the eighteen schools which arose in the second century. They are also known as the eighteen groups, and as the eighteen sects. But of the eighteen, seventeen schools are to be understood as being schismatics, the
1 Literally, formed the ‘ teachers’ clan, called the G-reat-Orderers.’ Each of the names of the seceding schools is a crux which we have no means of finally resolving. Some — e.g., G-okulika — may derive from the teacher’s name, some — e.g., Cetiyavadins — from a place — here probably Sanchi, called the Cetiva or shrine — some from the view professed — e.g., Sabbatthivadin.
4
Points of Controversy
Theravada only being non-schismatic. Moreover, it is said in the Dipavagsa :
1 The wicked bhikkhus, the Vajjiputtakas, who had been excommuni- cated by the Theras (Elders), gained another party ; and many people, holding the wrong doctrine, ten thousand assembled and [also] held a council. Therefore this Dhamma Council is called the Great Council.
The Bhikkhus of the Great Council settled a doctrine contrary [to the true faith]. Altering the original redaction, they made another redaction. They transposed Sottas, which belonged to one place [of the collection], to another place ; they destroyed the [true] meaning and the Faith in the Vinaya and in the five Collections [of Suttas], Those Bhikkhus who understood neither what had been taught in long •expositions, nor without exposition, neither the natural meaning nor the recondite meaning, settled a false meaning in connection with spurious speeches of the Buddha. These bhikkhus destroyed a great deal of [true] meaning under the colour of the letter. Rejecting single passages of the Suttas and of the profound Vinaya, they composed other Suttas and another Vinaya which had [only] the appearance [of the genuine ones]. Rejecting the other texts— that is to say, the Parivara, which is an abstract of the contents [of the Vinaya]— the six •sections of the Abhidhamma, the Patisambhida, the Niddesa, and some portions of the- Jataka, they composed new ones. They changed their names, their appearance, requisites, and gestures, forsaking what was original . 1
Those who held the Great Council were the first schismatics ; in imitation of them many heretics arose. Afterwards a schism occurred in that [new school] ; the Gokulika and Ekabyohara Bhikkhus formed two divisions. Afterwards two schisms took place amongst the Gokulikas : the Bahussutaka and the Pahhatti bhikkhus formed two divisions. And opposing these were the Cetiyas, [another] division of the Mahasangltikas. All these five sects, originating from the Maha- sangitikas, split the [true] meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the Collection; setting aside some portions of difficult passages, they altered them. They changed their names, their appearance, requisites, and gestures, forsaking what was original.
In the orthodox school of the Theras again a schism occurred : the Mahigsasaka and Vajjiputtaka bhikkhus formed two sections. In the school of the Vajjiputtakas four sections arose, to wit, the Dhammut- tarikas, Bhaddayanikas, Channagarikas, and Sammitis. In later times two divisions arose among the Mahiqsasakas : the Sabbatthivada and Dhammagutta bhikkhus formed two divisions. From the Sabbatthi- vadins the Kassapikas, from the Kassapikas the Sankantivadins, and
1 In Dr. Oldenberg’s translation this sentence is made to refer to grammatical innovations.
Commentator s Introduction 5
subsequently another section, the Suttavadins, separated in their turn. These eleven schools which separated themselves from the Theravada split the [true] meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the Collection ; setting aside some portions of difficult passages, they altered them. They changed their names, their appearance, requisites,, and gestures, forsaking what was original.
Seventeen are the schismatic sects, and there is one that is not schismatic ; together with that which is not schismatic, they are eighteen in all. The most excellent one of the Theravadins, which is even as a great banyan tree, is the complete doctrine of the Conqueror, free from omissions or admissions. The other schools arose as thorns grow on the tree. In the first century there were no schisms ; in the second century arose the seventeen schismatical schools in the religion of the Conqueror.’ 1
The Henaavatikas, Bajagirikas, Siddhatthas, Pubbaseliyas Aparaseliyas, Vajiriyas — other sis schools arose one after the other. To them no reference is here made. .
Now the Sasana held on its way as these eighteen early schools. And when Asoka, 2 the righteous ruler, had received faith, he bestowed daily a sum of 500,000 on the worship of the Buddha, the Norm, the Order, the main- tenance of his own teacher, the Elder Nigrodha, and on the dispensaries at the four gates, and so brought notable honour and patronage to the Sasana. Then the teachers of other faiths, being deprived of honour and patronage, so that they had not even enough to eat, sought that honour and patronage by entering the Order, and set forth each his own heresies, saying : c This is the Norm, this is the Discipline, this is the religion of the Master.’ Some, even without joining the Order, themselves cut off their hair, donned the yellow robes and went about among the Viharas, entering the assemblies at the time of the feast-services.
These bhikkhus, albeit they were confuted by Norm, Discipline, and the Master’s Word, lacking steadfastness, in the right order 3 of Norm and Discipline, wrought divers cankers, stains, and nuisance in the Sasana. Some prac- tised [holy] fire-cult; some the five-fold heat-asceticism; 4
1 Dlpavarjsa, v. 30-54 ; pp. 140-2 in Oldenberg’s translation.
2 Called also Dhammasoka ; the earlier king was Kalasoka.
3 °anulomaya. 4 Psalms of the Brethren , p. 120.
■6
Points of Controversy
some turned the way of the sun ; some deliberately strove
in one way or another, saying, ' We shall break up your
Doctrine and Discipline.’
Thereupon the Order would not, with such as these, hold festival or confession . 1 For seven years the fortnightly feast was suspended in the Asoka Park. The king strove by a decree to bring it to pass, but could not. Nay, he was filled with remorse when, through the misunderstand- ing of a stupid delegate, some bhikkhus were slain. And fain to allay both his regret and the plague in the Sasana, he asked the Order : ‘ Who now is sufficient for this busi- ness ?’ When he heard the answer : ‘ The Elder Tissa Moggali’s son, sire,’ he invited the Elder to come from the Ahoganga hill. And when he saw the Elder show a miracle, he was filled with confidence in the Elder’s powers, and consulted him on that which distressed him, and pro- cured assuaging of his remorse . 2 Moreover, the Elder dwelt seven days in the royal gardens teaching the king doctrine.
Thus instructed, the king on the seventh day convened the Order in the Asoka Park, and seated himself in a pavilion which he had had erected. Marshalling the bhikkhus into separate groups according to the views they professed, he sent for each group in turn, and asked :
- What was the doctrine of the Buddha ?’ Then the
Eternalists said: ‘He was an Eternalist’; others that he taught limited eternalism, immortality of the soul, eel-wriggling, fortuitous origins, consciousness [of soul after death], unconsciousness of the same, neither. Anni- hilationists said he taught annihilation of soul ; those who held with Nibbana in this life only claimed him no less . 3
The king, through the priming in doctrine previously dealt him, discerned that these were none of them [proper]
1 Mahavay&a, v. 284-282.
2 lb., 264 : ‘ The thera taught the king : “ There is no resulting guilt without evil intent.” 1
3 Various forms of soul-theory, dealt with in the Brahmajala Suttanta, Dialogues, i. 27 f.
Commentator's Introduction
7
bhikkhns, and ejecting them from the Order, he bestowed
white lay-raiment upon them. And there were 60,000 of
them in all. Then he sent for other bhikkhus and asked
them : ‘ Sir, what was the doctrine of the Buddha *?’
‘ Sire,’ they replied, ‘ he was an Analyst.’ 1 At this reply the king asked the Elder, saying : ‘ Was he an Analyst *?’
‘ Yes, sire.’ Then said the king : ‘ Now, sir, the Sasana is purged. Let the Order of bhikkhus hold the fortnightly feast.’ And, providing a guard, he entered the city. In concord the Order assembled and held the feast. And sixty hundred thousand bhikkhus were present.
At that congress Elder Tissa Moggalx’s son, to avert all bases of heresy that had arisen, and that might in the future arise, analyzed in detail the heads of discourse, by the method which had been delivered by the Master, into 500 orthodox statements and 500 heterodox statements, and so uttered the book of the bases of discourse, the salient feature in which had been the future crushing of all dissentient views.
Thereupon, selecting one thousand bhikkhus who were learned in the Three Pitakas and versed in the Pour Pati- sambhidas, 2 just as the Elder, Kassapa the Great [at the First Council, had] recited Dhamma and Yinaya, so did he, reciting, after purging the religion of its stains, hold the Third Council. And in reciting the Abhidhamma, he in- corporated this book even as he uttered it. As it is said : —
Set forth in outline the Book of the ‘Subjects of Discourse,’ Giving account of the ‘ soul ’ and such points controverted. By the mere heads thus laid down in delectable mansions Moggall’s son filled out, here on earth, the full detail.
Now, inasmuch as achieved is the way for the comment,
I will discourse on the matter. Listen attentive !
1 Or a Particularism as against the superficiality and inaccuracy of sweeping generalizations. See Majjhima, ii. 197 (Subhasutta) ; cf. ‘ The Value of Life in Buddhism,’ by Mrs. Rh. D., Buddhism, Ran- goon, ii. 193. The name became synonymous with Theravadin.
1 Meaning text, origins, exposition.
8
Points of Controversy
I. 1.
IBonour to tbe jEjalteh ©ne Brabant JBu&bba Supreme
POINTS OF CONTROVERSY
Chapter I
1. Of the Existence of a Personal Entity.
Controverted Point . — That the f person ’ is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
From, the Commentary. — The Theravadin 1 questions a Puggala- vadin (one who believes in the existence of a personal entity, soul, or perduring immortal essence in man) concerning his position. Who among the eighteen schools of thought were Puggalavadins ? In the Sasana the Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas, and many other teachers besides, not belonging to the Sasana. 4 Person ’ 2 means soul, being, vital principle. 4 Is known ’ : 3 is approached and got at by the under- standing, is cognized. ‘ Beal not taken as an effect of magic or mirage, actual. ‘ Ultimate ’ : highest sense, not taken from tradition, or hearsay. * Known ’ as one of the' fifty-seven ultimates of our conscious experience. 4
I.—THE EIGHT REFUTATIONS.
The First Refutation.
(i.) The Fivefold Affirmative Presentation.
[§ 1] Theravadin. — Is ‘the person ’ known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
1 More literally, 4 one of ours sakavadin.
2 Used in its popular sense = ho mo in the Nikayas; puggalain the Abhidhamma Pitaka largely supersedes a 1 1 a and other terms for soul.
3 Literally, is got or found. Cf. Dialogues, ii. 166 ; Psalms of the Sisters, 190 : 4 Mayest thou obtain.’
4 Five aggregates, twelve sense-organs and objects, eighteen elements, twenty-two controlling powers. See Compendium of Philosophy, Part VII.
2 .
9
The Eight Refutations
Puggalavddin . — Yes. 1
Th. Is the person known in the same way 2 as a real and ultimate fact is knovra ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th— Acknowledge your refutation: (i.) If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say, the person is known in the same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is known] .
(ii.) That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say, ‘ the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,’ but (2) we ought not to say, the person is known in the same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is known].
(hi-) If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted.
(iv.) In affirming the former statement (I), while (v.) denying the latter (2), you are wrong.
(ii.) The Fourfold Rejoinder.
[2] P. — Is the ‘ person ’ not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — No, it is not known. 3
P. — Is it unknown in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is [known] ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P. — Acknowledge the rejoinder: 4 (i.) If the person be not
1 ‘ Yes,’ because the Exalted One, whose utterances were mutually consistent, who taught no mere on-dits, and who himself had universal knowledge, said in the Suttas handed down, that ‘ there is for instance the person who is working for his own advantage,’ and so on. — Corny.
2 Tato. This is an ‘ instrumental’ phrase: kin te ‘puggalo pi ten’ a k arena upalabbhatlti?’ ‘In the same way,’ that is, either as the factors of mind and body are known, by immediate con- sciousness, or under one of the twenty-four relation-categories. — Corny.
3 English idiom requires that the affirmative Amantal be rendered negatively.
4 Pati-kammaq, ‘ re-action ’ ; hence, retort, rejoinder, rebutting, repartee.
10
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed,
good sir, you should also say : not known in the same way
as any real and ultimate fact is known.
(ii.) That which you say here is wrong, namely, that (1) we ought to say ‘the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,’ and (2) we ought not to say : ‘not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.’
If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted either.
In affirming (2), while denying (1), you are wrong.
(iii.) The Fourfold Refutation.
[8] P . ( continues ). — But if you imagine we ought to affirm that (1) the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but we ought not also to affirm that (2) the ‘ person ’ is not known in the same way as [any] real and ultimate fact [is known], then you, who have actually assented to the very proposition contained in that negative question, 1 must certainly be refuted in the following manner : — let us then refute you, for you are well refuted !
(i.) If (1) the ‘person 5 is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, their indeed, good sir, you should have said [as well] that (2) the ‘person’ is not known 2 in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.
(ii.) What you affirm is false, namely, that the former statement (1) should be affirmed, but that the latter (2) should not be affirmed.
If the latter statement (2) is not to be affirmed, then neither truly can the former (1) be affirmed.
That which you say here — (1) should be affirmed, but not (2) ; this statement of yours is wrong.
1 Implied in t a 1 1 h a, there.
2 In P.T.S. ed. read n ! up al ab b h at i.
3.
The Eight Refutations
11
(iv.) The Fourfold Application . 1
[4] P. (continues). — If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (§ 1). Thus, according to us (1) was true (the person is known, etc.) ; but (2) was not true (. . . known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted. [You say] you have refuted us ; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument ran that if we affirmed (1), we must also affirm (2) ; that if we did not admit the truth of (2), neither could we admit the truth of (1) ; that we were wrong in assenting to (1), while denying (2).
(v.) The Fourfold Conclusion A
[5] P. {continues) . — N ay (I repeat), we are not to be refuted thus, (i.) namely, that my proposition compels me to assent to your ‘ known in the same way,’ etc. ; (ii.) your pro- nouncement that my proposition (1) coupled with my rejection (2) is wrong; 3 (iii.) that if I reject (2), I must also reject (1) ; (iv.) that I must affirm both or none. This refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other hand, that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel to the argument 4 was well done.
The Second Refutation.
(i.) The Fivefold Adverse Controversy.
[6] P. — Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — No, it is not known . . . ( continue as in § 1 , reversing the speakers, and substituting ‘ not known ’ for ‘ known.’
1 Upanaya, or Upanayana, is the technical term in Buddhist logic for the minor premiss, and means the leading-up-towards, the subsumption.
2 lSriggamana, 1 going down or away 1 : a technical term in Buddhist logic.
3 In the P.T.S. ed. n’up ala bbh ati, in this paragraph, according to B r , should be upalabbhati.
.* P atipa dan a — i.e., k at ha-magg a-p a tip ad an a. — Corny.
12 Of Soul or Person I. 1.
(ii.) The Fourfold Rejoinder.
[7] Th . — Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P . — Yes . . . ( continue as in § 2, reversing the speakers, and substituting ‘ known ’ for * not known.’
(iii.) The Fourfold Refutation.
[8] Th . — But if you imagine we ought to affirm that ‘ the person ’ is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but that we ought not to affirm as well that the person is known in the same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is known], etc. . . . ( continue as in § 3, reversing the speakers, and substituting ‘ known ’for ‘ not known ’).
(iv.) The Fourfold Application.
[9] Th. ( continues ) . — If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (§ 6). Thus, according to us (a) was true (a soul is not known, etc.) ; but (b) was not true (. . . not known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted, etc.
(v.) The Fourfold Conclusion.
[10] Th. ( continues ). — Nay, I repeat, we are not to be refuted as you claim to have refuted us . . . wherefore your refutation was ill done, etc. 1
The Third Refutation.
[11]. Th . — Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
1 So far for what the Corny, calls p a t h am a-s u ddhis a c c hi- kattho : — the ‘first’ controversy ‘merely’ relating to the ‘reality’ of the personal entity considered absolutely, or in itself. Its reality is next considered in relation to space, to time, and, lastly, to things in general. And nnder each of these four aspects, as we have already seen above nnder the first, the argument is presented affirmatively and negatively, thus making up the eight-faced views, or a 1 1 h a-m ukha- v a d a, of the controversy.
8 .
The Eight Refutations
13
P — It is.
Th. — Is the person known everywhere in that sense?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation : If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you ought to admit that the person is known in that sense everywhere. You are wrong to admit the one propo- sition (At) and deny the other (C). If ((7) is false, (A) is also false. 1
The Fourth Refutation.
[12] Th. — Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P— It is.
Th. — Is the person known always in that sense ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( continue as above, substituting ‘ always ’ for ‘ everywhere ’).' 2
The Fifth Refutation.
[13] Th. — Is the person known . . . (as in § 11) . . . in everything 3 in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? ( con- tinue as in § 11, substituting ‘in everything ’ for ‘every- where ’).
1 Complete, as in §§ 2-5. This section is termed okasasacchi- kattho, or reality in respect of place. It deals with the errors (1) that the soul or person is in the r u p a or material qualities (r u p a s- mit) attanaq s amanup as s anado sa rj), so often repudiated in the Nikayas ; and (2) the living thing or principle (j I v o) is different from the body (sar Iraq), also frequently mentioned in those hooks. — Corny.
2 This section is known as ‘ reality in respect of time.’ According to the Corny, the adherent’s question refers to both the former and later lives (of any given person), to the present remainder of life, and to its final close (dharaman a-p arinibbutakalaiica).
3 That is, in all the mental and bodily constituents, the organs and objects of sense, etc. Corny, (for Khandhesuti, P.T.S. ed., p, 15, read s a b b e s ii t i).
14
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
The Sixth Refutation.
[14] P. — Is the person not known . . . ( otherwise as in § 11) . . . everywhere in that sense ? . . . ( substituting ‘ not known’ for ‘ known’). 1
The Seventh Refutation.
[15] P . — Is the person not known . . . always in that sense ? . . .
The Eighth Refutation.
[16] P . — Is the person not known ... in everything in that sense ? . . .
II. COMPARATIVE INQUIRY.
Comparison with other Realities, simply treated . 2
[17] Th. — Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, and is material quality 3 also known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
' P.— Yes.
Th. — Is material quality one thing and the person another ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation : If the person and material quality be each known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that they are distinct things. You are wrong to
1 This and the next two sections, opened by the opponent, are to be completed as in §§ 6-10.
2 Suddhika-saechikattha-sarjsandana.
3 Rupai), i.e., the material khandha, or aggregate in the con- stituents of personality ; the twenty-eight properties of matter con- sidered as qualities of body mentally presented. On the rendering ef. Compendium, Part VI., and p. 271 f.
11 .
Comparative Inquiry
15
admit the former proposition and not the latter. If the
latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be
affirmed. To say that the person and material quality are
both known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, but
that they are not mutually distinct things, is false.
[18-73] The same form of controversy is then pursued con- cerning fifty-five other real and ultimate facts, or aspects of them, namely : —
[18] feeling \
[19] perception 1 j the other aggregates
[20] coefficients (sankhara's) 1 2 j ( khandha’s );
[21] consciousness ;
[22] the organ of sight
[23] „ of hearing
[24] ,, of smell
[25] „ of taste
[26] „ of touch
[27] visible object the twelve sense factors
[28] sound ( dyatana’s ); 3
[29] odour
[30] taste
[31] tangible object
[32] mind ( sensus communis )
[33] cognizable object ;
[34] eye as subjective element 1 ,
[35-8] ear, nose, tongue, body ‘te eighteen elements
as subjective element J
[39-48] sights, sounds, odours, tastes, touches as objec- tive element ;
[44-8] visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile cog- nition as subjective element,
[49] mind as subjective element,
[50] mind- cognizing as subjective element,
[51] cognizables as objective element ;
1 On the import of this term cf. Compendium, p. 15.
2 lb., p. 182, n. 2. 3 Ih., p. 183 f.
4 lb.
16
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
[52-7] 1 the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body,
mind as controlling power,
[58-60] female sex, male sex, life as con- trolling power,
[61-5] pleasure, pain, joy, grief, hedonic indifference as controlling power,
[66-70] the controlling powers : faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, under- standing,
[71-3] the controlling powers [known as]
(i.) the thought, ‘ I shall come to know the unknown/ (ii.) the coming to know, (iii.) the having known.
[74] P . — Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — It is not.
P . — Did the Exalted One say: ‘There is the person who works for his own good?’ 2 And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — Is material quality one thing and the person another?
Th. — Nay, that cannot he truly said.
P. — Acknowledge this rejoinder: 3 If the Exalted One said : ‘ There is the person who works for his own good,’ and if material quality be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that material quality and the person are two distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If material quality and person are not two distinct facts, then neither can you also say*that the Exalted One predicated anything concerning a ‘ person.’ Your position is false/
[75-129] The controversy is now repeated with the succes-
1 Compendium, p. 175 f.
2 From a category of four sorts of persons (puggala), occurring in three of the four Nikciyas ie.g., JDighu, iii. 232 ; MajjMma, i. 341, 411 ; Anguttara, ii. 95), though not with the phrase A 1 t h i, ‘ There is.’
3 Namely, to § 17. 4 Complete as in §§ 3-16.
the
twenty-two
- controlling
powers (indriya’s). 1
14.
