Points of Controversy OR Subjects of Discourse
BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE
KATHA - VATTHU
FROM THE ABHIDHA MMA-PITAKA
BY
SHWE ZAN AUNG, B.A
AND
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.
1915
POINTS OP CONTROVERSY;
OR
SUBJECTS OF DISCOURSE
(KATHA- VATTHU)
THE COMMENTATOR’S INTRODUCTION.
Honour to the Exalted One Arahant Buddha Supreme.
Seated in heavenly mansions, by devas surrounded,
Teacher of earth and of heaven, Person unrivalled,
Skilled in the term and the concept, ending his discourse
Called the ‘ Description of Persons1 , he, supreme Person,
Set forth in outline the Book of the ‘Subjects of Discourse’
Giving account of the ‘ soul ’ and such points controverted.
By the mere heads thus laid down in delectable mansions
Moggali’s son filled out, here on earth, the full detail.
Now inasmuch as achieved is the way for the comment,
I will discourse on the matter. Listen attentive !
Now when he had wrought the Twin-Miracle, the Exalted
One went for the rains to the City of the Thrice Ten (x10 million)
Devas(angels). And there beneath the Coral Tree, seated on the
Pandukambala Rock, making his mother chief witness,
he discoursed to the assembly of Devas on matters philo-
1 Puggala-P annatt i. Paiinatti signifies both the idea or
•concept of any cognizable thing or group of things, and also the
verbal expression of the same. See Compendium of Philosophy ,
p. 4 L, 198, 264.
2
Points of Controversy
sophical [Abhidhamma-katha]. After he had taught
them the Dhamma-Sangani, the Vibhanga, the
Dhatu-Katha, and the Puggala-Pannatti, he
thought : — "When in the future the turn for setting forth
the Kathavatthu shall have arrived, my disciple, the
greatly wise Elder, Tissa son of Moggall, will purge the
blemishes that have arisen in the Religion, 1 and calling a
Third Council, will, seated in the midst of the Order, divide
this compilation into a thousand sections, 2 five hundred
being assigned to our views, five hundred to views of others/
For this occasion, beginning with an eight-sectioned inquiry
into the theory of person or soul, in four questions each of
two fivefold divisions, he drew up, with respect to the
course to be adopted in all the discourses, a list of heads
in a text uncompleted by just one section for recitation.
Then delivering in detail the remainder of the Abhi-
dhamma discourse, 3 his rains-season sojourn being over, he
descended by the jewelled stairway that was in the midst
of the gold and silver stairways from the deva world to the
city of Sankassa, 4 and so accomplishing the welfare of all
beings and establishing it as long as he lived, he completed
existence, leaving no remaining basis of future life.
Thereupon the company of his adherents, headed by
Great Kassapa, made friendship with Ajatasattu the
king, and drew r up a compendium of the body of Doctrine
and Discipline. 5 After a hundred years had expired, the
Yaj ji-puttaka bhikkhus declared for the ‘ ten bases ’ of
relaxation of rules. When they heard of this, Elder
Yasa, son of the brahmin Kakandaka, making friend-
ship with the king named Asoka, son of Susunaga,
selected seven hundred from among the twelve thousand
1 S a s a n a, meaning practically what ‘ in the Church ’ or ‘in the
Faith ’ or ‘ in Doctrine ’ would mean for Christendom.
2 Suttani.
3 This can only refer to the two last books Yamaka and Patthana.
4 Vin. Texts, iii. 396.
5 Dhamma-Vinaya-sarirai), not -kayap, as we might
have expected (cf. 24, n. 2), But the term was preempted; see
Dlgha-Nik, iii. 84.
Commentator's Introduction
3
bhikkhus, and quashing the ten bases, drew up a com-
pendium of the body of Doctrine and Discipline- Re-
futed by those Elders who had performed this task, ten
thousand of the Yajjiputtaka bhikkhus seeking adherents,
and gaining but a weak following among themselves,
formed the school called (1) Mahasanghika. 1 From this
arose the secession of two other schools: — the (2) Gokulikas
and the (3) Ekabboharikas. From the former of these
arose the secession of yet two other schools (4) Pannat-
tivadins and (5) Bahulikas, or as they were also called,
Bahussutikas- Among just these arose other teachers :
—the (6) Cetiyavadins. Thus from the school of the
Mahasanghikas, in the- second century, five schools arose,
making with the Mahasanghikas sis.
In that second century only two schools seceded from the
Theravada : — (i.) Mahirjsasakas and (ii.) Yajjiputtakas.
Now 7 , from the Yajjiputtakas four other seceding schools
arose, to wit, the (iii.) Dhammuttariyas, the (iv.) Bhadra-
yanikas, the (v.) Channagarikas, and the (vi.) Sammitiyas.
Again, from the Mahiijsasakas, in the second century only,
two seceding schools arose : — the (vii.) Sabbatthivadins and
the (viii.) Dhammaguttikas. From the Sabbatthivadins
in their turn the (is.) Kassapikas split off, and the
Kassapikas again, splitting later in two, the (x.) Sankanti-
kas were formed, and yet again, the Sankantikas splitting
in two, the (si.) Suttavadins.
Thus from the Theravada arose these eleven seceding
bodies, making twelve in all. And thus these twelve,
together w 7 ith the six schools of the Mahasanghikas, con-
stitute the eighteen schools which arose in the second
century. They are also known as the eighteen groups, and
as the eighteen sects. But of the eighteen, seventeen
schools are to be understood as being schismatics, the
1 Literally, formed the ‘ teachers’ clan, called the G-reat-Orderers.’
Each of the names of the seceding schools is a crux which we have
no means of finally resolving. Some — e.g., G-okulika — may derive
from the teacher’s name, some — e.g., Cetiyavadins — from a place
— here probably Sanchi, called the Cetiva or shrine — some from
the view professed — e.g., Sabbatthivadin.
4
Points of Controversy
Theravada only being non-schismatic. Moreover, it is said
in the Dipavagsa :
1 The wicked bhikkhus, the Vajjiputtakas, who had been excommuni-
cated by the Theras (Elders), gained another party ; and many people,
holding the wrong doctrine, ten thousand assembled and [also] held
a council. Therefore this Dhamma Council is called the Great Council.
The Bhikkhus of the Great Council settled a doctrine contrary [to
the true faith]. Altering the original redaction, they made another
redaction. They transposed Sottas, which belonged to one place [of
the collection], to another place ; they destroyed the [true] meaning
and the Faith in the Vinaya and in the five Collections [of Suttas],
Those Bhikkhus who understood neither what had been taught in long
•expositions, nor without exposition, neither the natural meaning nor
the recondite meaning, settled a false meaning in connection with
spurious speeches of the Buddha. These bhikkhus destroyed a great
deal of [true] meaning under the colour of the letter. Rejecting single
passages of the Suttas and of the profound Vinaya, they composed
other Suttas and another Vinaya which had [only] the appearance [of
the genuine ones]. Rejecting the other texts— that is to say, the
Parivara, which is an abstract of the contents [of the Vinaya]— the six
•sections of the Abhidhamma, the Patisambhida, the Niddesa, and some
portions of the- Jataka, they composed new ones. They changed
their names, their appearance, requisites, and gestures, forsaking what
was original . 1
Those who held the Great Council were the first schismatics ; in
imitation of them many heretics arose. Afterwards a schism occurred
in that [new school] ; the Gokulika and Ekabyohara Bhikkhus
formed two divisions. Afterwards two schisms took place amongst the
Gokulikas : the Bahussutaka and the Pahhatti bhikkhus formed two
divisions. And opposing these were the Cetiyas, [another] division of
the Mahasangltikas. All these five sects, originating from the Maha-
sangitikas, split the [true] meaning and the doctrine and some portions
of the Collection; setting aside some portions of difficult passages,
they altered them. They changed their names, their appearance,
requisites, and gestures, forsaking what was original.
In the orthodox school of the Theras again a schism occurred : the
Mahigsasaka and Vajjiputtaka bhikkhus formed two sections. In the
school of the Vajjiputtakas four sections arose, to wit, the Dhammut-
tarikas, Bhaddayanikas, Channagarikas, and Sammitis. In later times
two divisions arose among the Mahiqsasakas : the Sabbatthivada and
Dhammagutta bhikkhus formed two divisions. From the Sabbatthi-
vadins the Kassapikas, from the Kassapikas the Sankantivadins, and
1 In Dr. Oldenberg’s translation this sentence is made to refer to
grammatical innovations.
Commentator s Introduction 5
subsequently another section, the Suttavadins, separated in their turn.
These eleven schools which separated themselves from the Theravada
split the [true] meaning and the doctrine and some portions of the
Collection ; setting aside some portions of difficult passages, they
altered them. They changed their names, their appearance, requisites,,
and gestures, forsaking what was original.
Seventeen are the schismatic sects, and there is one that is not
schismatic ; together with that which is not schismatic, they are eighteen
in all. The most excellent one of the Theravadins, which is even as a
great banyan tree, is the complete doctrine of the Conqueror, free from
omissions or admissions. The other schools arose as thorns grow on
the tree. In the first century there were no schisms ; in the second
century arose the seventeen schismatical schools in the religion of the
Conqueror.’ 1
The Henaavatikas, Bajagirikas, Siddhatthas, Pubbaseliyas
Aparaseliyas, Vajiriyas — other sis schools arose one after
the other. To them no reference is here made. .
Now the Sasana held on its way as these eighteen early
schools. And when Asoka, 2 the righteous ruler, had
received faith, he bestowed daily a sum of 500,000 on the
worship of the Buddha, the Norm, the Order, the main-
tenance of his own teacher, the Elder Nigrodha, and on the
dispensaries at the four gates, and so brought notable
honour and patronage to the Sasana. Then the teachers
of other faiths, being deprived of honour and patronage, so
that they had not even enough to eat, sought that honour
and patronage by entering the Order, and set forth each
his own heresies, saying : c This is the Norm, this is the
Discipline, this is the religion of the Master.’ Some, even
without joining the Order, themselves cut off their hair,
donned the yellow robes and went about among the Viharas,
entering the assemblies at the time of the feast-services.
These bhikkhus, albeit they were confuted by Norm,
Discipline, and the Master’s Word, lacking steadfastness,
in the right order 3 of Norm and Discipline, wrought divers
cankers, stains, and nuisance in the Sasana. Some prac-
tised [holy] fire-cult; some the five-fold heat-asceticism; 4
1 Dlpavarjsa, v. 30-54 ; pp. 140-2 in Oldenberg’s translation.
2 Called also Dhammasoka ; the earlier king was Kalasoka.
3 °anulomaya. 4 Psalms of the Brethren , p. 120.
■6
Points of Controversy
some turned the way of the sun ; some deliberately strove
in one way or another, saying, ' We shall break up your
Doctrine and Discipline.’
Thereupon the Order would not, with such as these, hold
festival or confession . 1 For seven years the fortnightly
feast was suspended in the Asoka Park. The king strove
by a decree to bring it to pass, but could not. Nay, he
was filled with remorse when, through the misunderstand-
ing of a stupid delegate, some bhikkhus were slain. And
fain to allay both his regret and the plague in the Sasana,
he asked the Order : ‘ Who now is sufficient for this busi-
ness ?’ When he heard the answer : ‘ The Elder Tissa
Moggali’s son, sire,’ he invited the Elder to come from
the Ahoganga hill. And when he saw the Elder show a
miracle, he was filled with confidence in the Elder’s powers,
and consulted him on that which distressed him, and pro-
cured assuaging of his remorse . 2 Moreover, the Elder
dwelt seven days in the royal gardens teaching the king
doctrine.
Thus instructed, the king on the seventh day convened
the Order in the Asoka Park, and seated himself in a
pavilion which he had had erected. Marshalling the
bhikkhus into separate groups according to the views they
professed, he sent for each group in turn, and asked :
- What was the doctrine of the Buddha ?’ Then the
Eternalists said: ‘He was an Eternalist’; others that
he taught limited eternalism, immortality of the soul,
eel-wriggling, fortuitous origins, consciousness [of soul
after death], unconsciousness of the same, neither. Anni-
hilationists said he taught annihilation of soul ; those who
held with Nibbana in this life only claimed him no less . 3
The king, through the priming in doctrine previously
dealt him, discerned that these were none of them [proper]
1 Mahavay&a, v. 284-282.
2 lb., 264 : ‘ The thera taught the king : “ There is no resulting guilt
without evil intent.” 1
3 Various forms of soul-theory, dealt with in the Brahmajala
Suttanta, Dialogues, i. 27 f.
Commentator's Introduction
7
bhikkhns, and ejecting them from the Order, he bestowed
white lay-raiment upon them. And there were 60,000 of
them in all. Then he sent for other bhikkhus and asked
them : ‘ Sir, what was the doctrine of the Buddha *?’
‘ Sire,’ they replied, ‘ he was an Analyst.’ 1 At this reply
the king asked the Elder, saying : ‘ Was he an Analyst *?’
‘ Yes, sire.’ Then said the king : ‘ Now, sir, the Sasana
is purged. Let the Order of bhikkhus hold the fortnightly
feast.’ And, providing a guard, he entered the city. In
concord the Order assembled and held the feast. And sixty
hundred thousand bhikkhus were present.
At that congress Elder Tissa Moggalx’s son, to avert all
bases of heresy that had arisen, and that might in the future
arise, analyzed in detail the heads of discourse, by the method
which had been delivered by the Master, into 500 orthodox
statements and 500 heterodox statements, and so uttered
the book of the bases of discourse, the salient feature in
which had been the future crushing of all dissentient views.
Thereupon, selecting one thousand bhikkhus who were
learned in the Three Pitakas and versed in the Pour Pati-
sambhidas, 2 just as the Elder, Kassapa the Great [at the
First Council, had] recited Dhamma and Yinaya, so did he,
reciting, after purging the religion of its stains, hold the
Third Council. And in reciting the Abhidhamma, he in-
corporated this book even as he uttered it. As it is said : —
Set forth in outline the Book of the ‘Subjects of Discourse,’
Giving account of the ‘ soul ’ and such points controverted.
By the mere heads thus laid down in delectable mansions
Moggall’s son filled out, here on earth, the full detail.
Now, inasmuch as achieved is the way for the comment,
I will discourse on the matter. Listen attentive !
1 Or a Particularism as against the superficiality and inaccuracy of
sweeping generalizations. See Majjhima, ii. 197 (Subhasutta) ; cf.
‘ The Value of Life in Buddhism,’ by Mrs. Rh. D., Buddhism, Ran-
goon, ii. 193. The name became synonymous with Theravadin.
1 Meaning text, origins, exposition.
8
Points of Controversy
I. 1.
IBonour to tbe jEjalteh ©ne Brabant JBu&bba Supreme
POINTS OF CONTROVERSY
BOOK I
1. Of the Existence of a Personal Entity.
Controverted Point . — That the f person ’ is known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact.
From, the Commentary. — The Theravadin 1 questions a Puggala-
vadin (one who believes in the existence of a personal entity, soul, or
perduring immortal essence in man) concerning his position. Who
among the eighteen schools of thought were Puggalavadins ? In the
Sasana the Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas, and many other teachers
besides, not belonging to the Sasana. 4 Person ’ 2 means soul, being,
vital principle. 4 Is known ’ : 3 is approached and got at by the under-
standing, is cognized. ‘ Beal not taken as an effect of magic or
mirage, actual. ‘ Ultimate ’ : highest sense, not taken from tradition,
or hearsay. * Known ’ as one of the' fifty-seven ultimates of our
conscious experience. 4
I.—THE EIGHT EEFUTATIONS.
The First Refutation.
(i.) The Fivefold Affirmative Presentation.
[§ 1] Theravadin. — Is ‘the person ’ known in the sense of
a real and ultimate fact ?
1 More literally, 4 one of ours sakavadin.
2 Used in its popular sense = ho mo in the Nikayas; puggalain
the Abhidhamma Pitaka largely supersedes a 1 1 a and other terms for
soul.
3 Literally, is got or found. Cf. Dialogues, ii. 166 ; Psalms of the
Sisters, 190 : 4 Mayest thou obtain.’
4 Five aggregates, twelve sense-organs and objects, eighteen elements,
twenty-two controlling powers. See Compendium of Philosophy,
Part VII.
2 .
9
The Eight Refutations
Puggalavddin . — Yes. 1
Th. Is the person known in the same way 2 as a real and
ultimate fact is knovra ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th— Acknowledge your refutation: (i.) If the person be
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed,
good sir, you should also say, the person is known in
the same way as [any other] real and ultimate fact [is
known] .
(ii.) That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that
we ought to say, ‘ the person is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact,’ but (2) we ought not to say, the
person is known in the same way as [any other] real and
ultimate fact [is known].
(hi-) If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted,
then indeed the former statement (1) should not be
admitted.
(iv.) In affirming the former statement (I), while
(v.) denying the latter (2), you are wrong.
(ii.) The Fourfold Rejoinder.
[2] P. — Is the ‘ person ’ not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — No, it is not known. 3
P. — Is it unknown in the same way as any real and
ultimate fact is [known] ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P. — Acknowledge the rejoinder: 4 (i.) If the person be not
1 ‘ Yes,’ because the Exalted One, whose utterances were mutually
consistent, who taught no mere on-dits, and who himself had universal
knowledge, said in the Suttas handed down, that ‘ there is for instance
the person who is working for his own advantage,’ and so on. — Corny.
2 Tato. This is an ‘ instrumental’ phrase: kin te ‘puggalo pi
ten’ a k arena upalabbhatlti?’ ‘In the same way,’ that is,
either as the factors of mind and body are known, by immediate con-
sciousness, or under one of the twenty-four relation-categories. — Corny.
3 English idiom requires that the affirmative Amantal be
rendered negatively.
4 Pati-kammaq, ‘ re-action ’ ; hence, retort, rejoinder, rebutting,
repartee.
10
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed,
good sir, you should also say : not known in the same way
as any real and ultimate fact is known.
(ii.) That which you say here is wrong, namely, that
(1) we ought to say ‘the person is not known in the sense
of a real and ultimate fact,’ and (2) we ought not to say :
‘not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact
is known.’
If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then
indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted
either.
In affirming (2), while denying (1), you are wrong.
(iii.) The Fourfold Refutation.
[8] P . ( continues ). — But if you imagine we ought to
affirm that (1) the person is not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact, but we ought not also to affirm that
(2) the ‘ person ’ is not known in the same way as [any] real
and ultimate fact [is known], then you, who have actually
assented to the very proposition contained in that negative
question, 1 must certainly be refuted in the following
manner : — let us then refute you, for you are well
refuted !
(i.) If (1) the ‘person 5 is not known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact, their indeed, good sir, you should have
said [as well] that (2) the ‘person’ is not known 2 in the
same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.
(ii.) What you affirm is false, namely, that the former
statement (1) should be affirmed, but that the latter
(2) should not be affirmed.
If the latter statement (2) is not to be affirmed, then
neither truly can the former (1) be affirmed.
That which you say here — (1) should be affirmed, but
not (2) ; this statement of yours is wrong.
1 Implied in t a 1 1 h a, there.
2 In P.T.S. ed. read n ! up al ab b h at i.
3.
The Eight Refutations
11
(iv.) The Fourfold Application . 1
[4] P. (continues). — If this be a faulty refutation, look at
the parallel procedure in your own argument (§ 1). Thus,
according to us (1) was true (the person is known, etc.) ;
but (2) was not true (. . . known in the same way, etc.).
Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider
ourselves to have been refuted. [You say] you have refuted
us ; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument ran
that if we affirmed (1), we must also affirm (2) ; that if we
did not admit the truth of (2), neither could we admit the
truth of (1) ; that we were wrong in assenting to (1), while
denying (2).
(v.) The Fourfold Conclusion A
[5] P. {continues) . — N ay (I repeat), we are not to be refuted
thus, (i.) namely, that my proposition compels me to assent
to your ‘ known in the same way,’ etc. ; (ii.) your pro-
nouncement that my proposition (1) coupled with my
rejection (2) is wrong; 3 (iii.) that if I reject (2), I must
also reject (1) ; (iv.) that I must affirm both or none. This
refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other
hand, that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel
to the argument 4 was well done.
The Second Refutation.
(i.) The Fivefold Adverse Controversy.
[6] P. — Is the person not known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
Th. — No, it is not known . . . ( continue as in § 1 , reversing
the speakers, and substituting ‘ not known ’ for ‘ known.’
1 Upanaya, or Upanayana, is the technical term in Buddhist
logic for the minor premiss, and means the leading-up-towards, the
subsumption.
2 lSriggamana, 1 going down or away 1 : a technical term in
Buddhist logic.
3 In the P.T.S. ed. n’up ala bbh ati, in this paragraph, according
to B r , should be upalabbhati.
.* P atipa dan a — i.e., k at ha-magg a-p a tip ad an a. — Corny.
12 Of Soul or Person I. 1.
(ii.) The Fourfold Rejoinder.
[7] Th . — Is the person known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact ?
P . — Yes . . . ( continue as in § 2, reversing the speakers,
and substituting ‘ known ’ for * not known.’
(iii.) The Fourfold Refutation.
[8] Th . — But if you imagine we ought to affirm that ‘ the
person ’ is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,
but that we ought not to affirm as well that the person is
known in the same way as [any other] real and ultimate
fact [is known], etc. . . . ( continue as in § 3, reversing the
speakers, and substituting ‘ known ’for ‘ not known ’).
(iv.) The Fourfold Application.
[9] Th. ( continues ) . — If this be a faulty refutation, look at
the parallel procedure in your own argument (§ 6). Thus,
according to us (a) was true (a soul is not known, etc.) ;
but (b) was not true (. . . not known in the same way,
etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not
consider ourselves to have been refuted, etc.
(v.) The Fourfold Conclusion.
[10] Th. ( continues ). — Nay, I repeat, we are not to be
refuted as you claim to have refuted us . . . wherefore
your refutation was ill done, etc. 1
The Third Refutation.
[11]. Th . — Is the person known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
1 So far for what the Corny, calls p a t h am a-s u ddhis a c c hi-
kattho : — the ‘first’ controversy ‘merely’ relating to the ‘reality’
of the personal entity considered absolutely, or in itself. Its reality is
next considered in relation to space, to time, and, lastly, to things in
general. And nnder each of these four aspects, as we have already
seen above nnder the first, the argument is presented affirmatively and
negatively, thus making up the eight-faced views, or a 1 1 h a-m ukha-
v a d a, of the controversy.
8 .
The Eight Refutations
13
P — It is.
Th. — Is the person known everywhere in that sense?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation : If the person be known
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good
sir, you ought to admit that the person is known in that
sense everywhere. You are wrong to admit the one propo-
sition (At) and deny the other (C). If ((7) is false, (A) is
also false. 1
The Fourth Refutation.
[12] Th. — Is the person known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
P— It is.
Th. — Is the person known always in that sense ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( continue as
above, substituting ‘ always ’ for ‘ everywhere ’).' 2
The Fifth Refutation.
[13] Th. — Is the person known . . . (as in § 11) . . . in
everything 3 in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? ( con-
tinue as in § 11, substituting ‘in everything ’ for ‘every-
where ’).
1 Complete, as in §§ 2-5. This section is termed okasasacchi-
kattho, or reality in respect of place. It deals with the errors
(1) that the soul or person is in the r u p a or material qualities (r u p a s-
mit) attanaq s amanup as s anado sa rj), so often repudiated in
the Nikayas ; and (2) the living thing or principle (j I v o) is different
from the body (sar Iraq), also frequently mentioned in those hooks.
— Corny.
2 This section is known as ‘ reality in respect of time.’ According
to the Corny, the adherent’s question refers to both the former and
later lives (of any given person), to the present remainder of life, and to
its final close (dharaman a-p arinibbutakalaiica).
3 That is, in all the mental and bodily constituents, the organs and
objects of sense, etc. Corny, (for Khandhesuti, P.T.S. ed.,
p, 15, read s a b b e s ii t i).
14
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
The Sixth Refutation.
[14] P. — Is the person not known . . . ( otherwise as in
§ 11) . . . everywhere in that sense ? . . . ( substituting ‘ not
known’ for ‘ known’). 1
The Seventh Refutation.
[15] P . — Is the person not known . . . always in that
sense ? . . .
The Eighth Refutation.
[16] P . — Is the person not known ... in everything
in that sense ? . . .
II. COMPARATIVE INQUIRY.
Comparison with other Realities, simply treated . 2
[17] Th. — Is the person known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact, and is material quality 3 also known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
' P.— Yes.
Th. — Is material quality one thing and the person
another ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation : If the person and
material quality be each known in the sense of real and
ultimate facts, then indeed, good sir, you should also have
admitted that they are distinct things. You are wrong to
1 This and the next two sections, opened by the opponent, are to be
completed as in §§ 6-10.
2 Suddhika-saechikattha-sarjsandana.
3 Rupai), i.e., the material khandha, or aggregate in the con-
stituents of personality ; the twenty-eight properties of matter con-
sidered as qualities of body mentally presented. On the rendering
ef. Compendium, Part VI., and p. 271 f.
11 .
Comparative Inquiry
15
admit the former proposition and not the latter. If the
latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be
affirmed. To say that the person and material quality are
both known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, but
that they are not mutually distinct things, is false.
[18-73] The same form of controversy is then pursued con-
cerning fifty-five other real and ultimate facts, or aspects of
them, namely : —
[18] feeling \
[19] perception 1 j the other aggregates
[20] coefficients (sankhara's) 1 2 j ( khandha’s );
[21] consciousness ;
[22] the organ of sight
[23] „ of hearing
[24] ,, of smell
[25] „ of taste
[26] „ of touch
[27] visible object the twelve sense factors
[28] sound ( dyatana’s ); 3
[29] odour
[30] taste
[31] tangible object
[32] mind ( sensus communis )
[33] cognizable object ;
[34] eye as subjective element 1 ,
[35-8] ear, nose, tongue, body ‘te eighteen elements
as subjective element J
[39-48] sights, sounds, odours, tastes, touches as objec-
tive element ;
[44-8] visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile cog-
nition as subjective element,
[49] mind as subjective element,
[50] mind- cognizing as subjective element,
[51] cognizables as objective element ;
1 On the import of this term cf. Compendium, p. 15.
2 lb., p. 182, n. 2. 3 Ih., p. 183 f.
4 lb.
16
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
[52-7] 1 the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body,
mind as controlling power,
[58-60] female sex, male sex, life as con-
trolling power,
[61-5] pleasure, pain, joy, grief, hedonic
indifference as controlling power,
[66-70] the controlling powers : faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, under-
standing,
[71-3] the controlling powers [known as]
(i.) the thought, ‘ I shall come to know the
unknown/ (ii.) the coming to know, (iii.) the
having known.
[74] P . — Is the person not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — It is not.
P . — Did the Exalted One say: ‘There is the person
who works for his own good?’ 2 And is material quality
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — Is material quality one thing and the person another?
Th. — Nay, that cannot he truly said.
P. — Acknowledge this rejoinder: 3 If the Exalted One
said : ‘ There is the person who works for his own good,’
and if material quality be known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have
admitted that material quality and the person are two
distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of
the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If
material quality and person are not two distinct facts, then
neither can you also say*that the Exalted One predicated
anything concerning a ‘ person.’ Your position is false/
[75-129] The controversy is now repeated with the succes-
1 Compendium, p. 175 f.
2 From a category of four sorts of persons (puggala), occurring
in three of the four Nikciyas ie.g., JDighu, iii. 232 ; MajjMma, i. 341,
411 ; Anguttara, ii. 95), though not with the phrase A 1 t h i, ‘ There is.’
3 Namely, to § 17. 4 Complete as in §§ 3-16.
the
twenty-two
- controlling
powers
(indriya’s). 1
14.
Comparative Inquiry
17
sive substitution of each of the real and ultimate facts named
in §§ 18-73 for ‘material quality.’
Comparison with other Realities continued by
Way of Analogy.
[130] Th. — Material quality is (you have admitted)
known as a real and ultimate fact. Feeling, too, is known as
such. No w, is material quality one thing and feeling another ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is the person known also in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact, as material quality is known ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Then, is material quality one thing, person another
thing ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly he admitted.
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation : If material quality
and feeling are both known as real and ultimate facts, and
yet are two different things, then analogously, if the person
and material quality are both known as real and ultimate
facts, they, good sir, can equally be two different things. '
Your position in admitting the first pair of propositions,
but not the second pair, is false. If you cannot admit
the second pair, neither should you have admitted the
first pair. Your position is false. 1
[131-133] The same argument is then applied to the case of
. each of the other three khandhas, substituted for feeling.
[134] The permutations of the five aggregates ( khandhas )
.are proceeded with as in § 130, thus :
material quality and feeling, 1 m Ucei %
the person and material quality )
feeling and perception,
the person and feeling
feeling and the coefficients,
the person and feeling
feeling and consciousness,
the person and feeling
1 This discourse may be completed as in §§ 2-16.
T.S. V.
| , next by
| , next by
| ; after which
2
18 Of Send or Person I. 1.
perception, coefficients, and consciousness in their turn
replace feeling.
[135] Next each of the 12 Ayatanas, the 18 Dhatus, and
the 22 Indriyas is used in turn to illustrate the analogy, thus .*
organ of sight and organ of hearing, j ^ ^
tbe person and organ of sight, J
grouping in the Ayatana-analogies, the last grouping in the
Indriy a- analogies being
the controlling power of 4 one who has corue to know,’ and
that of ‘ the coming to know,’
the person and the controlling power of ‘ one who has come
to know.’
[136] P. — Material quality is known [you have ad-
mitted] in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Is
material quality one thing, feeling another thing ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Was it said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is the
person who works for his own good?’ 1 And is material
quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — [Well then,] is material quality one thing, the
person another?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P. — Acknowledge the rejoinder: 2 If material quality
and feeling are known as real, ultimate facts, and are
different things, then why are not 4 the person’ — a term used
by the Exalted One — and material quality also two different
things? Your position is false. You admit the truth of
the first pair of propositions, but not that of the analogous
second pair. If you deny the truth of the second pair,,
you should not admit the truth of the analogous first
pair.
{The discourse ?nay be completed as in §§ 3-16.)
1 Of. § 74. The opponent still assumes that the Buddha used the
word ‘pugg ala’ in the sense of a permanent ultimate entity.
2 I.e., to § 130.
18. Comparative Inquiry 19
[137] The 1 ivheel ’ (e a k k a) 1 of all the other ultimate
facts — other khandhas, ayatanas, etc. — now revolves about
this quotation, as it revolved in §§ 131-135.
Comparison by the Fourfold Method.
[138] Th.— Is ‘ the person’ known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — (i.) Is material quality the person ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. 2
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation: If the former pro-
position is true, you should also, good sir, have admitted
the latter. If you cannot affirm that material quality is
the person, neither should you have admitted that the
person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
Your position is false.
[139] Th. — You admit the former proposition, (ii.) Now,
is the person [known as being] in material quality ? (iii.) Is
it known as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Is
material quality known as being in the person ? 3
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. — Acknowledge the refutation : If the person is
indeed known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,
then, good sir, you should also have admitted one of these
other three propositions. Your position is false. If you
cannot admit any one of those three propositions [as to
where or how the person is known], then indeed, good sir,
you should not assent to the original proposition — that the
person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[140-141] The ‘ ivheel ’ is then turned for all the remaining
1 real and ultimate facts ’ in relation to * person 5 ... is
1 Commentarial term (pron. : c h a k k a) for a repeated formula.
In the text, p. 20, 1. 1, read Ajanahipafcikammar).
2 The opponent sees he is in danger of admitting himself a Nihilist
(ucchedavada, or materialist), and negates. — Corny.
3 The opponent here fears to assent to the sakk&yaditthi, or
heresy of individuality, often condemned in the Suttas. See below,
pp. 44 n., 45 n. 3.
20
Of Soul or Person I. 1.
feeling the person? ... is the person ... in feeling? . . .
apart from feeling? ... is feeling ... in the person?
. . . is the organ of sight the person? . . . and so on.
[142] P. — Is the person not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
PA .—It is not so known.
P.— (i.) Is material quality the person ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
P. — Acknowledge the rejoinder: 1 If the person is not
so known as you state, then you should have admitted
that material quality and person are the same. 2 If you
cannot admit the latter proposition, neither can you assert
the former. . . .
[143] P. — Is the person not known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th. — It is not so known.
P. — (ii.) Is the person known as being in material
quality? (iii.) Or as being apart from material quality?
(iv.) Or is material quality known as being in the person ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
P. — Acknowledge the rejoinder: 3 If the person is not
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good
sir, you should admit that it is known [in association with
material quality] as advanced in the other propositions.
If one of these cannot be admitted, neither should you
have asserted the first proposition. 4
( This and the 'preceding § may be completed as in §§ 3-16.)
[144-145] The ‘ wheel ’ is then turned as indicated in
§§ 140-141.
1 I.e., to § 138.
2 ‘ Material quality, 1 or any other of the fifty-seven ultimates. If
‘puggala’ is not a separate ultimate, it must be identifiable with
one of them— admitting the fact that puggala is— did not the
Exalted One say so ?
3 I.e., to § 189.
4 It being still asserted (by P.) that puggala is a real, etc., fact.
The Burmese editions repeat the supposed evidence given in § 74.
24.
Comparative Inquiry
21
Associated Characteristics.
[146] Th . — Is ‘the person’ known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
P. — Yes.
Th . — Is ‘ the person ’ related, or is it absolute ? Is ‘ the
person ’ conditioned, or is it unconditioned? Is it eternal?
or is it temporal ? Has it external features ? or is it
without any ?
P. — Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about
it. . . . (Continue as in § 1 : ‘ Acknowledge the refuta-
tion,’ etc. 1
[147] P. — Is ‘ the person ’ unknown in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th . — It is.
P . — Was it said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is the
person who works for his own good ’ . . . ?
Th.— Yes.
P . — Is the person related, or is it absolute ? conditioned
or unconditioned ? eternal or temporal ? with the marks or
without them ?
Th. — Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated
about it. 2
P. — Acknowledge, etc. 3 . . . {complete as in § 2 and in
§§ 3-16).
1 The text has here the eliding . . . p e . . . The Corny, remarks :
Inasmuch as anything considered in its real, ultimate sense is, except
Nibbana, bound up in relations (pace ay a), happens only as con-
ditioned by relations, arises, ceases, and has no perduring essence, and,
finally, has the character known as (leg . sankhatassa) the reason
for happening, therefore it is asked : Has the person also these
characteristics ?
2 Because (1) as an entity ‘ person ’ is non-existent ; (2) with ‘person’
as a concrete bundle of phenomena (the ‘ person ’ of the quotation)
the original thesis is not really concerned.
3 The text again breaks off with its . . . p e . . . (etc.).
22
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
To clear the Meaning of the Terms. 1
[148] Th. — Is ‘ the person ’ known, and conversely, is
ihat which is known the person ?
P . — The person is known. Conversely, of that which
is known some is ‘ person,’ some is not ‘ person.’
Th. — Do yon admit this with respect to the subject
•also : of that which is person, is some known and some
not known ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( continue as
before).
[149] Th. — Does ‘ person ’ mean a reality and con-
versely ?
P. — ‘ Person ’ is a reality. Conversely, reality means
in part person, in part not person.
Th. — Do you admit this with respect to the subject
also: that ‘person means in part reality, in part non-
reality ’?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[150] Th. — Does the person exist, and conversely?
P. — The person exists. Conversely, of the existent
some is person, some is not person.
Th. — Of the person is some existent, some non-existent ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[151] Query repeated with an equivalent major term. 2
[152] Th. — Is person something that is, and conversely ?
{Reply similar to the foregoing.)
1 An inquiry into how far the middle term, such as 1 that which is
known,’ is ‘ distributed’ with respect to the subject, or is coincident with
it. The Corny, explains that k e-hi-ci, ‘ some, 5 is [not instrumental,
but] equal to k o ci, hi being merely a particle. ‘ For me the person
is, and the Buddha said so, but not all that is known [as ultimately
real] is person. 5 The fact that ‘att'hi,’ ‘is,’ ‘exists,’ is not used in
Pah merely as a copula, gives the term, as meaning separate existence
in fact, not only in thought, a greater emphasis than our own ‘is.’
2 Sagvijjamano,an equivalent of the preceding v i j j a m a n o .
All are equivalents for u p a 1 a b b h a t i , ‘is known,’ or found. — Corny.
25. Sifting the Meaning 23
[153] Th : — Does the person exist, and conversely, is
that which exists not all person 2 1
P. — Yes.
Th . — Can you substitute ‘not exist (s) ’ for ‘exist(s) ’?
P.— No. . . .
Inquiry into Term-or-Concept 2
[154] Th . — Is one who has material quality in the
sphere of matter 3 a ‘ person ’ ?
Yes.
Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of
sense-desire ‘a person’?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[154®] Are those who have material qualities in the
sphere of matter ‘ persons ’ ?
Yes.
Are those who experience desires of sense in the sphere
of sense-desire ‘ persons’?
1 On this section the Commentator as follows : The opponent has
just admitted that the existent [the real ultimate existent] is greater
in extension than ‘ soul. ’ The Theravadin, having his assent to this,
now connects it with his assertion about the Buddha’s statement:
You quoted that saying: ‘There are (souls or) persons working for
their own good ’ . . . only on account of the term, and this you took
as implying that soul exists [as a. real ultimate]. But the Bhagava
also said, in the Sutta Nipata (1116) : ‘ Consider, Mogharaja, that the
world is empty of soul (att a).’ . . . Hence, by the quotation, if is
as easy to deny soul (puggalo n a 1 1 h i) as to affirm it (p u g g a 1 o
atthi), or, to say ‘that which exists not is all persons (natthi
sabbo puggalo), as to say that ‘that which exists is not all
persons’ (atthi na sabbo puggalo). The Corny, explains this
last clause as equivalent to 1 some existent things are persons, some
not.’ The converse in English is better expressed by ‘all existent
things are not persons.’
2 Pannatti. See p. 1, n.
3 Dhatu stands here, spatially considered, for loka, hence
‘ sphere ’ for 1 element.’ Cf. Yam, i. 374. Henceforth the text gives
only the opening of the ‘first refutation’ in each controversy, the
Theravadin putting the question. To indicate the speakers is therefore
unnecessary.
24
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
[154*] Is one who is without material qualities in the
sphere of the Immaterial a ‘ person ’ ?
Yes.
Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of
sense-desire a person ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[154] Are those who have no material qualities in the
Immaterial sphere 1 persons ’ ?
Yes.
Are those who experience sense-desires in the sphere of
of sense-desire ‘ persons ’ ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.
[155] Th. — According to you one who lias material
qualities in the sphere of matter is a ‘ person ’ ; one who has
no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere is a ‘ person ’ :
does anyone deceasing from the Rupa sphere get reborn in
the Immaterial sphere ?
Yes.
Is the ‘ person ’ who had material qualites [then] anni-
hilated, and does the person with no material qualities
come into being ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted. . . .
Queries repeated, substituting ‘ being n for ‘person.’
[156] Applying the terms ‘physical frame,’ 2 and ‘body’ 3
indiscriminately to our body, are these identical, one in
meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in
origin ?
Yes.
1 S a 1 1 o. Both are equivalent expressions for ‘ soul.’ See § 1, n. 2.
2 Kayo, literally, as in nikayo, a group, collection, congeries.
In psychology, the whole sentient surface, organ and seat of touch.
We lack a synonym for ‘ body cf. Korper, Leib.
3 The unusual phrase kayag appiyarj karitva is, in the
Corny., paraphrased by kayag appetabbag alliyapetab-
bageklbhavag upanetabbag a vib h a j i t ab b a g katva
‘taking [the two terms as applied to] body not in a separate but a
cohesive sense, i.e ., in one and the same sense, without dis-
tinguishing. ’
26- Sifting the Meaning 25
Are the terms ‘personal entity,’ 1 or ‘soul,’ 2 as applied
without distinction to the individual, identical, one in
meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in
origin ?
Yes.
Is ‘ physical frame ’ different from ‘ personal entity ’
(or ‘ individual ’) ?
Yes.
Is ‘ soul ’ one thing, ‘ body ’ another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Acknowledge the refutation : If there be this identity
and coincidence between 3 ‘physical frame’ and ‘body’;
and if there be this identity and coincidence between
‘ individual ’ (or personal entity) and ‘ soul ’ ; if, further,
‘ physical frame ’ is different from ‘ individual ’ (or personal
entity), then indeed, good sir, it should also have been
admitted that ‘ soul ’ is different from ‘ body.’
You are wrong in (1) admitting the identity between
‘ physical frame ’ and ‘ body,’ (2) admitting the identity
between ‘ personal entity ’ and ‘ soul,’ (3) admitting the
difference between ‘ physical frame 1 and ‘ personal entity,’
while (4) you deny the difference between ‘ body ’ and
- soul.’
If you cannot admit (4), neither should you have
admitted (1), (2), (3). You cannot admit (1), (2), (3), while
denying (4).
[157] P. — Are the terms ‘physical frame ’ and ‘ body ’
applied to body without distinction of meaning, identical,
one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the
same in origin ?
Th. — Yes.
P . — Was it said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is the indi-
vidual [or person] who works for his own good ?’
1 Puggalo .
2 J I v o . The etymology of j I v o — ‘ living ’ thing — reveals, better
than our ambiguous 1 soul,’ the difficulty of denying j ivo of a living
or live body.
3 The text here and below [§ 157] repeats the details of the identity,
intensive and extensive.
26
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Th. — Yes.
P.— Is ‘physical frame’ one thing, ‘individual’ (or
e personal entity ’) another ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P . — Acknowledge my rejoinder t 1 If there be this identity
and coincidence between * physical frame ’ and ‘ body and
if it was said by the Exalted One ‘ There is the individual,
etc. 2 . . then indeed, good sir, it should also have been
admitted that ‘ physical frame 1 is one thing and ‘ indi-
vidual ’ or ‘ personal entity ’ another. You are wrong in
admitting the first two propositions and denying the third.
If you cannot admit the third, neither should you have
admitted the first two . . . {complete the discourse as in
§§ 3-16).
Examination continued by way of Rebirth . 3
[158] Th . — Does (a person or) soul 4 run on (or trans-
migrate) from this world to another and from another
world to this ? 5
P.— Yes.
Is it the identical soul who transmigrates from this
world to another and from another world to this ? e
Nay, that cannot be truly said . . . ( complete as above).
Th . — Then is it a different soul who transmigrates. . . .
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. 7 . . . ( complete as
above) .
Th . — Then is it both the identical and also a different
soul who transmigrates . , . ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
1 Namely, to § 156. 2 Puggalo.
2 G-ati-anuyogo. — Corny. The PTS. text orbits the title
after § 170.
4 Puggalo is now rendered by soul, that term being in eschato-
logical discussion more familiar to us than ‘ person.’
5 This question eliciting an essential feature in the Puggala-v3.din’s
or animistic position is repeated, as a matter of form, before each of
the four following questions.
6 The Eternalist view. — Corny. See Dialogues, i. 46 f.
7 He fears lest he side with the Annihilationists. — Corny.
29. Transmigration 27
Tli .— Then is it neither the identical soul, nor yet a
different soul who transmigrates . . .?*
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Tli . — Is it the identical, a different, both identical and
also different, neither identical, nor different soul who
transmigrates . . . ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[159] P— Then is it wrong to say, 4 The soul trans-
migrates from this world to another world, and from
another world to this T
Tli. — Yes.
P. — Was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ When he hath run from birth to birth
Seven times and reached the last, that soul
End-maker shall become of ill,
By wearing every fetter doivn ’ ? 2
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — Then surely the soul does transmigrate from this
world to another world and from another world to this.
Again {repeating his first question) was it not said by the
Exalted One : * Without a known beginning, 0 bhikkhus, is
the way of life ever renewed ; unrevealed is the origin of souls
(lit. beings) who, shrouded in ignorance and bound by the
fetters of natural desire, run on transmigrating .’ 8 Is the
Suttanta thus ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Then surely the soul does transmigrate as was
said.
[160] Th . — Does the soul transmigrate from this world,
etc. ?
P.— Yes.
Th . — Does the identical soul so transmigrate ?
1 He fears in this and the next question lest he side with certain
Eternalists and the ‘Eelwrigglers’ respectively. — Corny. Cf. Dialogues,
i. 37 f.
2 Iti-vuttaka, § 24.
3 Sayyutta-Nikdya, iii. 149.
28 Of Soul or Person I.. 1.
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( complete as
usual).
Th. — I repeat my question.
P.~ Yes.
Th. — Is there any soul who alter being human becomes
a deva ? x
P . — Yes.
Th . — Is the identical man the deva ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . {complete as
usual).
Th. — [I repeat], is the identical man the deva ? 2
P.— Yes.
Th. — Now you are wrong to admit as true that, having
been man he becomes deva, or having been deva he becomes
man, and again that, having become man, a deva is different
from a human being, [and yet] that this identical soul
transmigrates. ...
Surely if the identical soul, without [becoming] different,
transmigrates when deceasing hence to another world,
there will then be no dying ; destruction of life will cease
to take place. There is action (karma); there is action’s
effect ; there is the result of deeds done. But w r hen good
and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the very
same [person] transmigrates — this is wrong. 3
[161] Th. — Does the self-same soul transmigrate from
this world to another, from another world to this ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, having been human, becomes
a Yakkha, a Peta, an inmate of purgatory,- a beast, for
example a camel, an ox, a mule, a pig, a buffalo ?
1 We have let deva stand. It includes all that we mean by spirit,
god, angel, and even fairy. (Pronounce day-v a.)
2 When he is [first] asked this, he denies for a mere man the state
of godship. When asked again, he admits the identity because of such
Sutta-passages as ‘ I at that time was Sunetta, a teacher ’ ( Peta -
vatthu, iv. 7, 3). — Corny.
3 By the orthodox view, the newly reborn is not 1 the same,’ nor
different, but a resultant of the deceased one’s karma (acts). Hence
the notion of an identical entity persisting is in conflict with that law
of karma which the otherwise-dissenting Puggalavadin would accept.
30.
Transmigration
29
P. — Yes.
Th. — Does the self-same human become anyone of these,
say, a buffalo ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( complete the
refutation as usual).
Th. — [I repeat] is the self-same human the buffalo ?
P.~~ Yes.
Th. — [But all this, namely, that] having been man, he
becomes a buffalo, or having been buffalo he becomes man,
again, that having become a man, he is quite different
from the buffalo, and yet that the self-same soul goes on
transmigrating, is wrong . . . ( complete as usual).
Surely if the identical soul, when deceasing from this
world and being reborn in another, is nowise different, then
there will be no dying, nor will taking life be possible.
There is action ; there is action’s effect ; there is the result
of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing
as results, you say that the identical person transmigrates,
— this is wrong.
[162] Th. — You say that the identical soul trans-
migrates. 1 Is there anyone who having been a noble
becomes a brahmin ?
Yes.
Is the noble in question the very same as the brahmin in
question ? .
Nay, that cannot truly be said .... {complete the dis-
course).
Is there anyone who, having been noble, becomes reborn
in the middle, or in the lower class ?
Yes.
Is the noble in question the very same as the person so
reborn ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
The other alternatives, substituting ‘ brahmin ,' etc., in turn
for ‘noble, 9 are treated similarly.
1 Eepeating the original question, § 160, second query.
30
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
[163] You say that the identical soul transmigrates. . . .
Is then one who has had hand or foot cut off, or hand and
foot, or ear or nose, or both cut off, or finger or thumb
cut off, or who is hamstrung, the same as he was before ?
Or is one whose fingers are bent or webbed 1 the same
as he was before? Or is one afflicted with leprosy, skin
disease, dry leprosy, consumption, epilepsy, the same as
he was before? Or is [one who has become] a camel,
ox, mule, pig, buffalo, the same as he was before ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[164] P. — Is it wrong to say : ‘ The identical soul trans-
migrates from this world to another, etc. ?’
Th. — Yes.
P. — But is not one who has ‘ attained the stream ’ (i.e.,
the first path towards salvation), when he is deceasing from
the world of men, and is reborn in the world of devas, a
stream-winner there also ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — But if this man, reborn as deva, is a stream-winner
also in that world, then indeed, good sir, it is right to
say: ‘The identical soul transmigrates from this world to
another.’ . . .
Th. — Assuming that one who has attained the stream,
when deceasing from the world of men, is reborn in the
world of devas, does the identical soul transmigrate from
this world to another and from another world to this in
just that manner ?
P. — Yes.
Th . — Is such a stream-winner, when reborn in deva-world,
a man there also ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . , (complete the
‘ refutation ’).
[165] Th. — Does the identical soul transmigrate from
this world to another, etc. ?
Yes.
1 Like the wings of a bat.
32. Transmigration 31
Is the transmigrator not different, still present "?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat, is the transmigrator not different, still present?
Yes.
If he has lost a hand, a foot, ... if he is diseased . . .
if he is an animal ... is he the same as before ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . (complete).
[166] Th . — Does the identical soul transmigrate ? . . .
Yes.
Does he transmigrate with his corporeal qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[Think again !] Does he transmigrate with these 9 1
Yes.
Are soul and body the same ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . . 2
Does he transmigrate with feeling, with perception, with
mental coefficients, with consciousness ? 3
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Think again . . . does he transmigrate with conscious-
ness?
Yes.
Is soul the same as body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[167] Th. — If, as you say, the identical soul transmigrates,
. . . does he transmigrate without corporeal qualities,
without feeling, perception, mental coefficients, without
consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . . 4
1 He first rejects because the material frame does not go with the
soul (Corny. P.T.S. text: read agamanap), then accepts because
there is no interval of soul-life only. — Corny. See below, YIII. 2.
2 The opponent rejects this, inasmuch as, in transmigrating, the body
is held to be abandoned ; moreover, he would not oppose the Suttas. —
Corny.
3 According to the Corny., this is denied because of possible rebirth
in the sphere known as the unconscious, but is admitted with respect
to other spheres.
4 Because without the five aggregates (mind, body) there is no
individual. — Corny .
32 Of Soul or Person I. 1.
Think again . . . without corporeal qualities . . . with-
out consciousness ?
Yes.
Is then the soul one thing, the body another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted. . . .
[168] Th. — If, as you say, the identical soul trans-
migrates, ... do the material qualities transmigrate ?
Nay, that cannot truly be admitted. . . .
Think again. . . .
Yes.
But is this soul (#) the same as this body ( x ) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Does feeling ... or perception ... or do mental co-
efficients ... or does consciousness transmigrate ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Think again ... does consciousness transmigrate ?
Yes.
But is this soul (x) the same as this body ( x ) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[169] Th. — Then, the identical soul, according to you,
transmigrating . . . does none of the above-named five
aggregates transmigrate ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Think again. . . .
Yes, they do.
Is, then, soul one thing, body another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
[170] At dissolution of each aggregate,
If then the ‘ person ’ cloth disintegrate,
Lo ! by the Budclha shunned, the Nihilistic creed.
At dissolution of each aggregate,
If then the ‘ soul ’ doth not disintegrate,
Eternal, like Nibbdna, 1 were the soul indeed.
1 Samasam o — ‘ i.e., exceedingly like, or just resembling by the
state of resemblance. Just as Nibbana is neither reborn nor dissolved,
so would the soul be.’ — Corny.
34. Derived Concepts 33
III— DERIVATIVES.
Examination continued by Way of Derivative Concepts. 1
[171] Th. — Is the concept of soul derived from the
corporeal qualities ?
P . — Yes. 2
Are material qualities impermanent, conditioned, do they
happen through a cause ? Are they liable to perish, to
pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change ?
Yes.
But has soul also any or all of these qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[172] Or is the concept of soul derived from feeling, from
perception, from mental coefficients, from consciousness ?
Yes (to each ‘ aggregate ’ in succession).
Is any mental aggregate impermanent, conditioned?
does it happen through a cause ? is it liable to perish, to
pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change ?
Yes.
But has soul also any or all of these qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[173] You said that the concept of soul is derived from
material qualities. Is the concept of blue -green 3 soul
derived from blue-green material qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or is the concept of yellow, red, white, visible, invisible,
resisting, or unresisting soul derived from corresponding
material qualities, respectively ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[174] Is the concept of soul derived from feeling?
1 This chapter is still largely eschatological, hence 1 soul ’ is retained
for p u g g a 1 a, though individual, person, or ego would serve equally
well in the more psychological considerations.
2 He will have it that the concept or notion of soul, or personal
■entity, is derived from material and mental qualities, just as the
shadow (read PTS. ed., c h a y a y a) is derived from the tree, and
.fire from fuel. — Corny.
3 N 1 1 a is both blue and also green, Indian writers applying it to
•both sky and trees. In these replies the animist rejects a pluralistic
.state for the soul. — Corny.
T.S. V.
3
34
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Yes.
Is the concept of good soul derived from good feeling ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes. 1
Now, does feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is
desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result,
and such as conveys happiness ?
No.
I repeat my question.
Yes.
But does ‘ good soul ’ entail result or fruit of like nature
with the above ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 2 . . .
[175] If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the
concept of bad soul derived from bad feeling ?
Yes.
Now does bad feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is
undesirable, unpleasing, spotted, an unhappy result, and
such as conveys unhappiness ?
Yes. 3
But does bad soul entail result or fruit of like nature to
the above ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[176] If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is
the concept of indeterminate soul — one to be termed neither
good nor bad — derived from indeterminate feeling ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Is the concept [I repeat] of an ethically indeterminate
soul derived from an ethically indeterminate feeling ?
Yes. 4
1 He now assents, taking 'good’ in the sense of expertness, pro-
ficiency. — Corny.
2 He rejects because it is not customary to speak thus of ‘soul.’
— Corny.
3 Taking ‘ bad 1 analogously to ‘ good ’ above. — Corny.
4 He now assents, because of the indeterminateness [of soul] with
respect to the Eternalist or Nihilist heresies. The changed replies are
to evade the imputation of Eternalism, etc. — Corny.
36
Derived Concepts 35
Is indeterminate feeling impermanent, conditioned ?
Does it happen through a cause ? Is it liable to
perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to
change ?
Yes.
Has an ethically indeterminate soul any or all of these
qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[177] Is the concept of soul derived from any of the
other three aggregates : — perception, mental co-efficients,
consciousness ? 1
Yes.
[Taking the last] : — is the concept of good soul derived
from good consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Now does good consciousness entail result or fruit — fruit
that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy
result, such as conveys happiness ?
Yes.
And does a good soul also entail the like ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[178] You say that the concept of soul is derived from
consciousness — is the concept of bad soul derived from bad
consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[I repeat] is the concept of bad soul derived from bad
consciousness ?
Yes.
Now does bad consciousness entail result or fruit, fruit
that is undesirable, etc. ( the reverse of what is entailed by
good consciousness ) ?
Yes.
And does a bad soul also entail the like ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
[179] Again, since you admit that the concept of soul is
derived from any or all of the aggregates, e.g., eonscious-
1 Elaborate, as with the two preceding aggregates (khandlia).
36
Of Soul or Person I. 1.
ness, is the concept of an ethically indeterminate soul
derived from indeterminate consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
But is the ethically indeterminate soul impermanent,
conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish . . .
to change ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[180] Ought it to be said that a soul who sees 1 is de-
rived from sight (or eye) ? 2
Yes.
Ought it to be said that, when sight (or eye) ceases, the
seeing soul ceases ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
( The pair of queries is applied, with like replies, to the
other four senses, and also to the sensus communis, mano.)
[181] Ought it to be said that a soul of wrong views is
derived from wrong views ?
Yes.
Ought it to be said that when the wrong views cease to
exist, the soul having wrong views ceases to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Ought it, again, to be said that when any other parts of
the Wrong Eightfold Path 3 cease to exist, the soul, said
by you to be derived from that part, ceases to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[182] Similarly, ought it to be said that a soul of right
views, or right aspiration, right speech, right action, right
livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right con-
centration, is derived from the corresponding part [of the
Eightfold Path] ?
1 The Corny, notes the ambiguity, in the argument, of moral and
physical vision in this word cakkhuma.
2 Cakkhu is both ‘ eye ’ and ‘ sight.’
3 The opposites to the qualities prescribed in the Ariyan Eightfold
Path are so termed— e.g., in Majjhima-Nik., i. 118.
39.
Derived Concepts
37
Yes.
Ought it, again, to be said that when the given part
ceases, the soul so derived ceases ?
Nay, that cannot truly he said. . . .
[183] Is the concept of soul derived from material
qualities and feeling ?
Yes.
Then could the concept of a double soul be derived from
the pair of aggregates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or could the concept of a double soul be derived from
material quality coupled with any of the other three aggre-
gates ... or the concept of five souls be derived from all
five aggregates? 1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[184] Is the concept of soul derived from the organs of
sight (eye) and hearing (ear) ?
Yes.
Then could the concept ‘ two souls ’ be derived from
the two organs ? . . . ( and so on as in § 183, to include
all the twelve ayatanas — i.e., organs and objects of sense
and the organ and object of sense co-ordination, mano,
d h a m m a.)
[185] Is the concept of soul derived from the elements
of sight (or eye) and hearing (or ear) ?
Yes.
Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these
two ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the concept of soul derived from the element of sight
and any other of the eighteen elements ? 2
Yes.
1 The idea is that, there being a plurality of aggregates in the
individual organism, and soul a derivative of anyone, there might
conceivably be five souls cohering in one individual’s life-continuum
(ekasantanen a) — which the Animist denies. — Corny.
2 ,Seep. 15.
38 Of Soul or Person I 1.
Could the concept of eighteen souls be derived from the
eighteen elements ?
Nay, that cannot be truly said. . . .
[186] Is the concept of soul derived from the control-
ling powers 1 — eye and ear ?
Yes.
Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these
two ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Could the concept of soul be derived from the control-
ling power, eye, and from any other of the twenty-two con-
trolling powers ?
Yes.
Could the concept of twenty-two souls be derived from
these ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[187] Is the concept of one soul derived from the be-
coming of one aggregate ? 2
Yes.
Could the concept of four souls be derived from the
becoming of the four (mental) aggregates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, by your assenting to the former question, could
the concept of five souls be derived from the becoming of
the five aggregates (mental and bodily) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[188] Is there only one soul in the becoming of one
aggregate ?
Yes.
Then are five souls in the becoming of all five aggre-
gates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[189] Is the concept of soul derived from material
1 Indriya (see p. 16). Cf. Ledi Sadaw, PFTS., 1914, p. 162.
2 Here the term vokara replaces k h a n d h a, as it often does
in the Yamaka. Becoming (b h a v a) in our idiom would be ‘ life-
time.’ *
41. Derived Concepts 39
qualities just as the idea of shadow is derived 1 from a
tree? And just as the idea of its shadow is derived from
the tree, and both tree and shadow are impermanent, is it
even so that the concept of soul is derived from material
qualities, both soul and material qualities being imper-
manent ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. „ . .
Are material qualities one thing and the concept of soul
derived therefrom another, in the same way as the tree is
one thing, and the idea of shadow derived from it another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[190] Is the concept of soul derived from material
qualities just as the notion ‘villager’ is derived from
village ? And if that is so, is material quality one thing,
soul another, just as village is one thing, villager another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[191] Or — just as a kingdom is one thing, a king
another? 2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[192] A jail 3 is not a jailer, but a jailer is he who has
the jail. Is it just so with material qualities and one who
has them? And accordingly, just as the jail is one thing,
the jailer another, are not material qualities one thing, and
one who has them another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
IV.— CONSCIOUSNESS.
[193] Is there the notion of soul to each [moment of]
consciousness ?
Yes.
1 Upadaya Is only now defined in the Corny . as ‘ having come
(or happened) because of, not without such and such.’ And as from
the impermanent only the impermanent can come, this idea of
puggala as ‘ derived from ’ impermanent aggregates, bodily and
mental, is obviously unfavourable for its upholder.
2 Worded analogously to § 190.
3 More literally a fetter or chain, and a ‘ fetterer ! or 1 chainer,’
nigalo, n eg alike.
40 Of Soul or Person I. 1.
Does the soul undergo birth, decay, death, disease and
rebirth in each [moment of] consciousness ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . }
[194] When the second [moment of] consciousness in a
process of thought arises, is it wrong to say : * It is the same,
or something different’? 2
Yes.
Then, when the second moment arises, is it not also
wrong to say : £ It is a boy ’ or ‘ it is a girl ’? 3
It may be so said.
Now acknowledge the refutation : If at the second
moment of consciousness it could not be said, £ It is the
same or something different,’ then indeed, good sir, neither
can it be said, at that moment, that ! It is a boy, or a girl.’
What you say, namely, that the former may not, the latter
may be affirmed, is false. If the former proposition may
not be affirmed, the second cannot be affirmed. Your
rejecting the one and accepting the other is w r rong.
[195] According to you it is wrong to say, when the
second moment of consciousness arises, ‘ It is the same or
something different.’ Can it not then, at such a moment,
be said : ‘ It is male or female, layman or religious, man or
deva.’
Yes, it can be . . . (complete as in § 194).
V.— THE FIVE' SENSES.
[196] P. — Is it wrong to say : 4 The soul or person is
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact 1 ?
Th. — Yes, it is wrong.
1 This the Puggalavadin, not approving of a momentary state for
the sonl, rejects. — Corny .
2 I.e., same as the first moment or different from it.
3 Should one say ‘ a man,’ ‘ a woman ’ instead. The Animist has
admitted constant becoming, change, in the previous reply. The child
at each moment is becoming more adult, but popular usage lets him
become 'man ’ or ‘woman,’ so to speak, by a sudden transition from
one static condition to the next. The Animist, who mixes such usage
with his philosophy, is constrained to justify the former and assents.
Of. Mrs. Eh. E.’s Buddhism , p. 132.
43.
Soul and Sense
41
P . — Is it not the case that when someone sees something
by means of something, a certain ‘ he ’ sees a certain ‘ it ’
by a certain ‘ means ’? x
Th. — Yes.
P . — But if that is so, then surely it should be said that
the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate
fact ?
Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four
senses. Again :
Is it not the case that when someone knows something
by means of something, a certain ' he ’ knows a certain 'it’
by a certain 'means’? If so, then surely it may be. said
that the person is known in a real and ultimate sense.
[197] Th. — Is the person known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is it not the case that when someone does not see
something by means of something, a certain ‘ he ’ does not
see a certain ‘ it by a certain ‘ means ’ ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Then it is equally the case that the person is not
known in a real and ultimate sense.
Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four
senses and cognition generally.
[198] P . — Is it wrong to say the person is known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
Th.— Yes.
P . — Was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ 0 bhikkhus ,
I see beings deceasing and being reborn by the purified vision
of the eye celestial, surpassing that of men. I discern beings
in spheres sublime or base, fair or frightful, of happy or woeful
1 The Animist, or Entity-theorist, seeking to establish his view by
another method, now says : ‘ "Why are you so concerned with all this
inquiry about derived concept ? Tell me this first : Why may we not
say, that a person is really and ultimately known, etc. . . J Here
‘ someone ’ is the p u g g a 1 o, ‘ something ’ is the visible object,
‘ means ’ is the eye. But the orthodox says it is only eye, depending
on visual consciousness, that sees, and so on. But in conventional
usage we say ‘ someone sees,’ etc. — Corny,
42 Of Soul or Person 1. 1.
doom, faring according to their actions ’l 1 Is the Suttanta
thus ?
Th.— Yes.
P . — Surely then the person 2 is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
[199] Th.~ Granting that the Exalted One said that
which is quoted, is that a reason for affirming that the
person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th . — Does the Exalted One, by the purified vision of the
eye celestial surpassing that of man, see visible objects, and
does he also see the person or soul ?
P. — He sees visible objects. 3
Th . — Are visible objects the person ? Do they end
one life and reappear ? Do they fare according to
Karma ?
P . — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th . — I repeat my former question.
P . — He does see the person or soul. 4
Th . — Is then the soul visible object ? Is it object
of sight, objective element of sight, blue, green, yellow,
red, white ? Is it cognizable by sight ? Does it impinge
on the eye ? Does it enter the avenue of sight ? 5
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th . — I repeat my former question.
P . — He does see both.
Th . — Are both then visible objects? Both objective
element of sight ? Are both blue, green, yellow, red,
white ? Are both cognizable by sight ? Do both impinge
1 Cf. Majjkima-Nik., i. 482. The wording of this passage above
differs very slightly from about some twenty references in the Nikayas.
When adequate indexes to the first two Nikayas are finished, we may
be able to trace one exactly like this.
2 Sat to, ' being,’ is synonymous with 'pugg a lo.’— Corny.
3 The affirmative replies are not distinctly assigned in the P.T.S. text.
4 By the quotation : ‘ I 3ee beings.’ . . .—Corny.
5 Things that are perceptible are apprehended in a fourfold synthesis
of seeing, hearing, reflection, understanding. — Corny. Hence the
soul cannot be identified with external objects as seen.
45.
43
Soul and Moral Agent
on the eye ? Do both enter the avenue of sight ? Do both
disappear, reappear in rebirths, faring according to Karma ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
VI. ETHICAL GOODNESS.
Examination continued by Reference to Human Action, called
also * The Section on Ethical Goodness .’
[200] P. — Are ethically good and bad actions known [to
exist] 2 1
Th. — Yes.
P— Are both the doer of ethically good and bad deeds,
and he who causes them to be done 2 known [to exist] ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . 3 {complete in
the usual way, viz., that the former admission involves accept-
ance of what is denied).
[201] Th. — Admitting that ethically good and bad deeds
are known [to exist] , do you assert that the doer and the
instigator are also known [to exist] ?
P.— Yes.
Then is he who made the doer, or inspired the instigator,
known [to exist] ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 4 . . .
I ask you again.
Yes. 5
But if the one be thus maker, etc., of the other, is there
then no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life
renewed, no final Nibbana without residual stuff of life? 6
1 This might, less literally, run : Are there such things as ethically
good, etc., actions ? Sceptical views in the age of the Nikayas denied
the inherent goodness and badness of conduct — denied their happy and
painful results. These are stated in Abhidhamma also. — Bud. Psych
Ethics, § 1215, p. 325, n. 1 ; Vibhanga, p. 392.
2 I.e., by commanding, instructing, and other methods. — Corny.
3 I.e., not as a persisting, identical, personal entity.
4 Denial from fear of the heresy of creation by a god {Anguttara-
NiJc., i. 178 f. ; Vibhanga , 367). — Corny.
5 Assented to because parents ‘ make 5 doers, teachers also. — Corny.
6 The idea is that * each previous soul would be the inevitable maker
of its successor.’ — Corny.
44
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
If good and bad deeds are known [to take place], is the
doer, is the instigator, of those deeds known to exist ?
Yes.
Is the person or soul known to exist, and his maker or
inspirer also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question : — if good and bad deeds. . . .
Yes.
Then is Nibbana [also] known to exist, and the maker
and the maker’s maker as well ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Then, again, if these things be as you say, is the earth
known to exist, and its maker and his maker also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or the ocean ? — or Sineru, chief of mountains ? — or
water? — or fire?— or air? — or grass, brush, and forest?
and the maker of each and his maker also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, if good and bad deeds being known to exist, doer
and instigator are also known to exist, are those deeds one
thing, and doer and instigator quite another thing ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 1 . . .
[202] P. — Is the effect of ethically good and bad deeds
known to take place ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is one who experiences the effect of such deeds
known to exist ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[203] Th. — Admitting that both these propositions are
true, is one who enjoys the first-named person known to
exist? ,
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Th. — I repeat the question.
1 Denied lest assent be shown to the heresy : the soul is that which
has mental properties or co-efficients (cf. Majjh.-N., i. 299 : Bud.
Psych. Eth ., p. 257 f.). — Corny.
47.
Soul and Moral Agent
45
P. — Yes. 1
Th. — If the one and the other be so, is there no making
an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed,
no final Nibbana without residual stuff of life ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. — Again, admitting both those propositions to be true,
does the person exist, and the enjoyer of that person also
exist? 2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, is
Nibbana known to exist, and one who experiences it also ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, is the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of moun-
tains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest, known to
exist, and one who experiences any of them known also to
exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . . 3
Or [finally] is the result of ethically good and bad deeds
one thing and he who experiences those results another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . . 4
[204] P. — Is celestial happiness known to exist?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is one who is experiencing celestial happiness known
to exist ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[205] Th.— Assuming both propositions to be true, is
one who enjoys that experiencer known to exist?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
1 Reflecting that a mother may embrace her child, a wife her husband,
who has experienced, or felt, and thus meet the question. — Corny.
2 If effects be not only external phenomena, if one subjectively
experiencing, or enjoying them be assumed, this enjoyer, now as
himself in turn an effect, would be enjoyed by another experiencer.
In this way there Would be an endless series of persons or souls
(pug gal a parampara). — Corny.
3 It is not clear why the P. should here negate. The Corny, adds
that these questions are put with ordinary meaning (s am a n ne n a).
Cf. p. 46, n. 1.
4 Lest he be accused of that feature in the heresy of individuality :
The soul has feeling.’ — See 56 (fol.), n. 1.
46
Of Soul or Person
1 . 1 .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an
end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life, no final Nibbana
without residual stuff of life ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, assuming both those propositions to be true, is the
person known to exist and the enjoyer of the person also?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Again, assuming that celestial happiness and those en-
joying it are both known to exist, is Nibbana known, and
one enjoying it known also to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, assuming as before, are the earth, the ocean,
Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and
forest known to exist and those enjoying them ? 1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or again, assuming as before, is celestial happiness one
thing, the enjoyer another thing?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[206] P. — Is human happiness known to exist ?
Th.— Yes.
Is the enjoyer of human happiness known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[207] Th. — Is both human happiness and the enjoyer
of it known to exist ?
P. — Yes.
Is one who enjoys the enjoyer known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an
end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life, no final Nibbana
without residual stuff of life ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
( The dialogue is then completed, as in § 205, on celestial
happiness .)
1 As such they are objects of consciousness, but not subjective
ultimates. — Corny.
50. Soul and Moral Agent 47
[208] P— Is the misery of the lower planes 1 known to
exist ?
Th. — Yes.
Is the experiencer of that misery known to exist ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[209] Th. — Do you admit both these propositions ?
P.— Yes.
Is the enjoyer of the sufferer of that misery known to
exist 2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
If the one and the other be so, is there no making an
end of ill, etc.? (complete in full as in §§ 205, 207).
[210, 211] Th . — Is the misery of purgatory known ?
(Complete as in §§ 204, 205, 207.)
[212] Th . — Are ethically good and bad acts (karmas)
known to exist? And the doer of them also? And the
instigator also? And the enjoyer of the effect — is he also
known to exist ?
P.— Yes.
Is he who does the acts the same as he who experiences
the effect ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 2 . . .
1 repeat my question.
Yes 3
Then, are happiness and misery self-caused ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Then, admitting you still assent to my first propositions,
is the doer a different [person] from the enjoyer [of the
effect] ?
1 Apaya, i.e., purgatory, animal kingdom, Petas, or unhappy,
hungry ‘ shades,’ and Asuras, or titans.
2 He fears to contradict the Suttas. — See Sayyuttci Nik., ii. 94 :
1 To say, one-and-the-same both acts and is affected by the result, is
not true.’ — Corny.
3 In the Suttas it is said : he has pleasure both here and hereafter.
— Corny.
48
Of Soul or Person I. 1.