Comparative Inquiry
17
sive substitution of each of the real and ultimate facts named
in §§ 18-73 for ‘material quality.’
Comparison with other Realities continued by Way of Analogy.
[130] Th. — Material quality is (you have admitted) known as a real and ultimate fact. Feeling, too, is known as such. No w, is material quality one thing and feeling another ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is the person known also in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, as material quality is known ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Then, is material quality one thing, person another thing ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly he admitted.
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation : If material quality and feeling are both known as real and ultimate facts, and yet are two different things, then analogously, if the person and material quality are both known as real and ultimate facts, they, good sir, can equally be two different things. ' Your position in admitting the first pair of propositions, but not the second pair, is false. If you cannot admit the second pair, neither should you have admitted the first pair. Your position is false. 1
[131-133] The same argument is then applied to the case of . each of the other three khandhas, substituted for feeling.
[134] The permutations of the five aggregates ( khandhas ) .are proceeded with as in § 130, thus :
material quality and feeling, 1 m Ucei % the person and material quality ) feeling and perception, the person and feeling feeling and the coefficients, the person and feeling feeling and consciousness, the person and feeling
1 This discourse may be completed as in §§ 2-16.
T.S. V.
| , next by
| , next by
| ; after which
2
18 Of Send or Person I. 1.
perception, coefficients, and consciousness in their turn replace feeling.
[135] Next each of the 12 Ayatanas, the 18 Dhatus, and the 22 Indriyas is used in turn to illustrate the analogy, thus .*
organ of sight and organ of hearing, j ^ ^
tbe person and organ of sight, J
grouping in the Ayatana-analogies, the last grouping in the Indriy a- analogies being
the controlling power of 4 one who has corue to know,’ and that of ‘ the coming to know,’
the person and the controlling power of ‘ one who has come to know.’
[136] P. — Material quality is known [you have ad- mitted] in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Is material quality one thing, feeling another thing ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Was it said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is the person who works for his own good?’ 1 And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — [Well then,] is material quality one thing, the person another?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P. — Acknowledge the rejoinder: 2 If material quality and feeling are known as real, ultimate facts, and are different things, then why are not 4 the person’ — a term used by the Exalted One — and material quality also two different things? Your position is false. You admit the truth of the first pair of propositions, but not that of the analogous second pair. If you deny the truth of the second pair,, you should not admit the truth of the analogous first pair.
{The discourse ?nay be completed as in §§ 3-16.)
1 Of. § 74. The opponent still assumes that the Buddha used the word ‘pugg ala’ in the sense of a permanent ultimate entity.
2 I.e., to § 130.
18. Comparative Inquiry 19
[137] The 1 ivheel ’ (e a k k a) 1 of all the other ultimate facts — other khandhas, ayatanas, etc. — now revolves about this quotation, as it revolved in §§ 131-135.
Comparison by the Fourfold Method.
[138] Th.— Is ‘ the person’ known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — (i.) Is material quality the person ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. 2
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation: If the former pro- position is true, you should also, good sir, have admitted the latter. If you cannot affirm that material quality is the person, neither should you have admitted that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Your position is false.
[139] Th. — You admit the former proposition, (ii.) Now, is the person [known as being] in material quality ? (iii.) Is it known as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Is material quality known as being in the person ? 3
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation : If the person is indeed known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should also have admitted one of these other three propositions. Your position is false. If you cannot admit any one of those three propositions [as to where or how the person is known], then indeed, good sir, you should not assent to the original proposition — that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[140-141] The ‘ ivheel ’ is then turned for all the remaining 1 real and ultimate facts ’ in relation to * person 5 ... is
1 Commentarial term (pron. : c h a k k a) for a repeated formula. In the text, p. 20, 1. 1, read Ajanahipafcikammar).
2 The opponent sees he is in danger of admitting himself a Nihilist (ucchedavada, or materialist), and negates. — Corny.
3 The opponent here fears to assent to the sakk&yaditthi, or heresy of individuality, often condemned in the Suttas. See below, pp. 44 n., 45 n. 3.
20
Of Soul or Person I. 1.
feeling the person? ... is the person ... in feeling? . . . apart from feeling? ... is feeling ... in the person?
. . . is the organ of sight the person? . . . and so on.
[142] P. — Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
PA .—It is not so known.
P.— (i.) Is material quality the person ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
P. — Acknowledge the rejoinder: 1 If the person is not so known as you state, then you should have admitted that material quality and person are the same. 2 If you cannot admit the latter proposition, neither can you assert the former. . . .
[143] P. — Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — It is not so known.
P. — (ii.) Is the person known as being in material quality? (iii.) Or as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Or is material quality known as being in the person ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
P. — Acknowledge the rejoinder: 3 If the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should admit that it is known [in association with material quality] as advanced in the other propositions. If one of these cannot be admitted, neither should you have asserted the first proposition. 4
( This and the 'preceding § may be completed as in §§ 3-16.)
[144-145] The ‘ wheel ’ is then turned as indicated in §§ 140-141.
1 I.e., to § 138.
2 ‘ Material quality, 1 or any other of the fifty-seven ultimates. If ‘puggala’ is not a separate ultimate, it must be identifiable with one of them— admitting the fact that puggala is— did not the Exalted One say so ?
3 I.e., to § 189.
4 It being still asserted (by P.) that puggala is a real, etc., fact. The Burmese editions repeat the supposed evidence given in § 74.
24.
Comparative Inquiry
21
Associated Characteristics.
[146] Th . — Is ‘the person’ known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P. — Yes.
Th . — Is ‘ the person ’ related, or is it absolute ? Is ‘ the person ’ conditioned, or is it unconditioned? Is it eternal? or is it temporal ? Has it external features ? or is it without any ?
P. — Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about it. . . . (Continue as in § 1 : ‘ Acknowledge the refuta- tion,’ etc. 1
[147] P. — Is ‘ the person ’ unknown in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th . — It is.
P . — Was it said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is the person who works for his own good ’ . . . ?
Th.— Yes.
P . — Is the person related, or is it absolute ? conditioned or unconditioned ? eternal or temporal ? with the marks or without them ?
Th. — Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about it. 2
P. — Acknowledge, etc. 3 . . . {complete as in § 2 and in §§ 3-16).
1 The text has here the eliding . . . p e . . . The Corny, remarks : Inasmuch as anything considered in its real, ultimate sense is, except Nibbana, bound up in relations (pace ay a), happens only as con- ditioned by relations, arises, ceases, and has no perduring essence, and, finally, has the character known as (leg . sankhatassa) the reason for happening, therefore it is asked : Has the person also these characteristics ?
2 Because (1) as an entity ‘ person ’ is non-existent ; (2) with ‘person’ as a concrete bundle of phenomena (the ‘ person ’ of the quotation) the original thesis is not really concerned.
3 The text again breaks off with its . . . p e . . . (etc.).
22
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
To clear the Meaning of the Terms. 1
[148] Th. — Is ‘ the person ’ known, and conversely, is ihat which is known the person ?
P . — The person is known. Conversely, of that which is known some is ‘ person,’ some is not ‘ person.’
Th. — Do yon admit this with respect to the subject •also : of that which is person, is some known and some not known ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( continue as before).
[149] Th. — Does ‘ person ’ mean a reality and con- versely ?
P. — ‘ Person ’ is a reality. Conversely, reality means in part person, in part not person.
Th. — Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: that ‘person means in part reality, in part non- reality ’?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[150] Th. — Does the person exist, and conversely?
P. — The person exists. Conversely, of the existent some is person, some is not person.
Th. — Of the person is some existent, some non-existent ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[151] Query repeated with an equivalent major term. 2
[152] Th. — Is person something that is, and conversely ?
{Reply similar to the foregoing.)
1 An inquiry into how far the middle term, such as 1 that which is
known,’ is ‘ distributed’ with respect to the subject, or is coincident with
it. The Corny, explains that k e-hi-ci, ‘ some, 5 is [not instrumental,
but] equal to k o ci, hi being merely a particle. ‘ For me the person
is, and the Buddha said so, but not all that is known [as ultimately
real] is person. 5 The fact that ‘att'hi,’ ‘is,’ ‘exists,’ is not used in
Pah merely as a copula, gives the term, as meaning separate existence
in fact, not only in thought, a greater emphasis than our own ‘is.’
2 Sagvijjamano,an equivalent of the preceding v i j j a m a n o . All are equivalents for u p a 1 a b b h a t i , ‘is known,’ or found. — Corny.
25. Sifting the Meaning 23
[153] Th : — Does the person exist, and conversely, is that which exists not all person 2 1 P. — Yes.
Th . — Can you substitute ‘not exist (s) ’ for ‘exist(s) ’? P.— No. . . .
Inquiry into Term-or-Concept 2
[154] Th . — Is one who has material quality in the sphere of matter 3 a ‘ person ’ ?
Yes.
Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire ‘a person’?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[154®] Are those who have material qualities in the sphere of matter ‘ persons ’ ?
Yes.
Are those who experience desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire ‘ persons’?
1 On this section the Commentator as follows : The opponent has just admitted that the existent [the real ultimate existent] is greater in extension than ‘ soul. ’ The Theravadin, having his assent to this, now connects it with his assertion about the Buddha’s statement: You quoted that saying: ‘There are (souls or) persons working for their own good ’ . . . only on account of the term, and this you took as implying that soul exists [as a. real ultimate]. But the Bhagava also said, in the Sutta Nipata (1116) : ‘ Consider, Mogharaja, that the world is empty of soul (att a).’ . . . Hence, by the quotation, if is as easy to deny soul (puggalo n a 1 1 h i) as to affirm it (p u g g a 1 o atthi), or, to say ‘that which exists not is all persons (natthi sabbo puggalo), as to say that ‘that which exists is not all persons’ (atthi na sabbo puggalo). The Corny, explains this last clause as equivalent to 1 some existent things are persons, some not.’ The converse in English is better expressed by ‘all existent things are not persons.’
2 Pannatti. See p. 1, n.
3 Dhatu stands here, spatially considered, for loka, hence ‘ sphere ’ for 1 element.’ Cf. Yam, i. 374. Henceforth the text gives only the opening of the ‘first refutation’ in each controversy, the Theravadin putting the question. To indicate the speakers is therefore unnecessary.
24
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
[154*] Is one who is without material qualities in the sphere of the Immaterial a ‘ person ’ ?
Yes.
Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire a person ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[154] Are those who have no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere 1 persons ’ ?
Yes.
Are those who experience sense-desires in the sphere of of sense-desire ‘ persons ’ ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
[155] Th. — According to you one who lias material qualities in the sphere of matter is a ‘ person ’ ; one who has no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere is a ‘ person ’ : does anyone deceasing from the Rupa sphere get reborn in the Immaterial sphere ?
Yes.
Is the ‘ person ’ who had material qualites [then] anni- hilated, and does the person with no material qualities come into being ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted. . . .
Queries repeated, substituting ‘ being n for ‘person.’
[156] Applying the terms ‘physical frame,’ 2 and ‘body’ 3 indiscriminately to our body, are these identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin ?
Yes.
1 S a 1 1 o. Both are equivalent expressions for ‘ soul.’ See § 1, n. 2.
2 Kayo, literally, as in nikayo, a group, collection, congeries. In psychology, the whole sentient surface, organ and seat of touch. We lack a synonym for ‘ body cf. Korper, Leib.
3 The unusual phrase kayag appiyarj karitva is, in the Corny., paraphrased by kayag appetabbag alliyapetab- bageklbhavag upanetabbag a vib h a j i t ab b a g katva ‘taking [the two terms as applied to] body not in a separate but a cohesive sense, i.e ., in one and the same sense, without dis- tinguishing. ’
26- Sifting the Meaning 25
Are the terms ‘personal entity,’ 1 or ‘soul,’ 2 as applied without distinction to the individual, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin ?
Yes.
Is ‘ physical frame ’ different from ‘ personal entity ’ (or ‘ individual ’) ?
Yes.
Is ‘ soul ’ one thing, ‘ body ’ another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Acknowledge the refutation : If there be this identity and coincidence between 3 ‘physical frame’ and ‘body’; and if there be this identity and coincidence between ‘ individual ’ (or personal entity) and ‘ soul ’ ; if, further,
‘ physical frame ’ is different from ‘ individual ’ (or personal entity), then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that ‘ soul ’ is different from ‘ body.’
You are wrong in (1) admitting the identity between ‘ physical frame ’ and ‘ body,’ (2) admitting the identity between ‘ personal entity ’ and ‘ soul,’ (3) admitting the difference between ‘ physical frame 1 and ‘ personal entity,’ while (4) you deny the difference between ‘ body ’ and
- soul.’
If you cannot admit (4), neither should you have admitted (1), (2), (3). You cannot admit (1), (2), (3), while denying (4).
[157] P. — Are the terms ‘physical frame ’ and ‘ body ’ applied to body without distinction of meaning, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin ?
Th. — Yes.
P . — Was it said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is the indi- vidual [or person] who works for his own good ?’
1 Puggalo .
2 J I v o . The etymology of j I v o — ‘ living ’ thing — reveals, better than our ambiguous 1 soul,’ the difficulty of denying j ivo of a living or live body.
3 The text here and below [§ 157] repeats the details of the identity, intensive and extensive.
26
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Th. — Yes.
P.— Is ‘physical frame’ one thing, ‘individual’ (or e personal entity ’) another ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P . — Acknowledge my rejoinder t 1 If there be this identity and coincidence between * physical frame ’ and ‘ body and if it was said by the Exalted One ‘ There is the individual, etc. 2 . . then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that ‘ physical frame 1 is one thing and ‘ indi- vidual ’ or ‘ personal entity ’ another. You are wrong in admitting the first two propositions and denying the third. If you cannot admit the third, neither should you have admitted the first two . . . {complete the discourse as in §§ 3-16).
Examination continued by way of Rebirth . 3
[158] Th . — Does (a person or) soul 4 run on (or trans- migrate) from this world to another and from another world to this ? 5
P.— Yes.
Is it the identical soul who transmigrates from this world to another and from another world to this ? e
Nay, that cannot be truly said . . . ( complete as above).
Th . — Then is it a different soul who transmigrates. . . .
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. 7 . . . ( complete as above) .
Th . — Then is it both the identical and also a different soul who transmigrates . , . ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
1 Namely, to § 156. 2 Puggalo.
2 G-ati-anuyogo. — Corny. The PTS. text orbits the title
after § 170.
4 Puggalo is now rendered by soul, that term being in eschato- logical discussion more familiar to us than ‘ person.’
5 This question eliciting an essential feature in the Puggala-v3.din’s or animistic position is repeated, as a matter of form, before each of the four following questions.
6 The Eternalist view. — Corny. See Dialogues, i. 46 f.
7 He fears lest he side with the Annihilationists. — Corny.
29. Transmigration 27
Tli .— Then is it neither the identical soul, nor yet a different soul who transmigrates . . .?*
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Tli . — Is it the identical, a different, both identical and also different, neither identical, nor different soul who transmigrates . . . ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[159] P— Then is it wrong to say, 4 The soul trans- migrates from this world to another world, and from another world to this T
Tli. — Yes.
P. — Was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ When he hath run from birth to birth Seven times and reached the last, that soul End-maker shall become of ill,
By wearing every fetter doivn ’ ? 2
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — Then surely the soul does transmigrate from this world to another world and from another world to this. Again {repeating his first question) was it not said by the Exalted One : * Without a known beginning, 0 bhikkhus, is the way of life ever renewed ; unrevealed is the origin of souls (lit. beings) who, shrouded in ignorance and bound by the fetters of natural desire, run on transmigrating .’ 8 Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Then surely the soul does transmigrate as was said.
[160] Th . — Does the soul transmigrate from this world, etc. ?
P.— Yes.
Th . — Does the identical soul so transmigrate ?
1 He fears in this and the next question lest he side with certain Eternalists and the ‘Eelwrigglers’ respectively. — Corny. Cf. Dialogues, i. 37 f.
2 Iti-vuttaka, § 24.
3 Sayyutta-Nikdya, iii. 149.
28 Of Soul or Person I.. 1.
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( complete as usual).
Th. — I repeat my question.
P.~ Yes.
Th. — Is there any soul who alter being human becomes a deva ? x
P . — Yes.
Th . — Is the identical man the deva ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . {complete as usual).
Th. — [I repeat], is the identical man the deva ? 2
P.— Yes.
Th. — Now you are wrong to admit as true that, having been man he becomes deva, or having been deva he becomes man, and again that, having become man, a deva is different from a human being, [and yet] that this identical soul transmigrates. ...
Surely if the identical soul, without [becoming] different, transmigrates when deceasing hence to another world, there will then be no dying ; destruction of life will cease to take place. There is action (karma); there is action’s effect ; there is the result of deeds done. But w r hen good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the very same [person] transmigrates — this is wrong. 3
[161] Th. — Does the self-same soul transmigrate from this world to another, from another world to this ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, having been human, becomes a Yakkha, a Peta, an inmate of purgatory,- a beast, for example a camel, an ox, a mule, a pig, a buffalo ?
1 We have let deva stand. It includes all that we mean by spirit, god, angel, and even fairy. (Pronounce day-v a.)
2 When he is [first] asked this, he denies for a mere man the state
of godship. When asked again, he admits the identity because of such Sutta-passages as ‘ I at that time was Sunetta, a teacher ’ ( Peta -
vatthu, iv. 7, 3). — Corny.
3 By the orthodox view, the newly reborn is not 1 the same,’ nor different, but a resultant of the deceased one’s karma (acts). Hence the notion of an identical entity persisting is in conflict with that law of karma which the otherwise-dissenting Puggalavadin would accept.
30.
Transmigration
29
P. — Yes.
Th. — Does the self-same human become anyone of these, say, a buffalo ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( complete the refutation as usual).
Th. — [I repeat] is the self-same human the buffalo ?
P.~~ Yes.
Th. — [But all this, namely, that] having been man, he becomes a buffalo, or having been buffalo he becomes man, again, that having become a man, he is quite different from the buffalo, and yet that the self-same soul goes on transmigrating, is wrong . . . ( complete as usual).
Surely if the identical soul, when deceasing from this world and being reborn in another, is nowise different, then there will be no dying, nor will taking life be possible. There is action ; there is action’s effect ; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the identical person transmigrates, — this is wrong.
[162] Th. — You say that the identical soul trans- migrates. 1 Is there anyone who having been a noble becomes a brahmin ?
Yes.
Is the noble in question the very same as the brahmin in question ? .
Nay, that cannot truly be said .... {complete the dis- course).
Is there anyone who, having been noble, becomes reborn in the middle, or in the lower class ?
Yes.
Is the noble in question the very same as the person so reborn ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
The other alternatives, substituting ‘ brahmin ,' etc., in turn for ‘noble, 9 are treated similarly.
1 Eepeating the original question, § 160, second query.
30
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
[163] You say that the identical soul transmigrates. . . .
Is then one who has had hand or foot cut off, or hand and
foot, or ear or nose, or both cut off, or finger or thumb
cut off, or who is hamstrung, the same as he was before ?
Or is one whose fingers are bent or webbed 1 the same
as he was before? Or is one afflicted with leprosy, skin
disease, dry leprosy, consumption, epilepsy, the same as
he was before? Or is [one who has become] a camel,
ox, mule, pig, buffalo, the same as he was before ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[164] P. — Is it wrong to say : ‘ The identical soul trans-
migrates from this world to another, etc. ?’
Th. — Yes.
P. — But is not one who has ‘ attained the stream ’ (i.e., the first path towards salvation), when he is deceasing from the world of men, and is reborn in the world of devas, a stream-winner there also ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — But if this man, reborn as deva, is a stream-winner also in that world, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say: ‘The identical soul transmigrates from this world to another.’ . . .
Th. — Assuming that one who has attained the stream, when deceasing from the world of men, is reborn in the world of devas, does the identical soul transmigrate from this world to another and from another world to this in just that manner ?
P. — Yes.
Th . — Is such a stream-winner, when reborn in deva-world, a man there also ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . , (complete the ‘ refutation ’).
[165] Th. — Does the identical soul transmigrate from this world to another, etc. ?
Yes.
1 Like the wings of a bat.
32. Transmigration 31
Is the transmigrator not different, still present "?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat, is the transmigrator not different, still present?
Yes.
If he has lost a hand, a foot, ... if he is diseased . . . if he is an animal ... is he the same as before ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . (complete).
[166] Th . — Does the identical soul transmigrate ? . . .
Yes.
Does he transmigrate with his corporeal qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[Think again !] Does he transmigrate with these 9 1
Yes.
Are soul and body the same ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . . 2
Does he transmigrate with feeling, with perception, with mental coefficients, with consciousness ? 3
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Think again . . . does he transmigrate with conscious- ness?
Yes.
Is soul the same as body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[167] Th. — If, as you say, the identical soul transmigrates, . . . does he transmigrate without corporeal qualities, without feeling, perception, mental coefficients, without consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . . 4
1 He first rejects because the material frame does not go with the soul (Corny. P.T.S. text: read agamanap), then accepts because there is no interval of soul-life only. — Corny. See below, YIII. 2.
2 The opponent rejects this, inasmuch as, in transmigrating, the body is held to be abandoned ; moreover, he would not oppose the Suttas. — Corny.
3 According to the Corny., this is denied because of possible rebirth in the sphere known as the unconscious, but is admitted with respect to other spheres.
4 Because without the five aggregates (mind, body) there is no individual. — Corny .
32 Of Soul or Person I. 1.
Think again . . . without corporeal qualities . . . with- out consciousness ?
Yes.
Is then the soul one thing, the body another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted. . . .
[168] Th. — If, as you say, the identical soul trans- migrates, ... do the material qualities transmigrate ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted. . . .
Think again. . . .
Yes.
But is this soul (#) the same as this body ( x ) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Does feeling ... or perception ... or do mental co- efficients ... or does consciousness transmigrate ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Think again ... does consciousness transmigrate ?
Yes.
But is this soul (x) the same as this body ( x ) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[169] Th. — Then, the identical soul, according to you, transmigrating . . . does none of the above-named five aggregates transmigrate ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Think again. . . .
Yes, they do.
Is, then, soul one thing, body another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
[170] At dissolution of each aggregate,
If then the ‘ person ’ cloth disintegrate,
Lo ! by the Budclha shunned, the Nihilistic creed.
At dissolution of each aggregate,
If then the ‘ soul ’ doth not disintegrate,
Eternal, like Nibbdna, 1 were the soul indeed.
1 Samasam o — ‘ i.e., exceedingly like, or just resembling by the state of resemblance. Just as Nibbana is neither reborn nor dissolved, so would the soul be.’ — Corny.
34. Derived Concepts 33
III— DERIVATIVES.
Examination continued by Way of Derivative Concepts. 1
[171] Th. — Is the concept of soul derived from the corporeal qualities ?
P . — Yes. 2
Are material qualities impermanent, conditioned, do they happen through a cause ? Are they liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change ?
Yes.
But has soul also any or all of these qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[172] Or is the concept of soul derived from feeling, from perception, from mental coefficients, from consciousness ?
Yes (to each ‘ aggregate ’ in succession).
Is any mental aggregate impermanent, conditioned? does it happen through a cause ? is it liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change ?
Yes.
But has soul also any or all of these qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[173] You said that the concept of soul is derived from material qualities. Is the concept of blue -green 3 soul derived from blue-green material qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or is the concept of yellow, red, white, visible, invisible, resisting, or unresisting soul derived from corresponding material qualities, respectively ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[174] Is the concept of soul derived from feeling?
1 This chapter is still largely eschatological, hence 1 soul ’ is retained for p u g g a 1 a, though individual, person, or ego would serve equally well in the more psychological considerations.
2 He will have it that the concept or notion of soul, or personal ■entity, is derived from material and mental qualities, just as the shadow (read PTS. ed., c h a y a y a) is derived from the tree, and .fire from fuel. — Corny.
3 N 1 1 a is both blue and also green, Indian writers applying it to •both sky and trees. In these replies the animist rejects a pluralistic .state for the soul. — Corny.
T.S. V.
3
34
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Yes.
Is the concept of good soul derived from good feeling ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes. 1
Now, does feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result, and such as conveys happiness ?
No.
I repeat my question.
Yes.
But does ‘ good soul ’ entail result or fruit of like nature with the above ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 2 . . .
[175] If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the concept of bad soul derived from bad feeling ?
Yes.
Now does bad feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is undesirable, unpleasing, spotted, an unhappy result, and such as conveys unhappiness ?
Yes. 3
But does bad soul entail result or fruit of like nature to the above ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[176] If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the concept of indeterminate soul — one to be termed neither good nor bad — derived from indeterminate feeling ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Is the concept [I repeat] of an ethically indeterminate soul derived from an ethically indeterminate feeling ?
Yes. 4
1 He now assents, taking 'good’ in the sense of expertness, pro- ficiency. — Corny.
2 He rejects because it is not customary to speak thus of ‘soul.’ — Corny.
3 Taking ‘ bad 1 analogously to ‘ good ’ above. — Corny.
4 He now assents, because of the indeterminateness [of soul] with respect to the Eternalist or Nihilist heresies. The changed replies are to evade the imputation of Eternalism, etc. — Corny.
36
Derived Concepts 35
Is indeterminate feeling impermanent, conditioned ? Does it happen through a cause ? Is it liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change ?
Yes.
Has an ethically indeterminate soul any or all of these qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[177] Is the concept of soul derived from any of the other three aggregates : — perception, mental co-efficients, consciousness ? 1
Yes.
[Taking the last] : — is the concept of good soul derived from good consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Now does good consciousness entail result or fruit — fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result, such as conveys happiness ?
Yes.
And does a good soul also entail the like ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[178] You say that the concept of soul is derived from consciousness — is the concept of bad soul derived from bad consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[I repeat] is the concept of bad soul derived from bad consciousness ?
Yes.
Now does bad consciousness entail result or fruit, fruit that is undesirable, etc. ( the reverse of what is entailed by good consciousness ) ?
Yes.
And does a bad soul also entail the like ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
[179] Again, since you admit that the concept of soul is derived from any or all of the aggregates, e.g., eonscious-
1 Elaborate, as with the two preceding aggregates (khandlia).
36
Of Soul or Person I. 1.
ness, is the concept of an ethically indeterminate soul derived from indeterminate consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
But is the ethically indeterminate soul impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish . . . to change ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[180] Ought it to be said that a soul who sees 1 is de- rived from sight (or eye) ? 2 Yes.
Ought it to be said that, when sight (or eye) ceases, the seeing soul ceases ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
( The pair of queries is applied, with like replies, to the other four senses, and also to the sensus communis, mano.)
[181] Ought it to be said that a soul of wrong views is
derived from wrong views ?
Yes.
Ought it to be said that when the wrong views cease to exist, the soul having wrong views ceases to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Ought it, again, to be said that when any other parts of the Wrong Eightfold Path 3 cease to exist, the soul, said by you to be derived from that part, ceases to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[182] Similarly, ought it to be said that a soul of right views, or right aspiration, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right con- centration, is derived from the corresponding part [of the Eightfold Path] ?
1 The Corny, notes the ambiguity, in the argument, of moral and physical vision in this word cakkhuma.
2 Cakkhu is both ‘ eye ’ and ‘ sight.’
3 The opposites to the qualities prescribed in the Ariyan Eightfold Path are so termed— e.g., in Majjhima-Nik., i. 118.
39.
Derived Concepts
37
Yes.
Ought it, again, to be said that when the given part ceases, the soul so derived ceases ?
Nay, that cannot truly he said. . . .
[183] Is the concept of soul derived from material qualities and feeling ?
Yes.
Then could the concept of a double soul be derived from the pair of aggregates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or could the concept of a double soul be derived from material quality coupled with any of the other three aggre- gates ... or the concept of five souls be derived from all five aggregates? 1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[184] Is the concept of soul derived from the organs of sight (eye) and hearing (ear) ?
Yes.
Then could the concept ‘ two souls ’ be derived from the two organs ? . . . ( and so on as in § 183, to include all the twelve ayatanas — i.e., organs and objects of sense and the organ and object of sense co-ordination, mano, d h a m m a.)
[185] Is the concept of soul derived from the elements of sight (or eye) and hearing (or ear) ?
Yes.
Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these two ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the concept of soul derived from the element of sight and any other of the eighteen elements ? 2
Yes.
1 The idea is that, there being a plurality of aggregates in the individual organism, and soul a derivative of anyone, there might conceivably be five souls cohering in one individual’s life-continuum (ekasantanen a) — which the Animist denies. — Corny.
2 ,Seep. 15.
38 Of Soul or Person I 1.
Could the concept of eighteen souls be derived from the eighteen elements ?
Nay, that cannot be truly said. . . .
[186] Is the concept of soul derived from the control- ling powers 1 — eye and ear ?
Yes.
Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these two ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Could the concept of soul be derived from the control- ling power, eye, and from any other of the twenty-two con- trolling powers ?
Yes.
Could the concept of twenty-two souls be derived from these ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[187] Is the concept of one soul derived from the be- coming of one aggregate ? 2
Yes.
Could the concept of four souls be derived from the becoming of the four (mental) aggregates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, by your assenting to the former question, could the concept of five souls be derived from the becoming of the five aggregates (mental and bodily) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[188] Is there only one soul in the becoming of one aggregate ?
Yes.
Then are five souls in the becoming of all five aggre- gates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[189] Is the concept of soul derived from material
1 Indriya (see p. 16). Cf. Ledi Sadaw, PFTS., 1914, p. 162.
2 Here the term vokara replaces k h a n d h a, as it often does
in the Yamaka. Becoming (b h a v a) in our idiom would be ‘ life- time.’ *
41. Derived Concepts 39
qualities just as the idea of shadow is derived 1 from a tree? And just as the idea of its shadow is derived from the tree, and both tree and shadow are impermanent, is it even so that the concept of soul is derived from material qualities, both soul and material qualities being imper- manent ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. „ . .
Are material qualities one thing and the concept of soul derived therefrom another, in the same way as the tree is one thing, and the idea of shadow derived from it another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[190] Is the concept of soul derived from material qualities just as the notion ‘villager’ is derived from village ? And if that is so, is material quality one thing, soul another, just as village is one thing, villager another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[191] Or — just as a kingdom is one thing, a king another? 2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[192] A jail 3 is not a jailer, but a jailer is he who has the jail. Is it just so with material qualities and one who has them? And accordingly, just as the jail is one thing, the jailer another, are not material qualities one thing, and one who has them another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
IV.— CONSCIOUSNESS.
[193] Is there the notion of soul to each [moment of] consciousness ?
Yes.
1 Upadaya Is only now defined in the Corny . as ‘ having come (or happened) because of, not without such and such.’ And as from the impermanent only the impermanent can come, this idea of puggala as ‘ derived from ’ impermanent aggregates, bodily and mental, is obviously unfavourable for its upholder.
2 Worded analogously to § 190.
3 More literally a fetter or chain, and a ‘ fetterer ! or 1 chainer,’ nigalo, n eg alike.
40 Of Soul or Person I. 1.
Does the soul undergo birth, decay, death, disease and rebirth in each [moment of] consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . }
[194] When the second [moment of] consciousness in a process of thought arises, is it wrong to say : * It is the same, or something different’? 2
Yes.
Then, when the second moment arises, is it not also wrong to say : £ It is a boy ’ or ‘ it is a girl ’? 3
It may be so said.
Now acknowledge the refutation : If at the second moment of consciousness it could not be said, £ It is the same or something different,’ then indeed, good sir, neither can it be said, at that moment, that ! It is a boy, or a girl.’ What you say, namely, that the former may not, the latter may be affirmed, is false. If the former proposition may not be affirmed, the second cannot be affirmed. Your rejecting the one and accepting the other is w r rong.
[195] According to you it is wrong to say, when the second moment of consciousness arises, ‘ It is the same or something different.’ Can it not then, at such a moment, be said : ‘ It is male or female, layman or religious, man or deva.’
Yes, it can be . . . (complete as in § 194).
V.— THE FIVE' SENSES.
[196] P. — Is it wrong to say : 4 The soul or person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact 1 ?
Th. — Yes, it is wrong.
1 This the Puggalavadin, not approving of a momentary state for the sonl, rejects. — Corny .
2 I.e., same as the first moment or different from it.
3 Should one say ‘ a man,’ ‘ a woman ’ instead. The Animist has admitted constant becoming, change, in the previous reply. The child at each moment is becoming more adult, but popular usage lets him become 'man ’ or ‘woman,’ so to speak, by a sudden transition from one static condition to the next. The Animist, who mixes such usage with his philosophy, is constrained to justify the former and assents. Of. Mrs. Eh. E.’s Buddhism , p. 132.
43.
Soul and Sense
41
P . — Is it not the case that when someone sees something
by means of something, a certain ‘ he ’ sees a certain ‘ it ’
by a certain ‘ means ’? x
Th. — Yes.
P . — But if that is so, then surely it should be said that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses. Again :
Is it not the case that when someone knows something by means of something, a certain ' he ’ knows a certain 'it’ by a certain 'means’? If so, then surely it may be. said that the person is known in a real and ultimate sense.
[197] Th. — Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is it not the case that when someone does not see something by means of something, a certain ‘ he ’ does not see a certain ‘ it by a certain ‘ means ’ ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Then it is equally the case that the person is not known in a real and ultimate sense.
Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses and cognition generally.
[198] P . — Is it wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th.— Yes.
P . — Was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ 0 bhikkhus , I see beings deceasing and being reborn by the purified vision of the eye celestial, surpassing that of men. I discern beings in spheres sublime or base, fair or frightful, of happy or woeful
1 The Animist, or Entity-theorist, seeking to establish his view by another method, now says : ‘ "Why are you so concerned with all this inquiry about derived concept ? Tell me this first : Why may we not say, that a person is really and ultimately known, etc. . . J Here ‘ someone ’ is the p u g g a 1 o, ‘ something ’ is the visible object, ‘ means ’ is the eye. But the orthodox says it is only eye, depending on visual consciousness, that sees, and so on. But in conventional usage we say ‘ someone sees,’ etc. — Corny,
42 Of Soul or Person 1. 1.
doom, faring according to their actions ’l 1 Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.— Yes.
P . — Surely then the person 2 is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
[199] Th.~ Granting that the Exalted One said that which is quoted, is that a reason for affirming that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th . — Does the Exalted One, by the purified vision of the eye celestial surpassing that of man, see visible objects, and does he also see the person or soul ?
P. — He sees visible objects. 3
Th . — Are visible objects the person ? Do they end one life and reappear ? Do they fare according to Karma ?
P . — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th . — I repeat my former question.
P . — He does see the person or soul. 4
Th . — Is then the soul visible object ? Is it object of sight, objective element of sight, blue, green, yellow, red, white ? Is it cognizable by sight ? Does it impinge on the eye ? Does it enter the avenue of sight ? 5
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th . — I repeat my former question.
P . — He does see both.
Th . — Are both then visible objects? Both objective element of sight ? Are both blue, green, yellow, red, white ? Are both cognizable by sight ? Do both impinge
1 Cf. Majjkima-Nik., i. 482. The wording of this passage above differs very slightly from about some twenty references in the Nikayas. When adequate indexes to the first two Nikayas are finished, we may be able to trace one exactly like this.
2 Sat to, ' being,’ is synonymous with 'pugg a lo.’— Corny.
3 The affirmative replies are not distinctly assigned in the P.T.S. text.
4 By the quotation : ‘ I 3ee beings.’ . . .—Corny.
5 Things that are perceptible are apprehended in a fourfold synthesis of seeing, hearing, reflection, understanding. — Corny. Hence the soul cannot be identified with external objects as seen.
45.
43
Soul and Moral Agent
on the eye ? Do both enter the avenue of sight ? Do both disappear, reappear in rebirths, faring according to Karma ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
VI. ETHICAL GOODNESS.
Examination continued by Reference to Human Action, called also * The Section on Ethical Goodness .’
[200] P. — Are ethically good and bad actions known [to exist] 2 1
Th. — Yes.
P— Are both the doer of ethically good and bad deeds, and he who causes them to be done 2 known [to exist] ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . 3 {complete in the usual way, viz., that the former admission involves accept- ance of what is denied).
[201] Th. — Admitting that ethically good and bad deeds are known [to exist] , do you assert that the doer and the instigator are also known [to exist] ?
P.— Yes.
Then is he who made the doer, or inspired the instigator, known [to exist] ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 4 . . .
I ask you again.
Yes. 5
But if the one be thus maker, etc., of the other, is there then no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed, no final Nibbana without residual stuff of life? 6
1 This might, less literally, run : Are there such things as ethically good, etc., actions ? Sceptical views in the age of the Nikayas denied the inherent goodness and badness of conduct — denied their happy and painful results. These are stated in Abhidhamma also. — Bud. Psych Ethics, § 1215, p. 325, n. 1 ; Vibhanga, p. 392.
2 I.e., by commanding, instructing, and other methods. — Corny.
3 I.e., not as a persisting, identical, personal entity.
4 Denial from fear of the heresy of creation by a god {Anguttara- NiJc., i. 178 f. ; Vibhanga , 367). — Corny.
5 Assented to because parents ‘ make 5 doers, teachers also. — Corny.
6 The idea is that * each previous soul would be the inevitable maker of its successor.’ — Corny.
44
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
If good and bad deeds are known [to take place], is the doer, is the instigator, of those deeds known to exist ?
Yes.
Is the person or soul known to exist, and his maker or inspirer also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question : — if good and bad deeds. . . .
Yes.
Then is Nibbana [also] known to exist, and the maker and the maker’s maker as well ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Then, again, if these things be as you say, is the earth known to exist, and its maker and his maker also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or the ocean ? — or Sineru, chief of mountains ? — or water? — or fire?— or air? — or grass, brush, and forest? and the maker of each and his maker also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, if good and bad deeds being known to exist, doer and instigator are also known to exist, are those deeds one thing, and doer and instigator quite another thing ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 1 . . .
[202] P. — Is the effect of ethically good and bad deeds known to take place ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is one who experiences the effect of such deeds known to exist ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[203] Th. — Admitting that both these propositions are true, is one who enjoys the first-named person known to exist? ,
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Th. — I repeat the question.
1 Denied lest assent be shown to the heresy : the soul is that which has mental properties or co-efficients (cf. Majjh.-N., i. 299 : Bud. Psych. Eth ., p. 257 f.). — Corny.
47.
Soul and Moral Agent
45
P. — Yes. 1
Th. — If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed, no final Nibbana without residual stuff of life ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. — Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, does the person exist, and the enjoyer of that person also exist? 2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, is Nibbana known to exist, and one who experiences it also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, is the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of moun- tains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest, known to exist, and one who experiences any of them known also to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . . 3
Or [finally] is the result of ethically good and bad deeds one thing and he who experiences those results another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . . 4
[204] P. — Is celestial happiness known to exist?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is one who is experiencing celestial happiness known to exist ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[205] Th.— Assuming both propositions to be true, is one who enjoys that experiencer known to exist?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
1 Reflecting that a mother may embrace her child, a wife her husband, who has experienced, or felt, and thus meet the question. — Corny.
2 If effects be not only external phenomena, if one subjectively experiencing, or enjoying them be assumed, this enjoyer, now as himself in turn an effect, would be enjoyed by another experiencer. In this way there Would be an endless series of persons or souls (pug gal a parampara). — Corny.
3 It is not clear why the P. should here negate. The Corny, adds that these questions are put with ordinary meaning (s am a n ne n a). Cf. p. 46, n. 1.
4 Lest he be accused of that feature in the heresy of individuality : The soul has feeling.’ — See 56 (fol.), n. 1.
46
Of Soul or Person
1 . 1 .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life, no final Nibbana without residual stuff of life ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, assuming both those propositions to be true, is the person known to exist and the enjoyer of the person also?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, assuming that celestial happiness and those en- joying it are both known to exist, is Nibbana known, and one enjoying it known also to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, assuming as before, are the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest known to exist and those enjoying them ? 1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, assuming as before, is celestial happiness one thing, the enjoyer another thing?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[206] P. — Is human happiness known to exist ?
Th.— Yes.
Is the enjoyer of human happiness known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[207] Th. — Is both human happiness and the enjoyer of it known to exist ?
P. — Yes.
Is one who enjoys the enjoyer known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life, no final Nibbana without residual stuff of life ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
( The dialogue is then completed, as in § 205, on celestial happiness .)
1 As such they are objects of consciousness, but not subjective ultimates. — Corny.
50. Soul and Moral Agent 47
[208] P— Is the misery of the lower planes 1 known to exist ?
Th. — Yes.
Is the experiencer of that misery known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[209] Th. — Do you admit both these propositions ?
P.— Yes.
Is the enjoyer of the sufferer of that misery known to exist 2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, etc.? (complete in full as in §§ 205, 207).
[210, 211] Th . — Is the misery of purgatory known ? (Complete as in §§ 204, 205, 207.)
[212] Th . — Are ethically good and bad acts (karmas) known to exist? And the doer of them also? And the instigator also? And the enjoyer of the effect — is he also known to exist ?
P.— Yes.
Is he who does the acts the same as he who experiences the effect ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 2 . . .
1 repeat my question.
Yes 3
Then, are happiness and misery self-caused ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Then, admitting you still assent to my first propositions, is the doer a different [person] from the enjoyer [of the effect] ?
1 Apaya, i.e., purgatory, animal kingdom, Petas, or unhappy, hungry ‘ shades,’ and Asuras, or titans.
2 He fears to contradict the Suttas. — See Sayyuttci Nik., ii. 94 :
1 To say, one-and-the-same both acts and is affected by the result, is not true.’ — Corny.
3 In the Suttas it is said : he has pleasure both here and hereafter. — Corny.
48
Of Soul or Person I. 1.
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 1 . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes. 2
Then, are happiness and misery caused by another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Admitting you still assent to the first propositions, does the same and another do the deeds, does the same and another enjoy (the results) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Then is happiness and is misery both self-caused and produced by another?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Admitting that you still assent to the first propositions, does neither the same [person] both do the deeds and experience the results, nor one [person] do the deeds and another experience the results?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes, neither the same, nor two different persons.