Nay, that cannot truly be said. 1 . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes. 2
Then, are happiness and misery caused by another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Admitting you still assent to the first propositions, does
the same and another do the deeds, does the same and
another enjoy (the results) ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Then is happiness and is misery both self-caused and
produced by another?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Admitting that you still assent to the first propositions,
does neither the same [person] both do the deeds and
experience the results, nor one [person] do the deeds and
another experience the results?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes, neither the same, nor two different persons.
Then are happiness and misery not self-causing nor
caused by something else ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Admitting, finally, that you still assent to the first propo-
sitions, namely, that ethically good and bad actions ; as well
as the doer of them, and the instigator of the doer, are known
to exist, [I have now asked you four further questions :]
(1) Is he who does the act the same as he who experi-
ences the effect ? .
(2) Are doer and experiencer two different persons ?
(3) Are they the same and also different persons ?
(4) Are they neither the same nor different persons ?
[You have answered to each :] No. [I have then repeated
1 fiar/yutta-Nik., ii. 94 : ‘To say, one acts, another reaps the fruit, -
is not true.’
2 Fancying that as deva he surely enjoys the result of his actions -
when a man Corny.
Soul and Moral Agent
53.
49
the question. You have then said] : Yes. I have then
put four questions :
(1) Are happiness and misery self-caused ?
(2) Are they the work of another ?
(3) Are they both one and the other ?
(4) Are they, arising through a cause, self-caused, or the
work of another ? [And you have replied] : No. . . .
[213] P, — Is there such a thing as karma (action taking
effect) ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is there such a thing as a maker of karma ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[214] Th. — Is there such a thing as both karma and
the maker of karma ?
P.— Yes.
Is there a maker of that maker?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
Then if the one and the other exist, is there no making
an end of . ill, no cutting of the cycle of life, no final
Nibbana without residual stuff of life ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Again, since you assent to both the first propositions, is
there both a person and a maker of the person ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
Or ... is there both Nibbana and- a maker thereof ? . . .
nr the earth, ocean, Sineru, water, fire, air, grass, brush and
.forest, and the maker thereof ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
... Or is karma one thing, the maker of it another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
[215] P. — Is there such a thing as result of action ?
Th.— Yes. „ : '■
P. — Is there such a thing as an enjoyer of the result?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
T.S. v.
4
50 Of Soul or Person I. 1.
[216] Th. — Do you maintain then that there are both
results and enjoyer thereof?
P. — Yes.
Is there an enjoyer of that enjoyer?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Then, if this and that be so, is there no making an end
of ill, no . . . etc. {complete in full similarly to § 214, and
ending : — )
You maintaining that there is both result and enjoyer
thereof, is then result one thing, and the enjoyer of it
another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . ( complete as usual).
YII. SUPERNORMAL POWER.
Examination into ‘ Soul ’ continued by reference to Super-
intellectual Power.
[217] P. — Is it wrong to say ‘the person [or soul]
is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Have there not been those who could transform
themselves by magic potency ? 1
Th. — Yes.
P. — If that be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to
say ‘ the person [or soul] is known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact.’ Again, have there not been those who
could hear sounds by the element of celestial hearing, . . .
or know the mind of another, or remember previous lives,
1 On iddki, and this Mnd of it, called vikub b an a-i d dh i
see Compendium, p. 61 ; Patisambhida-magga , ii. 210 ; Atthasdlim,
91 ; Visuddhi-magga, ch. xii. The opponent fancies a soul or inner
principle can achieve magical efficacy only with respect to such
matter as is bound up with human power of control. In the third
question are enumerated the other five forms of the so-called c h a 1 -
abbinna, or ‘sixfold super-knowledge.' — Corny.
56.
51
Soul and Super -Knowledge
or see visible objects by the celestial eye, or realize the
destruction of the ‘ intoxicants ’ ?
Tk. — Yes.
P— If these things be so, then indeed, good sir, it is
right to say * the person is known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact.’
[218] Th. — Granting that there have been those who
could transform themselves by magic potency, is it for that
reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — When one has through magic potency transformed
himself, was he then the personal entity, and not when
not so transforming himself ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
This question is ashed, and so answered, in the case of the
other Jive modes .of super-intellectual faculty named above.
VIII. APPEAL TO THE SUTTAS . 1
[219] P. — Is it wrong to say ‘the person is known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is there not [one whom we call] mother ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say
‘ the person is known in tfeWsenseof'-a j:eal and ultimate
fact.’ Again, is there Wot [one whom we. call] father, are
there not brothers, sisters, nobles, brahmins, merchants,
serfs, householders, Religious, devas, humans ?
Th. — Yes. ... . ,
P. — If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right- to say
‘ the person is known,/ etc. . x- -
[220] Th. — Granting there are mother’s, fathers, etc.,
1 The final citations are lea up to by several preliminary inquiries.
These, says the Corny., bear on kinshipVXaws, career, rebirth, etc.
Of Soul or Person
52
I. 1.
is it for this reason that you insist thus respecting the
personal entity ?
P. — Yes.
Tk . — Is there anyone who, not having been a mother,
becomes a mother ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, not having been a personal
entity, becomes one ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
(This pair of questions is then put concerning ‘father,’
‘brother’ . . . ‘ deva,’ ‘human,’ and answered as above.)
Th. — Granting the existence of a mother, is it for this
reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, having been a mother, is
no longer a mother ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, having been a personal
entity, is no longer one ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
This last pair of questions is then put with respect to
‘father ’ and the rest, and answered as above.
[221] P. — Is it wrong to say * the person is known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact ’ ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — Is there no s^o3l4idng as a ‘ stream-winner ’ (or
one who has entorgd the first stags of the way to salvation) ?
Th.— Yes. ' . -
P * — If thgre be such a thing, then indeed, good sir, it
is right to assent to the original, preposition. Again, is
there no su.ch thing as A ‘ once-returnar, 1 a ‘no-returner,’
an arahant, 1 one who is freed in both ways, 2 one who is
1 Or those who are in the second,' third, an^altimate stages re-
spectively of the way to salvation^ ■'
2 Of. Dialogues, ii 70 Puggala-Panttatti, I., § 30 ; viz., both tem-
porarily and permanently body and mind, by Jhana and
the Path respectively.
58. Appeals to Authority 58
emancipated by understanding/ one who has the testimony
within himself, 2 one who has arrived at right views, one
who is emancipated by faith, one who marches along with
wisdom, 3 one who marches along with faith 9
Th.— Yes.
T • Then surely, good sir, it is right to affirm the first
proposition.
[222] Th. Granted that there is such a thing as a
£ stream- wanner,’ is it for that reason that the 'person’ is
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?
P. — Yes.
Th . — Is there anyone who, not having been a stream -
winner, is one now ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, not having been a ‘ person,’
is one now ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. — Again, granted that there is such an one as a
stream-winner, and that this is the reason for your
affirmation as to the personal entity, is there anyone who
having been a stream- winner, is so no longer ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who, not having been a person, is
one now ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
These questions are now put regarding the other designa-
tions, and are answered similarly.
[223] P. — If [as you say] it be wrong to assert 'the
person is known, etc., . . .’ are there not [the accepted
terms of] '.the Pour Pairs of men,’ ‘the Eight Individuals ’? 4
1 Or intuition (panna).
2 Namely, that he has certain of the intoxicants destroyed. Pugg.
Pann., I. § 32. For the remaining designations see op. ait., § 33, f.
3 The Pugg. Pann. Corny, so paraphrases dhammanusari;
‘panna is borne along and goes before.’ JPTS., 1914, p. 194.
These are all terms apparently involving a permanent personal entity,
from the opponent’s point of view.
4 I.e., those in the four paths (see above, § 221), and these divided
into those who have attained one or other of the four paths and the
four ‘ fruits ’ or fruitions (see prev. page).
54
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
Th. — Yes.
P. — But if that be so, surely it is right to speak of the
‘person ’ as known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[224] Th . — Granting that there are the Four, the Eight,
is it for this reason you assert the first proposition?
P.— Yes.
Th . — Do the Four, the Eight, appear because of the
Buddha’s appearing?
Yes.
Does the ‘ person ’ appear because of the Buddha’s
appearing ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
Then at the Buddha’s final Nibbana, is the ‘ person ’
annihilated, so that no personal entity exists ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[225] Th . — The person [you say] is known in the sense
of a real and ultimate fact— is the person conditioned? 1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the person unconditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is he neither ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.
Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there
another, a third alternative? 2
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
1 This is an inquiry into the nature of ‘ a real and ultimate [or self-
dependent] fact.’ Corny. ‘ Conditioned ’ (s a n k h a t a) is, in Buddhist
tradition, what has been prepared, brought about by something else,
made, has come together by conditions (Corny, on A., i. 152).
The opponent’s desire to get pugg ala outside the category of all
phenomena brings him into a somewhat 1 tight place.’
2 Koti, literally extreme, or point, or end.
60.
Appeals to Authority
55
Yes.
But was it not said by the Exalted One : 4 There are,
bhikkhus , these tivo irreducible categories — what are the two $
The irreducible category of the conditioned, the irreducible
category of the unconditioned. These are the tivo ’ P 1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Yes.
Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the
conditioned and the unconditioned, there is another, a
third alternative.
[226] Th. (continues). — You say that the person is neither
conditioned nor unconditioned ? Are then the conditioned,
the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Are the aggregates conditioned, Nibbana unconditioned,
the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned ?
Yes.
Then are the aggregates, Nibbana, and the person, three
entirely different things ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
(The last tivo questions are then applied to each aggregate
taken separately : — material qualities, feeling, perception,
mental co-efficients, consciousness).
[227] Th. — Is the genesis of the person apparent, and its
passing away also, and is its duration distinctively ap-
parent ?
Yes.
[Then] is the person conditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
It was said by the Exalted One : ‘ Bhikkhus, there are
these three characteristics of the conditioned : of conditioned
things the genesis is apparent, the ■passing away is apparent,
the duration 2 amidst change is apparent .’ Hence if these
three are characteristics of the person, this is also
1 Cf. Dlgha-Nik., iii. 274.
2 T hit ass a annath attar), literally 1 duration’s other-ness.’
Buddhaghosa paraphrases by jar a, decay. Anguttara-Nik., i. 152.
See Note on TJiiti, Appendix.
56 Of Soul or Person I, 1.
conditioned- Are these three characteristics not apparent
in the person ?
No, they are not apparent.
Then is the person unconditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
It was said by the Exalted One : £ Bhikkhus , there are
these three characteristics of the unconditioned : of uncon-
ditioned things, bhikkhus, the genesis is not apparent, the
passing away is not apparent, the duration amidst change is
not apparent.’ 1 Now if all these [as you say] do not charac-
terize the [notion of] ‘ person,’ the person is unconditioned.
[228] Th . — The person who has attained final Nibbana,
does he exist in the Goal, 2 or does he not exist therein ?
He exists in the Goal.
Is then the person who has finally attained eternal ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the person who has attained final Nibbana and does
not exist in the Goal annihilated ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[228a] Th. — On what does the person depend in order to
persist ?
P. — He persists through dependence on coming-to-be. 3
Th. — Is [the state of] coming-to-be impermanent, con-
ditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass
away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?
P. — Yes.
J Op. et loc. cit,
2 Parinibbuto puggalo atth’ atthamhinatth’ atthamhi?
The idiom is unusual for the Pitakas, and in this connection, we
believe, unique. The Corny, explains : ‘attharj pucchati nib-
b & n a rj , “He asks about the goal (or the Good), Nibbana.” P. rejects
both the following questions, lest he be thought either an Eternalist
or an Annihilationisi’ ‘Attained final Nibbana’ could of course be
rendered more literally ‘ has utterly become extinct.’
3 Bhavag, or^ existence ; but ' existence ’ is better reserved for
atthita. The Corny, paraphrases by up a p att i b h a v ar|, the
state of being reborn.
61. The Testimony of Self-consciousness 57
Th. — Is the person also impermanent, conditioned, arisen
through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become
passionless, to cease, to change ?
P . — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[229] P. — Is it wrong to say ‘ the person is known
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Is there no one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling,
knows that he is feeling it ? 1
Th. — Yes.
P. — Surely, if that be so, good sir, it is right to say
‘the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate
fact . . . and if he, on feeling painful feeling, knows that
he is feeling it — you admit this ? — it is right to say ‘ the
person is known,’ etc. So also for neutral feeling.
[230] Th. — I note what you affirm. Now is it for this
reason that you maintain the person to be known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Then is one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling,
knows he is feeling it, a personal entity, and is one who,
on that occasion, does not know, not a personal entity?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. — You deny this also in the case of painful and
neutral feeling ?
P. — Yes, that cannot truly be said, .
Th. — But you maintain, because of this self-awareness,
that the person is known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact ?
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is then pleasurable feeling one thing and the
self-conscious enjoyer another ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ...
(Same query and answer in the case of painful and neutral
feelings.)
1 ‘ The earnest student (yogavacara) knows ; the fool and
average man does not.’ — Corny.
58
Of Soul or Person I. 1.
[231] P— You deny that the person is known in the
sense of a real and ultimate fact: — Is there then no one
who may be occupied in contemplating the [concept of]
body with respect to his physical frame ?
Yes.
... or in contemplating [the concept of] feeling, or
consciousness, or certain mental properties 1 with respect
to these in himself, respectively ?
Yes.
Then surely, good sir, it is right to say as I do with
respect to the person.
[232] Th. — Granting the carrying out by anyone of the
four applications in mindfulness, is it for this reason that
you say as you do with respect to the personal entity ?
Yes.
Then is anyone when so engaged a person, and not,
when he is not so engaged ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[233] Th. — Or again, granting [as above] ... is
f body ’ one thing, the contemplator another ? and so for
- feeling/ etc. ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[234] Th. — Is the person known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
Yes.
Was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ 0 Mogharajan ! look upon the world
As void [o/ soul ], 2 * and ever heedful bide.
1 The reference is to the religions exercise in self-knowledge known
as the four Sati-patthana’s, or • applications in mindfulness.’
These properties are traditionally explained as the cetasika-
dhamma (see below . . .), but Ledi Sadaw judges otherwise. See
Compendium, 179, n, 3. The Animist holds that introspective exercise
involves a persisting identical subject.
2 Of. Sayyiitta-NiJc., iv. 54~ ! Void ’ implies ‘ of soul.’ ‘ Contemplate
the world of aggregates as void of entities. 5 — Corny.
64.
Appeals to Authority
59
Cut out the world 9 s opinions as to soul.
So shalt thou get past death ; so an thou look,
The king of death shall no more look on thee’? 1
Is it thus in the Suttanta ?
Yes.
Hence it is surely wrong to say that the person is known
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[235] Th . — Is it the person [or soul] here who ‘ looks upon ’ ?
Yes.
Does he contemplate with or without material qualities ?
With them.
Is that soul the same as that body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
But if he contemplates without material qualities, is
that soul quite, different from that body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. — [I ask again] is it the [soul or] person who con-
templates ?
Yes.
Does he contemplate when he has gone within, or does
he contemplate from without [the organism]?
He contemplates when he has gone within.
Is that soul that body ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Supposing he contemplates from without, is the soul one
thing, the body another ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[236] P. — Is it wrong to say 'the person is known in
the sense of a real and ultimate fact’?
Th. — Yes.
P. — Was not the Exalted One a speaker of truth, 2
a speaker in season, 3 a speaker of facts, 3 a speaker of
words that are right, 4 that are not wrong, that are not
ambiguous ?
1 Sutta-Nipdta, ver. 1119.
2 Dialogues , i. 4 ; Psalms of the Sisters, lxvi.
3 Digha-Nik., iii. 175 ; Anguttara-Nik., v. 205.
4 Anguttara-Nih, ii. 24 ; Hi-vuttaka , § 112.
60
Of Sold or Person
I. 1.
Tk— Yes.
P. — Now it was said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is the
person who works for his own good . . 1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th. — Yes.
P . — Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact.
[237] . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One :
‘ There is one person, bhikkhus, who , being reborn in this world,
is boon for the good , for the happiness of many , to show com-
passion on the world, for the advantage, the good, the happi-
ness of dev as and of men.’ 2
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact.
[238] Th . — Granting this, and also the veracity, etc., of
the Exalted One: — it was said by the Exalted One: ‘All
things are without soul .’ 3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.— Yes.
Th . — Hence surely it is wrong to say the person is
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[239] . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One : ‘ He
does not doubt that misery arises, comes to pass, that misery
ceases, passes away, nor is he perplexed thereat. And there-
upon independent insight 4 comes herein to him. Noio this,
Kaccdna, thus far is right views.’ 5
Is the Suttanta thus ?
1 See § 74.
2 Anguttara-Nik., i. 22 ; quoted in Questions of King Milinda, ii. 56.
3 Atta. Dhammapada, ver. 279 ; Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 28.
4 A-p ar a-p a cca y a-nan a g, 1 insight not conditioned by others.’
6 Sayyutta-NiJc., ii. 17 ; iii. 135. The quotation does not obviously
bear on the controverted point to us, but to a Buddhist versed in his
Suttas the context ( apparently a familiar one) arises : Insight comes
to him who has rejected the theories that the world is a persisting
entity, or a concourse of fortuitous illusions, being convinced that it is,
in its essentials, a cosmos of conditioned becoming.
66 .
Appeals to Authority
61
P. — Yes.
Th . — Hence surely it is wrong to say £ the person is
known,’ etc.
[240] Th. — . . . again, was it not said by Bhikkhuni
Vajira to Mara the evil one :
‘ “ Being ” P What dost thou fancy by that word ?
’Mong false opinions, Mara, art thou strayed.
This a mere bundle of formations is.
Therefrom no “ being ” mayest thou obtain.
For e’en as, ichen the factors are arranged,
The product by the name “ chariot ” is known,
So doth our usage covenant to say :
“ A being,” udien the aggregates are there.
’ Tis simply III that riseth, simply III 2
That doth persist, and then facleth away.
Nought beside III there is that comes to be ;
Nought else but III there is that facies away ’ ? 3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P. — Yes.
[241] Th. — . . . again, did not the venerable Ananda say
to the Exalted One : ‘ It is said, lord, “ the world is void, the
world is void.” Now in what way, lord, is it meant that the
world is void V [and did not the Exalted One reply:]
‘ Inasmuch, Ananda, as it is void of soul 4 and of what belongs
to soul, 5 therefore is the world called void. And wherein,
Ananda, is it void of sold and of what belongs to soul 1 The
eye, Ananda, is verily void of sold and of what belongs to soul,
so is visible object and the sense and contact of sight. So are
the other organs, and objects of the senses, and the other senses.
So is the co-ordinating organ, cognizable objects, mental con-
sciousness and contact. All are void of sold and of what belongs
to sold. And whatever pleasurable, painful, or neutral feeling
1 S at ta.
2 On this term see Ledi Sadaw, J.P.T.S., 1914, 13B f., and Mrs.
Eh. D., Buddhist Psychology , 1914, p. 83 f.
3 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 134 f. ; Pss. Sisters, 190. Her verses are not in
the Anthology of the Therls or Senior Sisters. She is not called Theri,
but only Bhikkhuni.
4 Atta. 6 Attaniya.
62
Of Soul or Person
I. 1.
arises, in relation to the senses, and the sense-co-ordinating
mind, that too is void of soul and of what belongs to soul.
It is for this, Ananda, that the world is said to be void ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.— Yes.
[242] Th . — . . . again, whereas you affirm that the person
is known, ete. . . . and we know the veracity, etc., of the
Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One : ‘ Bhikkhus,
if there were sold, should I have that which belongs to a
soul T 1 Or if there were that which belongs to soul, should I
have a sold? In both cases ye would reply: “Yea, lord
But both soul and that which belongs to soul being in very
truth and for ever impossible to be known, then this that is a
stage of opinion, namely : “ that is the world, that is the sold,
this I shall hereafter become, permanent, constant, eternal,
unchangeable — so shall I abide even like unto the Eternal —
is not this, bhikkhus, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of
fools ?” “ Whatever it be not, lord, it surely is, absolutely
and entirely a doctrine of fools.” ’ 3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P. — Yes.
[243] Th . — . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One :
‘ There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the
world— who are the three ? There is first, Seniya, that
kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent
sotd in the life that now is, and in that which is to come;
then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, ivho declares that
there is a real, persistent sold in the life that now is, but not
a soul in a future life ; lastly, there is a certain teacher who
does not declare that there is a sold either in the life that noiv
is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these
three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Anni-
hilationist; the third of these, he, Seniya, is called the teacher,
who is Buddha supreme . 4 These are the three teachers to be
found in the world.’ 5
1 Sarjyutta-N., iv. 54. 2 Atta, attaniya.
3 Majj hima- Nile . , i. 188.
4 More literally, perfectly enlightened (samma sambnddho).
B We cannot trace this quotation.
68.
63
Appeals to Authority
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P. — Yes.
Th. — ... again, did the Exalted One speak of ‘ a
butter-jar ’
P.— Yes.
Th. — Is there anyone who can make a jar out of butter?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th. . . . finally, did the Exalted One speak of an oil-
jar, a honey-jar, a molasses-jar, a milk-pail, a water-pot, a
cup, flask, bowl of water, a ' meal provided in perpetuity,’
a ' constant supply of congey ’ ? 1 2
P. — Yes.
Th. — Is there any supply of congey that is permanent,
stable, eternal, not liable to change ?
P. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th . — Hence it is surely wrong to say ‘ the soul is known
in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.’
1 Nor this. But the Corny, remarks : ‘ The following is adduced to
show that meaning is not always according to the form of what is said.
A gold jar is made of gold ; a butter-jar is not made of butter, nor is an
oil- jar made of oil, and so on. A meal instituted in perpetuity by
charity is not eternal and permanent as is Nibbana.
2 E.g., Vinaya, iv. 74; Jdtafca, i. 178 (trans., i. 60). The argument
is that to use such terms as puggala, being, etc., in their popular
conventional sense, as the Buddha did when teaching the laity, by no
means confers upon the transient aggregates so called any ultimate or
philosophical reality, any more than to speak of a constant supply of
food implies any eternal, immutable source. ‘ Given bodily and
mental aggregates/ concludes the Commentator in his peroration, ‘ it is
customary to say such and such a name, a family. This by popular
convention means “a person.” Hereon it was said by the Exalted
One : “ These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designa-
tions in common use in the world” ( Dialogues , i. 263). . . . The
Buddhas have two kinds of discourse, the popular and the philosophical.
The latter is, as a rule, too severe to begin with, therefore they take
the former first. But both first and last they teach consistently and
in conformity with truth according to the method selected.’
64
Of Falling Away
I.
2 .
2. Of Falling Away.
Controverted Point . — That an Arahant can fall away
from Arahantship.
From the Commentary . — Because of such statements in the Suttas as
- liability to fall away, and the opposite, these two things, bhikkhus, are
concerned with the falling away of a bhikkhu who is training ’ ; 1 and
‘ these five things, bhikkhus, are concerned with the falling away of
a bhikkhu who now and then attains emancipation,’ 2 certain sects in
the Order incline to the belief that an Arahant can fall away. These
are the Sammitiyas, the Vajjiputtiyas, the Sabbatthivadins, and some
of the Mahasanghikas. Hence, whether it be their view or that of
others, the Theravadin, in order to break them of it asks this
question.’ 3
I.— APPLYING THE THESIS.
[I] 4 Th. — Your assertion that an Arahant may fall away
from Arahantship involves the admission also of the follow-
ing : that he may fall away anywhere; [2] at any time ; [3]
that all Arahants are liable to fall away; [4] that an Arahant
is liable to fall away not only from Arahantship, but from
all four of the Path-fruitions. [5] Just as a man may
still be rich if he lose one lakh in four lakhs, but must,
you would say, lose all four to lose his title to the status
given him by the four.
1 Anguttara-NiJcdya, i. 96. 3 Ibid., iii. 173.
3 ‘ Falling away ’ is, more literally, declined, the opposite of growth.
See Dialogues , ii. 82 f. The Corny, continues : * “ Falling away ” is two-
fold — from what is won, and from what is not yet won. “ The vener-
able Godhika fell away from that emancipation of will which was inter-
mittent only” (B r ., samayikala, or, PTS, samadhikaya:
which comes of concentrative exercise, S ayy utta-Nikay a, i. 120),
illustrates the former. “ See that the reward of your recluseship fall
not away for you who are seeking it, [while yet more remains to be
done!]” (. MajjJivma-N i. 271) illustrates the latter.’
4 We have, for the remainder of the work, applied just sufficient
condensation to eliminate most of the dialogue as such, with its
abundant repetitions of the point controverted, and have endeavoured
to reproduce all the stages of argument and the matter adduced
therein.
70.
Classes of Ariyans
65
II. REFUTATION BY COMPARING CLASSES OF ARIYANS. 1
[6] If an Arahant may fall away, then must those in
the three lower Stages or Paths — the Never-Returners, the
Once-Returners, the Stream-Winners — also be held liable
to fall away and lose their respective fruits. 2
[7] If an Arahant may fall away, so as to be established
only in the next lower fruit, then must an analogous fall-
ing away be held possible in the case of the other three
classes, so that those in the first stage who fall away are
‘ established ’ only as average worldlings. Further,
If the Arahant fall away so as to be established in the
first fruit only, then must he, in regaining Arahantship,
realize it next after the first fruit. 3
[8] If an Arahant may fall away from Arahantship who
has admittedly put away more corruptions 4 than any of
those in the three lower stages, surely these may always
fall away from their respective fruits. Why deny this
liability in their case (9-13), and assert it only with respect
to the Arahant ?
[14-20] If an Arahant may fall away from Arahantship
who admittedly excels all others in culture of the [Eight-
fold] Path, of the Earnest Applications of Mindfulness, of
the Supreme Efforts, the Four Steps to Potency of Will,
the Controlling Powers and Forces, and of the Seven
Factors of Enlightenment, why deny that those who have
cultivated these [thirty-seven matters pertaining to En-
lightenment 5 ] in a lesser degree may no less fall away from
their respective fruits ?
[21-32] Similarly, if each and all of the Four Truths
— the fact of 111, the Cause of it, the Cessation of it, the
Way to the cessation of it— -have been seen by the Arahant
1 Viz., all who are graduating or have graduated in Arahantship.
2 Or fruition ; the conscious realization or assurance (to borrow a
Christian term) of the specified attainment.
3 Thus violating the constant four-graded order.
i Literally, torments, k i 1 e s a, i.e., vices causing torment.' On these
ten see below, and Bud. Psych. Ethics , p. 327 f.
6 On these see Dialogues, ii. 129 f. ; Compendium, pt. vii., § 6.
T.S. V. 5
66
Of Falling Aiocty
I. 2.
no less than by the three lower Paths, why maintain only
of the Arahant that he can fall away?
[83] You cannot assert that the Arahant, who has put
away lust 1 and all the other corruptions, may fall away
from Arahantship, and yet deny that the Stream-Winner,
who [on his part] has put away the theory of soul, 2 may
also fall away from his fruit ; or deny either that the latter,
who [on his part] has also put away doubt, the contagion
of mere rule and ritual, or the passions, ill - will and
nescience, all three entailing rebirth on planes of misery,
may also fall away. Or [34], similarly, deny that the
Once-Returner, who [on his part] has put away the theory
of a soul, doubt, the contagion of mere rule and ritual,
gross sensuous passions, coarse forms of ill-will, may also
fall away from his fruit. Or [35] , similarly, deny that the
Never-Returner, who [on his part] has put away the theory
of soul, doubt, the contagion of mere rule and ritual, the
residuum 3 of sensuous passion and ill-will, may also fall
away from his fruit. Or analogously [36] assert that the
Never-Returner can fall away, but that the Stream-Winner
cannot, or [37], that the Once-Returner cannot. Or,
analogously [38], assert that the Once-Returner can fall
away, but that the Stream-Winner cannot.
Conversely [39], you cannot maintain that the Stream-
Winner, who has [of course] put away theory of soul, etc.,
cannot fall away from his fruit, without maintaining as
much for the Arahant who [on his part] has put away the
passions of appetite and all the other corruptions. 4 Nor,
similarly [40-4], can you maintain that anyone of the four
1 R aga , or lobha, understood as appetite or greed in general.
2 Sakkayaditthi. On this term see Bud. Psy. Ethics, 247,
n. 2. This and the next two vices are the first three ‘fetters’
destroyed by those in the first Path. Rhys Davids, American Lec-
tures, p. 146 f.
3 Literally, accompanied by a minimum of (anu-sahagato).
In the Bhammasamgani, and below (iv, 10), this work of diminishing
is worded differently. See Bud. Psy. Ethics, p. 96, and n. 1.
4 Namely, hate, nescience, or dulnes?, conceit, error, doubt, stolidity,
excitement, unconscientiousness, disregard of blame, or indiscretion.
85 . Classes of Ariyans 67
Classes cannot fall away, without maintaining as much for
any other of the four.
[45] You admit all the achievements and qualifications
conveyed by the terms and phrases associated [in the
Suttas] with the position of Arahant : —
That he has 4 put away passion or lust, cut it off at the
root, made it as the stump of a palm tree, incapable of
renewing its existence, not subject to recrudescence,’ 1 and
has also so put away the remaining [nine] corruptions —
hate, nescience, conceit, etc.
[46] That, in order so to put away each and all of the
corruptions, he has cultivated —
the Path,
the Earnest Applications of Mindfulness,
the Supreme Efforts,
the Steps to Potency of Will,
the Controlling Powers and Forces,
the Factors of Enlightenment ; 2
[47] That he has [consummated as having] 4 done' with
lust, done with hate, done with nescience,’ 3 that he is one
by whom
4 that which was to be done is done,’
4 the burden is laid down,
the good supreme is won,
the fetter of becoming is wholly broken away,’
one who is 4 emancipated through perfect knowledge,’ 4 who
has 4 lifted the bar/ 4 filled up the trenches,’ 4 who has
drawn out,’ 4 is without lock or bolt/ an Ariyan, one for
whom 4 the banner is lowered/ ‘the burden is fallen,’ who
is 'detached/ 6 ‘conqueror of a realm well conquered/ 6 who
1 Anguttara-NiJi., i. 218 (elsewhere connected with tanha,
natural desire).
2 See above, §§ 14-29. 3 Pss. Brethren, p. 193.
4 The epithets named thus far recur frequently'as one of the refrains
of Arahantship, e.g., Anguttara-Nik., iii. 859.
5 These are all discussed in Majjhima-Nik., i. 139,
6 We cannot trace this simile verbatim. Differently worded, it
occurs, e.g., in Iti-vuttaka, § 82.
68 Of Falling Aicay 1. 2.
has ‘comprehended 111, has put away its cause, has realized
its cessation, has cultivated the Path [thereto],’ 1 who has
£ understood that which is to be understood, 2 compre-
hended that which is to be comprehended, put away that
which is to be put away, developed that which is to be
developed, realized that which is to be realized.’ 3
How then can you say that an Arahant can fall away
from Arahantship ?
[48] With respect to your modified statement, that only
the Arahant, who now and then [i.e., in Jhana] reaches
emancipation, falls away, but not the Arahant who is at
any and all seasons emancipated: —
[49-51] I ask, does the former class of Arahant, who
has put away each and all of the corruptions, who has
cultivated each and all of the matters or states pertaining
to enlightenment, who deserves each and all of the afore-
said terms and phrases associated with Arahantship, fall
away from Arahantship ?
[52-54] For you admit that the latter class of Arahant,
who has done and who has deserved as aforesaid, does not
fall away. If you admit also, with respect to the former
class, that all these qualities make falling away from
Arahantship impossible, then it is clear that the matter of
occasional, or of constant realization of emancipation does
not affect the argument.
[55] Can you give instances of Arabants falling away
from Arahantship ? Did Sariputta ? Or the Great Mog-
gallana ? Or the Great Kassapa ? Or the Great Kaeca-
yana ? Or the great Kotthita ? Or the Great Panthaka? 4
Of all you admit that they did not.
1 The noble or Ariyan Eightfold Path.
2 Esp. the five aggregates. Sayyutta-Nik., iii. 26, etc.
3 On all these four see Dlgha-NiJc., iii. 280 f.
4 On all of these Pss. of the Brethren may be consulted. Kot-
thita in some MSS. is Kotthika.
89.
Appeals to Authority
69
PROOF FROM THE SXJTTAS.
[56] You say that an Arahant may fall away from
Arahantship. But was it not said by the Exalted One : —
£ Both high and loio the roays the learners wend :
So hath the Holy One to man revealed .
Not twice they fare who reach the further shore,
Nor once \_alone that goal ] doth Jill their thought P 1
Hence you are wrong.
[57] . . • Again, is there to be a ‘cutting of what has
been cut ?’ For was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ He who with cravings conquered grasps at naught,
For idiom no work on self is still un wrought,
No need for cutting what is cut is there ;
All perils sioejot away, the Flood, the Snare V 2
[58] . . . Again, your proposition implies that there is
a reconstructing of what is already done. But this is not
for the Arahant, for was it not said by the Exalted One : —
£ For such a Brother rightly freed, whose heart
Hath peace, there is no building up again,
Nor yet remaineth, aught for him to do.
Like to a rock that is a monolith,
And trembleth never in the windy blast,
So all the world of sights and tastes and sounds,
Oclours and tangibles, yea, things desired
And undesirable can ne'er excite
A man like him. His heart stands firm, detached,
And of all that he notes the passing hence ?’ 3
Hence there is no reconstructing what is already done.
1 Sutta-Nipdta, ver. 714. The Corny . explains ‘ high and low ways ’
by easy or painful progress, as formulated in. Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 54.
2 Untraced except the first line, for which see Sutta-Nipata, ver.
741; Anguttara-Nik., ii. 10; Iti-vuttaka, §§ 15, 105.
3 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 378; Pss. of the Brethren, vers. 642-4.
70
Of Falling A way
I. 2.
[59] S.V.S.M: 1 — Then our proposition according to you
is wrong. But was it not said by the Exalted One :• —
‘ Bhikkhus, there are these five things which conduce to the
falling away of a bhikkhu icho is intermittently emancipated : —
which are the five ? Delight in business, in talk, in sleep, in
society, absence of reflection on how his heart is emanci-
pated l ’ 2
Hence the Arahant may fall away.
[60] Th. — But does the Arahant delight in any of those
things ? If you deny, how can they conduce to his falling
away? If you assent, you are admitting that an Arahant
is affected and bound by worldly desires-— which of course
you deny.
[61] Now if an Arahant were falling away from Arahant-
ship, it would be, you say, because he is assailed by lust,
■or hate, or error. Such an attack, you say further, is in
■consequence of a corresponding latent bias. 3 Yet if I ask
you whether an Arahant harbours any one of the seven
forms of latent bias — sensuality, enmity, conceit, erro-
neous opinion, doubt, lust for rebirth, ignorance — you must
deny such a thing.
[62] Or if, in his falling away, he is, you say, accumu-
lating lust, belief in a soul, doubt, or the taint of mere rule
and ritual, these are not vices you would impugn an
Arahant withal.
[63] In fact you admit that an Arahant neither heaps
up nor pulls down, neither puts away nor grasps at, neither
scatters nor binds, neither disperses nor collects, but that,
having pulled down, put away, scattered, dispersed, so
abides.
Hence it surely cannot be said that ‘ An Arahant may
fall away from Arahantship.’ 2
1 Any of the four sects holding the controverted view.
2 Anguttara-]<!ik., hi. 173.
3 See below, ix. 4.
93.
Of Devas and the Higher Life
71
3. Of the Higher Life.
Controverted Point . — That there is no higher life among
the devas. 1
From the Commentary. — ‘ The higher life 2 is of twofold import :
path-culture and renunciation of the world. No deva practises the
latter. But the former is not forbidden them, except to those of the
unconscious plane. But some, for instance the Sammitiyas, do not
believe in any path-culture among the higher devas of the Karnaloka,
and, beyond them, of the Rupaloka, justifying themselves by the
Suttanta passage cited below.’