Then are happiness and misery not self-causing nor caused by something else ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Admitting, finally, that you still assent to the first propo- sitions, namely, that ethically good and bad actions ; as well as the doer of them, and the instigator of the doer, are known to exist, [I have now asked you four further questions :]
(1) Is he who does the act the same as he who experi- ences the effect ? .
(2) Are doer and experiencer two different persons ?
(3) Are they the same and also different persons ?
(4) Are they neither the same nor different persons ?
[You have answered to each :] No. [I have then repeated
1 fiar/yutta-Nik., ii. 94 : ‘To say, one acts, another reaps the fruit, - is not true.’
2 Fancying that as deva he surely enjoys the result of his actions - when a man Corny.
Soul and Moral Agent
53.
49
the question. You have then said] : Yes. I have then
put four questions :
(1) Are happiness and misery self-caused ?
(2) Are they the work of another ?
(3) Are they both one and the other ?
(4) Are they, arising through a cause, self-caused, or the work of another ? [And you have replied] : No. . . .
[213] P, — Is there such a thing as karma (action taking effect) ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is there such a thing as a maker of karma ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[214] Th. — Is there such a thing as both karma and the maker of karma ?
P.— Yes.
Is there a maker of that maker?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
Then if the one and the other exist, is there no making an end of . ill, no cutting of the cycle of life, no final Nibbana without residual stuff of life ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Again, since you assent to both the first propositions, is there both a person and a maker of the person ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Or ... is there both Nibbana and- a maker thereof ? . . . nr the earth, ocean, Sineru, water, fire, air, grass, brush and .forest, and the maker thereof ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
... Or is karma one thing, the maker of it another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
[215] P. — Is there such a thing as result of action ?
Th.— Yes. „ : '■
P. — Is there such a thing as an enjoyer of the result?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
T.S. v.
4
50 Of Soul or Person I. 1.
[216] Th. — Do you maintain then that there are both results and enjoyer thereof?
P. — Yes.
Is there an enjoyer of that enjoyer?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Then, if this and that be so, is there no making an end of ill, no . . . etc. {complete in full similarly to § 214, and ending : — )
You maintaining that there is both result and enjoyer thereof, is then result one thing, and the enjoyer of it another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( complete as usual).
YII. SUPERNORMAL POWER.
Examination into ‘ Soul ’ continued by reference to Super- intellectual Power.
[217] P. — Is it wrong to say ‘the person [or soul] is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Have there not been those who could transform themselves by magic potency ? 1
Th. — Yes.
P. — If that be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say ‘ the person [or soul] is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.’ Again, have there not been those who could hear sounds by the element of celestial hearing, . . . or know the mind of another, or remember previous lives,
1 On iddki, and this Mnd of it, called vikub b an a-i d dh i see Compendium, p. 61 ; Patisambhida-magga , ii. 210 ; Atthasdlim, 91 ; Visuddhi-magga, ch. xii. The opponent fancies a soul or inner principle can achieve magical efficacy only with respect to such matter as is bound up with human power of control. In the third question are enumerated the other five forms of the so-called c h a 1 - abbinna, or ‘sixfold super-knowledge.' — Corny.
56.
51
Soul and Super -Knowledge
or see visible objects by the celestial eye, or realize the destruction of the ‘ intoxicants ’ ?
Tk. — Yes.
P— If these things be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say * the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.’
[218] Th. — Granting that there have been those who could transform themselves by magic potency, is it for that reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — When one has through magic potency transformed himself, was he then the personal entity, and not when not so transforming himself ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
This question is ashed, and so answered, in the case of the other Jive modes .of super-intellectual faculty named above.
VIII. APPEAL TO THE SUTTAS . 1
[219] P. — Is it wrong to say ‘the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is there not [one whom we call] mother ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say ‘ the person is known in tfeWsenseof'-a j:eal and ultimate fact.’ Again, is there Wot [one whom we. call] father, are there not brothers, sisters, nobles, brahmins, merchants, serfs, householders, Religious, devas, humans ?
Th. — Yes. ... . ,
P. — If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right- to say ‘ the person is known,/ etc. . x- -
[220] Th. — Granting there are mother’s, fathers, etc.,
1 The final citations are lea up to by several preliminary inquiries. These, says the Corny., bear on kinshipVXaws, career, rebirth, etc.
Of Soul or Person
52
I. 1.
is it for this reason that you insist thus respecting the
personal entity ?
P. — Yes.
Tk . — Is there anyone who, not having been a mother, becomes a mother ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, not having been a personal entity, becomes one ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
(This pair of questions is then put concerning ‘father,’ ‘brother’ . . . ‘ deva,’ ‘human,’ and answered as above.)
Th. — Granting the existence of a mother, is it for this reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, having been a mother, is no longer a mother ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, having been a personal entity, is no longer one ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
This last pair of questions is then put with respect to ‘father ’ and the rest, and answered as above.
[221] P. — Is it wrong to say * the person is known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact ’ ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — Is there no s^o3l4idng as a ‘ stream-winner ’ (or one who has entorgd the first stags of the way to salvation) ?
Th.— Yes. ' . -
P * — If thgre be such a thing, then indeed, good sir, it is right to assent to the original, preposition. Again, is there no su.ch thing as A ‘ once-returnar, 1 a ‘no-returner,’ an arahant, 1 one who is freed in both ways, 2 one who is
1 Or those who are in the second,' third, an^altimate stages re- spectively of the way to salvation^ ■'
2 Of. Dialogues, ii 70 Puggala-Panttatti, I., § 30 ; viz., both tem- porarily and permanently body and mind, by Jhana and
the Path respectively.
58. Appeals to Authority 58
emancipated by understanding/ one who has the testimony within himself, 2 one who has arrived at right views, one who is emancipated by faith, one who marches along with wisdom, 3 one who marches along with faith 9
Th.— Yes.
T • Then surely, good sir, it is right to affirm the first proposition.
[222] Th. Granted that there is such a thing as a £ stream- wanner,’ is it for that reason that the 'person’ is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
P. — Yes.
Th . — Is there anyone who, not having been a stream - winner, is one now ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, not having been a ‘ person,’ is one now ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. — Again, granted that there is such an one as a stream-winner, and that this is the reason for your affirmation as to the personal entity, is there anyone who having been a stream- winner, is so no longer ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, not having been a person, is one now ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
These questions are now put regarding the other designa- tions, and are answered similarly.
[223] P. — If [as you say] it be wrong to assert 'the person is known, etc., . . .’ are there not [the accepted terms of] '.the Pour Pairs of men,’ ‘the Eight Individuals ’? 4
1 Or intuition (panna).
2 Namely, that he has certain of the intoxicants destroyed. Pugg. Pann., I. § 32. For the remaining designations see op. ait., § 33, f.
3 The Pugg. Pann. Corny, so paraphrases dhammanusari; ‘panna is borne along and goes before.’ JPTS., 1914, p. 194. These are all terms apparently involving a permanent personal entity, from the opponent’s point of view.
4 I.e., those in the four paths (see above, § 221), and these divided into those who have attained one or other of the four paths and the four ‘ fruits ’ or fruitions (see prev. page).
54
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Th. — Yes.
P. — But if that be so, surely it is right to speak of the ‘person ’ as known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[224] Th . — Granting that there are the Four, the Eight, is it for this reason you assert the first proposition?
P.— Yes.
Th . — Do the Four, the Eight, appear because of the Buddha’s appearing?
Yes.
Does the ‘ person ’ appear because of the Buddha’s appearing ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
Then at the Buddha’s final Nibbana, is the ‘ person ’ annihilated, so that no personal entity exists ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[225] Th . — The person [you say] is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact— is the person conditioned? 1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the person unconditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is he neither ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there another, a third alternative? 2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
1 This is an inquiry into the nature of ‘ a real and ultimate [or self- dependent] fact.’ Corny. ‘ Conditioned ’ (s a n k h a t a) is, in Buddhist tradition, what has been prepared, brought about by something else, made, has come together by conditions (Corny, on A., i. 152). The opponent’s desire to get pugg ala outside the category of all phenomena brings him into a somewhat 1 tight place.’
2 Koti, literally extreme, or point, or end.
60.
Appeals to Authority
55
Yes.
But was it not said by the Exalted One : 4 There are, bhikkhus , these tivo irreducible categories — what are the two $ The irreducible category of the conditioned, the irreducible category of the unconditioned. These are the tivo ’ P 1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Yes.
Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the conditioned and the unconditioned, there is another, a third alternative.
[226] Th. (continues). — You say that the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned ? Are then the conditioned, the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Are the aggregates conditioned, Nibbana unconditioned, the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned ?
Yes.
Then are the aggregates, Nibbana, and the person, three entirely different things ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
(The last tivo questions are then applied to each aggregate taken separately : — material qualities, feeling, perception, mental co-efficients, consciousness).
[227] Th. — Is the genesis of the person apparent, and its passing away also, and is its duration distinctively ap- parent ?
Yes.
[Then] is the person conditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
It was said by the Exalted One : ‘ Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics of the conditioned : of conditioned things the genesis is apparent, the ■passing away is apparent, the duration 2 amidst change is apparent .’ Hence if these three are characteristics of the person, this is also
1 Cf. Dlgha-Nik., iii. 274.
2 T hit ass a annath attar), literally 1 duration’s other-ness.’ Buddhaghosa paraphrases by jar a, decay. Anguttara-Nik., i. 152. See Note on TJiiti, Appendix.
56 Of Soul or Person I, 1.
conditioned- Are these three characteristics not apparent in the person ?
No, they are not apparent.
Then is the person unconditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
It was said by the Exalted One : £ Bhikkhus , there are these three characteristics of the unconditioned : of uncon- ditioned things, bhikkhus, the genesis is not apparent, the passing away is not apparent, the duration amidst change is not apparent.’ 1 Now if all these [as you say] do not charac- terize the [notion of] ‘ person,’ the person is unconditioned.
[228] Th . — The person who has attained final Nibbana, does he exist in the Goal, 2 or does he not exist therein ?
He exists in the Goal.
Is then the person who has finally attained eternal ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the person who has attained final Nibbana and does not exist in the Goal annihilated ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[228a] Th. — On what does the person depend in order to persist ?
P. — He persists through dependence on coming-to-be. 3
Th. — Is [the state of] coming-to-be impermanent, con- ditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?
P. — Yes.
J Op. et loc. cit,
2 Parinibbuto puggalo atth’ atthamhinatth’ atthamhi? The idiom is unusual for the Pitakas, and in this connection, we believe, unique. The Corny, explains : ‘attharj pucchati nib- b & n a rj , “He asks about the goal (or the Good), Nibbana.” P. rejects both the following questions, lest he be thought either an Eternalist or an Annihilationisi’ ‘Attained final Nibbana’ could of course be rendered more literally ‘ has utterly become extinct.’
3 Bhavag, or^ existence ; but ' existence ’ is better reserved for atthita. The Corny, paraphrases by up a p att i b h a v ar|, the state of being reborn.
61. The Testimony of Self-consciousness 57
Th. — Is the person also impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change ?
P . — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[229] P. — Is it wrong to say ‘ the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is there no one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows that he is feeling it ? 1
Th. — Yes.
P. — Surely, if that be so, good sir, it is right to say ‘the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact . . . and if he, on feeling painful feeling, knows that he is feeling it — you admit this ? — it is right to say ‘ the person is known,’ etc. So also for neutral feeling.
[230] Th. — I note what you affirm. Now is it for this reason that you maintain the person to be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Then is one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows he is feeling it, a personal entity, and is one who, on that occasion, does not know, not a personal entity?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. — You deny this also in the case of painful and neutral feeling ?
P. — Yes, that cannot truly be said, .
Th. — But you maintain, because of this self-awareness, that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is then pleasurable feeling one thing and the self-conscious enjoyer another ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
(Same query and answer in the case of painful and neutral feelings.)
1 ‘ The earnest student (yogavacara) knows ; the fool and
average man does not.’ — Corny.
58
Of Soul or Person I. 1.
[231] P— You deny that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact: — Is there then no one who may be occupied in contemplating the [concept of] body with respect to his physical frame ?
Yes.
... or in contemplating [the concept of] feeling, or consciousness, or certain mental properties 1 with respect to these in himself, respectively ?
Yes.
Then surely, good sir, it is right to say as I do with respect to the person.
[232] Th. — Granting the carrying out by anyone of the four applications in mindfulness, is it for this reason that you say as you do with respect to the personal entity ?
Yes.
Then is anyone when so engaged a person, and not, when he is not so engaged ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[233] Th. — Or again, granting [as above] ... is f body ’ one thing, the contemplator another ? and so for
- feeling/ etc. ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[234] Th. — Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Yes.
Was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ 0 Mogharajan ! look upon the world As void [o/ soul ], 2 * and ever heedful bide.
1 The reference is to the religions exercise in self-knowledge known as the four Sati-patthana’s, or • applications in mindfulness.’ These properties are traditionally explained as the cetasika- dhamma (see below . . .), but Ledi Sadaw judges otherwise. See Compendium, 179, n, 3. The Animist holds that introspective exercise involves a persisting identical subject.
2 Of. Sayyiitta-NiJc., iv. 54~ ! Void ’ implies ‘ of soul.’ ‘ Contemplate
the world of aggregates as void of entities. 5 — Corny.
64.
Appeals to Authority
59
Cut out the world 9 s opinions as to soul.
So shalt thou get past death ; so an thou look,
The king of death shall no more look on thee’? 1
Is it thus in the Suttanta ?
Yes.
Hence it is surely wrong to say that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[235] Th . — Is it the person [or soul] here who ‘ looks upon ’ ?
Yes.
Does he contemplate with or without material qualities ?
With them.
Is that soul the same as that body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
But if he contemplates without material qualities, is that soul quite, different from that body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. — [I ask again] is it the [soul or] person who con- templates ?
Yes.
Does he contemplate when he has gone within, or does he contemplate from without [the organism]?
He contemplates when he has gone within.
Is that soul that body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Supposing he contemplates from without, is the soul one thing, the body another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[236] P. — Is it wrong to say 'the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact’?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Was not the Exalted One a speaker of truth, 2 a speaker in season, 3 a speaker of facts, 3 a speaker of words that are right, 4 that are not wrong, that are not ambiguous ?
1 Sutta-Nipdta, ver. 1119.
2 Dialogues , i. 4 ; Psalms of the Sisters, lxvi.
3 Digha-Nik., iii. 175 ; Anguttara-Nik., v. 205.
4 Anguttara-Nih, ii. 24 ; Hi-vuttaka , § 112.
60
Of Sold or Person
I. 1.
Tk— Yes.
P. — Now it was said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is the person who works for his own good . . 1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th. — Yes.
P . — Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[237] . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is one person, bhikkhus, who , being reborn in this world, is boon for the good , for the happiness of many , to show com- passion on the world, for the advantage, the good, the happi- ness of dev as and of men.’ 2
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[238] Th . — Granting this, and also the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One: — it was said by the Exalted One: ‘All things are without soul .’ 3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.— Yes.
Th . — Hence surely it is wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[239] . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One : ‘ He does not doubt that misery arises, comes to pass, that misery ceases, passes away, nor is he perplexed thereat. And there- upon independent insight 4 comes herein to him. Noio this, Kaccdna, thus far is right views.’ 5
Is the Suttanta thus ?
1 See § 74.
2 Anguttara-Nik., i. 22 ; quoted in Questions of King Milinda, ii. 56.
3 Atta. Dhammapada, ver. 279 ; Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 28.
4 A-p ar a-p a cca y a-nan a g, 1 insight not conditioned by others.’
6 Sayyutta-NiJc., ii. 17 ; iii. 135. The quotation does not obviously
bear on the controverted point to us, but to a Buddhist versed in his Suttas the context ( apparently a familiar one) arises : Insight comes to him who has rejected the theories that the world is a persisting entity, or a concourse of fortuitous illusions, being convinced that it is, in its essentials, a cosmos of conditioned becoming.
66 .
Appeals to Authority
61
P. — Yes.
Th . — Hence surely it is wrong to say £ the person is known,’ etc.
[240] Th. — . . . again, was it not said by Bhikkhuni Vajira to Mara the evil one :
‘ “ Being ” P What dost thou fancy by that word ? ’Mong false opinions, Mara, art thou strayed.
This a mere bundle of formations is.
Therefrom no “ being ” mayest thou obtain.
For e’en as, ichen the factors are arranged,
The product by the name “ chariot ” is known,
So doth our usage covenant to say :
“ A being,” udien the aggregates are there.
’ Tis simply III that riseth, simply III 2 That doth persist, and then facleth away.
Nought beside III there is that comes to be ;
Nought else but III there is that facies away ’ ? 3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P. — Yes.
[241] Th. — . . . again, did not the venerable Ananda say to the Exalted One : ‘ It is said, lord, “ the world is void, the world is void.” Now in what way, lord, is it meant that the world is void V [and did not the Exalted One reply:] ‘ Inasmuch, Ananda, as it is void of soul 4 and of what belongs to soul, 5 therefore is the world called void. And wherein, Ananda, is it void of sold and of what belongs to soul 1 The eye, Ananda, is verily void of sold and of what belongs to soul, so is visible object and the sense and contact of sight. So are the other organs, and objects of the senses, and the other senses. So is the co-ordinating organ, cognizable objects, mental con- sciousness and contact. All are void of sold and of what belongs to sold. And whatever pleasurable, painful, or neutral feeling
1 S at ta.
2 On this term see Ledi Sadaw, J.P.T.S., 1914, 13B f., and Mrs. Eh. D., Buddhist Psychology , 1914, p. 83 f.
3 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 134 f. ; Pss. Sisters, 190. Her verses are not in the Anthology of the Therls or Senior Sisters. She is not called Theri, but only Bhikkhuni.
4 Atta. 6 Attaniya.
62
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
arises, in relation to the senses, and the sense-co-ordinating
mind, that too is void of soul and of what belongs to soul.
It is for this, Ananda, that the world is said to be void ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.— Yes.
[242] Th . — . . . again, whereas you affirm that the person
is known, ete. . . . and we know the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One : ‘ Bhikkhus, if there were sold, should I have that which belongs to a soul T 1 Or if there were that which belongs to soul, should I have a sold? In both cases ye would reply: “Yea, lord But both soul and that which belongs to soul being in very truth and for ever impossible to be known, then this that is a stage of opinion, namely : “ that is the world, that is the sold, this I shall hereafter become, permanent, constant, eternal, unchangeable — so shall I abide even like unto the Eternal — is not this, bhikkhus, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools ?” “ Whatever it be not, lord, it surely is, absolutely
and entirely a doctrine of fools.” ’ 3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P. — Yes.
[243] Th . — . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One :
‘ There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the world— who are the three ? There is first, Seniya, that kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent sotd in the life that now is, and in that which is to come; then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, ivho declares that there is a real, persistent sold in the life that now is, but not a soul in a future life ; lastly, there is a certain teacher who does not declare that there is a sold either in the life that noiv is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Anni- hilationist; the third of these, he, Seniya, is called the teacher, who is Buddha supreme . 4 These are the three teachers to be found in the world.’ 5
1 Sarjyutta-N., iv. 54. 2 Atta, attaniya.
3 Majj hima- Nile . , i. 188.
4 More literally, perfectly enlightened (samma sambnddho).
B We cannot trace this quotation.
68.
63
Appeals to Authority
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — ... again, did the Exalted One speak of ‘ a butter-jar ’
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who can make a jar out of butter?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. . . . finally, did the Exalted One speak of an oil- jar, a honey-jar, a molasses-jar, a milk-pail, a water-pot, a cup, flask, bowl of water, a ' meal provided in perpetuity,’ a ' constant supply of congey ’ ? 1 2
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is there any supply of congey that is permanent, stable, eternal, not liable to change ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th . — Hence it is surely wrong to say ‘ the soul is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.’
1 Nor this. But the Corny, remarks : ‘ The following is adduced to show that meaning is not always according to the form of what is said. A gold jar is made of gold ; a butter-jar is not made of butter, nor is an oil- jar made of oil, and so on. A meal instituted in perpetuity by charity is not eternal and permanent as is Nibbana.
2 E.g., Vinaya, iv. 74; Jdtafca, i. 178 (trans., i. 60). The argument is that to use such terms as puggala, being, etc., in their popular conventional sense, as the Buddha did when teaching the laity, by no means confers upon the transient aggregates so called any ultimate or philosophical reality, any more than to speak of a constant supply of food implies any eternal, immutable source. ‘ Given bodily and mental aggregates/ concludes the Commentator in his peroration, ‘ it is customary to say such and such a name, a family. This by popular convention means “a person.” Hereon it was said by the Exalted One : “ These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designa- tions in common use in the world” ( Dialogues , i. 263). . . . The Buddhas have two kinds of discourse, the popular and the philosophical. The latter is, as a rule, too severe to begin with, therefore they take the former first. But both first and last they teach consistently and in conformity with truth according to the method selected.’
64
Of Falling Away
I.
2 .
2. Of Falling Away.
Controverted Point . — That an Arahant can fall away from Arahantship.