The Theravadin speaks : —
[1] You deny the practice of the higher life among
devas ; yet you deny also [that they are physically, men-
tally, or morally defective] : — that they are, all of them,
stupid, deaf and dumb, unintelligent, communicating by
signs, 3 and incapable of discerning the meaning of what is
well or badly spoken; that they all lack faith in the
Buddha, the Doctrine, the Order ; that they did not attend
the Exalted Buddha ; ask him questions and delight in his
answers ; that they are all of them handicapped by their
actions, by the corruptions, by the effect of their actions ;
that they are all faithless, devoid of purpose and under-
standing, incapable of reaching the right Order of the Path 4
in things that are good; that they are matricides, parri-
cides, murderers of saints, shedders of holy blood, schis-
matics; that they all take life, steal, are unchaste, liars,
1 On ‘ deva ’ see above, p. 28, n. 1.
2 Brahmaeariyavasa, or best-conduct-living. The Sammi-
tiya holds by the externals ; the Theravadin is more concerned with
the essential ethical career.
3 Explained in the Corny, by muga viya hattha muddaya
vattaro, ‘ like dumb speakers by signs made by the hands.’ On
such language cf. Dictlogtces, i. 21, n. 4, or Dlgha-Nih., i. 11, § 25.
4 Sammattap (Sansk., samyaktva, abstract noun of
samma; ref. wrongly given in JPTS, 1910, p. 116, s.v., § II.).
Sammatta-niyamo (opposed to micchatta-niyamo, the
wrong, vicious order of things), the right law or order, insuring against
rebirth in purgatory, involving final salvation. Cf. v. 4 ; xii. 5.
72 Of the Higher Life I. 3.
slanderers, revilers, idle talkers, given to covetousness,
ill-will and erroneous opinion.
[2] Nay, you maintain on the other hand that they are,
and practise the opposite of all this. How then can you
say there is no religious life among them ?
The Saimnitiyci speaks : —
[3] You maintain the thesis in the affirmative, and yet
you deny that devas practise renouncing the world, the
tonsure, wearing the yellow robes, carrying the beggar’s
bowl; you deny that either a Supremely Awakened one,
or those enlightened for self only, 1 or the pair of chief
disciples, 2 appear among the devas. Where then is their
‘ religious life ’ ?
Theravaclin speaks : —
[4-7] We agree that among the gods these practices
and advents are not found. But is the religious life
found only where these things are observed — the renun-
ciation, the tonsure and the rest — and not where they are
not observed ? Only there, you say ; and yet when I ask :
‘ Does he who renounces the world, and so forth, lead
the religious life, and does he who does not renounce
the world, etc., not lead the religious life,’ you do not
agree. 3
[8] Again, do you maintain that only where Buddhas
arise is there religious life, and that where they do not
arise, there is none ? You vacillate in your reply. Now
the Exalted One was born in Lumbini, became supremely
enlightened at the foot of the Bodhi Tree, and set turning
the Norm-Wheel at Benares. Is the religious life to be
observed in those places only and not elsewhere ?
[9] I ask a similar question with regard to the Middle
Country, 4 where there have been advents of those awakened
1 Pacceka-Buddhas, who did not teach the world.
2 On these, believed to attend every Buddha, see Dialogues, ii. 7.
3 Because of the attainment of the Path by laymen, and by some of
the devas. — Corny.
4 Roughly speaking, the Ganges valley, or the whole of Aryan North
India. See Rhys Davids in JBAS, 1904, 83 f.
97. Professing ancl Living 73
for self alone, and [10] with regard to the Magadhese, 1
where there was the advent of a chief pair of disciples.
[11] S. — You claim that the religious life is practised
among devas, yet you deny that it is universally practised,
for instance, among the devas of the ‘unconscious sphere.’
Th . — This is only what we should both claim and deny
for mankind, for instance, that whereas the religious life is
practised among men, it is not practised among the un-
tutored barbarians of the border countries, where there is
no rebirth of such as become religieux of either sex, or of
believing laymen and lay women.
[12] S. — You say with respect to the religious life in
deva-worlds, ‘ There are spheres where it exists, there are
other spheres where it does not ’ : — are both these condi-
tions represented in the unconscious sphere, and both in
the worlds of conscious devas ? If not, then where does it
exist and where does it not exist ?
Th. — The religious life exists only among such devas
as are conscious.
[18] Th. — You admit that the religious life is practised
among men.
S. — In certain places only, not in others.
Th. — Do you mean to say that both kind of places are
represented in the outlying border countries, among un-
trained barbarians, where none are born who become
religieux or pious laymen and lay women? If not, how
can you claim that the religious life is practised at all ?
Where is it practised ?
S . — In the Middle Country, not in the outlying border
countries.
[14] S. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘In three respects , bhikkhns, do the people of India excel
both those of North Kuru and the Three -and-Thirty gods :
— in courage, in mindfulness, and in the religious life ?’ 2
1 Cf. Vinaya Texts , i. 144 f. ; Pss. of the Brethren , 340 f.
2 Anguttara-Nih., iv. 396.
74 Of the Higher Life I. 3.
Is the Suttanta thus? Does it not show there is no
religious life among devas ?
Th . — Did not the Exalted One say at SavatthI : ‘ Here
the religious life is practised V x And does this show that
it was only practised at SavatthI, and not elsewhere?
[15] Again, the Never-Returner, for whom the five
‘ lower fetters ’ are done away with, but not, as yet, the five
e upper fetters,’ deceases ‘ here,’ is reborn ‘ there’ 2 — where
for him does the fruit [of his works] arise ? ‘ There,’ and
only there, you say. How then can you deny religious life
among the devas ?
[16] Eor when such an one is reborn ‘ there,’ it is there
that he ‘ gets rid of the burden,’ there that he compre-
hends the nature of 111, there that he puts away the
corruptions, there that he realizes the cessation [of 111],
there that he has intuition of the immutable. What then
do you mean when you say, ‘ There is no religious life
among the devas ?’
S . — Because it was here that he practised that Path of
which he there realizes the fruit.
[17] Th- — If you admit that the Never-Returner realizes
fruit there by the Path practised here, you must also
admit that the Stream-Winner realizes fruit here by path-
practice there. You must, similarly, admit that the Once-
Returner and the person completing existence 3 here, realize
here the fruit won by path-practice there.
Further, since you do admit that the Stream- Winner
realizes fruit here won by path-practice here, you must
admit that the Never-Returner may, similarly, realize fruit
1 "We cannot trace this quotation.
2 I.e., in the heavens called ‘Pure Abodes.’ — Corny. There, and
and not on earth, he was believed to complete existence (p a r i n i fa-
b^ya^). In the Suttanta phrase, he became a ‘ t/iere-utt er- going -
outer’ (tat tha-p arinibbayl), e.g., Ma/jjh. Nik., ii. 146; Angut-
tara-Nik., i. 232, etc. The Pure Abodes were the summit of the
Rupa-beaven, the limit of material, if ethereal, rebirth. See Com-
pendium, p. 138 f.
3 ParinibbayI puggalo. The latter word is now used in its
common or popular meaning — the only meaning accepted in Theravada.
101 .
Completed by Some in Heaven
75
there won by path-practice there. Again, just as you admit
that the Once-Bet urner and the person completing exist-
ence may, by path-practice here, realize fruit here, so must
you similarly admit that the Never-Returner may realize
fruit there won by path-practice there.
[18] If you declare that a person who, ‘ leaving this
life, attains consummation [in the Pure Abodes],’ 1 practises
the path without putting away the corruptions, you must
admit it no less in the case of a person who has worked
for the realization of the fruit of Stream-Winning, or the
fruit of the One-Return, or the fruit of Arahantship.
Again, if you declare that a person who has worked for
the realization of the fruit of Stream-Winning, or for the
fruit of the One-Return, or for that of Arahantship, practises
the path and puts away the corruptions simultaneously,
you must also admit as much in his case who, leaving
this life, attains consummation [in the Pure Abodes].
[19] You are admitting [by the position taken up with
regard to the thesis], that a Never-Returning person, when
he is reborn there, has * done that which was to be done,’ 2
is in the condition of having practised. But this is
tantamount to declaring that the Arahant is reborn, — that
the Arahant goes from one life to another, goes from one
destination to another, goes from one cycle to another of
renewed life, goes from one rebirth to another — which of
course you deny.
You cannot, again, admit those qualifications in the
Never-Returner and deny him those of ‘ one who has got
rid of the burden,’ 2 when he is reborn there; for then you
must admit that he will [there] practise the path again 3 to
get rid of the burden.
[20] Similarly, whatever other attainments in the re-
1 Idha-vihay a-nittho puggalo = c a Never-Returner who
consummates after leaving this life.’ — Corny.
3 A phrase always associated with Arahantship. See above, 2, § 47.
3 This would bring ‘ the religious life’ into the life of the devas, the
Never-Returner being then reborn, finally, as a deva of the Pure
Abodes.
76 Of the Higher Life I. 3.
ligious life you withhold from the Never- Returner on his
■final rebirth there : — understanding of 111, putting away
of corruptions, realization of the cessation of 111, intuition
of the immutable — you compel him, in order to win them,
to ‘ practise the path ’ [among the devas as deva]. Else
you declare implicitly that he there completes existence
without winning one or the other of them.
[21] /S.— Just as a deer wounded by an arrow, though
he may run far, yet dies of his hurt, even so does the
Never-Returner, by the path here practised, realize there
the fruit thereof.
Th . — The deer wounded by an arrow, though he run far,
yet dies of his hurt with the arrow in him. But does the
Never-Returner, when by the path here practised he there
realizes the fruit thereof, bear the arrow with him
S. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
4. Of Purification Piecemeal.
Controverted Point . — That [the converted man] gives up
the corruptions piecemeal. 1 2
From the Commentary . — ‘ This discussion is to break down the
opinion, held now by the Sammitiyas and others, that when Stream-
Winners and those in the other paths, through the higher comprehen-
sion gained in jhana, attain insight into the nature of 111 and so on,
1 The simile is not apt in so far as the Non-Returner’s final birth
- there ’ is likened to the dying only of the deer, and not to the last,
expiring run before it sinks dying. The arrow, for the Never-Returner,
has still work to do. Only for the Arahant is its work done. The
former, as deva , has one more spell of running to do.
2 Odhis-odhiso. This term is applied also, in the Patisam-
bhidd-magga (ii. 180), to the more specialized variety of the
< love-irradiating ’ contemplation prescribed as a religions exercise,
anodhiso being the more catholic form of the same. As we
pointed out in reviewing this work ( JBAS , 1908, p. 591), in a
corresponding differentiation in the Jdtaha Atthahatha (i. 80 f. ; ii. 61),
the word appears as an-odissaka. We have not found either
variant elsewhere in the Pitakas.
103.
Man Progresses as a Whole
77
the putting away of corruptions [or vices] goes on piecemeal, that is,
by one portion at a time.’
[1-4] Theravcidin . — You affirm this because, you say,
when a person 1 who has worked to realize the fruit of the
First Path (Stream- Winning) wins insight into the nature
of 111 and its cause, he gives up these [three of the ten]
fetters 2 — theory of a soul, doubt, and the contagion of
mere rule and ritual — and the corruptions involved in
these, in part ; further, that when such a person wins
insight into the cessation of 111, he gives up the latter two
of those fetters and the corruptions involved in them, in
part; further, that when such a person wins insight into
the Path [leading to that cessation], he gives up those
corruptions involved, in part.
But then you should also admit — what you deny — that
one part of him is Stream-Winner, one part is not ; that he
attains, obtains, reaches up to, lives in the realization of,
enters into personal contact with the fruition of Stream-
Winning with one part of him, and not with the other part
of him ; that with one part only of him has he earned the
destiny of but seven more rebirths, or the destiny to be
well reborn only twice or thrice, as man or deva, or the
destiny of but one more rebirth ; 3 that in one part of him
only is he filled with faith in the Buddha, the Norm, the
Order ; that with one part only of him is he filled with
virtues dear to Ariyans.
[5-8] Again, you say, that when a person who has
worked to realize the fruition of the Once-Beturner, wins
insight into the nature of III and its cause, he gives up
gross sensuous passions, the coarser forms of ill-will, and
the corruptions involved in these, in part ; further, that
1 Pugg a la, again used in its popular or non-metaphysical sense.
2 Cf. above, p. 66, n. 2.
3 S at t a -kkha t tupar am o, kolankolo, ekabljl. Cf.
Anguttara-Ni'k., i. 233 ; Puggala-Panhatti , p. 15 f. ; and Commen-
tary , JPTS, 1914, p. 195 f., in all of which these terms are explained.
The last — the ‘ one-seeder ’ — differs from the Once, and the Never-
Returners, in that he is already in his last life, and that on earth,
78
Of Purification Piecemeal
I. 4.
when such a person wins insight into the cessation of 111,
he gives up the coarser forms of ill-will and the corruptions
involved therewith, in part ; further, that when such a
person wins insight into the Path [leading to the cessation
of 111], he gives up the corruptions referred to.
But then you should also admit — which you deny — that
one part of him is Once-Beturner, one part is not ; that he
attains, obtains, reaches up to, lives in the realization of,
enters into personal contact with the fruition of the Once-
Beturner, with one part of him and not with the other part.
[9-12] Again, you say, that when a person who has
worked to realize the fruition of the Never-Beturner, wins
insight into the nature of 111 and its cause, he gives up the
little residuum of sensuous passion, the little residuum of
ill-will and the corruptions involved therewith, in part ;
further, that when such a person wins insight into the
cessation of 111, he gives up the little residuum of ill-will
and the corruptions involved therewith, in part ; further,
that when he wins insight into the path [leading to the
cessation of 111], he gives up the corruptions aforenamed
in part.
But then you must also admit — which you deny — that
one part of him is Never-Beturner, one part is not ; that he
attains, obtains, reaches up to, lives in the realization of,
enters into personal contact with the fruition of the Never-
Beturner with one part of him, and not with the other part
of him ; that with one part of him only does he complete
existence within the term between birth and middle life,
or within the term between middle life and death, or without
external instigation, 1 or with it ; that with one part of him
only does he become ‘ an upstreamer,’ bound for the senior
deva-world, 2 and not with the other part of him.
1 Asankharena. The Puggala-Pannatti Corny . explains this to
mean ‘ effected with little trouble, without much contriving ’ ( JPTS ,
1914, p. 199). Sa-sankharena implies of course the opposite:
‘dukkhena, kasirena, adhim at t a p a y o g a p katva.
• 2 Akanittha, the fifth and topmost plane of the ‘Pure Abodes.’ The
- stream,’ according to the Corny, quoted, may be understood either as
‘ natural desire,’ or the ‘ round ’ of rebirth, or as the 4 Path-stream.’
106.
Appeals to Authority
79
[13-16] Again, you say that when a person who has
worked to realize Arahantship wins insight into the nature
of 111 and its cause, he gives up the lust of life with
material quality, the lust of life of immaterial quality,
conceit, distraction, ignorance, and the corruptions in-
volved therein, in part; further, that when such an one
wins insight into the cessation of 111, he gives up the last
three of those fetters and the corruptions involved therein,
in part ; further, that when he wins insight into the path
[leading to the cessation of 111], he gives up the last two of
those fetters — distraction and ignorance — and the corrup-
tions involved in them, in part.
But then you must also admit — what you deny — that
one part of him is Arahant, and one part is not ; that he
attains to, obtains, reaches up to, lives in the realization
of, enters into personal contact with Arahantship with one
part of him, and not with the other part of him ; that with
one part only has be done with passions, hate, dulness ;
that with one part only has he e done that which was to be
done,’ 1 ‘got rid of the burden,’ ‘won the good supreme,’
4 wholly destroyed the fetter of becoming,’ with one part
only is be emancipated by perfect knowledge, is ‘ one for
whom the bar is thrown up,’ ‘ the trenches are filled,’
‘ one who has drawn out,’ ‘for whom there is no lock or
bolt,’ with one part only is he Ariyan, ‘ with lowered
banner,’ ‘ with burden fallen,’ * detached,’ ‘ conqueror of a
realm well conquered,’ with one part only has he under-
stood 111, put away its cause, realized its cessation,
practised the path, comprehended that which is to be
comprehended, learnt that which should be learnt, put
away that which is to be eliminated, developed that which
is to be developed, realized that which may be realized,
and not any of this with the other part.
[17] S. — But if it be wrong to deny that my thesis is
true, why did the Exalted One say thus : —
‘ Little by little , one by one, as pass
The moments, gradually let the wise ,
i Cf. I. 2, § 47,
80
I. 4.
Of Purification Piecemeal
Like smith the blemishes of silver, blow
The specks that mar his parity away ’ ? 1
Is the Snttanta thus '? Does this not justify my answer-
ing ‘ Yes ’ ? 2
[18] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ For him, e’en as insight doth come to pass,
Three things as bygones are renounced for aye :
Belief that in him divells a soul, and doubt,
And faith in rule and rite — if aught 3, remain.
Both from the fourfold doom 4 is he released,
And ne'er the six fell deeds are his to do ’ ? 5 6
Is the Suttanta thus ?
[19] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ Whenever, 0 bhikkhus, for the Ariyan disciple there doth
arise the stainless, flawless Eye of the Norm — that ivhat-
soever by its nature may happen, may also 'by its nature
cease — then -with the arising of that vision doth he put away
these three fetters : — belief in a sold, doubt, and the contagion
of mere rule and ritual ’ ? 6
Is the Suttanta thus ? Hence it must not be said that
the religious man gives up the corruptions piecemeal.
5. Of Renouncing Evil.
Controverted Point. — That the average man 7 renounces
sensuous passions and ill-will.
’ 1 Dhammapada, verse 239 ; latter half also in Sutta-Nipdta,
verse 962.
2 Omit na in Tenahi, etc.
3 Read y a d’ for y a d i.
4 Rebirth in purgatory, as demon, as ‘ shade,’ or as beast.
5 Matricide, parricide, Arahanticide, wounding a Buddha, schism,
heresy. Sutta-NipCda, verse 231.
6 Of. Vinaya Texts , i. 97; Sayy-Nih., iv. 47, 107; Anguttarci-
NiJe., iv. 186.
7 Puthnjj an o, literally ‘one-of-tlie-many-folk,’ a worldling,
I'homme moyen sensuel, to quote the famous phrase of Quetelet.
109. The Implication of 1 Renouncing ’ 81
Commentary. — This question is asked to break down the opinion
held, for instance, at present by the Sammitiyas, that an average man
who achieves Jhana, who understands the Truths and becomes a
Never-Returner, renounced sensuous passions and ill-will while he was
as yet only an average man of the world.
[1, 2] Theravadin. — You. maintain that, as average man,
he does renounce them. Now by ‘ renouncing ’ I imply
that he renounces for ever, without remainder, 1 severing
all connection with them, them and their roots, and all
desire for them, and all latent bias toward them ; renounces
them by Ariyan insight, by the Ariyan path ; renounces
them while experiencing the immutable ; renounces them
while realizing the Fruit of the Never-Retumer. This you
deny.
And if, for ‘ renouncing,’ you substitute ‘ arresting,’ I
claim the same implications, and you deny them.
[3, 4] The .person -who works for the realization of the
Never-Returner’s Fruit : — he renounces, he arrests in this
thorough -going way — on that we are agreed. But does the
average man ? You deny this [no less than I].’
[5, 6] But if you apply these words ‘ renounce,’ ‘ arrest ’
[in your limited meaning] to the average man, you must
also apply them, as meaning just so much and no more,
to the candidate for the Fruit of the Never-Returner.
[7, 8] By what path (or means) does your average man
renounce sensuous passions and ill-will ?
S . — By the path that belongs to the Riipa-sphere 2
Tit . — Now does that path lead men out [of the round of
rebirth] ? 3 does it go to extinction [of 111], to Enlighten-
ment, to disaccumulation ? 3 Is it clear of intoxicants,
1 The orthodox view is of a gradual giving up, from the First Path
onward, residua lingering' till the Third Path is past. See above, p.' 66
[33], The Stream-Winner is no longer ‘ average man.’
2 I.e., to the plane of a sublimated material existence, to wit, a more
ethereal frame, sight and hearing. Man and the lower devas occupy
the Kama-sphere of full sensuous endowment as we know it. ' On this
‘path,’ Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 43 f. The Rupa-sphere, or sublimated material
heavens, would he the limit of the average man’s aspirations. -■ 1
3 On this term see Bud. Psy. Ethics, 82, n 2
T.S. V.
6
82
0/ Renouncing Evil I. 5.
fetters, ties, floods, bonds, hindrances, uninfected, 1 clear
of what makes for grasping and for corruption ? 2 Is it not
true, on the other hand, that this path is not any of these
things? How, then, can you say that by it an average
man renounces sensuous passions and ill-will ?
[9, 10] You agree that the path practised by the person
who works for the realization of the Never-Returner’ s Fruit
possesses all those qualities. But you should agree that
that path belonging to the Riipa-sphere possesses the same
qualities [since you claim that by it the average man
renounces even as the Never- Returner renounces]. But
you admit it has the opposite qualities ? Then, by parity of
reasoning, you should find those opposite qualities in the
path practised by the Never-Returner [since you claim
that by it the latter arrives at the same renunciation as
does the average man].
[11] You say that an average man, who is done with
lusting after sensuous pleasures, 3 as soon as he has com-
prehended the truth, 4 becomes forthwith established in the
fruition of the Never-Returner 6 — why not add in Arahant-
ship ? Why stop short of this ?
You must also admit that he has been practising the
First, Second, and Third Paths at the same time, realizing
the respective Fruits at the same time, and experiencing a
combination of the respective contacts, feelings, perceptions,
volitions, cognitions, believings, endeavours, reflections,
and concentrations [all at different stages of evolution]
which characterize each upward step.
[12] Or, if he does not arrive [at the Third Fruit] in this
way, by what path does he arrive ? ‘ By the path of the
Never-Returner,’ say you? Yet you deny that the re-
nouncing of the three fetters — theory of a soul, doubt,
1 Bead aparamattho. ■
2 On all these terms see ojp. cit., 291-317.
3 Karnes u vltarago. The latter word is one of the stock of
Arahant terras ; see above, p. 67 [47].
4 Dhamma, or Norm.
5 In other words, you make him leap at a hound from No-path to
the consummation of the Third Path.
113. Appeals to Authority 83
and the contagion of mere rule and ritual — belongs to the
work of the Never-Returning Path. Nay, you must admit
it [since you leave your average man no other path],
although it was said, was it not, by the Exalted One that
the Fruit of the First Path was got by the renouncing of
those three fetters Z 1
[13] Once more, you deny that, by that Third Path, gross,
sensuous desires and the coarser forms of ill-will are re-
nounced. Nay, but you are bound to admit this, for was it
not said by the Exalted One that the Fruit of the Second
Path was got by the reducing sensuous passions and ill-
will to a minimum ? 2
Finally, by your previous assertion concerning the
average man’s comprehending the truth (§11), you are
bound to admit, though you deny it, that all who compre-
hend the truth, the Norm, are established in the Never-
Returner’s Fruit as soon as that comprehension arises.
[14] S, — But if the controverted question is to be answered
by £ No,’ was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ In days of old on earth there lived
Six teachers tohom men flocked to hear.
No flesh they ate for pity's sake.
Freed from the bonds of sense-desires.
No taste had they for fleshly lusts.
In Brahma-heaven they found rebirth.
‘ Disciples too of them there were,
Souls by the hundred not a few.
No flesh they ate for pity’s sake,
Freed from the bonds of sense-desires.
No taste had they for fleshly lusts.
In Brahma-heaven they found rebirth ’ ? 3
1 Anguttara Nik., i. 231 ; ii. 89, etc.
2 Banjyutta-Nik., v. 357, etc. ; Anguttara-Nik., i. 232 ; ii. 89.
3 Anguttara-N., iii. 373. The Opponent’s argument is obscured, in
English, by the want of association between the terms Kama-(loka)
and Brahma — i.e., Rupa-loka. 4 Sense/ 4 fleshly/ belong to the former
term. Renouncing all that, the persons of the poem are reborn,
like Never-Re turners, in the upper heavens.
84
Of Renouncing Evil
I. 5.
Is the Suttanta thus ?
[15] Th, — Yes. But was it not said by the Exalted
One: —
‘ Verily, bhikkhus, I my unto you that this teacher, Sunetta,
though he lived long maintaining life on earth, did not get
released from birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation, suffering,
sorrow, and despair. Why was he not released from ill ?
Because he had not enlightenment nor penetration concerning
four things. What were they ? The virtue, the concentration ,
the understanding, the emancipation of the Ariyan. Once,
bhikkhus, these four are understood and penetrated, then is
the thirst for becoming cut off, then is the lust for becoming
perished, then is there no more coming back to be. .. .
1 The virtuous habit and the mind intent,
Insight and utmost range of liberty :
All these are known to Gotama renoivned.
His understanding mastering all its truth,
The Buddha to the Brethren taught the Norm ;
Our Teacher, Seer, Ender of all III,
Perfected life and wholly passed away ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus? Hence it is not right to say
‘ the average man [as such] renounces sensuous passions
and ill-will.’
6. Of Everything as persistently existing.
Controverted Point . — That everything exists.
From the Commentary . — This question was asked by one of ours, in
order to break down an opinion, held at present by the Sabbatthivadins, 2
that, judging by the Suttanta passage : ‘ Whatever is material quality,
1 Anguttara-Nik,, iv. 104 f. (The last line expands the one Pali
word; parinibbuto.)
2 Sansk. Sarvasthivadins, literally, ‘ everythiog-exists-believers.’
On the history and literature of this influential school, see Professor
Takakusu in JPTS, 1905, 67 f. ; T. Watters, On Yuen Chwang (in
which consult Index).
115.
The Implications of ‘ Exists ’
85
past, present, future,’ etc., all phenomena, past, present, future [once
they arise among the aggregate constituents of personal life and
experience] persist in that state, 1 and that therefore all go on existing.
TO PURGE [ABSTRACT TIME-JIDEAS.
[1] Theme adin. — You say that ‘all’ 2 exists. Hereby
you are involved in these further admissions
All exists everywhere, 3 at all times, in every way, 4 in all
things, not in a combined state, the non-existent exists, 5
the right view which looks upon your wrong view as wrong
exists.
[2] Again, taking all in terms of time, you affirm that
the past exists, the future exists, the present exists. But
is not the past [something that has] ceased— that is,
departed, changed, gone away, gone utterly away? How
then can you say ‘ the past exists ’ ? Again, is not the
future [something that is] not yet born, not yet come to
be, not yet come to pass, has not happened, not befallen,
is not manifested? How then can you say ‘the future
exists ’?
The present, you say, exists ; and the present is [some-
thing that has as yet] not ceased, not departed, not changed,
not gone away, not utterly gone away. And the past, you
say, ‘ exists ’ ; then you should say of the past also that it
has not ceased, not departed, and so on.
Again, the present, you say, exists — that is, it is born,
1 Literally, ‘ do not abandon that state.’
2 ‘All,’ in the Nikayas, stands for everything accessible to sentient
experience. ‘J will teach you the “ all'” — what is that? The
sense-organs and their objects and the co-ordinating mind. If anyone
say : ‘ “ I reject this all , and teach you another all,” he could not
explain ... he would be out of his range.' Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 15 ;
cf. Majjhima-Nik., i. 8.
3 ‘ In the whole body.’ — Corny.
4 1 In various colours,’ is the illustration given by the Burmese
translator.
3 I.e., chimseras, such as a sixth personal aggregate (one more than
the orthodox five constituents mental and bodily), or horns in a hare,
etc. — Corny.
86
Of Persisting Existence
I, 6.
has become, has come to pass, happened, befallen, is mani-
fested. And the future, you say, * exists ’ ; then you should
say of the future also that it is born, has become, and so on.
Again, the past, you say, exists, and yet that it has
ceased, departed, and so on. And the present, you say,
exists ; then you should say of the present also that it has
ceased, departed, and so on.
Once more, the future, you say, exists, and yet that it is
not born, not become, and so on. And the present, you
say, exists ; then you should say of the present also that
it is not born, not become, and so on.
[B] Do past material qualities 1 exist? ‘Yes,’ you say.
But if you describe these in terms of whai ‘has ceased,’
and so on, as aforesaid, how can you say ‘those past qualities
exist ’ ? Similarly, for future material qualities — if they [in
common with all that is future] are not born, and so on,
how can they be said to exist ?
[Similarly, the other more general admissions afore-
stated apply also to material qualities in particular :] if
in saying ‘present material qualities exist,’ you mean they
have ‘not ceased to be,’ etc., then if past material qualities
‘ exist,’ they also have ‘ not ceased to be,’ etc. And if, in
saying present material qualities ‘ exist,’ you mean they
are ‘ born, are come to be,’ etc., then, if future material
qualities ‘ exist,’ they also are ‘ born, are come to be,’ etc.
Again, if in saying ‘ past material qualities exist,’ you mean
that they have ‘ ceased, departed,’ etc., then, if present
material qualities ‘ exist,’ they also have ‘ ceased,’ etc.
And if, in saying ‘future material qualities exist,’ you
mean they are ‘not yet born,’ etc., then, if present material
qualities ‘ exist,’ they also are ‘ not yet born,’ etc.
[4] And all these arguments apply equally to each of the
other four aggregates — do feeling, to perception, to mental
coefficients, to consciousness.
For instance, if, in saying, ‘present consciousness exists,’
you mean it has not ceased to be, not departed, etc., then,
1 htiip a rj. ‘ The time-reference is now connected with the aggre-
gates (khandha’s, mental and bodily constituents).’ — Corny.
118.
The Implications of ‘ Exists ’
87
if past consciousness [still] ‘ exists/ it also has not £ ceased
to be, departed/ etc. And if, in saying £ present conscious-
ness exists,’ you mean it is born, is come to be, etc., then,
if future consciousness, as you say, £ exists,’ it also ‘ is born,
is come to be/ etc. Again, if, in saying ‘past consciousness
exists,’ you mean it has ceased, departed, etc., then, if present
consciousness, as you say, £ exists/ it also has £ ceased,
departed,’ etc. And if, in saying ‘future consciousness
exists/ you mean it is not yet born, has not come to be,
etc., then, when you say ‘present consciousness exists,’ it
also is * not yet born, has not come to be/ etc.
[5] In the expression ‘present material- aggregate,’ 1 in
whichever order you use the two terms, if no distinction is
made 2 between each, if they are used as identical, of one
import, as the same, as of the same content and origin,
then when you say, that (A) present material-aggregate, on
ceasing, gives up its present state, you must also admit
that (Ax') material-aggregate gives up its materiality. Simi-
larly, when you say, that (a) present material- aggregate on
ceasing does not give up its materiality, you must also admit
that (ax) it does not give up its presence (present state) .
[6] S . — But in the expression ‘white cloth,’ in which-
ever order you use the terms, if no distinction is made
between each, if they are used as identical, of one import,
as the same, as one in content and origin, then when you
say (A) 1 white cloth when it is being dyed loses its white-
ness/ you must also admit (AJ it loses its ‘ clothness.’
Again, in the expression ‘ white cloth,’ in whichever order
you use the terms, if no distinction is made between each,
if they are used as aforesaid, then when you say (a) ‘ white
cloth when it is being dyed does not give up its clothness,’
you must also admit that (a x ) it does not give up its white-
ness. . . .
[7] Th. — If you assert that the material - aggregate
retains its materiality, you must admit that the material-
1 Paccuppannag rupar).
2 Appiyap karitva. Ekatthata an unnat a.— Corny.
88 Of Persisting Existence I. 6.
aggregate is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to
change. You know that the opposite is true; hence it
should not be said that materiality is retained.
[8] Nibbana does not abandon its state as Nibbana — by
this we mean Nibbana is permanent, persistent, eternal,
not subject to change. And you ought to mean this, too,
in the case of material-aggregate, if you say that the latter
does not abandon its materiality.
Do you mean by ‘ material-aggregate does not abandon its
materiality,’ that the aggregate is impermanent, non-persis-
tent, temporary, subject to change ? You assent. Well, then,
you should affirm the same with regard to Nibbana when
you say: Nibbana does not abandon its state as Nibbana. . . .
[9] If, in your statement ‘the past exists’ (§ 2), you
mean it retains its pastness or preterition, then in your
statement ‘ the future exists ’ (§ 2) yon ought to mean : it
retains its futurity, and in your statement ‘the present
exists,’ you ought to mean : it retains its presentness, or
presence. [10] Each of these affirmations involves a similar
affirmation respecting the other two divisions of time.
[11] If the past ‘ exists ’ and retains its preterition, then
must it be permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to
change ; and this, you admit, is not right. [12] When you
say Nibbana exists, and retains its state as Nibbana, you
mean: it is permanent and so on. So much also must you
mean if you predicate the same respecting ‘the past.’ Or,
if you do not mean that the past is permanent and so on,
when you say ‘ it exists and retains its preterition,’ then when
you say this of Nibbana, you imply that Nibbana is imper-
manent and so on.
[13-20] All the foregoing (§§ 9-12) applies equally to
the particular past, future, and present things called ‘ the
five aggregates ’ — e.g. : —
If, in your statement ‘past consciousness exists,’ you
mean : it retains its preterition, then, in your statement
‘future consciousness exists,’ you must mean: such conscious-
ness retains its futurity ; also, in your statement ‘ present
consciousness exists,’ you must mean such consciousness
124.
Abstract Time-Ideas
89
retains its presence. And each of these affirmations involves
a similar affirmation respecting the other two divisions of
time. Again, if past consciousness exists and retains its pre-
tention, then must it be permanent, persistent, eternal, not
subject to change — and this you admit is not right. When
you say, ‘ Nibbana exists and retains its state as Nibbana,’
you mean it is permanent and so on. So much also must
you mean, if you predicate the same respecting past con-
sciousness. Or, if you do not mean that past consciousness
is permanent and so on, when you say At exists and retains
its pretention,’ then when you say this of Nibbana, you imply
that Nibbana is impermanent, not persistent, temporary,
subject to change. . . .
[21] Is the past a non-existent thing? If you say ‘yes,’
you must reject your view that the past exists. If you say
‘the non-past exists,’ then to say ‘there exists a past,’ is
equally wrong.
Again, is the future a non-existent thing ? If you say
‘yes,’ you must reject your view that the future exists. If
you say ‘the non-future [alone] exists,’ then to say ‘there
exists the future,’ is equally wrong.
[22] Does that which has been future become present ?
If you assent, 1 you must admit that that which was future
is the same as that which is now present. You admit this?
Then you must admit that anything which having been
[future], is [present], will in turn, having been [future],
become once more [present]. 2 You admit this ? Then you
must also admit that that which, not having been [future],
is not [present], will not in turn have been [future] only to
become [present] again. 3
1 He first denies because the future was then not yet present ; he then
assents, because an anticipated thing when realized is present. — Corny.
2 The translation from Pali into Burmese has : 1 Having become
present, does it become future and then again present?’ The Corny.
explains that the opponent admits the repetition of this imaginary
process of becoming, because he thinks he can speak of an anticipated
thing realized as 1 having been, is.’
3 E.g., a chimsera like the horn of a hare. — Corny. Or as we might
say, a unicorn.
90
Of Persisting Existence
1 . 6 .
[This series of dilemmas is also applicable to ‘ present ’
and ‘past,’ thus:] Does that which has been present
become past ? If so, you must admit that that which was
present is the same as that which is past. 1 If you do
admit this, you must also admit that anything which
having been [present], is [past] will in turn have been
[present] only to become [past once more ] 2 If you do admit
this, you must also admit it as true for their contradictories.
Similarly for future, present, past : — Does the future,
having been, become present, and the present, having
been, become past ? If so, you must admit that these three
are identical, and that the process of becoming the one
after having been the other is repeated. If you do admit
this, you must admit it as true for their contradictories.
APPLICATIONS OP THE PURGED TIME-IDEAS.
[23] Do [all the conditions of an act of visual percep-
tion: — ] eye, visible objects, visual consciousness, light,
attention, when past, exist? If you say ‘yes,’ you should
also admit that one sees the object that is past with an eye
that is past. Similarly, for all the conditions of all other
varieties of sense-perception that are past — to wit: ear,
audible objects, auditory consciousness, space, 3 attention ;
the nose, odours, olfactory consciousness, air, attention ;
the tongue, sapid objects, sapid consciousness, liquid, atten-
tion ; body, touches, body-consciousness, extensity, atten-
tion; mind, objects of consciousness, reflection, the seat
[of mental activity], 4 attention. For instance, taking the
last : you should then also admit that one perceives the
‘past ’ object of consciousness with the ‘ past ’ mind.
1 In the Burmese translation : Is [just] this ‘ past ’ that present, or
that (present) this past ?
2 The opponent invests time with objective reality, hut practically
rejects all time distinctions. According to him ‘ will be ’ becomes ‘is,’
merges into ‘was.’ The Theravadin tests this by inverting the time-
process, and showing the endlessness of such imaginary processes.
3 Sic, presumably conceived as full of air (v a y o) ; cf. smell below.
i Yatt hu. Note the silence as to the heart. — Compendium, 277.
127. Concrete Things in Abstract Time 91
[24] Similarly, if the conditions of a future act of sense-
perception exist — e.g., eye, visible objects, visual conscious-
ness, light, attention, then one should see future object with
future eye, and so on. [25] For if you say that the con-
ditions of present visual and other perception exist, and
that you see present objects with an eye, etc., that is
present, so, if you maintain that the past conditions of sense-
perception ‘exist/ must you say that with the past eye one
sees past objects, etc. ; [26] and similarly for future con-
ditions of sense-perception.
[27] If you deny that with the past eye, visible objects,
visual consciousness existing, one does not see past objects
with past eyes, equally must you deny that, wuth the
conditions for present vision existing, one does not see
present objects with present eyes. Similarly for the
other senses.
[28] Similarly for future vision.
[29] Does past coming-to-know 1 exist ? If you assent,
you must admit that the function of knowing is done by
that same [past] coming-to-know. And if you admit that,
you must also admit that by that same [past] coming-to-
know one understands 111, puts away its cause, realizes its
cessation, practises the Path [not by present cognition].
[30] The same argument applies to future coming-to-
know.
[31] Does present coming-to-know, or cognition, exist,
and is the function of knowing performed by that same
present cognition ? If you assent, you must admit that, past
coming-to-know also existing [§ 29] , the function of know-
ing is performed by that same past cognition. So that if,
by that present cognition, the nature of 111 be understood,
its cause put away, its cessation realized, the path leading
thereto be practised, it is no less by that past cognition
that all this is effected. [32] The same reasoning precisely
holds good to the extent to which you maintain that present
coming - to - know exists. [33] But you maintain that,
1 N an ap : — the process is meant, not the 1 body 3 of knowledge, or
knowing conceived as a product.
92
Of Persisting Existence
I. 6.
whereas the past process-of-knowing exists, it is impossible
to perform the function of knowing with it. Then, by
parity of reasoning, surely it is equally impossible to know
with the existing present process-of-knowing. More par-
ticularly, if you cannot carry out the Four Truths con-
cerning 111 [§§ 29, 31] with past existing cognition, neither
can you do so with present existing cognition— which is
absurd. [34] Future knowing and present knowing are
mutually involved in just the same way.
[35] Do the corruptions of [his] past exist for the Ara-
hant? 1 You reply ‘yes.’ But is the Arahant [now] lustful
with [that past, yet existing] lust, hostile with that hate,
ignorant with that dulness, vain with that conceit, errant
with that error, perplexed with that doubt, torpid with that
sloth, distracted with that excitement, shameless with that
impudence, reckless with that indiscretion, all of which are
past and yet ‘ existing 3 ?
[36] Similarly, you say that the past [five lower] fetters
and corruptions exist for the Never-Beturner. But is he
now holding that theory of soul, perplexed with that doubt,
infected by that contagion of mere rule and ritual, subject
to residual sensuous passions and ill-will, that are past and
yet ‘ existing ’ ?
[37] Similarly, you say that the same past fetters, and
grosser sensuous passions and coarser forms of ill-will
‘exist’ for the Once-Returner. But is he now bound by
those fetters, and subject to those grosser passions and
coarse forms of ill-will ?
[38] Similarly, you say that the past three fetters 2 and
lust, hate and dulness entailing the rebirths of misery,
exist for the Stream-Winner. But is he now bound by
those fetters and those vices ?
[39] Granting that past lust exists for an average man,
is he affected by that same lust? Yes? Then, surely,
if paat lust ‘ exists ’ for an Arahant, he also is affected by
that same lust ? Similarly for the other nine corruptions
1 A fortiori, since ‘ all exists ’ (§ 1). The ten corruptions (pp. 65,
n. 4 ; 66, n. 4) follow. 2 Soul-theory, doubt, ritualism.
134
93
Time and Things
[§ 35]. [40-42] If you say that the average man is still
subject to corruptions or fetters, past, yet 'existing,’ you
must also admit that past corruptions and fetters, in so
far as they ‘ exist ’ in those who have reached any stage of
the path, involve their being subject to them at present.
[43-6] Conversely, if it is impossible for an Arahant, or
one in any lower stage of the path, to be now subject to
certain corruptions or to fetters which ‘ exist ’ for him as past,
it is equally impossible for the average man to be subject
to a corruption or fetter which ‘ exists ’ for him as * past.’
[47] Do past hands exist? 1 Then must you also admit
that taking and laying down by them is also apparent [as
existences]. Similarly for legs, feet, and their going to
and fro, for joints of limbs, and their contracting and
extending, for the stomach, and its hunger and thirst.
[48] Does the past body exist ? Then must you also
admit that the past body undergoes lifting and lowering,
annihilation and dissolution, the being shared by crows,
vultures, and kites ; also that poison, weapons, fire may get
access to the body ; also that this past body may be liable
to be bound by confinement by rope or chain, by village,
town, or city jail, by fourfold restraint, and by the fifth,
to wit, strangling. 2
[49] Do the [other] past elements [of the past body]
exist— -its cohesiveness, heat, mobility? 3 If you assent,
then you must admit that with each past element the past
body still performs the corresponding function.
[50] Do past and future as well as present material
aggregates exist ? If so, then there must be three material
aggregates. And if you say that past and future as well as
present fivefold aggregates exist, you must admit that there
are fifteen aggregates. [51] Similarly, you must admit
three organs of sight, or thrice twelve organs and objects
1 As part of ‘ everything ’ (§ 1).
2 Literally, by the neck. -
3 The first, 1 hardness ’ (or solidity) , has been implicitly dealt with
under § 47. ‘ Cohesiveness ’ may be rendered fluidity. The four
elements are the philosophic or abstract conceptions of the popular
four elements : earth, water, etc.
94
Of Persisting Existence
I. 6.
of sense. 1 [52] Similarly, you must admit three elements
of sight, or eighteen elements multiplied by three time-
divisions, fifty-four in all. [53] Similarly, you must admit
three visual controllers, 2 or sixty-six controllers in all.
[54] Would you say that a Wheel-turning monarch 3 of
the past or of the future, as ’well as one of the present,
'exists’? But this amounts to saying that three W T heel-
turning monarchs are actually living. 4 The same impli-
cation lies in a similar assertion respecting Perfectly
Enlightened Ones [Buddhas].
[55] Does the past exist? 'Yes ’ you reply. Then, is the
existent the past? You reply ‘the existent may be past,
and may he not-past.’ But herein you make out that the
past may be the past and may be the not-past. Your
position is "wrong, and you are refuted. 5
[56] You are similarly involved if you say that, whereas
the future exists, the existent may be future [and] may not
be future. [57] So also for ' the present.’ [58] Similarly,
if you affirm that Nibbana exists, but that the existent may
be Nibbana, 6 may not be Nibbana : — this amounts to saying
that Nibbana [is or may be] not Nibbana, not-Nibbana [is,
or may be] Nibbana.
1 The six senses and their obj eots multiplied by three time-divisions.
2 Indriya’s. See p. 16; Vibhanga, 122; Yamaha, ii. 61, 283.
3 Or world-emperor.
4 Literally, there is for them the state of being face to face. It is
orthodox to hold that there can neither be two such monarchs, nor two
Buddhas (Saviour-Buddhas) at the same time. Dlgha-Nih., iii. 114 ;
Vibhanga, 336.
5 The position of the Theravadin is, of course, by European logic,
only tenable if the major term ‘exist,’ ‘the existent,’ be distributed:
does (A) the past = (B) all that exists. But since, in Buddhist or
natural logic, B coincides with A in one and the same object, we can
substitute B for A ; and we may then follow the argument. But that
such an argument as that above could be introduced in serious dia-
lectical discussion shows how the Indian mind grasped particular
concepts in philosophical discussion.
6 Bead, for a 1 1 1 a n, nibb anan(ti), in PTS. edition.
140. Appeals to Authority 95
[59] S . — Is it wrong to say £ the past exists/ £ the future
exists ’?
Th.— Yes.
S . — But was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘What-
soever material quality, bhikkhus, whether past , future,
or present, is either internal or external, gross or subtle,
common or excellent, distant or near, is called the material
aggregate . Whatsoever feeling, whether past, future, or
present, of which the foregoing may he said, is termed the
aggregate of feeling. So also are the other three aggregates’? 1
Surely then the past exists, the future exists.
[60] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
£ Thesd three modes in word, term, or name, bhikkhus, which
have been distinct in the past, arc now distinct, and ivill be
distinct, are not condemned by recluses and brahmins who are
wise. Which three ? (1) That material aggregate which is past,-
which has ceased, which is changed, is reckoned, termed , named
“ has been ” ; it is not reckoned as “ exists,” nor as “ will be.”
And so for the aggregates of feeling, perception, mental co-
efficients, consciousness. (2) That material aggregate which
is not yet born, and which has not appeared, is reckoned,
termed, named “trill be,” but is not reckoned as “exists,”
nor as “has been.” And so for the mental aggregates.
(3) That material body which has come to birth, has appeared,
is reckoned, termed, named “ exists,” but is not reckoned as
“ has been,” nor as “ will be.” And so for the mental aggre-
gates. Verily these three modes in word, term, or name, bhik-
khus, are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are not,
will not, be condemned by recluses and brahmins who are
tvise.
‘Bhikkhus, the folk of Ukkala, Lenten speakers of old, 2
1 Majjhima-Nik., in. 16 f. ; Sayy.-Nik., iii. 47.
2 Ukkala-vassabhahha, In B h Okkala. . . . The Br.
translation renders this by adipurisa, men of old. But that, the
district so-called (? identified with Orissa) is referred to is Buddha-
ghosa’s opinion : ‘ Those dwelling in the country Ukkala.’ He divides
the rest : v a s s o (sic) ca bhanna ca — ‘for these causation-
theorists are two.’ Presently, however, he refers to them collectively
96 Of Persisting Existence I. 6.
Casualists, Deniers of the Deed, Sceptics — even they , too,
judged that these three, modes of reckoning, terming, or naming,
should not be condemned or repudiated. And, why teas that l
Because they were afraid of blame, of unpopularity, of incur-
ring opposition ’ ? 1
[61] Again, did not the venerable Phagguna say to the
Exalted One : ‘ Does the eye (or sight), lord, still exist by
ivhich past Buddhas, icho have completed existence, have cut
off the multipliers of life, 2 have cut off its cycle, have exhausted
it, and utterly passed beyond all 111, might be revealed ? Or
does the ear, the nose, the tongue, the co-ordinating sense, still
exist with • which one might do this ’ ? 1 Nay, Phagguna, the
eye docs not exist, nor any sense by which past Buddhas, who
have so wrought, might be revealed ’ ? 3
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it must surely not be said
■that ‘the past is,’ ‘the future is.’
[62] Again, was it not said by the venerable Nandaka :
‘ Formerly there was greed, [ivithm him] , that was bad; that
this no longer exists is good. Formerly there ivere hate and
dulness, that teas bad; that these no longer exist, that is
good ’l 4
Is the Suttanta thus? Surely then it should not be
said that ‘ the past exists.’
[6B] S . — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ If,
bhikkhus, there be lust after, pleasure in, craving for, edible
food, 5 consciousness establishes itself and grows there. Wherever
as j ana, people, thus: ‘These two (classes of) people and these
three views.’ These three views he tersely characterizes by referring to
(1) Makkhali Gosala’s formula (Dialogues, i. 71 ; Majjh.-Nik., i. 407) ;
(2) the words karoto na kariyati papap— ‘evil result be fall s
not the doer ’ (Angutt.-Nik., i. 192) ; (3) Ajita KesakambalTs view
(. Dialogues , i. 73). Sdratthappakdsim, VI. 437. Cf. Vin. Texts,
i. 81; Ehys Davids, Bud. Birth Stories, 110. Cf. JRAS., 1910,
526 f., where the reviewer, E. Muller, overlooks this passage.
1 Sayyutta-Nih, iii. 71.
2 Natural desires (tanha) — so Buddhaghosa’s Commentary; else-
where conceit and erroneous views are added.
2 Op cit., iv. 52. * Anguttara-Nik., i. 197 (III. 66):
5 Support, proximate cause ; see next page, n. 4, j
143. Appeals to Authority 97
consciousness establishes itself and grows, there doth exist an
entry 1 for mind and body. Wherever an entry for mind and
body doth exist, there do grow 2 mental coefficients. Wherever
mental coefficients do grow, there re-becoming in the future doth
exist. Wherever re-becoming in the future doth exist, there
do follow future birth, decay, and dying. Wherever future
birth, decay, and dying do exist, I, bhikkhus, do declare that
to be accompanied by grief, anguish, 3 and despair. And
whether the “ food ” be [ edible , or] contact, or act of will,
or consciousness , 4 I declare it to be accompanied by grief,
anguish, and despair ’ ? 5
Is the Suttanta thus ? Hence must it not surely be
said ‘ the future exists ’ ? 6
[64] Th . — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
- If there be no lust after, pleasure in, craving for, edible food,
consciousness doth not establish itself or grow there. Wher-
ever consciousness doth not establish itself and grow , there cloth
not exist an entry for mind and body. Wherever an entry
for mincl and body doth not exist, there cloth exist no growth
of mental coefficients. Wherever growth of mental coefficients
doth not exist, there doth exist no future re-becoming. Wher-
ever future re-becoming doth not exist, there doth exist no
future birth, no decay and dying. Wherever there doth exist
in the future no birth, decay, or dying, I declare, bhikkhus,
that such edible food is not attended by grief, anguish, and
despair. Or whether the ‘food ” be contact, or act of will ,
1 Avakkanti, an opportunity for rebirth as the resultant of
foregoing consciousness, i.e., in a previous life.
2 The Burmese translation also reads vuddhi, though B r . has
h u d d h i.
3 Sadarar). So Singhalese MSS. PTS edition and Br. read
sarajap (with) ‘ dust,’ a figure for the passions which cause obscurity
of ‘ vision.’ Cf. Dialogues , ii. 32.
4 As one of the four 1 foods ’ or proximate causes taught in the
Dhamma, vinhana (consciousness), functioning at death, is the
■cause of fresh effect-v innana beginning in the conceived germ. Cf.
Mrs. Bh. D., Bud. Psychology, 1914, 22, 61 ; also Bud . Psy. Eth., 30, n. 1.
5 Sayyutta-Nih., ii. 101.
6 In PTS edition either na must be suppressed, or ? must be
inserted. The Hanthawaddy Br. edition omits na vattabbaij.
T.S. V. I
98
Of What does my ‘ Past ’ Consist ? I. 7.
or consciousness , I declare it to he unattended by grief,
anguish , and despair ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus ? Surely then it should not be said
that ‘ the future exists.’
7. Of what does my ‘ Past ’ Consist ?
Controverted Point. — That one’s past consists in [bodily
and mental] aggregates. 2
[1] Opponent. — If you affirm that [my] past consisted in
aggregates — as you do — you must also admit that the past
exists 3 — which you deny. This is also the position in the
case of the organs and objects of sense, the elements, 4 or
all of the three taken together. [2] Again, if you admit
that [my] future will consist in aggregates — as you do — you
must also admit that the future exists — which you deny.
This is also the position in the case of the organs and ob-
jects of sense, the elements, or all of the three taken together.
[3] If you admit — as you do — that [my] present consists
in aggregates and that it exists, you must also admit that
1 This passage in the Sntta quoted, follows immediately on the previous,
quotation. The Opponent’s emphasis lies on the atthi, ‘ doth exist,’
of the solemn categorical declaration in the Sutta. The Theravadin,.
by completing the declaration, shows that the future, so far from
existing, depends entirely, for its eoming-to-exist at all, on the circum-
stances attending the occurrence of a certain pre-requisite, or ante-
cedent condition. Before it exists, certain conditions must have come
to pass. So the Corny. : ‘the words “there doth exist in the future
re-becoming,” etc., do not amount to a “state of existing,” but refer to.
certainty of result, given the consummation of the conditions.’
2 This is a supplementary discussion to the foregoing, the Opponent,
in the absence of any new allocation by the Commentator, being
doubtless still a Sabbatthi vadin. His ‘ opinion is that past and
future both exist, because the aggregates and other factors of our
experience retain their state [as a sort of complex soul]. The
Theravadin’s “yes” summarizes the past as khandhas (read
khandhasangahitatta, as in Br.).’ — Corny.
3 The factors of individual life — in their ultimate terms — were
among the ‘ phenomenal realities ’ of orthodox doctrine.
4 The elements were the physical irreducibles in the organism, and
the sentient apparatus ‘ derived’ from them. Vibhanga, 82-5.
145-8. Is 1 to Consist’ tantamount ‘to Exist’ f 99
ray past, which consisted in aggregates, exists. Similarly
for other present factors of experience. [4] Similarly,
again, for my future.
[5] Again, if you admit a past consisting in aggregates
— or other factors, such as sense-organs, etc. — which does
not [now] exist, you must admit that the present consist-
ing (as you agree) in aggregates, etc., no longer exists.
[6] Similarly as to a future consisting in aggregates, etc.,
but not existent.
[7] Again, a little more specifically, if you admit that
material qualities in the past formed my aggregates, sense-
organs and objects, elements, or all of these together, then
you must also admit that past material qualities exist.
[8] And if you admit that material qualities in the future
will form my aggregates, etc., you must also admit that
future material qualities exist.
[9] Again, if you admit that material qualities in the
present form my bodily aggregate and the other factors, and
that the present exists, you must also admit that my past
material qualities, having consisted in bodily aggregate,
etc., exist.
[10] The same reasoning holds good, if, for 'past,
‘ future ’ material quality be substituted.
[11] Again, if you admit past material qualities existing
as an aggregate, and hold the view that those past qualities
do not exist, then you must admit that present material
qualities existing as an aggregate, and other present factors,
do not exist. [12] Similarly as to future material qualities
existing as an aggregate, and other future factors, held by
you to be non-existent.
[13] This also holds good if, for * material qualities/ any of
the four mental aggregates be substituted. For instance, 1
if you admit that consciousness in the past formed my
aggregate, sense-organs and objects, or elements [all of
which you would call real], then you must also admit
that past consciousness exists. [14] Similarly, if you
admit that future consciousness will form my aggregate,
1 §§ 13-18 are parallel to §§ 7-11.
100
Of What does my ‘ Past ’ Consist ? I. 7.
etc., you must also admit that future consciousness exists.
[15] Again, if you admit that present consciousness forms
my aggregate, with other factors, and that the present
exists, you must also admit that my past consciousness,
consisting in aggregate, sense-organ, and the rest, exists.
So again for future consciousness.
[17] Once more, if you declare, of past consciousness
existing as an aggregate, and the rest, that that conscious-
ness does not exist, then you must admit that present
consciousness, existing as an aggregate, does not exist.
[18] Similarly as to future consciousness.
[19] Th. — Is it then wrong to say that my past and
my future consisting in aggregates, elements, sense-organs
and -objects, do not exist ?
Opp . — Yes.
Th . — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ These
three modes in word, in term, or in name , bhikkhus, which are,
and were , formerly held distinct, are not mixed, will not he
confused, are not condemned by recluses and brahmins who are
wise : — which three ? (1) Those aggregates, material and
mental, which are past, have ceased, are changed, are reckoned,
termed, named “ have been ” ; they are not reckoned as “ are ”
(or “ exist”), nor yet as “ will be.” Similarly, (2) for those
aggregates that “will be,” and (3) for those that “are.” . . .’ P
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it should surely 2 be said
that my past and future consisting in aggregates, elements,
sense-organs and -objects, exist.
[20] Opp. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ Whatsoever material qualities, bhikkhus, whether past, future,
or present, are either internal or external, gross or subtle,
common or excellent, distant or near, are called the material
aggregate. Whatsoever feeling, or other mental aggregate,
whether past, etc. . . .’? 3
1 This quotation, cut short in the original, is that of § 60 in the
preceding discourse. — Sayy.-Nik., iii. 71.
2 In the PTS test n a should be omitted. Br. reads n a both here
and in the final sentence. The Corny, assigns the question and citation
in [20] to the Opponent. Hence the two conclusions must differ.
3 Scvrjyutta-Nik., iii. 47 ; quoted also above, I. 7, § 59.
151. Consequences Matured and Immature 101
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.— Yes.
Opp . — Hence it should certainly not be said that ‘my
past and future consisting in aggregates,’ etc., do not exist.
8. Of Some oj the Past and Future as still Existing.
Controverted Point. — That (i.) some of the past exists,,
some does not ; (ii.) some of the future exists, some does not.
From the Commentary. — The Theravadin by his questions seeks to
break down the opinion, held by those seeeders from the Sabbatthi-
vaclins known as Kassapika’s, that the past survives, as presently
existing, in part.
[1] (i.) Th. — Does the past exist ? Some of it exists, you
reply, some does not exist. You must then admit, [in
equivalent terms], that some of it has ceased, departed,
passed away, utterly passed away; some of it has not ceased,
departed, passed away, utterly passed away. Yet you
deny this.
[2] You must also admit, more specifically, that of past
things of which the results are not yet matured some are
existent, some not — you deny this — and that of past things
of which the results are matured, some are existent, some
not — you deny this — further, that of things which are with-
out result, 1 some exist, some do not. This also you deny.
[3] Again, referring to your declaration that the past
exists in part, which of the past exists, which not ?
K . — Those past things of which the effect is not matured
exist ; those past things of which the effect is matured
do not.
Th. — But if you admit the existence of the former part,
you must also admit the existence of the latter part, and
also the existence of those past things that are without
1 A vip a k a = a vy akat a (or abyakata). These include all
classes of consciousness which happen as moral effects or resultants
(v i p a k a c i 1 1 a), and are morally inoperative, also all material
qualities, and Nibbana. Cf. Compendium, pp. 19, 20 ; Bud. Psych.
Fill., p. 156, n. 1 ; 168.
102 Of Some of the Past as Still Existing I. 8.
effect. 1 Again, if those past things of which the effect
is matured are non-existent, no less are those past things
of which the effect is not matured existent, as well as those
things which are without effect. Once more, you say,
those past things the effect of which is not matured exist,
but might not such past things be said to have ceased ?
You admit this? But you cannot say that a thing both is
and has ceased.
[4] Do you contend that those past things, the effect of
which is not yet matured, but which have ceased, exist ?
'Then must you also admit that those past things, the effect
of which is matured and which have ceased, exist, as well
as those past things which are without effect — that these,
too, exist.
If, on the other hand, you say that those past things, the
effect of which is matured, and which have ceased, do not
•exist, then must you also admit that those past things, the
effect of which is not yet matured, and which have ceased,
•do not exist [contradicting what you have previously
affirmed], as well as those things which are without effect.
Or do those past things, the effect of which is not yet
matured, but which have ceased, exist ? And are those
past things, the effect of which is matured, but which have
ceased, non-existent? Then you hereby affirm also that
some of those past things, the effect of which is in part
matured, and in part not yet matured, but which have
•ceased, exist, while some do not exist — which you deny.
[5] K. — Is it then wrong to say ‘ those past things, the
■effect of which is not yet matured, exist ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
K. — Is it not a fact that past things, the effect of which
is not yet matured, will become mature as to effect?
Th.— Yes.
1 ‘ Queries and answers all revolve about these three groups : incom-
plete results, completed results, and the indeterminate, or absence of
results. Of the act producing rebirth, life and decease are its result,
and the maturing of that result, accordingly, lasts from birth to death.’
— Corny.
153.
Does the Future exist in Part ?
103
K . — If that be so, then it is surely not -wrong to say
that past things yet immature in their effect exist.
Th . — Granting that such past things will become mature
as to their effect, can they be said to exist ? Yes, you say;
but granting that they will in this respect mature, can they
be said to be present ? If you admit this, 1 then, granting
that present things will perish, are they non-existent ?
[6] 2 (i.) To the question ‘Does the future exist?’ you reply
‘some of it exists, some does not.’ You must then admit [in
equivalent terms] that some of it is born, produced, has
happened, appeared, some of it not. Yet you deny this.
Granting your declaration, do some things that have been
inevitably determined 3 exist, and some not? You are
committed to this, and also to this : that some future things
which are not inevitably determined exist, and some not.
[7] ^Referring to your declaration (ii.) : — which of the
future exists, which does not exist ? You reply : ‘ Those
future things which are inevitably determined exist, those
that are not so determined do not.’ You deny then that
those future things not inevitably determined do exist,
though you are really committed to this by the former half
of your reply. Again, if future things not inevitably
determined are non-existent, then also future things which
are inevitably determined are also non-existent.
With regard to those future things inevitably determined
which you say ‘ exist,’ would you not admit that such future
things have not been born ? Yes ? Then how can you say
that things not yet born exist ?
[8] Or, if inevitably determined future things, which are
not yet born, do exist, then future things not so determined,
which are not yet born, exist. Or again, if future things
1 Namely, that past things are present things.
2 §.§ 6-10 correspond to §§ 1-5.
3 Uppadino. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., § 1087, n. 4. They will
certainly arise from the fact that their conditions are stable, however
long the maturing may take, e.g. the consummation to be achieved
in the coming of Metteyya Buddha. Atthasalinl, 361.
104
Of Some of the Past as Still Existing I. 8.
not inevitably determined, which are not yet born, are non-
existent, then you must say no less of similar but inevitably
determined things.
[9] ii.—Then is it wrong to say * those future things
which are inevitably determined exist ’?
Th. — Yes.
K — But will not future things which are inevitably
determined happen ?
Th. — Yes.
K . — Surely then things inevitably determined exist.
[10] Th. — Granting that future things, if inevitably
determined, will happen, do they exist ?
K.~ Yes.
Th. — Granting they will happen, are they present ?
K . — No [the future is not the present].
Th. — I repeat my question.
K . — Yes [since, if they are existent, they are present].
Th. — And granting that present things will cease, are
they non-existent ?
K. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th. — But you have already admitted this.
9. Of Applications in Mindfulness.
Controverted Point . — That all mental states are appli-
cations in mindfulness.
From the Commentary . — The groups holding special views who arose
later, to wit, the Andhakas, comprising the sub-groups of thePubbaseliyas,
Aparaseliyas, Bajagirikas, and Siddhatthikas, held the opinion that the
objects of mindfulness, namely, the body and the rest, were themselves
[the conscious subject :] mindfulness. This they deduced from the
passage in the ‘ Satipatthana-Sapyutta 5 : ‘I will show you, bhikkhus,
the induction and the cessation of applications in mindfulness.’ 1 To
break down this opinion, the Theravadin puts the question.
1 Sapyutta-Nikaya, v. 184. The controversy turns upon the double
sense, subjective and objective, of the term sati-patthana, or
mindfulness-applications. The Opponent confuses the objects of this
important fourfold religious exercise with the mental exercise itself,
155. Limiting the Intension 105
[1] Th . — Do all cognizable things constitute applications
in mindfulness T
A ndhaka. — Yes.
Th . — Then must you also admit that all cognizable
things constitute mindfulness, the controlling faculty and
force of mindfulness, mindfulness that is perfect, that is a
factor of enlightenment, the * sole conveying ’ path ‘ leading
to extinction,’ to ‘ enlightenment,’ to 4 disintegration,’ are
4 not [bound up with] the intoxicants,’ not akin to the
fetters, ties, floods, bonds, hindrances, contagions, graspings,
corruptions ’ ; you must admit that all cognizable things
constitute the * ten recollections,’ namely of the Buddha,
the Norm, the Order, morals, pious liberality, the devas,
4 mindfulness in respiration,’ 4 reflection on death,’ 4 mind-
fulness concerning the body,’ 4 reflection on peace.’ 2 But
this you deny.
thus merging object in subject, ‘subject’ in Buddhism being ‘con-
sciousness of object.’ We have much the same ambiguity observed in
the popular use of object and subject of thought. Etymologically ob~
and sub- scarcely support the distinction prescribed by philosophy.
A ‘subject for meditation’ is an ‘object of thought.’ A ‘hypnotic
subject ’ is for the hypnotizer an object.
The Sutta on which the opinion is based is ambiguously worded in
the contest that follows. This gives not the induction and cessation
of the meditating 1 mindfulness,’ but the cause or genesis (samudayo
can mean these or induction) of the four prescribed objects of the
meditation — the body, feelings, consciousness, and cognizable objects—
the causes being nourishment, contact, mind-and-body, attention,
respectively. Hence for the immature thought of the sectarian mind
there is thus much of justification.
1 On this term, which includes ‘ memory,’ the etymological meaning
of sati, see Compendium , 40, 179 ; Buddh. Psy., 1914. . . . The
quaint comment runs thus : ‘ Inasmuch as patthana mean “ those
things to which one applies”; — applies what? mindfulness . . . thus
such mindfulness has patth ana’s as its field; but patthanas
apply — what? mindfulnesses. Thus patthana’s mean (a) objects
of mindful application, (6) subjects applying mindfulness.’
2 All of these terms are technical in Buddhist religious culture, and
most are associated with applications of mindfulness, in the Suttas
concerning it. Dialogues, ii. 827 f. ; MajjhimarNik., i. 55 f. ; Sayyutta-
Nik., v. 141 f. ; 294 ; also Vihhanga , 198 f. ; 206.
106 Of Applications in Mindfulness I. 9.
[2] Again, you must equally admit, given your firso
affirmation, that the eye-organ constitutes an application in
mindfulness. And if you are driven to admit that it does,
then you must admit everything for it, which, as I claim,
you must admit for all cognizable things. [3] The same
argument holds for the four other sense-organs, for the five
objects of sense, for lust, hate, dulness, conceit, error,
doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, indiscretion.
[4] Is mindfulness itself ail application of mindfulness,
and conversely? If you admit this, then must you also
admit that each of the foregoing cognizable things is an
application of mindfulness, and that application of mindful-
ness is each of those things.
You deny ; then do you hold that each of those cognizable
things is an application of mindfulness, but not conversely ?
You assent ; then you must equally admit that mindfulness
itself is an application in mindfulness, but that application
in mindfulness is not mindfulness.
[5] A. — Then is it wrong to say [ all things are applica-
tions in mindfulness ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
A. — But is not mindfulness established 1 concerning all
cognizable things ?
Th.— Yes.
A . — How then, good sir, can you deny what I affirm :
‘ All cognizable things are applications of mindfulness ’?
Th. — We have said that mindfulness is established
concerning all cognizable things: now, are all cognizable
things applications of mindfulness ?
A.— Yes.
Th. — Contact 2 is established with respect to all cognizable
things : are then all such things applications in contact ?
For this is that to which you have committed yourself.
Again, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness, each of
1 Santitthati, literally translated, but ‘ actualized ’ may possibly
be a truer rendering.
2 Contact (phassa) may be physical or mental. If mental, it
takes place without impact a n g h a 1 1 a n a). Bud. Psy. Eth 5, n. 2.
157.
107
Appeals to Authority
these is established with respect to all cognizable things :
are then all such things applications in feeling, in percep-
tion, etc.? For this must equally be admitted.
[6] Again, if your proposition is to stand, then you
equally admit for all beings 1 that they have mindfulness at
hand, are endowed and set up with 2 mindfulness, having it
ever in readiness. 3
Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘ They,
bhikkhus, who do not enjoy mindfulness regarding the body, do
not enjoy the Ambrosial ; they, bhikkhus, who enjoy mindfulness
regarding the body, enjoy the Ambrosial 5 '} 4
Is the Suttanta thus? You admit it is; but do ‘all
beings ’ enjoy, obtain, practise, develop, and multiply mind-
fulness regarding the body ? You know they do not.
[7] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ There is
a id cry, bhikkhus, that leads only to the purification of beings, to
the passing beyond sorrow and grief, to the extinction of ill
and sadness, to the attainment of right method , 5 to the realiza-
tion of Nibbana, and that way is the four applications of
mindfulness ’? 6
Is the Suttanta thus? You admit it is; but have ‘all
beings ’ this one and only way so leading ? You are bound
to admit that they have not.
[8] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ When
a Wheel-turning Monarch appears, bhikkhus, then doth there
appear seven treasures. What are the seven ? The treasure
of the Wheel doth appear, and the treasures of the Elephant,
the Horse, the Jewel, the Woman, the Householder, the Heir-
apparent ; yea, bhikkhus, on the appearance of a Wheel-
turning Monarch do these seven treasures appear. When
1 Who are all ‘ cognizable things ’ (cl h a mm a).
2 Samohita.
3 This term, in the original, is an intensive form of the attribute
first named in this sentence : upatthita, p a c c up a 1 1 hit a.
4 Anguttara-NiJc., i. 45. ‘The Ambrosial’ in its literal meaning,
the Not-dead, is a name for Nibbana.
5 Cf. Sayyutta-Nik., v, 388.
6 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 141 ; cf. Dialogues, ii. 327 : Majjhima-NiTe.,i. 55.
108
Of Existence in Immutable Modes
I. 10.
a Tathagata appears, bhikkhus, Arahant Buddha Supreme,
then doth there appear these seven treasures of enlightenment.
What are the seven 1 The treasures of those factors of
enlightenment : Mindfulness, Search for Truth, Energy, Zest,
Serenity, Concentration, Equanimity ; yea, bhikkhus, on the
appearance of a Tathagata Arahant, Buddha Supreme, do
these seven treasures appear ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus ? You admit it is. But do ‘ all
things ’ become that treasure of Mindfulness which is a
factor of enlightenment, when a Tathagata appears? You
know they do not, yet you are bound to admit they do.
[9] Lastly, if all things are applications of mindfulness,
they must be equally other of the (thirty-seven) things
pertaining to enlightenment, 2 such as the supreme efforts,
the steps to magic potency, the controlling faculties and
forces, the factors of enlightenment. To this admission
are you committed.
10. Of Existence in Immutable Modes.
Controverted Point. — That things exist so and not
otherwise.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion now held by the
Andhakas and others, such as the Pnbbaseliyas, etc., named above.
They declare that all things exist, in time, by way of material and other
qualities, as past, present, or future, but that there is no past that is at
once future and present, nor any future and present that are also past,
and therefore all exists only as thus (a), and not as thus (6). Then,
says the Theravadin, the past both is and is not.
[1] Th .■ — Does the past exist ?
A . — It exists on this wise, it does not exist on that
wise.
Th . — Does the past, as you describe it, both exist and not
exist ? You deny, 3 then affirm 4 — for you must affirm. And
1 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 99. 2 g ee g 5j 5
3 Because it cannot, in its character as past, be both existent and
non-existent.
4 Because it can exist in its own character only.
159-62. Time and Things in Immutable Modes 109
if this same past both exists and does not exist, then is also
existence non-existence and conversely, then is the state of
being a state of non-being and conversely, then are * is ’
and ‘ is not ’ convertible terms, identical, one in meaning,
the same, same in content and in origin. And this of course
you do not admit.