From the Commentary . — Because of such statements in the Suttas as
- liability to fall away, and the opposite, these two things, bhikkhus, are
concerned with the falling away of a bhikkhu who is training ’ ; 1 and ‘ these five things, bhikkhus, are concerned with the falling away of a bhikkhu who now and then attains emancipation,’ 2 certain sects in the Order incline to the belief that an Arahant can fall away. These are the Sammitiyas, the Vajjiputtiyas, the Sabbatthivadins, and some of the Mahasanghikas. Hence, whether it be their view or that of others, the Theravadin, in order to break them of it asks this question.’ 3
I.— APPLYING THE THESIS.
[I] 4 Th. — Your assertion that an Arahant may fall away from Arahantship involves the admission also of the follow- ing : that he may fall away anywhere; [2] at any time ; [3] that all Arahants are liable to fall away; [4] that an Arahant is liable to fall away not only from Arahantship, but from all four of the Path-fruitions. [5] Just as a man may still be rich if he lose one lakh in four lakhs, but must, you would say, lose all four to lose his title to the status given him by the four.
1 Anguttara-NiJcdya, i. 96. 3 Ibid., iii. 173.
3 ‘ Falling away ’ is, more literally, declined, the opposite of growth.
See Dialogues , ii. 82 f. The Corny, continues : * “ Falling away ” is two- fold — from what is won, and from what is not yet won. “ The vener- able Godhika fell away from that emancipation of will which was inter- mittent only” (B r ., samayikala, or, PTS, samadhikaya: which comes of concentrative exercise, S ayy utta-Nikay a, i. 120), illustrates the former. “ See that the reward of your recluseship fall not away for you who are seeking it, [while yet more remains to be done!]” (. MajjJivma-N i. 271) illustrates the latter.’
4 We have, for the remainder of the work, applied just sufficient condensation to eliminate most of the dialogue as such, with its abundant repetitions of the point controverted, and have endeavoured to reproduce all the stages of argument and the matter adduced therein.
70.
Classes of Ariyans
65
II. REFUTATION BY COMPARING CLASSES OF ARIYANS. 1
[6] If an Arahant may fall away, then must those in the three lower Stages or Paths — the Never-Returners, the Once-Returners, the Stream-Winners — also be held liable to fall away and lose their respective fruits. 2
[7] If an Arahant may fall away, so as to be established only in the next lower fruit, then must an analogous fall- ing away be held possible in the case of the other three classes, so that those in the first stage who fall away are ‘ established ’ only as average worldlings. Further,
If the Arahant fall away so as to be established in the first fruit only, then must he, in regaining Arahantship, realize it next after the first fruit. 3
[8] If an Arahant may fall away from Arahantship who has admittedly put away more corruptions 4 than any of those in the three lower stages, surely these may always fall away from their respective fruits. Why deny this liability in their case (9-13), and assert it only with respect to the Arahant ?
[14-20] If an Arahant may fall away from Arahantship who admittedly excels all others in culture of the [Eight- fold] Path, of the Earnest Applications of Mindfulness, of the Supreme Efforts, the Four Steps to Potency of Will, the Controlling Powers and Forces, and of the Seven Factors of Enlightenment, why deny that those who have cultivated these [thirty-seven matters pertaining to En- lightenment 5 ] in a lesser degree may no less fall away from their respective fruits ?
[21-32] Similarly, if each and all of the Four Truths — the fact of 111, the Cause of it, the Cessation of it, the Way to the cessation of it— -have been seen by the Arahant
1 Viz., all who are graduating or have graduated in Arahantship.
2 Or fruition ; the conscious realization or assurance (to borrow a Christian term) of the specified attainment.
3 Thus violating the constant four-graded order.
i Literally, torments, k i 1 e s a, i.e., vices causing torment.' On these ten see below, and Bud. Psych. Ethics , p. 327 f.
6 On these see Dialogues, ii. 129 f. ; Compendium, pt. vii., § 6.
T.S. V. 5
66
Of Falling Aiocty
I. 2.
no less than by the three lower Paths, why maintain only
of the Arahant that he can fall away?
[83] You cannot assert that the Arahant, who has put away lust 1 and all the other corruptions, may fall away from Arahantship, and yet deny that the Stream-Winner, who [on his part] has put away the theory of soul, 2 may also fall away from his fruit ; or deny either that the latter, who [on his part] has also put away doubt, the contagion of mere rule and ritual, or the passions, ill - will and nescience, all three entailing rebirth on planes of misery, may also fall away. Or [34], similarly, deny that the Once-Returner, who [on his part] has put away the theory of a soul, doubt, the contagion of mere rule and ritual, gross sensuous passions, coarse forms of ill-will, may also fall away from his fruit. Or [35] , similarly, deny that the Never-Returner, who [on his part] has put away the theory of soul, doubt, the contagion of mere rule and ritual, the residuum 3 of sensuous passion and ill-will, may also fall away from his fruit. Or analogously [36] assert that the Never-Returner can fall away, but that the Stream-Winner cannot, or [37], that the Once-Returner cannot. Or, analogously [38], assert that the Once-Returner can fall away, but that the Stream-Winner cannot.
Conversely [39], you cannot maintain that the Stream- Winner, who has [of course] put away theory of soul, etc., cannot fall away from his fruit, without maintaining as much for the Arahant who [on his part] has put away the passions of appetite and all the other corruptions. 4 Nor, similarly [40-4], can you maintain that anyone of the four
1 R aga , or lobha, understood as appetite or greed in general.
2 Sakkayaditthi. On this term see Bud. Psy. Ethics, 247, n. 2. This and the next two vices are the first three ‘fetters’ destroyed by those in the first Path. Rhys Davids, American Lec- tures, p. 146 f.
3 Literally, accompanied by a minimum of (anu-sahagato). In the Bhammasamgani, and below (iv, 10), this work of diminishing is worded differently. See Bud. Psy. Ethics, p. 96, and n. 1.
4 Namely, hate, nescience, or dulnes?, conceit, error, doubt, stolidity, excitement, unconscientiousness, disregard of blame, or indiscretion.
85 . Classes of Ariyans 67
Classes cannot fall away, without maintaining as much for any other of the four.
[45] You admit all the achievements and qualifications conveyed by the terms and phrases associated [in the Suttas] with the position of Arahant : —
That he has 4 put away passion or lust, cut it off at the root, made it as the stump of a palm tree, incapable of renewing its existence, not subject to recrudescence,’ 1 and has also so put away the remaining [nine] corruptions — hate, nescience, conceit, etc.
[46] That, in order so to put away each and all of the corruptions, he has cultivated —
the Path,
the Earnest Applications of Mindfulness,
the Supreme Efforts,
the Steps to Potency of Will,
the Controlling Powers and Forces,
the Factors of Enlightenment ; 2
[47] That he has [consummated as having] 4 done' with lust, done with hate, done with nescience,’ 3 that he is one by whom
4 that which was to be done is done,’
4 the burden is laid down, the good supreme is won, the fetter of becoming is wholly broken away,’ one who is 4 emancipated through perfect knowledge,’ 4 who has 4 lifted the bar/ 4 filled up the trenches,’ 4 who has drawn out,’ 4 is without lock or bolt/ an Ariyan, one for whom 4 the banner is lowered/ ‘the burden is fallen,’ who is 'detached/ 6 ‘conqueror of a realm well conquered/ 6 who
1 Anguttara-NiJi., i. 218 (elsewhere connected with tanha, natural desire).
2 See above, §§ 14-29. 3 Pss. Brethren, p. 193.
4 The epithets named thus far recur frequently'as one of the refrains of Arahantship, e.g., Anguttara-Nik., iii. 859.
5 These are all discussed in Majjhima-Nik., i. 139,
6 We cannot trace this simile verbatim. Differently worded, it occurs, e.g., in Iti-vuttaka, § 82.
68 Of Falling Aicay 1. 2.
has ‘comprehended 111, has put away its cause, has realized its cessation, has cultivated the Path [thereto],’ 1 who has £ understood that which is to be understood, 2 compre- hended that which is to be comprehended, put away that which is to be put away, developed that which is to be developed, realized that which is to be realized.’ 3
How then can you say that an Arahant can fall away from Arahantship ?
[48] With respect to your modified statement, that only the Arahant, who now and then [i.e., in Jhana] reaches emancipation, falls away, but not the Arahant who is at any and all seasons emancipated: —
[49-51] I ask, does the former class of Arahant, who has put away each and all of the corruptions, who has cultivated each and all of the matters or states pertaining to enlightenment, who deserves each and all of the afore- said terms and phrases associated with Arahantship, fall away from Arahantship ?
[52-54] For you admit that the latter class of Arahant, who has done and who has deserved as aforesaid, does not fall away. If you admit also, with respect to the former class, that all these qualities make falling away from Arahantship impossible, then it is clear that the matter of occasional, or of constant realization of emancipation does not affect the argument.
[55] Can you give instances of Arabants falling away from Arahantship ? Did Sariputta ? Or the Great Mog- gallana ? Or the Great Kassapa ? Or the Great Kaeca- yana ? Or the great Kotthita ? Or the Great Panthaka? 4 Of all you admit that they did not.
1 The noble or Ariyan Eightfold Path.
2 Esp. the five aggregates. Sayyutta-Nik., iii. 26, etc.
3 On all these four see Dlgha-NiJc., iii. 280 f.
4 On all of these Pss. of the Brethren may be consulted. Kot- thita in some MSS. is Kotthika.
89.
Appeals to Authority
69
PROOF FROM THE SXJTTAS.
[56] You say that an Arahant may fall away from Arahantship. But was it not said by the Exalted One : —
£ Both high and loio the roays the learners wend :
So hath the Holy One to man revealed .
Not twice they fare who reach the further shore,
Nor once \_alone that goal ] doth Jill their thought P 1
Hence you are wrong.
[57] . . • Again, is there to be a ‘cutting of what has been cut ?’ For was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ He who with cravings conquered grasps at naught,
For idiom no work on self is still un wrought,
No need for cutting what is cut is there ;
All perils sioejot away, the Flood, the Snare V 2
[58] . . . Again, your proposition implies that there is a reconstructing of what is already done. But this is not for the Arahant, for was it not said by the Exalted One : —
£ For such a Brother rightly freed, whose heart Hath peace, there is no building up again,
Nor yet remaineth, aught for him to do.
Like to a rock that is a monolith,
And trembleth never in the windy blast,
So all the world of sights and tastes and sounds,
Oclours and tangibles, yea, things desired
And undesirable can ne'er excite
A man like him. His heart stands firm, detached,
And of all that he notes the passing hence ?’ 3
Hence there is no reconstructing what is already done.
1 Sutta-Nipdta, ver. 714. The Corny . explains ‘ high and low ways ’ by easy or painful progress, as formulated in. Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 54.
2 Untraced except the first line, for which see Sutta-Nipata, ver. 741; Anguttara-Nik., ii. 10; Iti-vuttaka, §§ 15, 105.
3 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 378; Pss. of the Brethren, vers. 642-4.
70
Of Falling A way
I. 2.
[59] S.V.S.M: 1 — Then our proposition according to you
is wrong. But was it not said by the Exalted One :• —
‘ Bhikkhus, there are these five things which conduce to the falling away of a bhikkhu icho is intermittently emancipated : — which are the five ? Delight in business, in talk, in sleep, in society, absence of reflection on how his heart is emanci- pated l ’ 2
Hence the Arahant may fall away.
[60] Th. — But does the Arahant delight in any of those things ? If you deny, how can they conduce to his falling away? If you assent, you are admitting that an Arahant is affected and bound by worldly desires-— which of course you deny.
[61] Now if an Arahant were falling away from Arahant- ship, it would be, you say, because he is assailed by lust, ■or hate, or error. Such an attack, you say further, is in ■consequence of a corresponding latent bias. 3 Yet if I ask you whether an Arahant harbours any one of the seven forms of latent bias — sensuality, enmity, conceit, erro- neous opinion, doubt, lust for rebirth, ignorance — you must deny such a thing.
[62] Or if, in his falling away, he is, you say, accumu- lating lust, belief in a soul, doubt, or the taint of mere rule and ritual, these are not vices you would impugn an Arahant withal.
[63] In fact you admit that an Arahant neither heaps up nor pulls down, neither puts away nor grasps at, neither scatters nor binds, neither disperses nor collects, but that, having pulled down, put away, scattered, dispersed, so abides.
Hence it surely cannot be said that ‘ An Arahant may fall away from Arahantship.’ 2
1 Any of the four sects holding the controverted view.
2 Anguttara-]<!ik., hi. 173.
3 See below, ix. 4.
93.
Of Devas and the Higher Life
71
3. Of the Higher Life.
Controverted Point . — That there is no higher life among the devas. 1
From the Commentary. — ‘ The higher life 2 is of twofold import : path-culture and renunciation of the world. No deva practises the latter. But the former is not forbidden them, except to those of the unconscious plane. But some, for instance the Sammitiyas, do not believe in any path-culture among the higher devas of the Karnaloka, and, beyond them, of the Rupaloka, justifying themselves by the Suttanta passage cited below.’
The Theravadin speaks : —
[1] You deny the practice of the higher life among devas ; yet you deny also [that they are physically, men- tally, or morally defective] : — that they are, all of them, stupid, deaf and dumb, unintelligent, communicating by signs, 3 and incapable of discerning the meaning of what is well or badly spoken; that they all lack faith in the Buddha, the Doctrine, the Order ; that they did not attend the Exalted Buddha ; ask him questions and delight in his answers ; that they are all of them handicapped by their actions, by the corruptions, by the effect of their actions ; that they are all faithless, devoid of purpose and under- standing, incapable of reaching the right Order of the Path 4 in things that are good; that they are matricides, parri- cides, murderers of saints, shedders of holy blood, schis- matics; that they all take life, steal, are unchaste, liars,
1 On ‘ deva ’ see above, p. 28, n. 1.
2 Brahmaeariyavasa, or best-conduct-living. The Sammi- tiya holds by the externals ; the Theravadin is more concerned with the essential ethical career.
3 Explained in the Corny, by muga viya hattha muddaya vattaro, ‘ like dumb speakers by signs made by the hands.’ On such language cf. Dictlogtces, i. 21, n. 4, or Dlgha-Nih., i. 11, § 25.
4 Sammattap (Sansk., samyaktva, abstract noun of samma; ref. wrongly given in JPTS, 1910, p. 116, s.v., § II.). Sammatta-niyamo (opposed to micchatta-niyamo, the wrong, vicious order of things), the right law or order, insuring against rebirth in purgatory, involving final salvation. Cf. v. 4 ; xii. 5.
72 Of the Higher Life I. 3.
slanderers, revilers, idle talkers, given to covetousness, ill-will and erroneous opinion.
[2] Nay, you maintain on the other hand that they are, and practise the opposite of all this. How then can you say there is no religious life among them ?
The Saimnitiyci speaks : —
[3] You maintain the thesis in the affirmative, and yet you deny that devas practise renouncing the world, the tonsure, wearing the yellow robes, carrying the beggar’s bowl; you deny that either a Supremely Awakened one, or those enlightened for self only, 1 or the pair of chief disciples, 2 appear among the devas. Where then is their ‘ religious life ’ ?
Theravaclin speaks : —
[4-7] We agree that among the gods these practices and advents are not found. But is the religious life found only where these things are observed — the renun- ciation, the tonsure and the rest — and not where they are not observed ? Only there, you say ; and yet when I ask :
‘ Does he who renounces the world, and so forth, lead the religious life, and does he who does not renounce the world, etc., not lead the religious life,’ you do not agree. 3
[8] Again, do you maintain that only where Buddhas arise is there religious life, and that where they do not arise, there is none ? You vacillate in your reply. Now the Exalted One was born in Lumbini, became supremely enlightened at the foot of the Bodhi Tree, and set turning the Norm-Wheel at Benares. Is the religious life to be observed in those places only and not elsewhere ?
[9] I ask a similar question with regard to the Middle Country, 4 where there have been advents of those awakened
1 Pacceka-Buddhas, who did not teach the world.
2 On these, believed to attend every Buddha, see Dialogues, ii. 7.
3 Because of the attainment of the Path by laymen, and by some of the devas. — Corny.
4 Roughly speaking, the Ganges valley, or the whole of Aryan North India. See Rhys Davids in JBAS, 1904, 83 f.
97. Professing ancl Living 73
for self alone, and [10] with regard to the Magadhese, 1 where there was the advent of a chief pair of disciples.
[11] S. — You claim that the religious life is practised among devas, yet you deny that it is universally practised, for instance, among the devas of the ‘unconscious sphere.’
Th . — This is only what we should both claim and deny for mankind, for instance, that whereas the religious life is practised among men, it is not practised among the un- tutored barbarians of the border countries, where there is no rebirth of such as become religieux of either sex, or of believing laymen and lay women.
[12] S. — You say with respect to the religious life in deva-worlds, ‘ There are spheres where it exists, there are other spheres where it does not ’ : — are both these condi- tions represented in the unconscious sphere, and both in the worlds of conscious devas ? If not, then where does it exist and where does it not exist ?
Th. — The religious life exists only among such devas as are conscious.
[18] Th. — You admit that the religious life is practised among men.
S. — In certain places only, not in others.
Th. — Do you mean to say that both kind of places are represented in the outlying border countries, among un- trained barbarians, where none are born who become religieux or pious laymen and lay women? If not, how can you claim that the religious life is practised at all ? Where is it practised ?
S . — In the Middle Country, not in the outlying border countries.
[14] S. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘In three respects , bhikkhns, do the people of India excel both those of North Kuru and the Three -and-Thirty gods : — in courage, in mindfulness, and in the religious life ?’ 2
1 Cf. Vinaya Texts , i. 144 f. ; Pss. of the Brethren , 340 f.
2 Anguttara-Nih., iv. 396.
74 Of the Higher Life I. 3.
Is the Suttanta thus? Does it not show there is no religious life among devas ?
Th . — Did not the Exalted One say at SavatthI : ‘ Here the religious life is practised V x And does this show that it was only practised at SavatthI, and not elsewhere?
[15] Again, the Never-Returner, for whom the five
‘ lower fetters ’ are done away with, but not, as yet, the five e upper fetters,’ deceases ‘ here,’ is reborn ‘ there’ 2 — where for him does the fruit [of his works] arise ? ‘ There,’ and
only there, you say. How then can you deny religious life among the devas ?
[16] Eor when such an one is reborn ‘ there,’ it is there that he ‘ gets rid of the burden,’ there that he compre- hends the nature of 111, there that he puts away the corruptions, there that he realizes the cessation [of 111], there that he has intuition of the immutable. What then do you mean when you say, ‘ There is no religious life among the devas ?’
S . — Because it was here that he practised that Path of which he there realizes the fruit.
[17] Th- — If you admit that the Never-Returner realizes fruit there by the Path practised here, you must also admit that the Stream-Winner realizes fruit here by path- practice there. You must, similarly, admit that the Once- Returner and the person completing existence 3 here, realize here the fruit won by path-practice there.
Further, since you do admit that the Stream- Winner realizes fruit here won by path-practice here, you must admit that the Never-Returner may, similarly, realize fruit
1 "We cannot trace this quotation.
2 I.e., in the heavens called ‘Pure Abodes.’ — Corny. There, and and not on earth, he was believed to complete existence (p a r i n i fa- b^ya^). In the Suttanta phrase, he became a ‘ t/iere-utt er- going - outer’ (tat tha-p arinibbayl), e.g., Ma/jjh. Nik., ii. 146; Angut- tara-Nik., i. 232, etc. The Pure Abodes were the summit of the Rupa-beaven, the limit of material, if ethereal, rebirth. See Com- pendium, p. 138 f.
3 ParinibbayI puggalo. The latter word is now used in its common or popular meaning — the only meaning accepted in Theravada.
101 .
Completed by Some in Heaven
75
there won by path-practice there. Again, just as you admit
that the Once-Bet urner and the person completing exist-
ence may, by path-practice here, realize fruit here, so must
you similarly admit that the Never-Returner may realize
fruit there won by path-practice there.
[18] If you declare that a person who, ‘ leaving this life, attains consummation [in the Pure Abodes],’ 1 practises the path without putting away the corruptions, you must admit it no less in the case of a person who has worked for the realization of the fruit of Stream-Winning, or the fruit of the One-Return, or the fruit of Arahantship.
Again, if you declare that a person who has worked for the realization of the fruit of Stream-Winning, or for the fruit of the One-Return, or for that of Arahantship, practises the path and puts away the corruptions simultaneously, you must also admit as much in his case who, leaving this life, attains consummation [in the Pure Abodes].
[19] You are admitting [by the position taken up with regard to the thesis], that a Never-Returning person, when he is reborn there, has * done that which was to be done,’ 2 is in the condition of having practised. But this is tantamount to declaring that the Arahant is reborn, — that the Arahant goes from one life to another, goes from one destination to another, goes from one cycle to another of renewed life, goes from one rebirth to another — which of course you deny.
You cannot, again, admit those qualifications in the Never-Returner and deny him those of ‘ one who has got rid of the burden,’ 2 when he is reborn there; for then you must admit that he will [there] practise the path again 3 to get rid of the burden.
[20] Similarly, whatever other attainments in the re-
1 Idha-vihay a-nittho puggalo = c a Never-Returner who
consummates after leaving this life.’ — Corny.
3 A phrase always associated with Arahantship. See above, 2, § 47.
3 This would bring ‘ the religious life’ into the life of the devas, the Never-Returner being then reborn, finally, as a deva of the Pure Abodes.