[2] Similarly, you say the future exists only on this wise,
not on that wise. This is to say it both exists and does not
exist; and that involves the same antinomy.
[3] Similarly, you say the present exists only on this
wise, not on that wise — and you are landed as before.
[4] If the past exists only as you say it does, how is it
existent, how non-existent ?
A. — The past exists only as past; it does not exist as
future, it does not exist as present.
Th. — But this still commits you to saying that the same
both is and is not, and thus to the same antinomy.
[5, 6] Similarly as regards the ‘how’ of such future
and present as you hold to exist.
[7] A . — Then is it wrong to say ‘ the past or the
future or the present exists only on this wise, not on that
wise 5 ?
Th. — Yes.
A . — Do you mean then that the past exists also as
future and as present, the future also as past and as
present, the present also as past and as future — for to this
you are committed ? Hence I am surely right.
[8] Th. — Do material qualities exist ?
A. — They exist on this wise, they do not exist on that
wise.
Th. — Here again you are committed to saying ‘the
same both exists and does not exist,’ and to the same anti-
nomy as before. [9] Similarly in the case of the other
four aggregates — feeling, etc. [10-11] Again, with refer-
ence to how they exist on this wise, and how they do
not, when you reply, ‘ the one aggregate, e.g., the bodily,
exists as such, but not as any of the four mental aggre-
110 Of Existence in Immutable Modes I. 10.
gates,’ you are equally committed to the antinomy stated
above.
[12] A . — Then is it wrong to say ‘any aggregate exists
only on this wise, not on that wise ’ ?
Th. — Yes.
A . — But this commits you to saying that each aggregate
exists equally as any of the other four. Surely then I am
right in saying that each aggregate exists in a specific
fashion, and not otherwise. 1
1 The peculiar phraseology of this dialogue: — the ‘S’ev'atthi
s’eva n’atthlti ’ of the Theravadin, and the h’ev’atthi h’eva
natthiti of the Andhaka, — calls up, as Mr. Beni M. Barua has
pointed out to us, the Sapta-bhangl-naya of the Jains, by which they
sought to meet the uncompromising scepticism of Sahjaya Belatthi-
putta and his school. However that may be, the object here is rather
to shake rigid dogma, than to meet a series of negations. See H.
Jacobi, Jaina- Sutras, SEE, XLV., pp. xxvi-viii; Dialogues of the
Buddha, i. 75.
163.
Can Wicked Devos infect an Arahant ?
Ill
BOOK II
1. Of Conveyance by Another.
Controverted Point. — That an Arahant has impure dis-
charge.
From the Commentary. — This was asked concerning a notion
entertained by the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaselivas. These had noted
seminal discharge among those who professed Arahantship in the belief
that they had won that which was not won, or who professed Arahant-
ship, yet were overconfident and deceitful. And they wrongly
attributed to devas of the Mara group the conveyance, to such, of an
impure discharge. This leads to the second question, since even a
pure discharge is caused by passion.
[1] Th. — You contend that he may have. Yet you deny
that in the Arahant there remains any lust, sensuous
desires or assailing passion, any ‘fetter,’ ‘ flood,’ ‘ bond,’
or ‘ hindrance of sensuality.’ But this denial commits you
to negate your proposition.
[2] You admit that the average -worldling may have both
the one and the other, both the desires and the physical
result. But then you must also admit' both as true in the
case of the Arahant.
[3] What is the cause of that physical impurity which
you impute to the Arahant ?
P . A . — The devas of the Mara group convey it to the
Arahant.
Th. — Have then these devas themselves that physical
impurity ?
P. A. — No, in them it is non-existent.
Th. — Then you should not say that they convey it to
the Arahant. [4] From whom do they convey it ? Not,
1X2 Of Conveyance by Another II. 1.
yon affirm, from their own bodies, nor from the Arahant
himself, nor from other beings [which is absurd]. [5] You
deny also that they effect the conveyance through the pores
of the body. Then you should also deny that they convey
it at all. What [do you allege] is the reason of their con-
veying it ?
P. A. — Their idea is: ‘we shall cause doubt as to his
attainment to be laid hold of.’ 1
Th.— Is there doubt in an Arahant ? If you reply ‘ No,’
then your argument falls through. Or if you reply ‘ Yes,’
then must you herein admit that an Arahant may hold
doubts about the Teacher, the Doctrine, the Order, the
ethical training, the beginning and end of time— either or
both— and about things as happening through assignable
causes— which is absurd. [6] The average man holds
doubts about such things, but an Arahant does not [else is
he like the average man]. Or if both hold doubts not on
any of these eight points, but on other matters, 2 then
again the Arahant is no better than the average man.
[7] Granting your proposition, to what is the impurity
due ? You reply, to eating, drinking, chewing, tasting. But
you deny that the proposition is true of all who eat, drink,
chew, taste. Or, if you maintain the opposite conclusion,
you must admit that children, eunuchs, devas eat, drink,
etc., yet that the proposition is not true in their ease.
[8] Nor can you refer to any specific repository for that
impurity which you call a result of eating, drinking, etc.,
similar to that which is provided for the natural results of
eating, drinking, etc.
[9] If your proposition were true, then the Arahant
would pursue and produce things relating to sexual inter-
course, live a family life, use Kasi sandalwood preparations,
1 Vimatirj gahayissamati. A Singhalese v.Z. has g ah i s-
samati.
2 1 Such, as the name, family, etc., of a given woman or man, and
the like.’ — Corny. The ‘ eight points ’ constitute a stock formula even
up to the present. See ‘ Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine, 1 by Ledi
Sadaw, JPTS, 1913-14, p. 119. Bud. Psy. Ethics, § 1004.
169 Are all Amhants equally Immune ? 113
adorn himself with wreaths, perfumes, and cosmetics,
hoard gold and silver, like any average man, concerning
whom your proposition were true. [10] But how can it
he true of the Arahant who, as you admit, has put away
passion, has cut it off at the root, and made it as the
stump of a palm tree, made it incapable of rising up again
in future renewal? — of the Arahant who has treated in
like manner hate, ignorance, conceit, error, doubt, sloth,
distraction, impudence, and indiscretion ?
[11, 12] How, again, should it be true of one who, like
the Arahant, has cultivated the means for the putting away
of passion, etc., and all the other factors of enlightenment. 1
[13] How should it be true of one who, like the Arahant,
has [consummated as having] done with lust, done with
hate, done with nescience, by whom that which was to be
done is done, by whom the burden is laid down, by whom
the good supreme is won, and the fetter of becoming is
wholly broken away, who is emancipated through perfect
knowledge, who has lifted the bar, has filled up the
trenches, is a drawer-out, is without lock or bolt, an
Ariyan, of one for whom the banner is lowered, the burden
is fallen, who is detached, conqueror of a realm well-
conquered, who has comprehended 111, has put away the
cause thereof, has realized the cessation thereof, has culti-
vated the Path thereto, who has understood that which is
to be understood, comprehended that which is to be compre-
hended, put away that which is to be put away, developed that
which is to be developed, realized that which is to be realized? 3
[14-20] Do you still maintain your proposition?
P. A. — Yes, but only in the case of an Arahant who is
proficient in his own field, not of an Arahant who is
proficient in other things. 3
1 These are enumerated under heads in the text as above, I. 2, § 47.
2 See II., § 47 (p. 67).
3 This curious distinction is explained by the Corny, as that between
the Arahant who is ‘ freed by reason ’ (pannavimutto) and one
who is freed by the 1 eight attainments ’ (or stages in deliverance),
or who is ‘ freed both ways.’ See Dialogues, ii. 69, 70. The modified
position may be compared with a similar recourse above, p. 68.
IiS. V. 8
114 Of Conveyance by Another II. 1.
Th . — But how can you maintain it in the one case
without admitting it as true in the other? [15] The
former has the qualities and requisites of Arahantship
no less than the other ; both have equally put away
passion, and so on.
[21] How can you maintain your proposition when you
admit that there is a Suttanta in which the Exalted One
said : ‘ Bhikkhus ! those bhikkhus who are but average men , yet
are proficient in virtue and are mindful and reflective , can go-
to sleep without impure discharge. Those Rishis who are
outsiders, yet are devoid of passion in matters of sense, have
also no impure discharge. That an Arahant should have
impure discharge is anomalous and unnatural ’ ? 1
[22] P.A. — Is the proposition untrue ?
Th. — Yes.
P.A. — But if you admit that others may convey to the
Arahant clothing, alms, bedding, or medicine, surely my
proposition [as involving conveyance of something by
another] is tenable ?
[23] Th. — But is everything beyond those four requisites-
conveyable ? Could others convey to the Arahant the
fruition of Stream-Winning, of Once-Beturning, of Never-
Beturning, or of Arahanship ? No ? Then your argument
cannot hold.
2. Of the Knowledge of the Arahant.
Controverted Point .— That the Arahant may lack know-
ledge. 2
1 Vrnaya, i. 295. Atthanam, anavakaso — this idiomatic
pair of words means literally [something] out of place, without
occasion.
2 A £ - n a n a. This is less often used as a technical term in religion
than a v i j j &, ignorance, and m o h a, but see Sayy.-Nik., ii. 4 ;
v. 127, 429 ; Dhammasangani, § 1061, etc. This and the two following
propositions are based on the vague, loose extension of three several
terms.
173-6.
Ignorance and Crimes
115
From the Commentary. — The Pubbaseliyas hold that, because he was
liable to be ignorant and to get perplexed about facts concerning every-
day life, and to be surpassed in such knowledge by others, an Axahant
might be considered as lacking knowledge or insight, as given to doubt,
and as inferior to some. These views are refuted in this and the next
two discourses.
[1] Th. — You maintain that he does. Then you must
also admit that the Arahant has ignorance — ignorance as
flood, bond, latent bias, attack, fetter, hindrance. 1 If you
deny this, you cannot say he lacks knowledge.
[2] You would certainly admit lack of knowledge, ignorance
as ‘ flood,’ etc., in the case of the average man. [3] How
can you assert the former and deny the latter in the case of
the Arahant ?
[4] You would deny that an Arahant from lack of know-
ledge would kill living things, take what is not given, speak
lies, utter slander, speak harshly, indulge in idle talk, com-
mit burglary, carry off plunder, be a highwayman, commit
adultery, 2 and destroy village or town; yet you would admit
an average man might from lack of knowledge do such
things. [5] In fact you assert that an Arahant from lack
of knowledge w r ould pursue the opposite course from what
an average man would do from lack of knowledge.
[6] You deny that an Arahant lacks knowledge in respect
of the Teacher, the Doctrine, the Order, of the ethical train-
ing, of the beginning of time, the end of time, both beginning
and end, and of things as happening by way of assignable
causes. You deny that herein he lacks knowledge. Yet
you maintain your proposition. . . .
[7] You admit that an average man who lacks knowledge
lacks it in those respects, but that an Arahant who lacks
knowledge does not lack it in those respects. Must you
not also admit that an average man, lacking in knowledge,
does not lack it in those respects ?
[8-10] Can you maintain that the Arahant— one who
1 Six metaphors constantly applied to spiritual ignorance and
other failings in the Suttas. Cf. I., 5, § 8.
2 Of. Dialogues, i. 69.
116 Of the Knowledge of the A rah ant II. 2.
has so put away passion, 1 hate, ignorance, conceit, error,
doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, and indiscretion, that
they are cut off at the root and made as the stump of a
palm tree, incapable of rising again in future renewal, who
has cultivated the means for putting away passions and
all the other factors of enlightenment to that end, who has
consummated as having done with lust, hate, and nescience,
and to whom all the terms for the Arahant may be applied
— that such an one lacks knowledge ?
[11-16] Or how can you maintain your proposition with
regard to one class of Arahant only— to those who are
proficient in their own field— and not to another class— to
those who are proficient in other things ?
[17] Did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta : ‘ In
him if ho knows, 0 bhikkhus, who sees do I declare the
intoxicants to be extinct, not in him who knows not neither
sees. And what, bhikkhus, in him who knows who sees,
is the extinction of intoxicants ? “ Such is body, such its
cause, so is its cessation ; such are the four mental factors,
such their cause, so is their cessation ” — even this, 0 bhikkhus,
is the extinguishing of intoxicants ’? 2
How then can the Arahant [who knows who sees] lack
knowledge ?
[18] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta:
4 In him ivho knows, 0 bhikkhus, ivho sees do I declare the
intoxicants to be extinct, not in him ivho knows not, neither
sees And what, bhikkhus, in him who knows ivho sees is the
extinguishing of intoxicants ? “ This is III !" herein, bhikkhus,
for him who knows who sees is that extinguishing. “ This is
the cause of III . . . this is the cessation of III .. . this is
the course leading to the cessation of III ”■ — herein, bhikkhus,
for him who knows who sees is the extinguishing of intoxi-
cants' ? 3
How then can the Arahant [who knows who sees] lack
knowledge ?
1 §§ 8-16 are given more fully in the preceding discourse, §§ 10-20.
2 Sanyutta-Nikayu, ii. 29.
3 Ibid., v. 434.
178-80. Appeals to Authority 117
[19] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta :
‘ The man , 0 bhikkhus , who does not understand and compre-
hend all, who has not emptied himself of all, and given up all,
is not capable of extinguishing III. And he, 0 bhikkhus, who
understands, comp rehends, empties himself of , ancl gives up all ,
he is capable of extinguishing III 7 1
How then can the Arahant [who knows who sees] lack
knowledge ?
[20] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta :
‘ For him e’en as insight doth come to pass,
Three things as bygones core renounced for aye :
Belief that in him dwells a soul,
And faith in rule and rite — if aught remain.
Both from the fourfold doom is he released,
And ne'er the six fell deeds are his to do 7 2
How then can the Arahant be said to lack knowledge ?
[21] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta r
‘ Whenever, 0 bhikkhus, for the Ariyan disciple there doth
arise the stainless, flawless eye of the Norm — that whatsoever
is liable to happen is also liable to cease — together with the
arising of that vision core these three fetters : belief in a soul,
doubt, and the contagion of .mere rule and ritual put away by
him 7 3
How then can the Arahant be said to lack knowledge ?
[22] P. — Is it wrong to say ‘the Arahant lacks know-
ledge ’? May he not be ignorant of the name and lineage
of a woman or a man, of a right or wrong road, or of how
grasses, twigs, and forest plants are called ? If this is so,
surely, good sir, it is right to say that he lacks knowledge.
[23] Th. — If you say that, in not knowing such things,
the Arahant lacks ‘ knowledge/ would you also say he lacks
knowledge as to the fruition of Stream-Winning, Once-
Returning, Never-Returning, Arahantship ? Of course not ;
hence it should not be said that he lacks knowledge.
1 Sayyutta-Nikdya, iv. 17. The Br. translator renders the second
line— avirajayag appaj aharj— by ‘is not free from “ dust,” has
not given up the corruptions.’
2 See above (I. 4), p. 80. 3 See ibid.
118
Of Doubt in the Arab ant
II. 3.
B. Of Doubt in the Arahant.
Controverted Point . — That an Arahant may have doubts.
From the Commentary. — This discourse resembles the foregoing,
sentence for sentence— substituting ‘ doubt 5 (kankha) for lack of
knowledge and ‘perplexity’ (vieikiccha) for ignorance — but with
the following exceptions : (1) The expressions (from the religious
metaphors of the Suttas) ‘flood, 5 ‘bond,’ ‘latent bias,’ are not used in
the case of doubt (see above, §§ 1, 2). (2) The sections (§§ 4, 5) where
it is argued that, if an Arahant lacked knowledge, he might, like
any average man, offend against law and morality, are omitted-
(3) An additional passage is adduced from the Suttas (following the
•others as § 20) as follows :
[20] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta :
‘ Whene’er- in sooth ardently meditating
The brahmin sees [ the truth of] things 1 reveaUd,
All doubts are rolled away, for now he knoweth
That luhich befalls and likewise its conditions. 1
‘ Whene’er in sooth ardently meditating
The brahmin sees [the truth of] things reveaUd,
All doubts are rolled away, for he discerneth
That which doth make befall may be abolished.
- Whene’er in sooth ardent and meditating
The brahmin sees the truth of things revealed,
He standeth victor o’er the hosts of evil,
E’en as the sun that lighteth up the heavens.’ 2
‘ Ail doubts soever as to here or yonder,
Felt by themselves, or doubts that torture others
Thinkers renounce in ardent meditation.
Choosing to follow after holy conduct.’ 8
1 Dhamma and s a-h etu-dh arum a n, meaning in the (plural)
form things given, or data, phenomena, mental objects. But the
Burmese translation paraphrases dhamma by either bodhi-
pakkhiya dhamma or saccadhamma. In the context the
Buddha has just evolved the formula of causation as expressing a
universal law.
2 Vin. Texts, i. 18. The tristhubh metre of the text has been
imitated.
3 TJddna, v. 7. -
187-94. The Arahant’s Self -Redemption 119
‘ They ivho ’ mong souls beset by doubts, past all doubt
Have ivon, and now ■unswayed, from bonds enfranchised
Abide, to them a great reward is given.’ 1
‘ How should disciple ever doubt
That by the kind who here abide
The truth may yet be realized ?
All hail to Buddha who hath crossed
The flood and severed every doubt,
Great Conqueror and. Lord of all ’ l 2
4. Of the Arahant being excelled by Others.
Controverted Point. — That the Arahant is excelled by
others.
From the Commentary. — Here again the argument resembles that
in] II. 2, section for section, substituting ‘ excelled by others ’ for
- lack knowledge,’ and revealing the following exceptions :
(a) [1] Th. — You maintain that he is. Then you must
also admit that the Arahant is led by others, attains
through others, is conditioned by others, exists in de-
pendence upon others, and knows not sees not, being
baffled and without thoughtfulness. If you deny this,
you cannot affirm that he is excelled by others, etc. ...
( b ) The argument in 2, § § 4, 5, is omitted.
( c ) To the five quoted Sutta passages in 2, §§ 17-21, a
sixth is added :
[20] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Sut-
tanta :
‘ Nay, Dhotaka, to no one upon earth ivho doubts
Is’ t mine to go that I may set him free.
’ Tis in the learning of the noble Norm
That thou, thyself shalt journey o'er this Flood ’ % 3
1 We have not been able as yet to trace this stanza. The Uddnavarga
has the ‘ enfranchised 5 phrase in its last stanza of seven imitating
those above. Eockhill’s transl., xxxii. 91.
2 Digha-Nik., ii. 275 ( Dialogues , ii. 809). 3 Sutta-Nipdta, 1064.
120
Of Utterance c hiring Meditative Ecstasy II. 5.
5. Of Articulate Utterance [during Ecstasy ].
Controverted Point. — That there is articulate utterance 1
on the part of one who has entered into Jhana.
From, the Commentary . — It was held by the Pubbaseliyas and others
that anyone in First Jhana, at the moment of attaining the [first or]
Stream-Winner’s Path, uttered the truth : ‘ Sorrow!’ 2 This is refuted
by the Theravadin.
[1] You affirm this [in general]. Your statement should
hold good for such an one everywhere, always, for all such
persons, and for all such attainments in ecstatic meditation.
But you do not admit all such cases. Then you cannot
affirm it at all.
[2] Does such an one make utterance by bodily move-
ments ? You deny that he does so, but why not, if your
thesis is true? If he make no bodily expression, you
should not affirm that he makes vocal expression.
[B] If one during Jhana having [the power of] speech,
gives vocal expression, it follows that, having a body, he
may also make bodily expression.
[4] You affirm that, knowing the fact of 111, he utters the
word ‘ Sorrow/ yet you deny that, knowing the fact of Cause
[of 111], he utters the word ‘Cause.’ 3 But why? Why,
again, deny that he, knowing the facts of ‘ Cessation ’ [of
111] , and ‘ Path ’ [leading to that Cessation] , 4 utters those
words ?
[5] Or, taken negatively, why deny that he utters any of
the last three terms, yet not deny that he utters the first ?
[6] You say that the object of such an one’s insight is
the [Ariyan] truth. But you deny that the object of
1 B h e d o is literally a breaking or dividing off or up. The Com-
mentary paraphrases by vinhatti, intimation. See Bud. Psy. Eth. ,
192 f. ; Compendium, 22, 264. We have also rendered it by ‘ ex-
pression.’
2 I.e., the first of the four Ariyan Truths : that everything in life is
liable to undergo suffering or ill in general (d u k k h a).
3 I.e. the second of the four Ariyan Truths.
i I.e., the third and fourth of these four.
121
197-200. Why Limit the Alleged Utterance ?
such an one’s ear 1 is truth. This, you say, is sound.
But you deny that the object of his insight is sound.
[7] No, you say, the truth is the object of his insight,
sound the object of his ear. But if his insight has the
truth as its object, and his ear has sound as its object,
then, good sir, you should not affirm that such an one
makes articulate utterance.
[7a] If you say, that while his insight is concerned with
the [first] truth and his ear with the sound, the attainer
makes articulate utterance, you must admit a combination
of two contacts, two feelings, two perceptions, two voli-
tions, two consciousnesses [at a given moment], (which is
absurd).
[8] You affirm your thesis, yet you deny that it applies
to one who has attained Jhana by any one of the eight
artifices, 2 to wit, earth, water, fire, or air; blue-green,
yellow, red, or white colour, or by [any of the four im-
material conceptual inductions, to wit,] infinity of space
or of consciousness, ‘nothingness,’ or ‘neither perception
nor non-perception.’ 3 How is this intelligible ? [9] If you
deny each of these possibilities, you cannot affirm your
proposition.
[10] You deny, further, that one who practises Jhana
for merely mundane objects makes articulate expression,
whether he attain any of the four stages. Neither then
can you affirm your proposition. [11] If you deny the
former, you must deny the latter.
[12] You affirm your proposition only of one attaining
the first supramundane Jhana, not the second, third, or
fourth. But if you affirm it of the first stage, what is
there to make you deny it of the other three stages ?
[14] P. — Is it wrong to say that there is articulate utter-
ance on the part of one who has entered Jhana ?
Th.— Yes.
P. — But was it not said by the Exalted One that initial
1 Or, hearing (s o t a p).
2 Bud . Pay. Eth. , 43, n. 4 ; 58. 3 Ibid., p. 71 f.
122 Of Utterance during Meditative Ecstasy II. 5.
and sustained application of mind was vocal activity? 1
And does not such application belong to one in first
Jhana ? Surely then my proposition is true.
[15] Th. — Granting that you quote correctly, and that
one in first Jhana is engaged in such application, Isay, you
have just denied that anyone attaining Jhana by any of the
eight artifices does make articulate utterance. How then
can you also affirm your proposition ?
[16] P.— But was it not said by the Exalted One that
speech arises from initial application [or directing] of
thought ? And does not such movement of thought belong
to one in first Jhana ?
[17] Th. — That is no good reason. The Exalted One
also said that speech is caused by perception. 2 Now one
in second, third, or fourth Jhana has perception, but [we
know that] he no longer applies or sustains thought. So
also for the four more abstract Jhana states (see § 8).
[18] Moreover, is it not said in the Suttanta : : In one
who has entered first Jhana speech has ceased ’ ? 3
[19] If you maintain your proposition in the teeth of
this one, you must cease to hold [in accordance with the
next words] in the Suttanta : that ‘ in one who has entered
second Jhana, thought initial and sustained has ceased.’ 4
Similarly you must contradict the remaining words : ‘ in
one who has entered third Jhana, zest has ceased ; in one who
has induced fourth Jhana, respiration has ceased ; in one who
has induced ecstasy of infinite space, perception of bodily
qualities has ceased; in one who has induced ecstasy of in-
finite consciousness, perception of space infinity has ceased ;
1 Majjhi?na-Nih, i. 301 : ‘ vitakka-vicara vaci- sankharo
quoted in Yamaha, i. 229). The context in the Sutta (the Cula-Vedalla)
shows that Dhammadinna teaches, not identity between the two terms,
but causal sequence. Thinking leads to speaking. This is probably
the reference made in § 16, or it may be to Bh’amma-sangani ,
§§ 981, 982.
2 See again Dhamma-mngani, ibid. Perception (sauna) is
awareness without the more ratiocinative procedm-e implied in ‘ applied
and sustained thought.’
3 Sarjyutta-Nik., iv. 217. 4 Ibid.
202-03.
Appeals to Authority
123
in one who has induced ecstasy of nothingness, perception of
infinity, of consciousness, has ceased ; in one who has induced
ecstasy wherein is neither perception nor non-perception, per-
ception of nothingness has ceased ; in one who has induced
trance, 1 both perception and feeling have ceased . 52
[20] P. — But if my proposition is wrong, why did the
Exalted One say that ‘ for first Jhdnci sound is obnoxious ’ ? s
Does not this show that one who has attained Jhana can
emit speech ?
[21] Th. — You accept both the Suttanta dictum and your
proposition. But, by the same Sutta, that which is elimi-
nated successively, as each further stage of Jhana 4 is
reached, was pronounced to be obnoxious in its turn.
Does that therefore indicate that one who attained each
stage, practised each obstacle to that stage ?
[22] P. — But did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta:
0 Ananda, Abhibhu, disciple of Sikliin, the Exalted One,
Arahant Buddha Supreme, standing in the Brahma-world,
lifted up his voice over ten thousand worlds, saying 5 :
‘ Arise and strive ! go forth and give
Yourselves unto the Buddha’s Rule !
Sweep ye away the hosts of Death
As elephant a rush-built shed.
Who in this Norm and Discipline
Earnest and zealous shall abide,
Casting away the round of births,
He shall make litter end of III’ ? 6
Surely then an attainer does utter articulate sounds
during ecstasy.
1 Literally, the cessation of perception and sensation.
2 Op. cit., ibid.
3 Anguttara-Nik., v. 133 f.
- Ibid. The stages are here given as those in § 19, but in the Sutta,
only the four Jhanas and trance are given.
6 Ibid. i. 227.
6 SayyuttaNik., i. 157.
124:
Of Inducing Insight by saying ‘ Sorroiv 5
II. 6.
6. Of inducing [ Insight ] by saying ‘ Sorrow !’
Controverted Point . — That induction [of insight] by the
word * sorrow !’ is a factor of an'd included in the Path.
From the Commentary . — An opinion of the Pubbaseliyas is that
repeating the word ‘dukkhal’ induced insight (nanaij), and was
thus a factor and part of the Path [of salvation]. 1 They admit it as
true for those only who are qualified to win insight (v i p a s s a k a).
Th. Then you must also affirm that all who utter that
word are practising 2 the Path, which is absurd.
Or if you do affirm this, notwithstanding, then you must
also affirm that the average fqolish person, in uttering that
word, is practising the Path, and, again, that matricides,
parricides, murderers of Arahants, those that shed blood
[of Buddhas], those that cause schism in the Order, in
uttering the word ‘ sorrow !’ are practising the Path, which
is absurd.
7. Of the Duration of Consciousness . 3
Controverted Point . — That a single [unit of] consciousness
lasts for a day.
From the Commentary . — TheTheravadin puts this question to correct
the belief of the Andhakas, whose secession is narrated above, that,
judging by the apparent continuity both of consciousness in Jhana
and of sub-consciousness, a single state of consciousness lasted for a
length of time,
[1] Th . — If your proposition is true, does one-half of the
day belong to the ‘nascent moment,’ and one-half to the
1 I.e., the Four-staged Path : Stream -Winning, etc., not the Ariyan
Eightfold Path. Of. Dhamma-sangani, §§ 283-92. (This is incor-
rectly stated to be the latter path in the translation, p. 84, n. 1.)
2 Bhaventi, making to become, developing.
3 In the appended title, p. 208, of PTS text, read cittatthiti-
k a t h a, as in the Commentary.
204-06.
Phases of a Conscious Unit
125
‘ cessant moment’? 1 You say no; but you have im-
plied it. A similar admission is involved in affirming
that a state of consciousness lasts two days, or four days
or eight, ten, or twenty days, or a month, or two, four,
eight, or ten months, or a year, or any number of years, or
any number of teons.
[2] Are there other phenomena beside mind which arise
and cease many times during one day? Yes, you say?
Then do you contend that they come and go as quickly as
mind? If you say no, then your proposition falls. If
you say they do, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ I
consider, bhikkhus, that there is no phenomenon that comes
and goes so quickly as mind. It is not easy to find a simile
to shoio ho w quickly mind comes and- goes ’ ? 2
Again : ‘J-ust as a monkey faring through the dense forest
catches one bough, and, letting it go, catches another, and then
another, even so, bhikkhus, until what is called thought, or
mind, or consciousness, by day as by night, one arises iciien
another perishes ’ ? 3
[4] [Take the content of a state of consciousness :]
does any visual consciousness or other sense-consciousness
last a whole day, or any bad thought, such as conscious-
ness accompanied by passion, hate, ignorance, conceit,
error, doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, or indiscretion ?
If not, then neither can consciousness be said to last a
day.
[5] Does one hear, smell, taste, touch, apprehend men-
tally by means of the same [unit of] consciousness as one
sees? Or see, hear, etc., or touch by means of the same
[unit of] consciousness as one apprehends mentally ? You
1 Any citta (unit of consciousness) came to be orthodoxly con-
sidered as consisting of three ‘ moments ’ : nascent, static, cess ant.
This grew apparently out of the older twofold division of nascent
(uppada) and cessant (vaya, bhanga), such as is here alone
adduced.
2 Anguttara-Nilc., i. 10.
3 Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 95. Cf. Hume : perceptions ‘ succeed each
other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and
movement. . . (p. 584, Green and Grose ed.).
126 Of the Duration of Consciousness II. 7.
say ‘no.’ Then you cannot affirm that one [and the same
unit of] consciousness lasts a whole day.
[6] Similarly, if you deny that one moves backward with
the same [unit of] consciousness as one moves forward,
and vice versa, you cannot affirm your proposition. A
similar argument applies to looking backward, looking
forward, and to bending, extending by means of the same
unit of consciousness. 1
[7] In the case of the devas who have reached the realm
of space-infinity, does any unit of consciousness last their
whole lifetime ? You affirm it does, yet you deny a similar
duration in the case of humanity. You deny it also in the
case of all devas of the plane of sense-desires, and of all
devas of the higher or Efipa plane, 2 why not of those of
the first-named non-Eupa plane?
[8] You affirm, I say, this duration of a unit of conscious-
ness during the 20,000 seons of the Anipa-deva's life, yet
you deny an analogous duration in a unit of human con-
sciousness, lasting, say, for 100 years, and you deny it in
the case of all those devas of the Kamaloka and Rupaloka,
whose lifetime varies from 500 years in the Four Great
Kings to 16,000 seons of years in the senior 3 devas.
[9] A . — Does then the mind of the devas who have
reached the plane of space-infinity arise and cease moment
by moment ?
Th . — It does.
1 Cf. again Hume’s unconscious plagiarism : ‘ Our eyes cannot turn
in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still
more variable than our sight ; . . . nor is there any single power of
the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one
moment . . . several perceptions successively make their appearance ;
pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures
and situations 5 (p. 534, Green and Grose ed.).
2 The groups of devas are all enumerated in the text : of the heavens
of the Four Kings, of the Thirty-Three, of the Yama’s, of Delight, etc.,
of the Brahmas, etc., as enumerated in the accurately preserved
tradition recorded in the Compendium, pp. 138, 142.
3 Literally, the non-younger devas. Cf. Compendium, pp. 140, 142.
208.
127
The Fact of Manifold Happiness
A . — But do these devas themselves decease, and are they
reborn moment by moment ?
Th. — Nay, that .cannot truly be said.
A . — Surely this momentary living and dying is involved
in the momentary happening of consciousness ?
[10] Th . — But if you affirm that in the case of these
devas a unit of consciousness lasts as long as they live,
then you must also admit that they die with the same unit
of consciousness as that wherewith they are reborn ; but
you are not prepared to admit this. ...
8. Of [the World as only a ] Cinderheap.
Controverted Point. — That all conditioned things are
absolutely 1 cinderheaps.
From the Commentary. — The opinion of the Gokulikas, from grasping
thoughtlessly the teaching of sueh Suttas as ‘ All is on fire, bhikkhus !’ 2
‘All conditioned things [involve] ill, 53 is that all conditioned things
are without qualification no better than a welter of embers whence the
flames have died out, like an inferno of ashes. To correct this by
indicating various forms of happiness, the Theravadin puts the question.
[1] Th. — You affirm this ; but is there not such a thing
as pleasurable feeling, bodily pleasure, mental pleasure,
celestial happiness, human happiness, the pleasures of
gain, of being honoured, of riding-and-driving, 4 of resting,
the pleasures of ruling, of administrating, of domestie-and-
secular life, of the religious life, pleasures involved in the
intoxicants 5 and pleasures that are not, the happiness [of
Nibbana], both while stuff of life remains and when none
remains, 6 worldly and spiritual pleasures, happiness with
1 Anodhikatva, ‘not having made a limit, without distinction.
— Corny.
2 Vin. Texts , i. 134.
3 Dialogues, ii. 175.
4 Yana-sukhaq, literally, vehicle-pleasure.
5 Asava’s: sensuality, desire for rebirth, erroneous opinions;
ignorance was added as a fourth.
8 Upadhisukhaq nirupadhisukhaq.
128
II. 8.
Of the World as a ‘ Cinclerheap ’
zest and without zest, Jhana- happiness, the bliss of
liberty, pleasures of sense-desire, and the happiness of
renunciation, the bliss of solitude, of peace, of enlighten-
ment? 1 Of course. How then can you maintain your
general affirmation ?
[2] G. — My proposition then is wrong ? But was it not
said by the Exalted One: ‘All is on fire, 0 bhikkhus !
How is everything on fire ? The eye is on fire ; visible
objects, visual consciousness , visual contact and the pleasure,
the pain, the neutral feeling therefrom— all is on fire. On
fire ichereivithal ? I tell you, on fire xvith the fires of passion,
hate , and ignorance; with the. fires of birth, decay, and
death ; with the fires of sorrow, lamentation, ill, grief, and
despair. All the field of sense, all the field of mind, all the
feeling therefrom is on fire with those fires ’ ? 2 Surely then
all conditioned things are mere einderheaps absolutely.
[3] Th. — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
- There are these five pleasures of sense, bhikkhus — namely,
visible objects seen through the eye as desirable, pleasing, de-
lightful, lovely, adapted to sense-desire, seductive; audible
objects, odorous, sapid, tangible objects, desirable, pleasing,
delightful, lovely, opposite to sense-desire, seductive ’ . . . ? 3
[4] G. — But was it not also said by the Exalted One : —
‘ A gain is yours, 0 bhikkhus ! well have ye won, for ye have
discerned the hour 4 for living the religions life. Hells have
I seen, bhikkhus, belonging to the six fields of contact. Hereof
whatsoever object is seen by the eye is unclesired only, not
desired; whatsoever object is sensed by ear, smell, taste,
touch, mind, is undesired only, not desired ; is unpleasant only,
not pleasant ; is unlovely only, not lovely ’ ? 5
1 The invariable generic term in each of the Pali compounds is
snkhai). On its pregnant import see Compendium, 277; cf. JPTS
1914, 134.
2 Vin. Texts, i. 134.
3 Majjhima-Nik., i. 85, 92 passim. 4 Literally, moment.
5 Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 126. The ‘ hour ’ is the crucial time when a
Buddha is living on earth. Cf. the passage with frequent allusions in
the Psalms of the Early Buddhists, 1. 13, 167 ; II. 162, 213, 280, 347
also Anguttara-Nik., iv. 225 f.
210 - 12 .
129
Appeals to Authority
[5] Th. — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
- A gain is yours, bhikkhm / well have ye won, for ye have
discerned the hour for living the religious life . Heavens
have I seen, bhikkhm, belonging to the six fields of contact.
Hereof whatsoever object is seen by the eye, or otherwise
sensed, is desired only, not undesired / is pleasing only, not
unpleasing ; is lovely only, not unlovely ’ l 1
[6] G. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : * The
impermanent involves III ; all conditioned things are im-
permanent’ ? 2
[7] Th. — But take giving : — does that bring forth fruit
that is undesired, unpleasant, disagreeable, adulterated?
Does it bear, and result in, sorrow ? Or take virtue, the
keeping of feastdays, religious training, and religious life: —
do they bring forth such fruit, etc. ? Do they not rather
have the opposite result ? How then can you affirm your
general proposition ?
[8] Finally, was it not said by the Exalted One :
£ Happy his solitude who, glad at heart,
Hath learnt the Norm and doth the vision see !
Happy is that benignity towards
The world which on no creature worketh harm.
Happy the freedom from all lust, th’ ascent
Past and beyond the needs of sense-desires.
He tvho doth crush the great “I am ” -conceit :
This, even this, is happiness supreme.
This happiness by happiness is won,
Unending happiness is this alone.
The Threefold Wisdom hath he made his own.
This, even this, is happiness supreme 1
You admit the Suttanta says this ? How then can you
•maintain your proposition ?
1 Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 126.
2 Anguttara-Nik., i., 286 ; Dialogues, li. 232 ; Sayyutta-NIk.,
passim.
3 Udcma, II. 1. Line 9 (slightly different) also occurs in Psabns of
the Brethren, ver. 220; cf. ver. 63; and line 11 occurs often in the
.Psalms, Parts I. and II. See Ibid., II., pp. 29, 57.
T.S. V.
9
1B0
Of a Specified Progress in Penetration
II. 9.
9. Of a specified Progress in Penetration.
Controverted Point. — That penetration is acquired in
segmentary order.
From the Commentary.. — By thoughtlessly considering such Suttas
as —
‘ Little by little , one by one, as pass
The moments , gradually let the wise,’ etc., 1
the Andhakas, Sabbatthivadins, Sammitiyas, and Bhadrayanikas have
acquired the opinion that, in realizing the Four Paths, the corruptions
were put away by so many slices as each of the Four Truths was
intuited (cf. I. 4).
[1] Th.—li you affirm that there is a definite graduation
in penetration, you must also affirm that the first Path
(Stream- Winning) is gradually developed. 2 If you refuse,
your first proposition falls. If you consent, you must also
admit gradual realization of the fruition of that Path.
But you cannot. [2-4] Similarly for the realization of
the second, third, and fourth Fruits.
[5] [But tell me more of this gradual piecemeal ac-
quiring:] when a person is working to be able to realize
the fruition of Stream- Winning, and wins insight into
[the first Truth, namely] the fact of 111, what does he
give up ?
A. S . S. Bh . — He gives up the theory of soul, doubt,,
the infection of mere rule and ritual, 3 and a fourth part in
the corruptions that are bound up with them.
Th. — This fourth part: — do you maintain that 'he-
[thereby] becomes one quarter Stream-Winner, one quarter
not? Has one quarter of him won, attained to, arrived
at, realized the Fruit? Does a quarter of him abide in
personal contact with it, and a quarter not ? Does a
1 Sutta-Nipdta, verse 962; Dhammapada , verse 289; quoted
already, I. 4, § 17 ; and below, § 18.
2 Development in Path-attainments is considered as essentially a
momentary flash of insight. Each phala-citta {unit of fruitional con-
sciousness) is, for instance, momentary, albeit the flow of such units
may persist awhile. Cf. Compendium, pp. 25, 161, n. 5, 215.
3 The first three 1 Fetters.’ See above, p. 66, n. 2.
218-17.
Saintship in Segments
131
quarter of him get seven more rebirths only, rebirths only
among gods and men, or one more rebirth only? 1 Is one
quarter of him endowed with implicit faith in the Buddha,
the Norm, the Order ? Is a quarter of him endowed with
virtues dear to Ariyans, and a quarter of him not ? You
deny this, yet it follows from your proposition.
[6] Again, when he wins insight into [the second, third,
and fourth Truths, namely] the cause of 111, its cessation,
and the Path leading to that, what does he give up ? The
same things, say you? Then the same objection applies.
[7-9] Or what does a person who is working to be able to
realize the fruition of the other three Paths give up ?
A. S. S. Bh. -He gives up respectively (3) the bulk of
sense-desires, intense ill-will, and a quarter of the corrup-
tions bound up with them ; (2) the residuum of sense-
desires and of ill-will, and one quarter of the corrup-
tions bound up with them ; (3) lusting after life in any of
the higher heavens, conceit, distraction, ignorance, and
one quarter of the corruptions bound up with them.
Th. — Then the same objection applies, namely, you must
say whether, for example, he is one quarter Arahant, 2 one
quarter not, and so on.
[10] When a person who is practising to be able to
realize the fruition of Stream-Winning is beginning to see
the fact of 111, would you call him * a practiser ’ ?
A. 8. 8. Bh. — Yes.
Th.- — Would you, when he has seen it, call him ‘ estab-
lished in the fruit’? No, you reply, but why not? So
again, in the case of the three other Truths — why not ?
[11] Again, you allow that such a person, when he is
coming to see the [first] Path, may be called a practiser,
and you allow that when he has seen that Path, he is to
be called ‘established in fruition.’ Yet you do not allow
that such a person who, when he is coming to see the fact
1 On these terms, see above, p. 77, n. 8.
2 The detailed replies to (1), (2), and (3) enumerate the respective
rewards of the Second, Third, and Fourth Paths stated fully in I. 4,
§§ 5, 9, and 13.
132
Reality as Indivisible
II. 9.
of 111, may be called practiser, may, when he has seen the
fact of III, be called ‘ established in fruition ’ — why not ?
Again, you allow that such a person, when he is coming to
see the [first] Path, may be called practiser, and when he
has seen the fact of 111, may be called established in
fruition. Yet you do not allow that such a person who,
when he is coming to see the cause, or the cessation of 111,
may be called practiser, may, when he has seen either
of these Truths, be called established in fruition — why
not ?
[12] Once more, you allow that such a person, when he
is coming to see the fact of 111, may be called practiser,
while you refuse, when he has seen that fact, to call him
established in fruition (as in § 10). Then you must allow,
and refuse similarly, if we substitute any other of the
Four Truths — but to this you did not agree [§ 11].
[13] With reference to your position (in § 12) : you
compel yourself to admit, that insight into the fact, or the
cause, or the cessation, of 111 is really of no value. 1
[14] A. S. S. Eh . — You affirm then that, when once [the
first Truth, viz., the fact and nature of] 111 is seen, the
Four Truths are seen ?
Th. — Yes.
A. S. 8. Bh . — Then you must admit also that the First
Truth amounts to the Four Truths.
Th , — [Ah, no ! for you as for us] if the material aggre-
gate (khandha) is seen to be impermanent, all five are
seen to be so. 2 Yet you would not therefore say that the
material aggregate amounts to all the others. [15] A
similar argument may be applied to the twelvefold field of
sense and the twenty-two £ controllers ’ or faculties.
[16] If you believe that the fruition of the First Path
is realized by [insight considered as divided into so many
integral portions, for example,] the Four Insights, the
1 Since the discerner may not be called. ‘ established in fruition.’
2 ‘ Just as the presence of the sea may be known by the taste of one
drop of sea-water.’ — Corny. See Appendix: Paramattha.
Appeals to Authority
13a
Eight, Twelve, Forty-four, Seventy-seven Insights, 1 then
you must admit a corresponding number of Fruits of the
First Path — which of course you do not.
[17] A. S. S. Bh. — You say our proposition that there is a
gradual sequence in penetration is wrong. But was it not
said by the Exalted One : ' Even, 0 bhikkhus, as the ocean
slopes gradually, inclines gradually, has gradual holloivs,
without abrupt precipices, so, in this Norm and Discipline ,
is there gradual training, gradual achievement, gradual prac-
tice, but no sudden discernment of gnosis' ! 2 3
[18] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ Little by little, one by one, as pass
The moments, gradually let the wise
Like smith the blemishes of silver, blow
The specks away that mar his purity ' P
[19] Th. — That is so. But did not the venerable G-avam-
pati address the brethren thus : e Brothers, I have heard
this from the Exalted One, and learnt it from his Ups : —
0 bhikkhus ! whoso sees the fact of III, sees also its cause, its
cessation, and the course of practice leading thereto. Whoso
sees the cause of III, sees also III itself, its cessation, and the
course of practice leading thereto. Whoso sees the cessation pf
III, sees also III itself, its cause, and the course of practice
leading to its cessation. Whoso sees the way, sees also III ,
sees its cause, sees its cessation ’ ? 4
[20] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ For him e'en as insight doth come to pass,
Three things as bygones are renounced for aye :
1 These are explained as insight into ( a ) the Truths, (b) the Truths
plus the four Sections of analytic knowledge (patisambhida’s),
(c) the Causal formula (patieca-samuppada), (d) the Truths
each applied to items 2 to 12 of that formula (as in Sayyutta-Nik.,
ii. 56 f. ; nanassa vatthuni), and, similarly applied, these seven
terms: ‘ impermanent, conditioned, causally arisen, subject to perish,
to pass away, to lose passion, to cease ’ ( Sayyutta-Nik ii. 26).
2 Vinaya Texts , iii. 303.
3 See above (I. 4, § 17), from the Corny.. 4
Sayyutta-Nik., v. 436.
134 Of the Buddha's Everyday Talk II. 10.
Belief that in him dwells a soul, and doubt,
And faith in rule and rite — if aught remain.
Both f rom the fourfold doom is he released
And ner the six fell deeds are his to do ’ ? 1
Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Whenever,
O bhikkhus, for the Ariyan disciple there doth arise the stain-
less, flaivless Eye of the Norm — that whatsoever by its nature
may happen, may all by its nature cease — then with the
■coming of that vision doth he put aivay these three fetters :
belief in a soul, doubt, and the contagion of mere rule and
■ritical ’ t 2
10. Of a Buddha's Everyday Usage.
Controverted Point . — That the Exalted Buddha’s ordinary
speech 3 was supramundane. 4
From the Commentary. — The Andhakas hold that his daily usages
were supramundane usages.
[1] Does this not involve the further statement that his
speech impinged only on the spiritual, but not on the
mundane ear ; and that the spiritual, not the mundane,
intelligence responded to it, and thus that disciples alone
were aware of it, not average persons? You do not admit
this. . . . Nay, you know that the Exalted Buddha’s
speech struck on the mundane hearing of men, was re-
sponded to by mundane intelligence, and that average
persons were awaj;e of it.
[2] [The terms he used, are they supramundane — ]
Path, Fruit, Nibbana, Path and Fruit of Stream-Winning,
Once - Beturning, Never -Beturning, Arahantship, earnest
1 Quoted above, I. 4, § 18. Sutta-Nipdta- , verse 231.
2 Quoted above, I. 5, § 19 ; see references.
3 Vobaro refers to common, worldly matters in general, but
reference is confined throughout to speech.
4 Lok-uttara, a wide term meaning all unworldly thought and
ideals, and including supernormal powers of mind, when occupied with
such ideals only. Jhana, e.g., may be lokiya, mundane. The
Opponent over-emphasizes the supernormal side of it.
221-4. Words inadequate to express the Real 135
application in mindfulness, supreme endeavour, steps to
magic potency, controlling power or faculty, force, factor
of enlightenment ?
[3] Were there any who heard his everyday speech ?
But you deny that a supramundane object is known
by way of the ear, impinges on the ear, comes into the
avenue of hearing. Therefore you cannot affirm that men
‘ heard ’ his everyday speech.
[4] Were there any who were ravished by his everyday
speech ? [We know that there were such. 1 ] But is a
supramundane thing an occasion of sensuous desire, ravish-
ing, entrancing, intoxicating, captivating, enervating? Is
it not rather the opposite ? . . .
[5] Further, there were some who were offended by his
habitual speech 2 But is a supramundane thing an occa-
sion of hate, of anger, of resentment ? Is it not rather the
opposite ? . . .
[6] Further, there were some who were baffled by his
habitual speech. 3 But is a supramundane thing an
occasion of obfuscation, causing want of insight and
blindness, extinguishing understanding, provoking vexa-
tion, not conducing to Nibbana? Is it not rather the
opposite ? . . .
[7] Now those who heard the Exalted Buddha’s habitual
speech, did they all develop the paths? Yes, you say?
But foolish average people heard him — matricides, too,
and parricides, slayers of Arahants, shedders of holy
blood, schismatics — therefore you are affirming that these
developed the paths ! . . .
[8] A . — But you may with one golden wand point out
both a heap of paddy and a heap of gold. So the Exalted
One, with his supramundane habitual speech, habitually
spoke about both mundane and supramundane doctrine.
Th . — It is no less possible to point out both paddy and
1 Of. Psalms of the Brethren , verse, 1270 ; Dialogues, ii. 16.
2 Of. Sayyutta-Nik., i. 160 ; Dighco-Nihaya, P&thika-Suttanta, etc.
3 E.g., disciples were asked to explain concise pronouncements by
the Master ( Sayyatta-Nih iv. 93 f., etc.).
136 Words not Coincident with Ideas II. 10.
gold with a wand of castoi'-oil wood. So the Exalted One,
with his mundane habitual speech, habitually spoke about
both mundane and supramundane matter.
[9] Now some o! you 1 say that the habitual speech of
the Exalted One the Buddha was mundane when speaking
to one so conversing, supramundane when speaking to one
so conversing. But this implies that his words impinged
on mundane hearing when he spoke of worldly things, and
on the supramundane hearing when he spoke of supra-
mundane things ; also that his hearers understood with
their mundane intelligence in the former case, and with
their supramundane intelligence in the latter ; also that
average persons understood in the former case, disciples in
the latter. To which you do not agree.
[10] A .— It is wrong then, according to you, to say that
the Exalted Buddha’s customary speech was mundane
when he spoke of mundane matters, supramundane when
he spoke of supramundane matters. But did he not use
both kinds of speech ? You ^assent. Then surely what
you maintain is untenable.
[11] Again, your proposition involves this further ad-
mission : that the speech of anyone becomes that of which
he is speaking — that if you speak of Path, your word
becomes Path ; similarly of what is not Path, of Eruit, of
Nibbana, of the Conditioned, of matter, of mind and their
opposites.
11. Of Cessation.
Controverted Point . — That there are two cessations [of
sorrow].
From the Commentary.~It is a belief of the Mahiijsfisakas and
the Andhakas that the Third Truth (as to the Cessation of 111),
though constructed as one, relates to two cessations, according as
sorrow ceases through reasoned or unreasoned reflections about
things.
1 So the Corny.
137
One Goal, Tiuo Modes of Access
[1] If you assert that there are two kinds of cessation, 1
you must also assert this duality with respect to the cessa-
tion of 111, the Truth about the cessation of 111, the Truth
about the nature of 111, its cause, and the path leading to
the cessation of 111 — to none of which you consent.
Further, you must assert that there are two shelters,
two retreats, two refuges, two supports, two deathless-
nesses, two ambrosias, two Nibbanas 2 — which you deny.
Or if you admit that there are, say, two Nibbanas, you
must admit some specific difference, say, of high, low, base,
sublime, superior, inferior— some boundary, division, line
or cleavage 3 in these two Nibbanas — which you deny. 4
[2] Further, you admit, do you not, that things 5 which
have ceased without deep reflection, 6 may also be made
1 N i r 5 d h a. In religions import, the term is a synonym of
Nibbana, whether it refers to cessation of 111 (dukkha), or to the
conditions of rebirth which inevitably result in 111. In the medically
inspired formula of the four Truths, nirddha is tantamount to
‘ health,’ i.e., to the ‘ cessation ’ of disease. Hence it suggests happiness,
rather than the reverse. Hence the English word ‘ riddance ’ might
often be a better rendering.
2 These terms are all similes for Nibbana, from the Suttas.
3 To the different readings of this word (see text, 226, n. 8), we would
add antarika, ‘interstice in threads,’ from Vinaya Texts, III. 94.
4 The somewhat scholastic insistence on the oneness of Nibbana
in the medieval Compendium (p. 168) is here shown to have early
authority, but we cannot quote any Suttanta support for it.
6 Sankhara. On the meaning in this context, cf. Compendium,
211, n. 3. It should not be .concluded that on any idealistic view
‘ things ’ are made no longer to exist now for the individual thinker
through his thought. According to the Commentarial tradition,
‘to cease’ means here prospective cessation; ‘to make to cease =
to cause to go into a state of not re- arising (anuppattibhavap)’ —
the negative of the term used to express future rebirth.
6 Patisankha, literally, re-reckoning. On this term, large, if
vague in import, yet rarely used in the Nikayas, see Bud. Psy. JEth.,
p. 354, n. 2. In popular diction its use in negative form is well
shown in the simile of the thirsty, exhausted man drinking ‘ rashly,
unreflectingly,’ from a cup against the contents of which he had been
warned. Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 110. See Compendium, loc. cit. Deep
reflection of spiritual insight, through its purity and the absence of state-
ments and questionings, is said to make worldly things cease. — Corny.
II. 11.
138 Of Cessation
to cease by deep reflection ? But this does not involve two
(final) cessations.
[3] M. A. — Surely it does, if you admit, as do you not,
that things which have ceased without, and those that
have ceased by, deep reflection are both annihilated for
ever 9 1
[4] Th. — You admit that the latter class of things ceases
because the Ariyan [eightfold] Path has been attained ?
Then must you also admit that the former class of things
ceases for the same reason — but you do not.
[5] Again, the latter class (i.e., things which have ceased
by deep reflection) does not, according to . you, ever arise
again. Then you must also admit this of the former
class — but you do not. 2 . . . Hence cessation is really
one, not two.
1 Corny. PTS edition, p. 61, line 1: for sakavadissa read
paravadissa. The Theravadin assents to the asserted annihilation,
partly because there is no need to destroy what has been destroyed,
partly because the things that have ceased without patisankha
continue as non-existent when the Path is developed. — Corny.
2 Contra the Theravadin’ s view, § 8.
228.
Graduation in Master and Disciples
139
BOOK III
1. Of Powers.
Controverted Point. — That the powers of the Buddha
are common to disciples.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion among the Andhakas,
derived from a thoughtless consideration of the ten Suttas in the Anurud-
dha Sapyutta, 1 beginning : 'I, brethren , from practice and development
of the Four Applications of Mindfulness , understand even as it really
is the causal occasion 2 as such, and ivhat is not the causal occasion
etc. Now of a Tathagata’s ‘ten powers,’ some he holds wholly in
common with his disciples, some not, and some are partly common
to both. All can share insight into extinction of intoxicants (a s a v a) ;
he alone discerns the degrees of development in the controlling powers
(indriyani), The causal occasion of anything, as well as seven
other matters, a Tathagata knows without limit, the disciple knows
them only within a certain range. 3 The latter can state them ; the
former can explain them. But the Andhakas say that the whole of
his power was held in common with his [leading] disciples.
[1] Th . — If your proposition is true, you must also affirm
that power of the Tathagata is power of the disciple and
conversely, whether you take power in general, or this or
that power, or power of this or that sort. And you must
also affirm that the disciple’s previous application, previous
line of conduct, instruction in the Doctrine, teaching of the
Doctrine, 4 are of the same sort as those of the Tathagata.
But all these [corollaries] you deny. . . .
1 Sarjyutta-Nikciya, v. 304 1; Suttas 15-24.
d T h a n a p thanato, paraphrased'by Buddhaghosa (Corny, on A.,
iii. 417) as karanap kar an at o (reason).
3 Pa-desen a, cf. Jut., v. 457 (trans., v. 246, n. 3).
4 The Corny, calls these two pairs of terms two pairs of synonyms.
140
Of Knoivledges as Pozvers
III. 1.
[2] You affirm [of course] that the Tathagata is Con-
queror, Master, Buddha Supreme, All-knowing, All-seeing,
Lord of the Norm, the Fountain-head of the Norm. 1 But
you would refuse these titles to disciples. Nor will you
admit of the disciples, as you do of the. Tathagata, that he
brings into being a Way where no way was, produces a
Way that had not been called into being, proclaims a
Way untold, is knower and seer of the Way and adept
therein.
[8] If you affirm that [one of the Tathagata’s powers :
that] of understanding as they really are the different
degrees of development in our controlling powers ( in-
driyani) is held by disciples in common with him, you
must also allow that a disciple is all-knowing, all-seeing.
[4] A. 2 — But you will admit that if a disciple can distin-
guish a causal occasion from an occasion that is not causal,
it were right to say that genuine insight of this kind is
common to Tathagata and disciple. [But you refuse to say
this. 3 ] . . .
[5] Again, you will admit that if a disciple knows, in
its causal occasion and conditions, 4 the result of actions
undertaken in the past, future, and present, it were right
to say that genuine insight of this kind is common to
Tathagata and disciple. [This, too, you refuse to say. 6 ]
[6-11] A similar implication holds good with respect to
the power of knowing the tendency of any course of action,
of knowing the worlds of manifold and intrinsically different
1 Dhamm a-p atisaranap, the latter half is a neuter substantive
applied to the Buddha, when appealed to for guidance and explanatory
teaching. It means literally ‘resorting to, having recourse to, ! and thence
the objective of such movement. See Bud. Psychology, 1914, p. 69.
2 The Andhaka is querist to the end.
3 The Theravadin draws the line at a coincident range of power.
‘These questions (§§ 4-11) are asked just to establish this : that the
powers named are common to disciples just in so far as they know
(jananamatta-samannen a).’ — Corny.
4 Thanaso hetuso, paraphrased, in Corny, an Angnttara-Nilc. ,
iii. 417, by pace ay at o cevahetutoca.
6 Because the power is not equally supreme in both.
141
230-31. Which Powers have they in Common?
elements; of knowing the manifold things beings have done
from free choice, of knowing the attainments in Jhana
or Deliverance or Concentration 1 — their impurities, their
purity, and emergence from them; of knowing how to
remember former lives ; of knowing whence beings are
deceasing and where they are being reborn. All these
corollaries, namely, that if a disciple knows, where a
Tathagata knows, the knowledge is common to both, you
deny. Finally, [12] are not the intoxicants as extinct for
a disciple as for a Tathagata ? Or is there any difference
between their extinction for a Tathagata and their extinc-
tion for a disciple, or between the [ensuing] emancipation
for a Tathagata and that for a disciple ? ‘ (None ’ you
say ; 2 then surely my proposition holds.
[13] Again, you have admitted that a Tathagata shares
the power of insight into the extinction as it really is of
intoxicants, in common with the disciple. But you will
not admit — though you surely must — that this is the case
with his knowledge of real causal antecedents and such as
are not real . . . 3 and also of the decease and rebirth of
beings.
[14] You affirm then that the power of the Tathagata’s
insight to discern as it really is a causal antecedent and
one that is not, is not held in common by disciples. Yet
you refuse to draw this line in the ease of the extinction of
intoxicants. Similarly, in the case of the remaining eight
powers — [which is absurd].
[15] Again, you admit that the power of the Tathagata’s
insight to know as they really are the degrees of develop-
ment in controlling powers is not held in common with the
disciples. Yet you will not admit as much with regard to the
insight into what are really causal antecedents and what
1 Buddhaghosa (on Anguttara-Nih., iii. 417) enumerates these as
‘the four Jhanas, the eight Deliverances (Dialogues, ii. 119), and the
three samadhi’s (Digha-Nik., iii. 219), also the nine grades in
elimination (ibid., 266).
2 Here the Theravadin admits there is no distinction in insight.
— Corny.
3 Here supply the remaining powers, §§ 6-11.
142
Of the Quality called Any an
III. 2.
are not, . . . nor of the insight into the extinction of intoxi-
cants. (Here, on the contrary, you find powers held in
common.) 1
[16] On the other hand, you admit a common power 1
in the discernment of what is really a causal occasion . . .
and of the extinction of intoxicants. But you will not
equally admit a common power in discernment of degrees
of development in controlling powers — how is this ?
2. Of Quality called] Ariyan.
Controverted Point. — (a) That the power of a Tathagata,
e.g., in discerning as it really is the causal occasion of
anything, and its contradictory, is Ariyan. 2
From the Commentary.— That, of the foregoing ten powers of dis-
cernment or insight, not only the last (insight into extinction of
intoxicants), but also the preceding nine were Ariyan, is a view of
the Andhakas.
[1] Th. — If it be so, you should also affirm of that power
that it is the (Ariyan) Path, [or other Ariyan doctrine,
such as] Fruit, Nibbana, one of the Four Paths to Arahant-
ship, or of the Four Fruits thereof, one of the Applica-
tions in Mindfulness, Supreme Efforts, Steps to Potency,
Controlling Powers, 3 Forces, or Factors of Enlightenment.
But you do not agree to this.
[2] Or is [the concept of] Emptiness the object of that
power? 4 If you deny, you cannot affirm your proposi-
tion. If you assent, then you must affirm that one who
is attending to the exercise of this power attends also to
Emptiness. If you deny, you cannot affirm that Empti-
ness is the object of the power in your proposition. If you
1 To the whole or to a limited extent. — See Corny, above.
2 See Rhys Davids, Early Buddhism, 49 ; Mrs. Rh. D., Buddhism , 69.
3 I.e., ethical or spiritual faculties. Cf. I. 2, § 15 ; Compendium, 179 f.
4 Sunnata. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 91, § 344 f. ‘ There are two
Emptinesses: (1) In the aggregates of a soul (s at t a); (2) Nibbana,
or detachment from all conditioned things. The Opponent denies
because of the latter, assents because of the former. — Corny.
238-8. Ariyan and the Threefold Object 143
assent, then yon are claiming a combination of two (mental)
contacts, two consciousnesses— which of course you deny.
[3] A similar argument holds good for the other two
concepts of the ‘ Signless’ and the ‘ Not-hankered-after.’ 1
[4] [Or, to argue conversely], you admit that (1) the
Applications in Mindfulness are Ariyan, and have as their
object the concepts of ‘Emptiness,’ the ‘ Signless,’ and the
c Not-hankered-after.’ But you deny that these are the
object of that power of a Tathagata. Hence that power
cannot be classified under things ‘ Ariyan.’
[5] This argument applies also to (2) the Supreme Efforts
and (3-6) the Steps to Potency, etc. (§ 1).
[6] A. — You say then that my proposition is wrong — -
that it is not Ariyan, and has not as its object Emptiness,
the Signless, or the Not-hankered-after. Yet you do not
deny that the six foregoing doctrines are Ariyan, and also
have that Threefold object — why deny the same of that
power of which my proposition speaks ?
[7] Th. — Nay, why do you maintain that the power of a
Tathagata, in discerning as it really is the decrease and
rebirth of beings and its contradictory, is Ariyan, while you
are not prepared to class that power with things we call
Ariyan — the Path, and so on ? .
[8-12] The arguments in §§ 2-6 are then repeated for the
Andhaka’ s propositions : — that the other po wers of a Tathagata
discerning the decease and rebirth of beings as they really are,
etc., are Ariyan .
[13] A. — You admit then that the tenth of the * Powers ’
ascribed to a Tathagata — insight into the extinction as it
really is of intoxicants — is Ariyan, but you deny it in the
case of the two powers named above. How can you affirm
it of the tenth ?
[14] The Andhaka puts the case negatively.
[15, 16] As in [13, 14], with the addition of the ‘ Three
Signs, ’ as ‘object,’ added to the predicate ‘is Ariyan .’
1 Animitta, Appanihita {Bud. Psy. Bth., p. 91, § 344 f.) ;
Comp., 211.
144
Of Emancipation
III. 3.
3. Of Emancipation.
Controverted Point. — That ‘ becoming emancipated ! has
reference to the heart being [at the time] in touch with
lust, 1 etc.
From the Commentary. — Whereas it is true that, in minds or hearts
devoid of e.g. lust, there is no need to get emancipated, the opinion held
at present by such as the Andhakas is that, just as a soiled garment is
released from its stains on being washed, so emancipation means that
a heart beset with lust is emancipated from lust. 2
[1] Th. — You affirm this. Then you must equally affirm
that ‘ becoming emancipated ’ refers to a heart which is
accompanied by, co-existent with, mixed with, associated
with, has developed with, goes about with, lust ; to a heart,
again, which is immoral, worldly, in touch with intoxicants,
allied with fetters, .ties, floods, bonds, hindrances, is in-
fected, allied with grasping, corrupt — which you refuse
to do.
[2] If the heart or mind which is in contact be emanci-
pated, are both contact and mind emancipated? 'Yes’ you
say. But then you must equally affirm that, if the heart
which is in touch with lust be emancipated, both lust and
heart are emancipated — which you refuse to do.
The same reasoning holds good not only of contact, but
also of [the other properties of the mind] — feeling, per-
ception, volition, . . . reason, or understanding.
1 Sara gar). The prefix sa corresponds to our co (or affix -f ul).
S a implies contact (p h a s s a), and contact was ranked as the essential
co-efficient of mind as receptive of, in touch with, sense.
2 In other words, the climax and crown of Path-graduation is de-
graded to denote progress in the early stages. Emancipation is
technically applied to release from rebirth, through release from the
conditions thereof. Nib ban a is extinction of lust, hate, and
nescience or delusion. Emancipation is the state of purity after the
purging was done (cf. III. 4). The opponent holds the serious errors
that the Arahant still has lust, etc., to get rid of, and that a preceding
unit of consciousness is essentially identical with the succeeding unit.
Cf. SayyuHa-Nih., iv. 251 ; ii. 171 and passim.
239-42. Emancipation instantaneously realized
145
[3] Once more, if mind which is in contact, and in touch
with lust, be emancipated, are both contact and mind
emancipated ? Yes, you say. But then you must equally
affirm that both lust and mind are emancipated — which
you refuse to do.
The same reasoning holds good of the other properties
of the mind.
[4-6, 7-9] The same argument is then applied to ‘ emanci-
pation ’ referred to ‘ hate,’ ancl to ‘ nescience or delusion ’ —
the other tivo of the fundamental conditions of evil doing.
[10] A. — You say that we are wrong in affirming that a
mind full of lust, hate and nescience undergoes emancipa-
tion. But your denial that a mind which is devoid of all
three undergoes emancipation rather confirms our view.
4. Of Emancipation as a Process.
Controverted, Point. — That spiritual emancipation is a
[gradual] process of becoming free. 1
From the Commentary . — The opinion is questioned of those who
■confuse the emancipation by partial arrest in the exercise of Jhana
•with that emancipation by complete severance experienced in a ‘ Path-
moment.’ They think that the mind, partially liberated by the former,
completes its emancipation by the gradual process of the latter.
[1] Th. — If your proposition is to stand, you must affirm
also that such a mind is then in part freed, in part not. And
if you assent to the second proposition, you must admit
that your subject is part Stream-Winner, part not — in other
words, that he has all the attributes of the Stream-Winner
in part only. 2
[2-4] The same argument holds for the other three Paths.
[5] You must also affirm as to whether [each conscious
unit] is emancipated at the moment of its genesis, and in
process of being emancipated as it ceases. 3 ...
1 The heresy seems to be analogous to that in III. 3, and to involve
a misapprehension of the orthodox meaning of the term in question
<vimutti).
2 Here and in [2-4] the same lists are given as in I. 4, §§ 1, 5, 9, 13.
3 Cf. II. 7, § 1 : ekag c it tag (unit of consciousness).
T.S. V.
10
146
Of Emancipation as a Process
III. 4.
[6] Opponent — You do not assent to my proposition ;
but was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ For him who thus
knows thus sees, the heart is set free from the intoxicants of
sense-desires, of becoming, and of ignorance ’ ? 1 Is there no
‘ being emancipated ’ here of the emancipated mind ?
[7] Th . — But is there not also a Suttanta in which the
Exalted One said : ‘ With heart thus made serene, made
wholly pure, and very clean , freed from lust and from de-
filement, become pliant, ready to ivork and imperturbable, he
bends over the mind to insight in the destruction of intoxi-
cants' 1 1 2 There is no process here of being set free.
[8] You would not speak of a mind partially lusting,
hating, being bewildered, being corrupted. How can you
then maintain your proposition? Would you not say
[straight away] that the mind is lustful or not, mal-
evolent or not, confused or not, suspended or not, destroyed
or not, finished or not ? 3
5. Of the Eighth Man. 4
Controverted Point. — That for the person in the Eighth
Stage, outbursts of wrong views and of doubt are put
away.
From the Commentary. — Here the question is raised concerning a
certain view of both Andhakas and Sammitiyas, namely, that, at the-
1 Dialogues, i. 9B.
2 Ibid., 92. It seems a little strange that this is not quoted as 1 the
same Suttanta.’ There are, however, parallels in this work, e.g., p. 96 f.
Cf. 98, n. 1.
3 ‘The mind’ (in our idiom) being, in Buddhist doctrine, a con-
ditioned series of citt a’s, each as momentary as the ‘ moments’ of its
attainments. Here the Theravadin resorts to the principle of Excluded
Middle, ‘ there being no room in philosophic Reality for a third alter-
native’ — paramatthato tatiya koti natthi. — Corny.
i Atthama-ko, literally Eightb-er. Of the Four Paths and.
Pour Fruitions^ this is the lowest, the first reached, or eighth from
Arahantship. The more correct view was that the victories alluded to-
belonged only to the next stage— to the ‘ moment ’ of fruition— making
the subject a genuine ‘ Stream-Winner.’
243-7.
His Fruitions are to come
147
moment of entering on the Path, after qualification and adoption, 1 two
of the (ten) corruptions no longer break out in the eighth man— that is,,
the person who has entered on the stream.
[1] Th . — Are you then also prepared to admit that the
eighth man is a Stream-Winner, one who has won, obtained,
arrived at, and realized the Fruit of Stream-Winning, and
that, having achieved, he lives in personal contact therewith’?
[2, 3] Are you further prepared to admit that he has put
away the latent bias of doubt and wrong views ? And if
these, then also the infection of mere rule and ritual?
For your proposition involves all this. [4] Conversely, if
you deny that these are put away by him, you must also
deny that he has put away wrong views and doubt.
[5] How should he have already put away wrong views
and doubt when he has not yet practised the Path wherein
they get put away ? And not only the Path (the Eight-
fold), but all the other factors of Enlightenment? 2
[6] For if he have not put away wrong views and doubt
by the Path, or the other factors, he can surely not have
put them away by means that is not the Path, but is
worldly, co-intoxicant, etc. . . . 3 and corrupt.
[7-8] A. 8. — Since you deny that a person of the eighth
rank has put away the [overt] outburst of wrong views
find of doubt, I ask you, will these arise any more in him ?
Tlu — They will not.
A. S . — Surely then our proposition is true: they are
put away.
[9, 10] Th. — Assuming that the outbursts will not again
arise [i.e., become manifest in action], you say they are
put away. But is the latent bias of wrong opinions,
doubt, and belief in mere rule and ritual equally put
away simply because these do not arise? And this you
are not prepared to admit.
£11] Once more, you claim that the eighth man has put
away wrong views and doubt. But you must then allow
1 See Compendium, pp. 55, 67 f. 2 129, n. 3, 170, n. 1.
2 See above, I. 2, §§ 14-20 ; III. 2, § 1.
3 For these elisions in the text, not ours, see above, III. 3, § 7.
148
III. 6.
Of the Eighth Man's Attainments
that one who has reached the stage in Jhana-meditation of
- adoption ’ 1 has put them away, and in this you do not
concur.
6. Of the Controlling Powers 2 of the Eighth Man.
Controverted Point. — That the five controlling powers
are absent 3 in a person of the Eighth Stage.
From the Commentary. — Among the Andhakas it is held that, at
the moment of entering the (first stage of the) Path, the ‘ Eighth Man ’
is in process of acquiring, but has not yet attained to, these powers.