76 Of the Higher Life I. 3.
ligious life you withhold from the Never- Returner on his ■final rebirth there : — understanding of 111, putting away of corruptions, realization of the cessation of 111, intuition of the immutable — you compel him, in order to win them, to ‘ practise the path ’ [among the devas as deva]. Else you declare implicitly that he there completes existence without winning one or the other of them.
[21] /S.— Just as a deer wounded by an arrow, though he may run far, yet dies of his hurt, even so does the Never-Returner, by the path here practised, realize there the fruit thereof.
Th . — The deer wounded by an arrow, though he run far, yet dies of his hurt with the arrow in him. But does the Never-Returner, when by the path here practised he there realizes the fruit thereof, bear the arrow with him
S. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
4. Of Purification Piecemeal.
Controverted Point . — That [the converted man] gives up the corruptions piecemeal. 1 2
From the Commentary . — ‘ This discussion is to break down the opinion, held now by the Sammitiyas and others, that when Stream- Winners and those in the other paths, through the higher comprehen- sion gained in jhana, attain insight into the nature of 111 and so on,
1 The simile is not apt in so far as the Non-Returner’s final birth
- there ’ is likened to the dying only of the deer, and not to the last,
expiring run before it sinks dying. The arrow, for the Never-Returner, has still work to do. Only for the Arahant is its work done. The former, as deva , has one more spell of running to do.
2 Odhis-odhiso. This term is applied also, in the Patisam- bhidd-magga (ii. 180), to the more specialized variety of the < love-irradiating ’ contemplation prescribed as a religions exercise, anodhiso being the more catholic form of the same. As we pointed out in reviewing this work ( JBAS , 1908, p. 591), in a corresponding differentiation in the Jdtaha Atthahatha (i. 80 f. ; ii. 61), the word appears as an-odissaka. We have not found either variant elsewhere in the Pitakas.
103.
Man Progresses as a Whole
77
the putting away of corruptions [or vices] goes on piecemeal, that is,
by one portion at a time.’
[1-4] Theravcidin . — You affirm this because, you say, when a person 1 who has worked to realize the fruit of the First Path (Stream- Winning) wins insight into the nature of 111 and its cause, he gives up these [three of the ten] fetters 2 — theory of a soul, doubt, and the contagion of mere rule and ritual — and the corruptions involved in these, in part ; further, that when such a person wins insight into the cessation of 111, he gives up the latter two of those fetters and the corruptions involved in them, in part; further, that when such a person wins insight into the Path [leading to that cessation], he gives up those corruptions involved, in part.
But then you should also admit — what you deny — that one part of him is Stream-Winner, one part is not ; that he attains, obtains, reaches up to, lives in the realization of, enters into personal contact with the fruition of Stream- Winning with one part of him, and not with the other part of him ; that with one part only of him has he earned the destiny of but seven more rebirths, or the destiny to be well reborn only twice or thrice, as man or deva, or the destiny of but one more rebirth ; 3 that in one part of him only is he filled with faith in the Buddha, the Norm, the Order ; that with one part only of him is he filled with virtues dear to Ariyans.
[5-8] Again, you say, that when a person who has worked to realize the fruition of the Once-Beturner, wins insight into the nature of III and its cause, he gives up gross sensuous passions, the coarser forms of ill-will, and the corruptions involved in these, in part ; further, that
1 Pugg a la, again used in its popular or non-metaphysical sense.
2 Cf. above, p. 66, n. 2.
3 S at t a -kkha t tupar am o, kolankolo, ekabljl. Cf. Anguttara-Ni'k., i. 233 ; Puggala-Panhatti , p. 15 f. ; and Commen- tary , JPTS, 1914, p. 195 f., in all of which these terms are explained. The last — the ‘ one-seeder ’ — differs from the Once, and the Never- Returners, in that he is already in his last life, and that on earth,
78
Of Purification Piecemeal
I. 4.
when such a person wins insight into the cessation of 111,
he gives up the coarser forms of ill-will and the corruptions
involved therewith, in part ; further, that when such a
person wins insight into the Path [leading to the cessation
of 111], he gives up the corruptions referred to.
But then you should also admit — which you deny — that one part of him is Once-Beturner, one part is not ; that he attains, obtains, reaches up to, lives in the realization of, enters into personal contact with the fruition of the Once- Beturner, with one part of him and not with the other part.
[9-12] Again, you say, that when a person who has worked to realize the fruition of the Never-Beturner, wins insight into the nature of 111 and its cause, he gives up the little residuum of sensuous passion, the little residuum of ill-will and the corruptions involved therewith, in part ; further, that when such a person wins insight into the cessation of 111, he gives up the little residuum of ill-will and the corruptions involved therewith, in part ; further, that when he wins insight into the path [leading to the cessation of 111], he gives up the corruptions aforenamed in part.
But then you must also admit — which you deny — that one part of him is Never-Beturner, one part is not ; that he attains, obtains, reaches up to, lives in the realization of, enters into personal contact with the fruition of the Never- Beturner with one part of him, and not with the other part of him ; that with one part of him only does he complete existence within the term between birth and middle life, or within the term between middle life and death, or without external instigation, 1 or with it ; that with one part of him only does he become ‘ an upstreamer,’ bound for the senior deva-world, 2 and not with the other part of him.
1 Asankharena. The Puggala-Pannatti Corny . explains this to mean ‘ effected with little trouble, without much contriving ’ ( JPTS , 1914, p. 199). Sa-sankharena implies of course the opposite: ‘dukkhena, kasirena, adhim at t a p a y o g a p katva.
• 2 Akanittha, the fifth and topmost plane of the ‘Pure Abodes.’ The
- stream,’ according to the Corny, quoted, may be understood either as
‘ natural desire,’ or the ‘ round ’ of rebirth, or as the 4 Path-stream.’
106.
Appeals to Authority
79
[13-16] Again, you say that when a person who has
worked to realize Arahantship wins insight into the nature
of 111 and its cause, he gives up the lust of life with
material quality, the lust of life of immaterial quality,
conceit, distraction, ignorance, and the corruptions in-
volved therein, in part; further, that when such an one
wins insight into the cessation of 111, he gives up the last
three of those fetters and the corruptions involved therein,
in part ; further, that when he wins insight into the path
[leading to the cessation of 111], he gives up the last two of
those fetters — distraction and ignorance — and the corrup-
tions involved in them, in part.
But then you must also admit — what you deny — that one part of him is Arahant, and one part is not ; that he attains to, obtains, reaches up to, lives in the realization of, enters into personal contact with Arahantship with one part of him, and not with the other part of him ; that with one part only has be done with passions, hate, dulness ; that with one part only has he e done that which was to be done,’ 1 ‘got rid of the burden,’ ‘won the good supreme,’
4 wholly destroyed the fetter of becoming,’ with one part only is be emancipated by perfect knowledge, is ‘ one for whom the bar is thrown up,’ ‘ the trenches are filled,’
‘ one who has drawn out,’ ‘for whom there is no lock or bolt,’ with one part only is he Ariyan, ‘ with lowered banner,’ ‘ with burden fallen,’ * detached,’ ‘ conqueror of a realm well conquered,’ with one part only has he under- stood 111, put away its cause, realized its cessation, practised the path, comprehended that which is to be comprehended, learnt that which should be learnt, put away that which is to be eliminated, developed that which is to be developed, realized that which may be realized, and not any of this with the other part.
[17] S. — But if it be wrong to deny that my thesis is true, why did the Exalted One say thus : —
‘ Little by little , one by one, as pass The moments, gradually let the wise , i Cf. I. 2, § 47,
80
I. 4.
Of Purification Piecemeal
Like smith the blemishes of silver, blow The specks that mar his parity away ’ ? 1
Is the Snttanta thus '? Does this not justify my answer- ing ‘ Yes ’ ? 2
[18] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ For him, e’en as insight doth come to pass,
Three things as bygones are renounced for aye : Belief that in him divells a soul, and doubt,
And faith in rule and rite — if aught 3, remain.
Both from the fourfold doom 4 is he released,
And ne'er the six fell deeds are his to do ’ ? 5 6
Is the Suttanta thus ?
[19] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ Whenever, 0 bhikkhus, for the Ariyan disciple there doth arise the stainless, flawless Eye of the Norm — that ivhat- soever by its nature may happen, may also 'by its nature cease — then -with the arising of that vision doth he put away these three fetters : — belief in a sold, doubt, and the contagion of mere rule and ritual ’ ? 6
Is the Suttanta thus ? Hence it must not be said that the religious man gives up the corruptions piecemeal.
5. Of Renouncing Evil.
Controverted Point. — That the average man 7 renounces sensuous passions and ill-will.
’ 1 Dhammapada, verse 239 ; latter half also in Sutta-Nipdta, verse 962.
2 Omit na in Tenahi, etc.
3 Read y a d’ for y a d i.
4 Rebirth in purgatory, as demon, as ‘ shade,’ or as beast.
5 Matricide, parricide, Arahanticide, wounding a Buddha, schism, heresy. Sutta-NipCda, verse 231.
6 Of. Vinaya Texts , i. 97; Sayy-Nih., iv. 47, 107; Anguttarci- NiJe., iv. 186.
7 Puthnjj an o, literally ‘one-of-tlie-many-folk,’ a worldling, I'homme moyen sensuel, to quote the famous phrase of Quetelet.
109. The Implication of 1 Renouncing ’ 81
Commentary. — This question is asked to break down the opinion held, for instance, at present by the Sammitiyas, that an average man who achieves Jhana, who understands the Truths and becomes a Never-Returner, renounced sensuous passions and ill-will while he was as yet only an average man of the world.
[1, 2] Theravadin. — You. maintain that, as average man, he does renounce them. Now by ‘ renouncing ’ I imply that he renounces for ever, without remainder, 1 severing all connection with them, them and their roots, and all desire for them, and all latent bias toward them ; renounces them by Ariyan insight, by the Ariyan path ; renounces them while experiencing the immutable ; renounces them while realizing the Fruit of the Never-Retumer. This you deny.
And if, for ‘ renouncing,’ you substitute ‘ arresting,’ I claim the same implications, and you deny them.
[3, 4] The .person -who works for the realization of the Never-Returner’s Fruit : — he renounces, he arrests in this thorough -going way — on that we are agreed. But does the average man ? You deny this [no less than I].’
[5, 6] But if you apply these words ‘ renounce,’ ‘ arrest ’ [in your limited meaning] to the average man, you must also apply them, as meaning just so much and no more, to the candidate for the Fruit of the Never-Returner.
[7, 8] By what path (or means) does your average man renounce sensuous passions and ill-will ?
S . — By the path that belongs to the Riipa-sphere 2
Tit . — Now does that path lead men out [of the round of rebirth] ? 3 does it go to extinction [of 111], to Enlighten- ment, to disaccumulation ? 3 Is it clear of intoxicants,
1 The orthodox view is of a gradual giving up, from the First Path onward, residua lingering' till the Third Path is past. See above, p.' 66 [33], The Stream-Winner is no longer ‘ average man.’
2 I.e., to the plane of a sublimated material existence, to wit, a more
ethereal frame, sight and hearing. Man and the lower devas occupy the Kama-sphere of full sensuous endowment as we know it. ' On this ‘path,’ Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 43 f. The Rupa-sphere, or sublimated material heavens, would he the limit of the average man’s aspirations. -■ 1
3 On this term see Bud. Psy. Ethics, 82, n 2
T.S. V.
6
82
0/ Renouncing Evil I. 5.
fetters, ties, floods, bonds, hindrances, uninfected, 1 clear of what makes for grasping and for corruption ? 2 Is it not true, on the other hand, that this path is not any of these things? How, then, can you say that by it an average man renounces sensuous passions and ill-will ?
[9, 10] You agree that the path practised by the person who works for the realization of the Never-Returner’ s Fruit possesses all those qualities. But you should agree that that path belonging to the Riipa-sphere possesses the same qualities [since you claim that by it the average man renounces even as the Never- Returner renounces]. But you admit it has the opposite qualities ? Then, by parity of reasoning, you should find those opposite qualities in the path practised by the Never-Returner [since you claim that by it the latter arrives at the same renunciation as does the average man].
[11] You say that an average man, who is done with lusting after sensuous pleasures, 3 as soon as he has com- prehended the truth, 4 becomes forthwith established in the fruition of the Never-Returner 6 — why not add in Arahant- ship ? Why stop short of this ?
You must also admit that he has been practising the First, Second, and Third Paths at the same time, realizing the respective Fruits at the same time, and experiencing a combination of the respective contacts, feelings, perceptions, volitions, cognitions, believings, endeavours, reflections, and concentrations [all at different stages of evolution] which characterize each upward step.
[12] Or, if he does not arrive [at the Third Fruit] in this way, by what path does he arrive ? ‘ By the path of the Never-Returner,’ say you? Yet you deny that the re- nouncing of the three fetters — theory of a soul, doubt,
1 Bead aparamattho. ■
2 On all these terms see ojp. cit., 291-317.
3 Karnes u vltarago. The latter word is one of the stock of Arahant terras ; see above, p. 67 [47].
4 Dhamma, or Norm.
5 In other words, you make him leap at a hound from No-path to the consummation of the Third Path.
113. Appeals to Authority 83
and the contagion of mere rule and ritual — belongs to the work of the Never-Returning Path. Nay, you must admit it [since you leave your average man no other path], although it was said, was it not, by the Exalted One that the Fruit of the First Path was got by the renouncing of those three fetters Z 1
[13] Once more, you deny that, by that Third Path, gross, sensuous desires and the coarser forms of ill-will are re- nounced. Nay, but you are bound to admit this, for was it not said by the Exalted One that the Fruit of the Second Path was got by the reducing sensuous passions and ill- will to a minimum ? 2
Finally, by your previous assertion concerning the average man’s comprehending the truth (§11), you are bound to admit, though you deny it, that all who compre- hend the truth, the Norm, are established in the Never- Returner’s Fruit as soon as that comprehension arises.
[14] S, — But if the controverted question is to be answered by £ No,’ was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ In days of old on earth there lived Six teachers tohom men flocked to hear.
No flesh they ate for pity's sake.
Freed from the bonds of sense-desires.
No taste had they for fleshly lusts.
In Brahma-heaven they found rebirth.
‘ Disciples too of them there were,
Souls by the hundred not a few.
No flesh they ate for pity’s sake,
Freed from the bonds of sense-desires.
No taste had they for fleshly lusts.
In Brahma-heaven they found rebirth ’ ? 3
1 Anguttara Nik., i. 231 ; ii. 89, etc.
2 Banjyutta-Nik., v. 357, etc. ; Anguttara-Nik., i. 232 ; ii. 89.
3 Anguttara-N., iii. 373. The Opponent’s argument is obscured, in English, by the want of association between the terms Kama-(loka) and Brahma — i.e., Rupa-loka. 4 Sense/ 4 fleshly/ belong to the former term. Renouncing all that, the persons of the poem are reborn, like Never-Re turners, in the upper heavens.
84
Of Renouncing Evil
I. 5.
Is the Suttanta thus ?
[15] Th, — Yes. But was it not said by the Exalted One: —
‘ Verily, bhikkhus, I my unto you that this teacher, Sunetta, though he lived long maintaining life on earth, did not get released from birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow, and despair. Why was he not released from ill ? Because he had not enlightenment nor penetration concerning four things. What were they ? The virtue, the concentration , the understanding, the emancipation of the Ariyan. Once, bhikkhus, these four are understood and penetrated, then is the thirst for becoming cut off, then is the lust for becoming perished, then is there no more coming back to be. .. .
1 The virtuous habit and the mind intent,
Insight and utmost range of liberty :
All these are known to Gotama renoivned.
His understanding mastering all its truth,
The Buddha to the Brethren taught the Norm ;
Our Teacher, Seer, Ender of all III,
Perfected life and wholly passed away ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus? Hence it is not right to say ‘ the average man [as such] renounces sensuous passions and ill-will.’
6. Of Everything as persistently existing.
Controverted Point . — That everything exists.
From the Commentary . — This question was asked by one of ours, in order to break down an opinion, held at present by the Sabbatthivadins, 2 that, judging by the Suttanta passage : ‘ Whatever is material quality,
1 Anguttara-Nik,, iv. 104 f. (The last line expands the one Pali
word; parinibbuto.)
2 Sansk. Sarvasthivadins, literally, ‘ everythiog-exists-believers.’ On the history and literature of this influential school, see Professor Takakusu in JPTS, 1905, 67 f. ; T. Watters, On Yuen Chwang (in which consult Index).
115.
The Implications of ‘ Exists ’
85
past, present, future,’ etc., all phenomena, past, present, future [once
they arise among the aggregate constituents of personal life and
experience] persist in that state, 1 and that therefore all go on existing.
TO PURGE [ABSTRACT TIME-JIDEAS.
[1] Theme adin. — You say that ‘all’ 2 exists. Hereby you are involved in these further admissions
All exists everywhere, 3 at all times, in every way, 4 in all things, not in a combined state, the non-existent exists, 5 the right view which looks upon your wrong view as wrong exists.
[2] Again, taking all in terms of time, you affirm that the past exists, the future exists, the present exists. But is not the past [something that has] ceased— that is, departed, changed, gone away, gone utterly away? How then can you say ‘ the past exists ’ ? Again, is not the future [something that is] not yet born, not yet come to be, not yet come to pass, has not happened, not befallen, is not manifested? How then can you say ‘the future exists ’?
The present, you say, exists ; and the present is [some- thing that has as yet] not ceased, not departed, not changed, not gone away, not utterly gone away. And the past, you say, ‘ exists ’ ; then you should say of the past also that it has not ceased, not departed, and so on.
Again, the present, you say, exists — that is, it is born,
1 Literally, ‘ do not abandon that state.’
2 ‘All,’ in the Nikayas, stands for everything accessible to sentient experience. ‘J will teach you the “ all'” — what is that? The sense-organs and their objects and the co-ordinating mind. If anyone say : ‘ “ I reject this all , and teach you another all,” he could not explain ... he would be out of his range.' Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 15 ; cf. Majjhima-Nik., i. 8.
3 ‘ In the whole body.’ — Corny.
4 1 In various colours,’ is the illustration given by the Burmese translator.
3 I.e., chimseras, such as a sixth personal aggregate (one more than the orthodox five constituents mental and bodily), or horns in a hare, etc. — Corny.
86
Of Persisting Existence
I, 6.
has become, has come to pass, happened, befallen, is mani-
fested. And the future, you say, * exists ’ ; then you should
say of the future also that it is born, has become, and so on.
Again, the past, you say, exists, and yet that it has ceased, departed, and so on. And the present, you say, exists ; then you should say of the present also that it has ceased, departed, and so on.
Once more, the future, you say, exists, and yet that it is not born, not become, and so on. And the present, you say, exists ; then you should say of the present also that it is not born, not become, and so on.
[B] Do past material qualities 1 exist? ‘Yes,’ you say. But if you describe these in terms of whai ‘has ceased,’ and so on, as aforesaid, how can you say ‘those past qualities exist ’ ? Similarly, for future material qualities — if they [in common with all that is future] are not born, and so on, how can they be said to exist ?
[Similarly, the other more general admissions afore- stated apply also to material qualities in particular :] if in saying ‘present material qualities exist,’ you mean they have ‘not ceased to be,’ etc., then if past material qualities ‘ exist,’ they also have ‘ not ceased to be,’ etc. And if, in saying present material qualities ‘ exist,’ you mean they are ‘ born, are come to be,’ etc., then, if future material qualities ‘ exist,’ they also are ‘ born, are come to be,’ etc. Again, if in saying ‘ past material qualities exist,’ you mean that they have ‘ ceased, departed,’ etc., then, if present material qualities ‘ exist,’ they also have ‘ ceased,’ etc. And if, in saying ‘future material qualities exist,’ you mean they are ‘not yet born,’ etc., then, if present material qualities ‘ exist,’ they also are ‘ not yet born,’ etc.
[4] And all these arguments apply equally to each of the other four aggregates — do feeling, to perception, to mental coefficients, to consciousness.
For instance, if, in saying, ‘present consciousness exists,’ you mean it has not ceased to be, not departed, etc., then,
1 htiip a rj. ‘ The time-reference is now connected with the aggre- gates (khandha’s, mental and bodily constituents).’ — Corny.
118.
The Implications of ‘ Exists ’
87
if past consciousness [still] ‘ exists/ it also has not £ ceased
to be, departed/ etc. And if, in saying £ present conscious-
ness exists,’ you mean it is born, is come to be, etc., then,
if future consciousness, as you say, £ exists,’ it also ‘ is born,
is come to be/ etc. Again, if, in saying ‘past consciousness
exists,’ you mean it has ceased, departed, etc., then, if present
consciousness, as you say, £ exists/ it also has £ ceased,
departed,’ etc. And if, in saying ‘future consciousness
exists/ you mean it is not yet born, has not come to be,
etc., then, when you say ‘present consciousness exists,’ it
also is * not yet born, has not come to be/ etc.
[5] In the expression ‘present material- aggregate,’ 1 in whichever order you use the two terms, if no distinction is made 2 between each, if they are used as identical, of one import, as the same, as of the same content and origin, then when you say, that (A) present material-aggregate, on ceasing, gives up its present state, you must also admit that (Ax') material-aggregate gives up its materiality. Simi- larly, when you say, that (a) present material- aggregate on ceasing does not give up its materiality, you must also admit that (ax) it does not give up its presence (present state) .
[6] S . — But in the expression ‘white cloth,’ in which- ever order you use the terms, if no distinction is made between each, if they are used as identical, of one import, as the same, as one in content and origin, then when you say (A) 1 white cloth when it is being dyed loses its white- ness/ you must also admit (AJ it loses its ‘ clothness.’
Again, in the expression ‘ white cloth,’ in whichever order you use the terms, if no distinction is made between each, if they are used as aforesaid, then when you say (a) ‘ white cloth when it is being dyed does not give up its clothness,’ you must also admit that (a x ) it does not give up its white- ness. . . .
[7] Th. — If you assert that the material - aggregate retains its materiality, you must admit that the material-
1 Paccuppannag rupar).
2 Appiyap karitva. Ekatthata an unnat a.— Corny.
88 Of Persisting Existence I. 6.
aggregate is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. You know that the opposite is true; hence it should not be said that materiality is retained.
[8] Nibbana does not abandon its state as Nibbana — by this we mean Nibbana is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. And you ought to mean this, too, in the case of material-aggregate, if you say that the latter does not abandon its materiality.
Do you mean by ‘ material-aggregate does not abandon its materiality,’ that the aggregate is impermanent, non-persis- tent, temporary, subject to change ? You assent. Well, then, you should affirm the same with regard to Nibbana when you say: Nibbana does not abandon its state as Nibbana. . . .
[9] If, in your statement ‘the past exists’ (§ 2), you mean it retains its pastness or preterition, then in your statement ‘ the future exists ’ (§ 2) yon ought to mean : it retains its futurity, and in your statement ‘the present exists,’ you ought to mean : it retains its presentness, or presence. [10] Each of these affirmations involves a similar affirmation respecting the other two divisions of time.
[11] If the past ‘ exists ’ and retains its preterition, then must it be permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change ; and this, you admit, is not right. [12] When you say Nibbana exists, and retains its state as Nibbana, you mean: it is permanent and so on. So much also must you mean if you predicate the same respecting ‘the past.’ Or, if you do not mean that the past is permanent and so on, when you say ‘ it exists and retains its preterition,’ then when you say this of Nibbana, you imply that Nibbana is imper- manent and so on.
[13-20] All the foregoing (§§ 9-12) applies equally to the particular past, future, and present things called ‘ the five aggregates ’ — e.g. : —
If, in your statement ‘past consciousness exists,’ you mean : it retains its preterition, then, in your statement ‘future consciousness exists,’ you must mean: such conscious- ness retains its futurity ; also, in your statement ‘ present consciousness exists,’ you must mean such consciousness
124.
Abstract Time-Ideas
89
retains its presence. And each of these affirmations involves
a similar affirmation respecting the other two divisions of
time. Again, if past consciousness exists and retains its pre-
tention, then must it be permanent, persistent, eternal, not
subject to change — and this you admit is not right. When
you say, ‘ Nibbana exists and retains its state as Nibbana,’
you mean it is permanent and so on. So much also must
you mean, if you predicate the same respecting past con-
sciousness. Or, if you do not mean that past consciousness
is permanent and so on, when you say At exists and retains
its pretention,’ then when you say this of Nibbana, you imply
that Nibbana is impermanent, not persistent, temporary,
subject to change. . . .
[21] Is the past a non-existent thing? If you say ‘yes,’ you must reject your view that the past exists. If you say ‘the non-past exists,’ then to say ‘there exists a past,’ is equally wrong.
Again, is the future a non-existent thing ? If you say ‘yes,’ you must reject your view that the future exists. If you say ‘the non-future [alone] exists,’ then to say ‘there exists the future,’ is equally wrong.
[22] Does that which has been future become present ? If you assent, 1 you must admit that that which was future is the same as that which is now present. You admit this? Then you must admit that anything which having been [future], is [present], will in turn, having been [future], become once more [present]. 2 You admit this ? Then you must also admit that that which, not having been [future], is not [present], will not in turn have been [future] only to become [present] again. 3
1 He first denies because the future was then not yet present ; he then assents, because an anticipated thing when realized is present. — Corny.
2 The translation from Pali into Burmese has : 1 Having become present, does it become future and then again present?’ The Corny. explains that the opponent admits the repetition of this imaginary process of becoming, because he thinks he can speak of an anticipated thing realized as 1 having been, is.’
3 E.g., a chimsera like the horn of a hare. — Corny. Or as we might say, a unicorn.
90
Of Persisting Existence
1 . 6 .
[This series of dilemmas is also applicable to ‘ present ’
and ‘past,’ thus:] Does that which has been present
become past ? If so, you must admit that that which was
present is the same as that which is past. 1 If you do
admit this, you must also admit that anything which
having been [present], is [past] will in turn have been
[present] only to become [past once more ] 2 If you do admit
this, you must also admit it as true for their contradictories.
Similarly for future, present, past : — Does the future, having been, become present, and the present, having been, become past ? If so, you must admit that these three are identical, and that the process of becoming the one after having been the other is repeated. If you do admit this, you must admit it as true for their contradictories.
APPLICATIONS OP THE PURGED TIME-IDEAS.
[23] Do [all the conditions of an act of visual percep- tion: — ] eye, visible objects, visual consciousness, light, attention, when past, exist? If you say ‘yes,’ you should also admit that one sees the object that is past with an eye that is past. Similarly, for all the conditions of all other varieties of sense-perception that are past — to wit: ear, audible objects, auditory consciousness, space, 3 attention ; the nose, odours, olfactory consciousness, air, attention ; the tongue, sapid objects, sapid consciousness, liquid, atten- tion ; body, touches, body-consciousness, extensity, atten- tion; mind, objects of consciousness, reflection, the seat [of mental activity], 4 attention. For instance, taking the last : you should then also admit that one perceives the ‘past ’ object of consciousness with the ‘ past ’ mind.
1 In the Burmese translation : Is [just] this ‘ past ’ that present, or that (present) this past ?
2 The opponent invests time with objective reality, hut practically rejects all time distinctions. According to him ‘ will be ’ becomes ‘is,’ merges into ‘was.’ The Theravadin tests this by inverting the time- process, and showing the endlessness of such imaginary processes.
3 Sic, presumably conceived as full of air (v a y o) ; cf. smell below.
i Yatt hu. Note the silence as to the heart. — Compendium, 277.
127. Concrete Things in Abstract Time 91
[24] Similarly, if the conditions of a future act of sense- perception exist — e.g., eye, visible objects, visual conscious- ness, light, attention, then one should see future object with future eye, and so on. [25] For if you say that the con- ditions of present visual and other perception exist, and that you see present objects with an eye, etc., that is present, so, if you maintain that the past conditions of sense- perception ‘exist/ must you say that with the past eye one sees past objects, etc. ; [26] and similarly for future con- ditions of sense-perception.
[27] If you deny that with the past eye, visible objects, visual consciousness existing, one does not see past objects with past eyes, equally must you deny that, wuth the conditions for present vision existing, one does not see present objects with present eyes. Similarly for the other senses.
[28] Similarly for future vision.
[29] Does past coming-to-know 1 exist ? If you assent, you must admit that the function of knowing is done by that same [past] coming-to-know. And if you admit that, you must also admit that by that same [past] coming-to- know one understands 111, puts away its cause, realizes its cessation, practises the Path [not by present cognition].
[30] The same argument applies to future coming-to- know.
[31] Does present coming-to-know, or cognition, exist, and is the function of knowing performed by that same present cognition ? If you assent, you must admit that, past coming-to-know also existing [§ 29] , the function of know- ing is performed by that same past cognition. So that if, by that present cognition, the nature of 111 be understood, its cause put away, its cessation realized, the path leading thereto be practised, it is no less by that past cognition that all this is effected. [32] The same reasoning precisely holds good to the extent to which you maintain that present coming - to - know exists. [33] But you maintain that,
1 N an ap : — the process is meant, not the 1 body 3 of knowledge, or knowing conceived as a product.
92
Of Persisting Existence
I. 6.
whereas the past process-of-knowing exists, it is impossible
to perform the function of knowing with it. Then, by
parity of reasoning, surely it is equally impossible to know
with the existing present process-of-knowing. More par-
ticularly, if you cannot carry out the Four Truths con-
cerning 111 [§§ 29, 31] with past existing cognition, neither
can you do so with present existing cognition— which is
absurd. [34] Future knowing and present knowing are
mutually involved in just the same way.
[35] Do the corruptions of [his] past exist for the Ara- hant? 1 You reply ‘yes.’ But is the Arahant [now] lustful with [that past, yet existing] lust, hostile with that hate, ignorant with that dulness, vain with that conceit, errant with that error, perplexed with that doubt, torpid with that sloth, distracted with that excitement, shameless with that impudence, reckless with that indiscretion, all of which are past and yet ‘ existing 3 ?
[36] Similarly, you say that the past [five lower] fetters and corruptions exist for the Never-Beturner. But is he now holding that theory of soul, perplexed with that doubt, infected by that contagion of mere rule and ritual, subject to residual sensuous passions and ill-will, that are past and yet ‘ existing ’ ?
[37] Similarly, you say that the same past fetters, and grosser sensuous passions and coarser forms of ill-will ‘exist’ for the Once-Returner. But is he now bound by those fetters, and subject to those grosser passions and coarse forms of ill-will ?
[38] Similarly, you say that the past three fetters 2 and lust, hate and dulness entailing the rebirths of misery, exist for the Stream-Winner. But is he now bound by those fetters and those vices ?
[39] Granting that past lust exists for an average man, is he affected by that same lust? Yes? Then, surely, if paat lust ‘ exists ’ for an Arahant, he also is affected by that same lust ? Similarly for the other nine corruptions
1 A fortiori, since ‘ all exists ’ (§ 1). The ten corruptions (pp. 65, n. 4 ; 66, n. 4) follow. 2 Soul-theory, doubt, ritualism.
134
93
Time and Things
[§ 35]. [40-42] If you say that the average man is still subject to corruptions or fetters, past, yet 'existing,’ you must also admit that past corruptions and fetters, in so far as they ‘ exist ’ in those who have reached any stage of the path, involve their being subject to them at present. [43-6] Conversely, if it is impossible for an Arahant, or one in any lower stage of the path, to be now subject to certain corruptions or to fetters which ‘ exist ’ for him as past, it is equally impossible for the average man to be subject to a corruption or fetter which ‘ exists ’ for him as * past.’
[47] Do past hands exist? 1 Then must you also admit that taking and laying down by them is also apparent [as existences]. Similarly for legs, feet, and their going to and fro, for joints of limbs, and their contracting and extending, for the stomach, and its hunger and thirst.
[48] Does the past body exist ? Then must you also admit that the past body undergoes lifting and lowering, annihilation and dissolution, the being shared by crows, vultures, and kites ; also that poison, weapons, fire may get access to the body ; also that this past body may be liable to be bound by confinement by rope or chain, by village, town, or city jail, by fourfold restraint, and by the fifth, to wit, strangling. 2
[49] Do the [other] past elements [of the past body] exist— -its cohesiveness, heat, mobility? 3 If you assent, then you must admit that with each past element the past body still performs the corresponding function.
[50] Do past and future as well as present material aggregates exist ? If so, then there must be three material aggregates. And if you say that past and future as well as present fivefold aggregates exist, you must admit that there are fifteen aggregates. [51] Similarly, you must admit three organs of sight, or thrice twelve organs and objects
1 As part of ‘ everything ’ (§ 1).
2 Literally, by the neck. -
3 The first, 1 hardness ’ (or solidity) , has been implicitly dealt with
under § 47. ‘ Cohesiveness ’ may be rendered fluidity. The four
elements are the philosophic or abstract conceptions of the popular four elements : earth, water, etc.
94
Of Persisting Existence
I. 6.
of sense. 1 [52] Similarly, you must admit three elements
of sight, or eighteen elements multiplied by three time-
divisions, fifty-four in all. [53] Similarly, you must admit
three visual controllers, 2 or sixty-six controllers in all.
[54] Would you say that a Wheel-turning monarch 3 of
the past or of the future, as ’well as one of the present,
'exists’? But this amounts to saying that three W T heel-
turning monarchs are actually living. 4 The same impli-
cation lies in a similar assertion respecting Perfectly
Enlightened Ones [Buddhas].
[55] Does the past exist? 'Yes ’ you reply. Then, is the existent the past? You reply ‘the existent may be past, and may he not-past.’ But herein you make out that the past may be the past and may be the not-past. Your position is "wrong, and you are refuted. 5
[56] You are similarly involved if you say that, whereas the future exists, the existent may be future [and] may not be future. [57] So also for ' the present.’ [58] Similarly, if you affirm that Nibbana exists, but that the existent may be Nibbana, 6 may not be Nibbana : — this amounts to saying that Nibbana [is or may be] not Nibbana, not-Nibbana [is, or may be] Nibbana.
1 The six senses and their obj eots multiplied by three time-divisions.
2 Indriya’s. See p. 16; Vibhanga, 122; Yamaha, ii. 61, 283.
3 Or world-emperor.
4 Literally, there is for them the state of being face to face. It is orthodox to hold that there can neither be two such monarchs, nor two Buddhas (Saviour-Buddhas) at the same time. Dlgha-Nih., iii. 114 ; Vibhanga, 336.
5 The position of the Theravadin is, of course, by European logic, only tenable if the major term ‘exist,’ ‘the existent,’ be distributed: does (A) the past = (B) all that exists. But since, in Buddhist or natural logic, B coincides with A in one and the same object, we can substitute B for A ; and we may then follow the argument. But that such an argument as that above could be introduced in serious dia- lectical discussion shows how the Indian mind grasped particular concepts in philosophical discussion.
6 Bead, for a 1 1 1 a n, nibb anan(ti), in PTS. edition.
140. Appeals to Authority 95
[59] S . — Is it wrong to say £ the past exists/ £ the future exists ’?
Th.— Yes.
S . — But was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘What- soever material quality, bhikkhus, whether past , future, or present, is either internal or external, gross or subtle, common or excellent, distant or near, is called the material aggregate . Whatsoever feeling, whether past, future, or present, of which the foregoing may he said, is termed the aggregate of feeling. So also are the other three aggregates’? 1
Surely then the past exists, the future exists.
[60] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
£ Thesd three modes in word, term, or name, bhikkhus, which have been distinct in the past, arc now distinct, and ivill be distinct, are not condemned by recluses and brahmins who are wise. Which three ? (1) That material aggregate which is past,- which has ceased, which is changed, is reckoned, termed , named “ has been ” ; it is not reckoned as “ exists,” nor as “ will be.” And so for the aggregates of feeling, perception, mental co- efficients, consciousness. (2) That material aggregate which is not yet born, and which has not appeared, is reckoned, termed, named “trill be,” but is not reckoned as “exists,” nor as “has been.” And so for the mental aggregates. (3) That material body which has come to birth, has appeared, is reckoned, termed, named “ exists,” but is not reckoned as “ has been,” nor as “ will be.” And so for the mental aggre- gates. Verily these three modes in word, term, or name, bhik- khus, are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are not, will not, be condemned by recluses and brahmins who are tvise.
‘Bhikkhus, the folk of Ukkala, Lenten speakers of old, 2
1 Majjhima-Nik., in. 16 f. ; Sayy.-Nik., iii. 47.
2 Ukkala-vassabhahha, In B h Okkala. . . . The Br. translation renders this by adipurisa, men of old. But that, the district so-called (? identified with Orissa) is referred to is Buddha- ghosa’s opinion : ‘ Those dwelling in the country Ukkala.’ He divides the rest : v a s s o (sic) ca bhanna ca — ‘for these causation- theorists are two.’ Presently, however, he refers to them collectively
96 Of Persisting Existence I. 6.
Casualists, Deniers of the Deed, Sceptics — even they , too, judged that these three, modes of reckoning, terming, or naming, should not be condemned or repudiated. And, why teas that l Because they were afraid of blame, of unpopularity, of incur- ring opposition ’ ? 1
[61] Again, did not the venerable Phagguna say to the
Exalted One : ‘ Does the eye (or sight), lord, still exist by ivhich past Buddhas, icho have completed existence, have cut off the multipliers of life, 2 have cut off its cycle, have exhausted it, and utterly passed beyond all 111, might be revealed ? Or does the ear, the nose, the tongue, the co-ordinating sense, still exist with • which one might do this ’ ? 1 Nay, Phagguna, the
eye docs not exist, nor any sense by which past Buddhas, who have so wrought, might be revealed ’ ? 3
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it must surely not be said ■that ‘the past is,’ ‘the future is.’
[62] Again, was it not said by the venerable Nandaka : ‘ Formerly there was greed, [ivithm him] , that was bad; that this no longer exists is good. Formerly there ivere hate and dulness, that teas bad; that these no longer exist, that is good ’l 4
Is the Suttanta thus? Surely then it should not be said that ‘ the past exists.’
[6B] S . — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ If, bhikkhus, there be lust after, pleasure in, craving for, edible food, 5 consciousness establishes itself and grows there. Wherever
as j ana, people, thus: ‘These two (classes of) people and these
three views.’ These three views he tersely characterizes by referring to
(1) Makkhali Gosala’s formula (Dialogues, i. 71 ; Majjh.-Nik., i. 407) ;
(2) the words karoto na kariyati papap— ‘evil result be fall s not the doer ’ (Angutt.-Nik., i. 192) ; (3) Ajita KesakambalTs view (. Dialogues , i. 73). Sdratthappakdsim, VI. 437. Cf. Vin. Texts, i. 81; Ehys Davids, Bud. Birth Stories, 110. Cf. JRAS., 1910, 526 f., where the reviewer, E. Muller, overlooks this passage.
1 Sayyutta-Nih, iii. 71.
2 Natural desires (tanha) — so Buddhaghosa’s Commentary; else- where conceit and erroneous views are added.
2 Op cit., iv. 52. * Anguttara-Nik., i. 197 (III. 66):
5 Support, proximate cause ; see next page, n. 4, j
143. Appeals to Authority 97
consciousness establishes itself and grows, there doth exist an entry 1 for mind and body. Wherever an entry for mind and body doth exist, there do grow 2 mental coefficients. Wherever mental coefficients do grow, there re-becoming in the future doth exist. Wherever re-becoming in the future doth exist, there do follow future birth, decay, and dying. Wherever future birth, decay, and dying do exist, I, bhikkhus, do declare that to be accompanied by grief, anguish, 3 and despair. And whether the “ food ” be [ edible , or] contact, or act of will, or consciousness , 4 I declare it to be accompanied by grief, anguish, and despair ’ ? 5
Is the Suttanta thus ? Hence must it not surely be said ‘ the future exists ’ ? 6
[64] Th . — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
- If there be no lust after, pleasure in, craving for, edible food,
consciousness doth not establish itself or grow there. Wher- ever consciousness doth not establish itself and grow , there cloth not exist an entry for mind and body. Wherever an entry for mincl and body doth not exist, there cloth exist no growth of mental coefficients. Wherever growth of mental coefficients doth not exist, there doth exist no future re-becoming. Wher- ever future re-becoming doth not exist, there doth exist no future birth, no decay and dying. Wherever there doth exist in the future no birth, decay, or dying, I declare, bhikkhus, that such edible food is not attended by grief, anguish, and despair. Or whether the ‘food ” be contact, or act of will ,
1 Avakkanti, an opportunity for rebirth as the resultant of foregoing consciousness, i.e., in a previous life.
2 The Burmese translation also reads vuddhi, though B r . has h u d d h i.
3 Sadarar). So Singhalese MSS. PTS edition and Br. read sarajap (with) ‘ dust,’ a figure for the passions which cause obscurity of ‘ vision.’ Cf. Dialogues , ii. 32.
4 As one of the four 1 foods ’ or proximate causes taught in the Dhamma, vinhana (consciousness), functioning at death, is the ■cause of fresh effect-v innana beginning in the conceived germ. Cf. Mrs. Bh. D., Bud. Psychology, 1914, 22, 61 ; also Bud . Psy. Eth., 30, n. 1.
5 Sayyutta-Nih., ii. 101.
6 In PTS edition either na must be suppressed, or ? must be inserted. The Hanthawaddy Br. edition omits na vattabbaij.
T.S. V. I
98
Of What does my ‘ Past ’ Consist ? I. 7.
or consciousness , I declare it to he unattended by grief, anguish , and despair ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus ? Surely then it should not be said that ‘ the future exists.’
7. Of what does my ‘ Past ’ Consist ?
Controverted Point. — That one’s past consists in [bodily and mental] aggregates. 2
[1] Opponent. — If you affirm that [my] past consisted in aggregates — as you do — you must also admit that the past exists 3 — which you deny. This is also the position in the case of the organs and objects of sense, the elements, 4 or all of the three taken together. [2] Again, if you admit that [my] future will consist in aggregates — as you do — you must also admit that the future exists — which you deny.
This is also the position in the case of the organs and ob- jects of sense, the elements, or all of the three taken together.
[3] If you admit — as you do — that [my] present consists in aggregates and that it exists, you must also admit that
1 This passage in the Sntta quoted, follows immediately on the previous, quotation. The Opponent’s emphasis lies on the atthi, ‘ doth exist,’ of the solemn categorical declaration in the Sutta. The Theravadin,. by completing the declaration, shows that the future, so far from existing, depends entirely, for its eoming-to-exist at all, on the circum- stances attending the occurrence of a certain pre-requisite, or ante- cedent condition. Before it exists, certain conditions must have come to pass. So the Corny. : ‘the words “there doth exist in the future re-becoming,” etc., do not amount to a “state of existing,” but refer to. certainty of result, given the consummation of the conditions.’
2 This is a supplementary discussion to the foregoing, the Opponent, in the absence of any new allocation by the Commentator, being doubtless still a Sabbatthi vadin. His ‘ opinion is that past and future both exist, because the aggregates and other factors of our experience retain their state [as a sort of complex soul]. The Theravadin’s “yes” summarizes the past as khandhas (read khandhasangahitatta, as in Br.).’ — Corny.
3 The factors of individual life — in their ultimate terms — were among the ‘ phenomenal realities ’ of orthodox doctrine.
4 The elements were the physical irreducibles in the organism, and the sentient apparatus ‘ derived’ from them. Vibhanga, 82-5.
145-8. Is 1 to Consist’ tantamount ‘to Exist’ f 99
ray past, which consisted in aggregates, exists. Similarly for other present factors of experience. [4] Similarly, again, for my future.
[5] Again, if you admit a past consisting in aggregates — or other factors, such as sense-organs, etc. — which does not [now] exist, you must admit that the present consist- ing (as you agree) in aggregates, etc., no longer exists.
[6] Similarly as to a future consisting in aggregates, etc., but not existent.
[7] Again, a little more specifically, if you admit that material qualities in the past formed my aggregates, sense- organs and objects, elements, or all of these together, then you must also admit that past material qualities exist.
[8] And if you admit that material qualities in the future will form my aggregates, etc., you must also admit that future material qualities exist.
[9] Again, if you admit that material qualities in the present form my bodily aggregate and the other factors, and that the present exists, you must also admit that my past material qualities, having consisted in bodily aggregate, etc., exist.
[10] The same reasoning holds good, if, for 'past,
‘ future ’ material quality be substituted.
[11] Again, if you admit past material qualities existing as an aggregate, and hold the view that those past qualities do not exist, then you must admit that present material qualities existing as an aggregate, and other present factors, do not exist. [12] Similarly as to future material qualities existing as an aggregate, and other future factors, held by you to be non-existent.
[13] This also holds good if, for * material qualities/ any of the four mental aggregates be substituted. For instance, 1 if you admit that consciousness in the past formed my aggregate, sense-organs and objects, or elements [all of which you would call real], then you must also admit that past consciousness exists. [14] Similarly, if you admit that future consciousness will form my aggregate, 1 §§ 13-18 are parallel to §§ 7-11.
100
Of What does my ‘ Past ’ Consist ? I. 7.
etc., you must also admit that future consciousness exists. [15] Again, if you admit that present consciousness forms my aggregate, with other factors, and that the present exists, you must also admit that my past consciousness, consisting in aggregate, sense-organ, and the rest, exists. So again for future consciousness.
[17] Once more, if you declare, of past consciousness existing as an aggregate, and the rest, that that conscious- ness does not exist, then you must admit that present consciousness, existing as an aggregate, does not exist.
[18] Similarly as to future consciousness.
[19] Th. — Is it then wrong to say that my past and my future consisting in aggregates, elements, sense-organs and -objects, do not exist ?
Opp . — Yes.
Th . — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ These three modes in word, in term, or in name , bhikkhus, which are, and were , formerly held distinct, are not mixed, will not he confused, are not condemned by recluses and brahmins who are wise : — which three ? (1) Those aggregates, material and
mental, which are past, have ceased, are changed, are reckoned, termed, named “ have been ” ; they are not reckoned as “ are ” (or “ exist”), nor yet as “ will be.” Similarly, (2) for those aggregates that “will be,” and (3) for those that “are.” . . .’ P
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it should surely 2 be said that my past and future consisting in aggregates, elements, sense-organs and -objects, exist.
[20] Opp. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Whatsoever material qualities, bhikkhus, whether past, future, or present, are either internal or external, gross or subtle, common or excellent, distant or near, are called the material aggregate. Whatsoever feeling, or other mental aggregate, whether past, etc. . . .’? 3
1 This quotation, cut short in the original, is that of § 60 in the preceding discourse. — Sayy.-Nik., iii. 71.
2 In the PTS test n a should be omitted. Br. reads n a both here and in the final sentence. The Corny, assigns the question and citation in [20] to the Opponent. Hence the two conclusions must differ.
3 Scvrjyutta-Nik., iii. 47 ; quoted also above, I. 7, § 59.
151. Consequences Matured and Immature 101
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.— Yes.
Opp . — Hence it should certainly not be said that ‘my past and future consisting in aggregates,’ etc., do not exist.
8. Of Some oj the Past and Future as still Existing.
Controverted Point. — That (i.) some of the past exists,, some does not ; (ii.) some of the future exists, some does not.
From the Commentary. — The Theravadin by his questions seeks to break down the opinion, held by those seeeders from the Sabbatthi- vaclins known as Kassapika’s, that the past survives, as presently existing, in part.
[1] (i.) Th. — Does the past exist ? Some of it exists, you reply, some does not exist. You must then admit, [in equivalent terms], that some of it has ceased, departed, passed away, utterly passed away; some of it has not ceased, departed, passed away, utterly passed away. Yet you deny this.
[2] You must also admit, more specifically, that of past things of which the results are not yet matured some are existent, some not — you deny this — and that of past things of which the results are matured, some are existent, some not — you deny this — further, that of things which are with- out result, 1 some exist, some do not. This also you deny.
[3] Again, referring to your declaration that the past exists in part, which of the past exists, which not ?
K . — Those past things of which the effect is not matured exist ; those past things of which the effect is matured do not.
Th. — But if you admit the existence of the former part, you must also admit the existence of the latter part, and also the existence of those past things that are without
1 A vip a k a = a vy akat a (or abyakata). These include all classes of consciousness which happen as moral effects or resultants (v i p a k a c i 1 1 a), and are morally inoperative, also all material qualities, and Nibbana. Cf. Compendium, pp. 19, 20 ; Bud. Psych. Fill., p. 156, n. 1 ; 168.
102 Of Some of the Past as Still Existing I. 8.
effect. 1 Again, if those past things of which the effect is matured are non-existent, no less are those past things of which the effect is not matured existent, as well as those things which are without effect. Once more, you say, those past things the effect of which is not matured exist, but might not such past things be said to have ceased ? You admit this? But you cannot say that a thing both is and has ceased.
[4] Do you contend that those past things, the effect of which is not yet matured, but which have ceased, exist ? 'Then must you also admit that those past things, the effect of which is matured and which have ceased, exist, as well as those past things which are without effect — that these, too, exist.
If, on the other hand, you say that those past things, the effect of which is matured, and which have ceased, do not •exist, then must you also admit that those past things, the effect of which is not yet matured, and which have ceased, •do not exist [contradicting what you have previously affirmed], as well as those things which are without effect.
Or do those past things, the effect of which is not yet matured, but which have ceased, exist ? And are those past things, the effect of which is matured, but which have ceased, non-existent? Then you hereby affirm also that some of those past things, the effect of which is in part matured, and in part not yet matured, but which have •ceased, exist, while some do not exist — which you deny.
[5] K. — Is it then wrong to say ‘ those past things, the ■effect of which is not yet matured, exist ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
K. — Is it not a fact that past things, the effect of which is not yet matured, will become mature as to effect?
Th.— Yes.
1 ‘ Queries and answers all revolve about these three groups : incom-
plete results, completed results, and the indeterminate, or absence of
results. Of the act producing rebirth, life and decease are its result,
and the maturing of that result, accordingly, lasts from birth to death.’
— Corny.
153.
Does the Future exist in Part ?
103
K . — If that be so, then it is surely not -wrong to say
that past things yet immature in their effect exist.
Th . — Granting that such past things will become mature as to their effect, can they be said to exist ? Yes, you say; but granting that they will in this respect mature, can they be said to be present ? If you admit this, 1 then, granting that present things will perish, are they non-existent ?
[6] 2 (i.) To the question ‘Does the future exist?’ you reply ‘some of it exists, some does not.’ You must then admit [in equivalent terms] that some of it is born, produced, has happened, appeared, some of it not. Yet you deny this. Granting your declaration, do some things that have been inevitably determined 3 exist, and some not? You are committed to this, and also to this : that some future things which are not inevitably determined exist, and some not.
[7] ^Referring to your declaration (ii.) : — which of the future exists, which does not exist ? You reply : ‘ Those future things which are inevitably determined exist, those that are not so determined do not.’ You deny then that those future things not inevitably determined do exist, though you are really committed to this by the former half of your reply. Again, if future things not inevitably determined are non-existent, then also future things which are inevitably determined are also non-existent.
With regard to those future things inevitably determined which you say ‘ exist,’ would you not admit that such future things have not been born ? Yes ? Then how can you say that things not yet born exist ?
[8] Or, if inevitably determined future things, which are not yet born, do exist, then future things not so determined, which are not yet born, exist. Or again, if future things
1 Namely, that past things are present things.
2 §.§ 6-10 correspond to §§ 1-5.
3 Uppadino. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., § 1087, n. 4. They will certainly arise from the fact that their conditions are stable, however long the maturing may take, e.g. the consummation to be achieved in the coming of Metteyya Buddha. Atthasalinl, 361.
104
Of Some of the Past as Still Existing I. 8.
not inevitably determined, which are not yet born, are non- existent, then you must say no less of similar but inevitably determined things.
[9] ii.—Then is it wrong to say * those future things which are inevitably determined exist ’?
Th. — Yes.
K — But will not future things which are inevitably determined happen ?
Th. — Yes.
K . — Surely then things inevitably determined exist.
[10] Th. — Granting that future things, if inevitably determined, will happen, do they exist ?
K.~ Yes.
Th. — Granting they will happen, are they present ?
K . — No [the future is not the present].
Th. — I repeat my question.
K . — Yes [since, if they are existent, they are present].
Th. — And granting that present things will cease, are they non-existent ?
K. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. — But you have already admitted this.
9. Of Applications in Mindfulness.
Controverted Point . — That all mental states are appli- cations in mindfulness.
From the Commentary . — The groups holding special views who arose later, to wit, the Andhakas, comprising the sub-groups of thePubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Bajagirikas, and Siddhatthikas, held the opinion that the objects of mindfulness, namely, the body and the rest, were themselves [the conscious subject :] mindfulness. This they deduced from the passage in the ‘ Satipatthana-Sapyutta 5 : ‘I will show you, bhikkhus, the induction and the cessation of applications in mindfulness.’ 1 To break down this opinion, the Theravadin puts the question.
1 Sapyutta-Nikaya, v. 184. The controversy turns upon the double sense, subjective and objective, of the term sati-patthana, or mindfulness-applications. The Opponent confuses the objects of this important fourfold religious exercise with the mental exercise itself,
155. Limiting the Intension 105
[1] Th . — Do all cognizable things constitute applications in mindfulness T
A ndhaka. — Yes.
Th . — Then must you also admit that all cognizable things constitute mindfulness, the controlling faculty and force of mindfulness, mindfulness that is perfect, that is a factor of enlightenment, the * sole conveying ’ path ‘ leading to extinction,’ to ‘ enlightenment,’ to 4 disintegration,’ are 4 not [bound up with] the intoxicants,’ not akin to the fetters, ties, floods, bonds, hindrances, contagions, graspings, corruptions ’ ; you must admit that all cognizable things constitute the * ten recollections,’ namely of the Buddha, the Norm, the Order, morals, pious liberality, the devas, 4 mindfulness in respiration,’ 4 reflection on death,’ 4 mind- fulness concerning the body,’ 4 reflection on peace.’ 2 But this you deny.
thus merging object in subject, ‘subject’ in Buddhism being ‘con-
sciousness of object.’ We have much the same ambiguity observed in
the popular use of object and subject of thought. Etymologically ob~
and sub- scarcely support the distinction prescribed by philosophy.
A ‘subject for meditation’ is an ‘object of thought.’ A ‘hypnotic
subject ’ is for the hypnotizer an object.
The Sutta on which the opinion is based is ambiguously worded in the contest that follows. This gives not the induction and cessation of the meditating 1 mindfulness,’ but the cause or genesis (samudayo can mean these or induction) of the four prescribed objects of the meditation — the body, feelings, consciousness, and cognizable objects— the causes being nourishment, contact, mind-and-body, attention, respectively. Hence for the immature thought of the sectarian mind there is thus much of justification.
1 On this term, which includes ‘ memory,’ the etymological meaning of sati, see Compendium , 40, 179 ; Buddh. Psy., 1914. . . . The quaint comment runs thus : ‘ Inasmuch as patthana mean “ those things to which one applies”; — applies what? mindfulness . . . thus such mindfulness has patth ana’s as its field; but patthanas apply — what? mindfulnesses. Thus patthana’s mean (a) objects of mindful application, (6) subjects applying mindfulness.’
2 All of these terms are technical in Buddhist religious culture, and most are associated with applications of mindfulness, in the Suttas concerning it. Dialogues, ii. 827 f. ; MajjhimarNik., i. 55 f. ; Sayyutta- Nik., v. 141 f. ; 294 ; also Vihhanga , 198 f. ; 206.
106 Of Applications in Mindfulness I. 9.
[2] Again, you must equally admit, given your firso affirmation, that the eye-organ constitutes an application in mindfulness. And if you are driven to admit that it does, then you must admit everything for it, which, as I claim, you must admit for all cognizable things. [3] The same argument holds for the four other sense-organs, for the five objects of sense, for lust, hate, dulness, conceit, error, doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, indiscretion.
[4] Is mindfulness itself ail application of mindfulness, and conversely? If you admit this, then must you also admit that each of the foregoing cognizable things is an application of mindfulness, and that application of mindful- ness is each of those things.
You deny ; then do you hold that each of those cognizable things is an application of mindfulness, but not conversely ? You assent ; then you must equally admit that mindfulness itself is an application in mindfulness, but that application in mindfulness is not mindfulness.
[5] A. — Then is it wrong to say [ all things are applica- tions in mindfulness ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
A. — But is not mindfulness established 1 concerning all cognizable things ?
Th.— Yes.
A . — How then, good sir, can you deny what I affirm :
‘ All cognizable things are applications of mindfulness ’?
Th. — We have said that mindfulness is established concerning all cognizable things: now, are all cognizable things applications of mindfulness ?
A.— Yes.
Th. — Contact 2 is established with respect to all cognizable things : are then all such things applications in contact ? For this is that to which you have committed yourself. Again, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness, each of
1 Santitthati, literally translated, but ‘ actualized ’ may possibly be a truer rendering.
2 Contact (phassa) may be physical or mental. If mental, it takes place without impact a n g h a 1 1 a n a). Bud. Psy. Eth 5, n. 2.
157.
107
Appeals to Authority
these is established with respect to all cognizable things : are then all such things applications in feeling, in percep- tion, etc.? For this must equally be admitted.
[6] Again, if your proposition is to stand, then you equally admit for all beings 1 that they have mindfulness at hand, are endowed and set up with 2 mindfulness, having it ever in readiness. 3
Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘ They, bhikkhus, who do not enjoy mindfulness regarding the body, do not enjoy the Ambrosial ; they, bhikkhus, who enjoy mindfulness regarding the body, enjoy the Ambrosial 5 '} 4
Is the Suttanta thus? You admit it is; but do ‘all beings ’ enjoy, obtain, practise, develop, and multiply mind- fulness regarding the body ? You know they do not.
[7] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is a id cry, bhikkhus, that leads only to the purification of beings, to the passing beyond sorrow and grief, to the extinction of ill and sadness, to the attainment of right method , 5 to the realiza- tion of Nibbana, and that way is the four applications of mindfulness ’? 6
Is the Suttanta thus? You admit it is; but have ‘all beings ’ this one and only way so leading ? You are bound to admit that they have not.
[8] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ When a Wheel-turning Monarch appears, bhikkhus, then doth there appear seven treasures. What are the seven ? The treasure of the Wheel doth appear, and the treasures of the Elephant, the Horse, the Jewel, the Woman, the Householder, the Heir- apparent ; yea, bhikkhus, on the appearance of a Wheel- turning Monarch do these seven treasures appear. When
1 Who are all ‘ cognizable things ’ (cl h a mm a).
2 Samohita.
3 This term, in the original, is an intensive form of the attribute first named in this sentence : upatthita, p a c c up a 1 1 hit a.
4 Anguttara-NiJc., i. 45. ‘The Ambrosial’ in its literal meaning, the Not-dead, is a name for Nibbana.
5 Cf. Sayyutta-Nik., v, 388.
6 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 141 ; cf. Dialogues, ii. 327 : Majjhima-NiTe.,i. 55.
108
Of Existence in Immutable Modes
I. 10.
a Tathagata appears, bhikkhus, Arahant Buddha Supreme,
then doth there appear these seven treasures of enlightenment.
What are the seven 1 The treasures of those factors of
enlightenment : Mindfulness, Search for Truth, Energy, Zest,
Serenity, Concentration, Equanimity ; yea, bhikkhus, on the
appearance of a Tathagata Arahant, Buddha Supreme, do
these seven treasures appear ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus ? You admit it is. But do ‘ all things ’ become that treasure of Mindfulness which is a factor of enlightenment, when a Tathagata appears? You know they do not, yet you are bound to admit they do.
[9] Lastly, if all things are applications of mindfulness, they must be equally other of the (thirty-seven) things pertaining to enlightenment, 2 such as the supreme efforts, the steps to magic potency, the controlling faculties and forces, the factors of enlightenment. To this admission are you committed.
10. Of Existence in Immutable Modes.
Controverted Point. — That things exist so and not otherwise.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion now held by the Andhakas and others, such as the Pnbbaseliyas, etc., named above. They declare that all things exist, in time, by way of material and other qualities, as past, present, or future, but that there is no past that is at once future and present, nor any future and present that are also past, and therefore all exists only as thus (a), and not as thus (6). Then, says the Theravadin, the past both is and is not.
[1] Th .■ — Does the past exist ?
A . — It exists on this wise, it does not exist on that wise.
Th . — Does the past, as you describe it, both exist and not exist ? You deny, 3 then affirm 4 — for you must affirm. And
1 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 99. 2 g ee g 5j 5
3 Because it cannot, in its character as past, be both existent and non-existent.
4 Because it can exist in its own character only.
159-62. Time and Things in Immutable Modes 109
if this same past both exists and does not exist, then is also existence non-existence and conversely, then is the state of being a state of non-being and conversely, then are * is ’ and ‘ is not ’ convertible terms, identical, one in meaning, the same, same in content and in origin. And this of course you do not admit.
[2] Similarly, you say the future exists only on this wise, not on that wise. This is to say it both exists and does not exist; and that involves the same antinomy.
[3] Similarly, you say the present exists only on this wise, not on that wise — and you are landed as before.
[4] If the past exists only as you say it does, how is it existent, how non-existent ?
A. — The past exists only as past; it does not exist as future, it does not exist as present.
Th. — But this still commits you to saying that the same both is and is not, and thus to the same antinomy.
[5, 6] Similarly as regards the ‘how’ of such future and present as you hold to exist.
[7] A . — Then is it wrong to say ‘ the past or the future or the present exists only on this wise, not on that wise 5 ?
Th. — Yes.
A . — Do you mean then that the past exists also as future and as present, the future also as past and as present, the present also as past and as future — for to this you are committed ? Hence I am surely right.
[8] Th. — Do material qualities exist ?
A. — They exist on this wise, they do not exist on that wise.
Th. — Here again you are committed to saying ‘the same both exists and does not exist,’ and to the same anti- nomy as before. [9] Similarly in the case of the other four aggregates — feeling, etc. [10-11] Again, with refer- ence to how they exist on this wise, and how they do not, when you reply, ‘ the one aggregate, e.g., the bodily, exists as such, but not as any of the four mental aggre-
110 Of Existence in Immutable Modes I. 10.
gates,’ you are equally committed to the antinomy stated above.
[12] A . — Then is it wrong to say ‘any aggregate exists only on this wise, not on that wise ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
A . — But this commits you to saying that each aggregate exists equally as any of the other four. Surely then I am right in saying that each aggregate exists in a specific fashion, and not otherwise. 1
1 The peculiar phraseology of this dialogue: — the ‘S’ev'atthi s’eva n’atthlti ’ of the Theravadin, and the h’ev’atthi h’eva natthiti of the Andhaka, — calls up, as Mr. Beni M. Barua has pointed out to us, the Sapta-bhangl-naya of the Jains, by which they sought to meet the uncompromising scepticism of Sahjaya Belatthi- putta and his school. However that may be, the object here is rather to shake rigid dogma, than to meet a series of negations. See H. Jacobi, Jaina- Sutras, SEE, XLV., pp. xxvi-viii; Dialogues of the Buddha, i. 75.
163.
Can Wicked Devos infect an Arahant ?
Ill