[1] Th. — You must deny him faith, if you deny in him
the controlling power of faith. So also for the other
four. But you will not go as far as that. [2] Contrari-
wise, you do allow that he [as Eighth Man] has faith and
the rest, but you go no farther. [3] Yet you are prepared
to admit, with respect to other controlling powers— -e.g.,
mind, gladness, etc. , . . and psychic life 4 — that whoso has
the attribute, has also the controlling power of it. [4] Why
draw the line at those five ? [5, 6] as, in fact, you do.
[7] You contend that, whereas the controlling power of
faith is absent in him, faith itself is not absent. That
whereas the controlling powers of energy, mindfulness,
concentration, and reason are absent in him, he is neither
indolent, nor heedless, nor unsteady or mentally vacillating,
nor stupid, nor deaf, nor dumb.
[8] , You acknowledge that his faith, energy, etc., are
[of the saving kind called] forth-leading, 5 yet you do not
credit him with the controlling powers [in which such
attributes consist].
1 See above, from the Commentary.
2 The five spiritual (or moral) sense-faculties are faith, energy,
mindfulness, 'concentration, reason, or understanding. We cannot
point to any passage where they are, as a pentad., connected with the
five ‘external’ senses. But they were considered, no less than the
latter five, as capable of being raised to powers controlling the
reciprocal interaction of the human being and his environment.
3 I.e., of course, not yet developed at this stage.
4 See Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 4 (xviii.) and p. 19, § 19 ; Compendium, 17.
5 N i y y a n i k a. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., p 82, n. 2.
250-51. Appeal to Authority 149
[9-12] You admit the attainment both of the attributes
and of these five controlling powers in the person who is
practising that he may realize the fruit of Once-Returning,
of Never-Returning, of Arahantship, but you deny the latter
for the Eighth Man alone ; the one goes with the other !
[18] Finally, is there not a ' Suttanta in which the
Exalted One said : ‘ The five controlling powers , bhikkhus —
which are they ? The controlling po wers that are faith, energy ,
mindfulness , concentration , understanding. From the comple-
tion and perfection of these five, a man becomes Arahant. Held
in a weaker degree, the holder becomes one icho is practising that
he may realize the Fruit of Arahantship ; in a yet weaker degree
the holder becomes a Never- Returner ; in a yet toeaker degree,,
one ivho is practising that he may realize the Fruit of Never -
Returning; in a yet weaker degree, a Once-Returner ; in a
yet rceaker degree, one toho is practising that he may realize
the Fruit of Once-Returning ; in a yet -weaker degree, a
Stream-Winner ; in a yet weaker degree, one who is prac-
tising that he may realize the Fruit of Stream- Winning. In
whom these five controlling powers are in every way, and
everywhere wholly absent, he, I declare, is one icho stands
without, in the ranks of the average man ’ ? 1
Yet you would not say that the Eighth Man stood thus
without ? Hence you must concede that the five con-
trolling powers are present in him.
7. Of the ‘Celestial Eye .’ 2
Controverted Point. — That the fleshly eye, when it is the
medium of an idea, 3 becomes the celestial eye.
From the Commentary . — This is a view held by the Andhakas
and Sammitiyas.
1 Sayyutta-Nikciya, v. 202.
2 Or vision. The power of apprehending, as visualized, things not
accessible to the sense of sight.
3 E>hammupatthaddar). ‘ Medium ’ is, more literally, support,
basis. D h a m m a may stand, as in § 1, for Fourth Jhana, or for the
sensuous idea, or the spiritual idea, according to the context.
150 Of the Celestial Eye ILL 7.
[1] Th. — If you affirm this, you must also say that the
fleshly eye is the celestial eye, and conversely,' that the
two are like in kind, are, in fact, identical, the one having
the same range, power, and field as the other. This you deny.
[2] Again, if you make the two thus on a par, you are
affirming that something grasped at [as effect by previous
karma] 1 becomes something not so grasped at, that ex-
perience in the universe of sense is experience in the
universe of ‘Rupa,’ that experience, analogously reasoning,
in the universe of Rupa is experience in the universe of the
remoter heavens, that the things included in these universes
are ‘the f7n-included ’ 2 — which is absurd.
[B] Further, you are, by your proposition, also admitting
that the celestial eye, when it is the medium of a sensuous
idea [in Jhana], becomes the fleshly eye. And, again, that,
when it is the medium of a [spiritual] idea, it then becomes
the eye of understanding — which you must deny.
[4] Further, you are also admitting that there are only
two kinds of vision (or ‘ eye ’). If you deny, your proposi-
tion falls. If you assent, I would ask whether the Exalted
One did not speak of three kinds of vision — the fleshly, the
celestial, and the eye of understanding, thus : ‘ Three,
bhikkhus, are the modes of sight 3 — lohich are they 1 The
fleshly eye, the celestial eye, the eye of understanding 1
‘ The eye of flesh, the heavenly eye,
And insight’s eye, vision supreme :■ —
These are the eyes, the visions three
Revealed by the man supreme.
The genesis of fleshly eye,
The may of eye celestial,
Horn intuition took its rise : —
The eye of insight unsurpassed.
Whoso doth come that eye to know,
Is from all ill and sorrow freed .’ 4
1 See Compendium, 159, n. 6. 2 Gi. Bud. Psy. Eth., xc.; 254, n. 1.
3 Literally, ‘are these eyes.’ 4 Iti-vuttaka, § 61.
254-7. Does Celestial Visioji explain Destiny ? 151
8. Of the Celestial Ear.
Controverted Point . — That the fleshly ear, when it is the
medium of an idea, is the celestial ear.
[1, 2] correspond exactly to the same sections in III. 7.
[3] Th. — Further, you are, by your proposition, also
admitting that the celestial ear, when it is the medium of
a [sensuous] idea, becomes the fleshly ear. Further, you
are also admitting that there is only one ear, or sense of
hearing. If you deny, you cannot maintain your pro-
position. If you assent, I would ask whether the Exalted
One did not speak of two ears — the fleshly ear and the
heavenly ear? 1
9. Of Insight into Destiny according to Deeds.
Controverted Point. — That the celestial eye amounts to
insight into destiny according to deeds.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion arising from a care-
less interpretation of the Sutta-passage : ‘ With purified celestial eye
surpassing that of men he sees being s as they pass away from one form
of existence and take shape in another ... he knows their destiny
as being according to their deeds,’ 2 namely, that the vision of itself
was also an explanation of the things seen.
[1] Th. — Your proposition involves this also : that in
the act of vision, attention is also paid to the sequence of
the Karma — which you did not allow. Or, if you do allow
this, you are further implying a combination of two con-
tacts and two consciousnesses — which you do not allow.
[2] Either, I repeat, you refuse to admit, that the act of
seeing with the celestial eye involves judgment: — 3 ‘these
beings, sirs, have plenty of evil deeds, words, and thoughts
in their past: 4 they are accusers of Ariyans, holders of
erratic views, undertakers of actions in conformity there-
with ; now that their living frame is broken up, they are
1 Cf. Dialogues , i. 89, and elsewhere, e.g., Majjhima-Nik., ii. 19.
2 Digha-Nik., i. 82 ( Dialogues , i. 91), and elsewhere.
3 Manasikaroti, or attending.
i Literally, ‘are endowed with.’ So below.
152 Of Insight into Destiny III. 9.
reborn in purgatory, in the abode of the fallen, the destiny
of evil-doers, a woeful doom ; but those folk, sirs, on the
other hand, have plenty of good deeds, words, and thoughts
to their account : the opposite of the foregoing ; they are
now reborn in a heaven to a happy destiny ’ ; or, you
accept this implication in celestial sight, and concede that
[in what is really one act of consciousness] there are two
contacts (or mental stimuli) and two consciousnesses.
[3] Again, if there have been those who, without this
celestial vision, without having obtained, arrived at, and
realized it, have had insight into destiny as being accord-
ing to deeds, your proposition cannot stand. [4] The
venerable Sariputta, as you imagine, was such an one.
Did he not say :
‘ Nor to attain the vision of my past,
Nor for the means to see — the eye divine —
The mystic power to read the thoughts of men,
Discern decease, rebirth in earth and heaven,
Nor for the ear celestially attuned
Cared I to strive ’ ? 1
10. Of Moral Restraint.
Controverted Point. — That there is self-control among
devas.
From the Commentary. — The question is raised concerning the
view of those who hold that among the devas, beginning above the
Thirty-Three, inasmuch as there was no committal of the five vices, 2
there is self-control.
1 Theragdtha, 996, 997. Cf. Psalms of the Brethren, p. 345. The
inference drawn by the translator from the Commentary to that work
tallies with the tradition. But we may conclude that Sariputta, who
stood foremost in wisdom and insight ( Anguttara-Nik ., i. 23) could,
according to tradition, have exercised those powers, had he cared to.-
Cf. the contrasted temperament in Moggallana, verse 1182-84. The
verse is cited {a) to dissipate {Corny,, lege vikkheparj karonto)
any misinterpretation through a wrong impression that the Thera
could not had he wished, (6) to refute the opponent on his own ground.
2 Verani : taking life, theft, fornication, false, slanderous, idle
speech, taking intoxicating drinks.
258-60. Do Devos exercise Self-Control? 153
[1] Th . — Since you affirm its existence, you imply also
[that there may be] absence of it among devas. You deny
this, meaning that there is no want of it among devas.
Then you imply that there is no [need of] self-control
among them — this again you deny, by your proposition.
[2] Granting that virtue is restraint from absence of
self-restraint, does this restraint exist among devas? ‘Yes,’
you say, but you are hereby implying also the co-existence
of absence of self-restraint. And this you deny.
[S] Yet you admit the co-existence among humans.
Why not among devas ? [4] For instance, you say £ devas
abstain from taking life, from intoxicating drinks.’ Yet
you deny that these vices are found among them. [5] You
contend they are not found among them, yet you will not
allow that restraint from them is not found either, [6, 7]
although you allow the co-existence of both among men.
[8] Opponent . — But if moral restraint is absent among
devas, surely you are implying that all devas are takers of
life, thieves, etc. 1 They are not, hence, etc. . . .
11. Of Unconscious Life.
Controverted Point. — That there is consciousness among
the denizens of the sphere called Unconscious. 2
From the Commentary.- —This belief is of the Andhakas, derived
partly from, the Word : ‘ mind [at rebirth] is conditioned by previous
actions,’ 3 so that, in their view, there is no living rebirth without
mind, partly from this other Word : ‘ those devas decease from that
group as soon as consciousness arises in them.’ 4 They concede con-
sciousness to those devas of the unconscious sphere at the moment of
rebirth and of decease.
1 Asagvara = sagvaritabb o — that over which self-restraint
ought to be used. — Corny. Hence, ‘ a viee. J If there were no vice,
self-restraint would be meaningless. Presence of vice denotes absence
of self-restraint.
2 Cf. Compendium , p. 1S6. A sphere in the mid-heavens called
Rupa-loka. Of. n. 4.
, 3 4 Vibhanga, 135 f. ; Sanyufta-Nih., ii. 2 passim.
4 Dig ha- Nik., iii. 33. ‘Mind* (v inn an a) and consciousness
(s a h n a) are here used in a synonymous and very general sense.
154
Of Unconscious Life
III. 11.
[1] Th. — But you surely cannot admit that such a being
has conscious life or destiny, dwells among conscious beings,
fares onward with conscious continuity from birth to birth,
has consciousness as his birthright, has acquired a conscious
personality ? Is not the opposite of all these terms true of
him ? [2] Is their life, etc., fivefold in its constituents ? Is
it not rather a life, destiny . . . acquisition of personality,
of a single constituent? 1 Hence, even if we grant your
proposition, you cannot say that such a being, when
consciously functioning, functions by just that [act of]
consciousness you ascribe to him ; nor do you claim this.
[3] If, in § 1, you substitute for ‘unconscious beings’
‘ men,’ you could and would describe the latter further as
‘ having conscious life, and destiny, and so on.’ And you
would describe them, further, as having a life, destiny,
habitation, further rebirth, constitution, acquisition of
personality [as determined for them] by five organic
constituents. But when I say you have committed your-
self to all this with respect to unconscious beings, in
virtue of your proposition, you deny. Similarly for § 8, if
we substitute ‘ man ’ for ‘ such a being, ’
[4] Let us assume the truth of your proposition, ad-
mitting, of course, that there is consciousness in the human
sphere — why do you go on to affirm, for those devas, an
unconscious life, destiny, habitation, further rebirth, con-
stitution, acquisition of personality, but deny it for men ?
And why do you go on, further, to affirm a life, destiny,
etc., of one organic constituent for those devas, but deny
it for men? Why, finally, do you deny, for the un-
conscious beings, the functioning in consciousness by
just that [quota of] consciousness you assign to them, but
affirm it in the case of human beings ?
[5] A. — If it is wrong to say ‘ there is consciousness in
1 I.e., of material quality only, not of this, plus the four classes of
mental constituents. Voliara is here used for khandha. Bud-
dhist tradition connects it with kar-ma. Yividhena visuq
visur) karlyati:‘is made by various ways and alternatives.’ Cf.
Vibhanga, 419; Yamaha, passim.
262-63. Are Unconscious Devas at Times Conscious ? 155
the Unconscious devas, 1 let me remind you of a Suttanta
in which the Exalted One said : There are devas, hhikkhus,
called the Unconscious Beings ; now those devas, token con-
sciousness does arise, decease from that group? But our view
really is this, that [6] they are only conscious sometimes.
X7i. That is to say, they are sometimes conscious beings,
having conscious life, having fivefold organic life, and
sometimes unconscious beings, having unconscious life,
having a single organic life — which is absurd.
[7] Again, at what time are they conscious, at what
time not ?
A. — At decease and at rebirth, but not during life.
Th. But then the same absurd transformation must
happen.
12. Of [the plant r] ivhcrein Consciousness neither is nor
is not. 2
Controverted Point. — That it is tvrong to say that, in the
plane wherein consciousness neither is nor is not, there is
consciousness.
From the Commentary. — This inquiry was directed against those
who, like the Andhakas of our time, hold that, from the Word : — ‘ the
sphere of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness,’ 3 — it is not
right to say that in that realm of life there is consciousness.
[1] Th. — But you would not describe that plane as one
of life, destiny, habitation of beings, continued existence,
birth, acquired personality that is unconscious ? [2] Nor
as a life, etc., of one constituent only ? Would you not call
it a life of four constituents ? 4
1 See p. 153, n. 4.
2 In the Pali summary, at the end of Book III., the title becomes
- of the topmost sphere of life.’
3 Of. any account of the more abstract Jhanas (e.g., Bud. Psy. Eth.,
74), or of the remoter heavens (e.g., Vibhanga, 421).
4 I.e., of the four mental aggregates. Wo are now concerned with
the remotest, Arupa or immaterial heavens. The PTS ed. has here
omitted a sentence. Of. the next § (2), and also III. 11, § 1. For
H aiici a s a nn a b h a v o, etc., read . . . sannabhavo.
156
Of a Heaven negatively described
III. 12.
[3] If we deny consciousness among the Unconscious
Beings, and call that sphere a life, destiny . . . personality
without consciousness, how can you deny consciousness to
this plane where consciousness neither is nor is not, with-
out describing it in the same terms ? Or how can we speak
of that sphere as a life of a single organic constituent with-
out describing this plane in the same terms ? [4] If your
proposition be right, and yet you describe this plane as
conscious life, etc., then similarly, in refusing conscious-
ness to the Unconscious sphere, you must describe that
sphere as conscious life, etc., which is' absurd. So also for
the fourfold organic life. [5] Bor if you deny conscious-
ness to this plane, and yet call it a life of four [mental]
constituents, then your proposition obviously falls through.
[6] You grant me that this plane, wherein consciousness
neither is nor is not, is a life of four constituents, saying
the while that there is no consciousness in this plane —
you allow, do you not, that in the [lower] plane called
‘ infinity of space ’ there is consciousness ? And that there
is consciousness in the [nest higher] planes : ' infinity of
consciousness, ’ and £ nothingness.’ Why not then for our
[fourth and highest] plane? [7] How can you admit
consciousness for those three and not for this, while you
allow that each is a life of four [mental] constituents ?
[8-10] Do you object to this : — in this plane consciousness
either is or is not ? Yes ? but why, when you admit the
co-presence of those four constituents ? Why, again, when
you admit them in the case of the other three planes, and
allow that there, too, consciousness either is or is not ?
[11] You admit that the plane in question is that
wherein is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness, and
yet you maintain that it is wrong to say : in that plane
consciousness neither is nor is not ! [12] But take
neutral feeling — is it wrong to say that neutral feeling is
either feeling or not feeling ? ‘ Yes,’ you admit, ‘that can-
not truly be said.’ Then how can the other be said?
267.
The Layman's Fetters
157
BOOK IV.
1. As to whether a Layman may he Arahant.
Controverted Point. — That a layman may be Arahant.
From the Commentary. — This concerns the belief of those who, like
the Uttarapathakas, seeing that Yasa, the clansman’s son, and others
attained Arahantship while living amid the circumstances of secular
life, judge that a layman might be an Arahant. Now the mea nin g'
in the Theravadin’s question refers to the spiritual 1 fetters ’ by which
a layman is bound. But the opponent answers ‘ yes,’ because he
sees only the outward characteristics. Now a layman is such by the
spiritual fetter, and not merely by the outward trappings, even as the
Exalted One said :
1 Though he be finely clad, if he fare rightly,
At peace and tamed, by right law nobly living,
Be f rain from scathe and harm to every creature ; —
Noble is he, recluse is he and bhUthhu ! ’ 1
[1] Th. — You say the layman may be Arahant. But
you imply therewith that the Arahant has the layman’s
fetters. ‘ No,’ you say, ‘ they do not exist for him.’ Then
how can a layman be Arahant ? [2] Now for the Arahant
the lay-fetters are put away, cut off at the root, made as
the stump of a palm tree, incapable of renewed life or of
coming again to birth. Gan you say that of a layman ?
[8] You admit that there was never a layman who, [as
such] without putting away his lay-fetters, made an end
in this very life of all sorrow. [4] Is there not a Suttanta
in which the Wanderer Vacehagotta addressed the Exalted
One thus : ‘ Is there now, 0 Gotama, any layman who,
1 Dhammapada, ver. 142. ( Layman ’ is-iMerally house- r , house-
holder (gi hi).
158
Can a Layman be Arahant ?
IV. 2.
without having put away the layman’’ s fetters, makes at death
an end of 111 V [And to whom the Exalted One said :] e Nay,
Vacchagotta, there is none ’ ? 1
[5] Again, in affirming your proposition, you imply
that an Arahant may carry on sexual relations, may suffer
such matters to come into his life, may indulge in a home 2
encumbered with children, 2 may seek to enjoy sandalwood
preparations of Kasi, may wear wreaths, use perfumes and
ointments, may accept gold and silver, may acquire goats
and sheep, poultry and pigs, elephants, cattle, horses and
mares, partridges, quails, peacocks and pheasants, 3 may
wear an attractively swathed head-dress, 4 * may wear white
garments with long skirts, may he a house-dweller all his
life — which of course you deny.
[6] XJ. — Then, if my proposition be wrong, how is it
that Yasa of the clans, Uttiya the householder, Setu the
Brahmin youth, attained Arahantship in all the circum-
stances of life in the laity? 6
2. Of [Arahantship as conferred by\ Rebirth [ alone ] .
Controverted Point. — That one may become Arahant at
the moment of rebirth.
From the Commentary.— This question is raised to elicit an opinion of
the Uttarapathakas. They namely had come to the conclusion that at
the very outset of reborn consciousness, one might be an Arahant,
they having either carelessly applied the Word, ‘ becomes born vnthout
parentage in the higher heavens and there completes existence ,’ 6 or,
1 Majj hima-Nik. , i. 483.
2 Literally couch. With this and the next four clauses, cf. Milinda,
ii. 57, 244 of the translation. Also above, p. 112 f.
3 Kapinjala, -jar a, we have not met with elsewhere. It may
mean ‘ dove.’
4 Read citta-, as in footnote, PTS.
6 The inference is that the layman, under exceptional circum-
stances, may attain Arahantship, but to keep it, must give up the
world.
6 Digha-Nihdya, iii. 132 and elsewhere.
268-71.
The Infant and the Arahant
159
converting the word ‘upahacca 5 into ‘ u p p a j j a,’ and changing
the meaning, ‘completed existence during the second half of the
term,' 1 into ‘ completed existence on being reborn.'
[1, 2] Th . — You affirm this proposition ; yet you deny
that one can become at birth either a Stream -Winner,
Once-Beturner, or Never-Keturner.
[3] And you can name none — not even the greatest —
who were Arahants from the time of birth — Sariputfca, or
the G-reat Theras : Moggallana, Ivassapa, Kaccayana,
Kotthika or Panthaka. [4] You deny it in fact of all of
them.
[5, 6] Consider our consciousness at rebirth : it arises
because rebirth has been desired. 1 2 Now such a mind is
worldly, co- intoxicant . . . 3 corrupt. Can it realize
Arahantship ? Is it of the kind that is called forthleading, 4 5
that goes toward extinction, 5 enlightenment, disaceumula-
ting, 4 is free from intoxicants . . . and corruptions ? Can
one by it put away lust, and hate, delusion . . . indiscretion?
Is it the Ariyan Path, the applications of mindfulness and
the rest of the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment ? Can
it understand 111, put away its cause, realize its cessation,
develop the path thereto? All this you, of course, must deny.
[6a] Or is the last act of consciousness at death the
realization of the Topmost Path (of Arahantship) and the
ensuing act of consciousness at rebirth the Fruit of that
Path (or full realization of Arahantship) ? You deny again.
Then your proposition is proved false.
1 8agy%dta-Nik., v. 201, etc. ; Anguttara-Nik., i. 283, 1, etc.
‘Completes (-ed) existence’ is parinibbayi, have become com-
pletely extinct, passed utterly away — a climax only effected by an
Arahant.
2 Literally, ‘ Does one by a rebirth-seeking consciousness realize,’ etc.
3 For these elisions, not ours, in the text, see above III. 3, § 7.
1 See p. 148, n. 5.
5 KhayagamI, either of lust, hate, delusion ( Sayyutta-Nik ., iv.,
251, or of the conditions of rebirth).
160
An Arahant is very Human
IV. 3.
3. Of the Arahant' s Common Humanity.
Controverted Point. — That all that belongs to the Arahant
is devoid of intoxicants.
From the Commentary , — It is an opinion of the TJttarapathakas
that everything about or belonging to an Arahant, he being devoid
of intoxicants, 1 is free from these.
[1] Th. — The things devoid of intoxicants are the Four
Paths, the Four Fruits, Nibbana, and the [thirty -seven]
factors of enlightenment; but these do not constitute every-
thing belonging to an Arahant. [2] His five sense-organs,
for instance, you do not call free from intoxicants 2 — hence
your proposition falls through.
[3] His body, again, is destined to be seized and coerced, 3
cut off and broken up, and shared by crows, vultures,
and kites — is anything ‘free from intoxicants’ to be so
described ?
[4] Into his body poison may get, and fire and the
knife — is anything ‘ free from intoxicants ’ to be so
described ?
His body may get bound by captivity, 4 by ropes, by
chains, may be interned in a village, town, city, or pro-
vince, may be imprisoned by the fourfold bondage, the fifth
being strangling 5 — is anything ‘free from intoxicants’
liable to this ?
[5] Moreover, if an Arahant give his robe to a man of
the world, does that which was free from intoxicants
thereby become co-intoxicant? You may admit this in
general terms, but do you admit that that which is free
from intoxicants may also be the opposite? If you say
‘ yes,’ then, by the analogy of the robe,'; anything else
about the Arahant — his religious characters: Path,
1 The Asavas or cardinal vices were in the Abhidhamma reckoned
as four : sensuality, rebirth (lust after), erroneous opinion, ignorance.
2 ‘Co-intoxicant 5 is an essential of r up a, or material quality.
3 Paggaha-niggahupago, 1 liable to be raised, lowered.’
i Addubandhanena.
5 For kanha read k ant ha. See I. 6, § 48.
273-74.
In Touch with the World
161
Fruit, etc. — having been free from intoxicants, may become
co-intoxicant. [6] The analogy may also be based on the
gift of food, lodging, or medicine.
[7] Or, conversely, if a man of the world give a robe or
[8] other requisite to an Arahant, does that which is co-
intoxicant become thereby the opposite ? Does that which
has been co-intoxicant become free from intoxicants — lust,
for instance, hate, delusion . . . indiscretion [such as beset
and characterize the man of the world] ?
[9] XJ . — You condemn my proposition. But is not the
Arahant free from intoxicants ? If he is, then I say that
everything connected with him is so.
4. Of [the Retaining of Distinctive] Endowments.
Controverted Point. — That one who realizes a fruition re-
tains the attributes thereof after realizing a higher fruition.
From the Commentary . — There are two kinds of spiritual acquisi-
tions, namely, acquisition at the present moment and acquisition
accruing at rebirth hereafter. But some, like the Uttarapathakas,
believe that there is one other, namely, the holding of past acquire-
ments as a permanent acquisition 1 in some Bupa or Ariipa heaven.
The latter kind is retained as long as the Jhanie achievement has not
.spent its force.’ The Theravadin view is that there is no'such quality,
but that all personal endowments are only held, as distinct acquisitions,
.until they are cancelled by other acquisitions.
[1, 2] Th. — You say, in fact, that an. Arahant is endowed
with all the Four Fruits, a Never-Beturner with three, a
'Once-Returner with two. Then you must also admit that
.an Arahant is endowed with four contacts, four feelings,
four perceptions, four volitions, four thoughts, four faiths,
•energies, mindfulnesses, concentrations, understandings ;
1 Pattidhammo. An Arahant is the resultant of his earlier
■spiritual victories, but these are transcended and cancelled by subse-
quent attainments. Nothing is permanent. Spiritual growth is
analogous to physical growth. The heterodox view is that of a
•.transference of something persisting. Cf. with this discourse, IV. 9.
T.S. V. 11
162
Of Attainments in Growth
IY. 4.
the Never- Returner with three of each, the Once-Returner
with two of each — which you must deny. 1
[3] Again, if an Arahant is endowed with the first
fruition, the second, and the third, he must be one of
whom the characteristics of all three classes of the first,
of the second, and of all five classes of the third stages
are true. 2 Then he would be rightly described as in one
and all at the same time — which is absurd. [4] The
same argument holds for those who have realized the
Third and the Second Fruit.
[5] Again, you admit that one who is endowed with
the Fruit of Stream-Winning is rightly called ‘ Stream-
Winner.’ But is the same person both Stream- Winner and
Arahant ? Similarly for the two other fruitions. [6] Simi-
larly, is the same person both Never-Returner and Stream-
Winner, or both Once-Returner and Never-Returner ? 3
[7] Would you not admit that the Arahant had evolved
past 4 the Fruit of the First Path? Yes, you say; then
you cannot maintain your proposition ;
[7-18] Because, if you are to maintain consistently that
the Arahant is yet endowed with that Path and that Fruit
out of and past which he has evolved, you must further
ascribe to him all those corruptions out of which the Stream-
Winner evolves— which is absurd. Similarly for the other
Paths and Fruits. And similarly for the Never-Returner
and the Once-Returner.
[19-21] U. — But if it be wrong to say that an Arahant is
endowed with four Fruits, not one, a Never-Returner with
three, not one, a Once-Returner with two, not one, do you
deny that the Arahant has acquired four Fruits and has
not fallen away from them, the Never-Returner three, and
so on ? You do not deny this. Hence it is right to say :
They * are endowed with ’ four, three, two Fruits.
1 The ‘ Fruit 5 or fruition is one psychic act, in which the whole being
is engaged. This act 1 informs ’ the next, etc., but does not itself persist.
2 See pp. 77, 78. 3 A clause omitted in the PTS edition.
4 Yitivatto, vi-ati-vatto, away-beyond-turned; ‘ in-tr a ns-
volved’ for ‘ e-volved,’ our ‘in ’ having, like vi, a double import. Cf.
with this argument, III. 4.
279-80.
Sense Impressions as Successive
168
[22-4] Th . — I grant they have acquired them, and have
not fallen away from them. But I say that, if you affirm
that they are endowed with the Fruits, you must no less
affirm a fortiori that they are endowed with the respective
Paths. [But by pushing the argument a step further, we
have seen that you were landed in the absurdity of
ascribing corruptions to saints.]
5. Of tic Arahant' s Indifference in Sense-Cognition.
Controverted Point . — That an Arahant is endowed with
six indifferences.
From the Commentary. — The Arahant is said to be able to call up
indifference with respect to each of the six gates of sense-knowledge.
But he is not in a state of calling up indifference with respect to all
six at the same moment. 1
[1] Th . — In affirming this proposition, you imply that
the Arahant experiences [simultaneously] six contacts
[between sense-organ (and sense-mind) and their objects] ,
six feelings, perceptions, volitions, . . . insights — which you
deny ; that [2] he is using his five senses and mental co-
ordination at [the same instant] ; that [8] he, being con-
tinually, constantly, uninterruptedly in possession of, and
made intent with six indifferences, six indifferences are
present to him 2 — both of which you deny.
[4] Opponent . — Yet you admit that an Arahant is gifted
with sixfold indifference. 3 Is this not admitting my propo-
sition ?
1 In TheravSda, sensations, however swift in succession, are never
simultaneous.
2 Literally, 1 recur to him 5 (paccupatthita).
3 Chalupekkho, a phrase we have not yet traced in the Pitakas.
The six, however, are mentioned in Dlgha-Nik., iii. 245; Majjhima-
Nik iii. 219.
164
Of ‘ Enlightened ’ and ‘ Enlightenment ’
IV. 6
6. Of becoming ‘The Enlightened ’ ( Buddha ) through
Enlightenment ( bodhi ) .
Controverted Point. — That through Enlightenment one
becomes ‘ The Enlightened.’ 1
- From the Commentary. — B6dhi is an equivalent for (1) insight
into the Pour Paths ; (2) insight into all things, or the omniscience of a
Buddha. And some, like the Uttarapathabas at present, [do not dis-
tinguish, but] hold that, as a thing is called white by white-coloured
surface, black by black-coloured surface, so a person is called ‘ Buddha ’
because of this or that aspect of b 6 d h i. 2
[1] Th. — If it is in virtue of ‘ enlightenment ’ that one
becomes ‘ The Enlightened,’ then it follows that, in virtue
of the cessation, suspension, subsidence of enlightenment,
he ceases to be The Enlightened — this you deny, but you
imply it.
[2] Or is one The Enlightened only in virtue of past en-
lightenment ? Of course you deny this 3 — [then my previous
point holds]. If ‘you assent, do you mean that one who is
The Enlightened exercises the work of enlightenment by that
past enlightenment only ? If you assent, you imply that
he understands 111, puts away its cause, realizes its cessa-
tion, develops the Eightfold Path thereto, by that jmst
enlightenment — which is absurd.
1 It is difficult for those who are not readers of Pali to follow the
intentional ambiguity of the terms in the argument. To the noun
bodhi corresponds the deponent verb bujjhati, to awake, to be
enlightened, to be wise, to know. And buddho is the past par-
ticiple, One who is buddho is graduating, or has graduated in the
Fourfold Path. If he become samma sambuddho, supremely
and continually (or generally) enlightened, orsabbannu-buddho,
omnisciently enlightened, he is then a world-Buddha, saviour of
men. To keep this double sense in view, we have not used ‘ Buddha ’
for this latter meaning.
2 Here (1) and (2) are applied indiscriminately to one and the same
person ; again, there is still a sect in Burma who identify the Buddha
with bodhi itself, ignoring his distinctive personality. The Thera-
vadin takes account of both views.
3 ‘ Because of the absence now of that past moment [of enlighten-
ment.’]— Corny.
2S2-S. The Double Meaning of ‘Bodin'* 165'
[8] Substitute for ‘past,’ ‘ future’ enlightenment, and
the same argument applies.
[4] Let us assume that one is called The Enlightened
through present enlightenment : if you assert that he
exercises the work of enlightenment through present en-
lightenment, you must also affirm [by analogy] that if he
is called The Enlightened through past, or [5] through
future enlightenment, it is by that that he understands 111,
puts away its cause, and so on — which you deny.
[6] For if an enlightened person, so-called in virtue of
past, or [7] of future enlightenment, does not exercise the
work of enlightenment, through one or the other respec-
tively, then [by analogy] one who is enlightened by present
enlightenment does not exercise enlightenment through
that present enlightenment — which is absurd.
[8] Do you then affirm that one is called The Enlightened
through past, present, and future enlightenment? 1 Then
are there three enlightenments-? If you deny, your affirma-
tion [by the foregoing] cannot stand. If you assent,,
you imply that he, being continually, constantly, uninter-
ruptedly gifted with and intent through three enlighten-
ments, these three are simultaneously present to him —
which you of course deny. 2
[9] U . — But surely one who is called The Enlightened,
is one who has acquired enlightenment ? How is. my pro-
position wrong? 3
[10] Th. — You assume that one is called The Enlightened
from having acquired enlightenment, or by enlightenment
—is enlightenment the same as the acquiring of enlighten-
ment ? 4
1 1 This is assented to as being the proper thing to say.’ — Corny.
2 Gf. IV. 5, § 3.
3 In that it would mean: a Buddha, in the absence of Bodhi,
would no longer be a Buddha, a distinct personality. The person is
merged in the concept of B 6 dhi. — Gf. Corny.
i The opponent denying, the argument finishes according to. the
stereotyped procedure.
166
Of One gifted -with the Marks
IV. 7.
7. Of One gifted ivith the Marks.
Controverted Point . — That one who is gifted with the
Marks is a Bodhisat.
From the Commentary.— This and the two following discourses are
about Uttarapathaka views. This one deals with a belief derived from
a careless interpretation of the Sntta : ‘ for one endowed as a superman
there are two careers.’ 1
[1] Th.~Bj your proposition you must also admit [cl
fortiori ] (a) that anyone who is gifted with the Marks to a
limited extent, 2 with one-third, or one-half of them, is a
limited, one-third, or half Bodhisat, respectively — which
you deny.
[2] And (h) that a universal emperor 3 — who is also
gifted with the Marks — is a Bodhisat, and that the previous
study and conduct, declaring and teaching the Norm 4 in
the Bodhisat’s career, are the*same as those in the uni-
versal emperor’s career ; that (c) when a universal emperor
is born, devas receive him first, and then humans, as they
do the new-born Bodhisat ; [B] that (d) four sons of the
devas receiving the new-born imperial babe place it before
the mother, saying: ‘Rejoice, 0 queen! to thee is born a
mighty son !’ even as they do for the new-born Bodhisat ;
that (e) two rain-showers, cold and warm, come from the
sky, wherewith both babe and mother may be washed,
even as happens at the birth of a Bodhisat ; [4] that (/) a
new-born imperial babe, standing on even feet, and facing
north, walks seven paces, a white canopy being held over
him, and looking round on all sides speaks the trumpet 5
notes: ‘I am the foremost, I am chief, I am the highest
in the world. This is my last birth ; now is there no more
coming again to be !’ [6] that (g) there is manifested at
1 See below. On the thirty- two Marks and the Bodhisat — i.e.,
Bodhisatta, ‘ enlightenment-being,’ or one who in the same life becomes
a Buddha, i.e., a Samma-sambuddha — see Dialogues , ii. 14 f.
2 Padesa. See above, III. 1, n. 8.
3 Literally, a Wheel-Turner, disposer of the symbol of empire.
Dialogues , ii. 11 f.
- Gf. above, III. 1, § 1. 5 Literally, bull-speech.
285—86. Bodhisat and World-Emperor 167
the birth of the one as of the other a mighty light, a
mighty radiance, a mighty earthquake ; that ( h ) the natural
body of the one as of the other lights up a fathom’s space
around it ; that (?') one and the other see a great dream 1 —
all of which you deny.
[6] U . — But if you reject my proposition, tell me : is
there not a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said :
- BMkkhus, to one endowed with the thirty-two marks of a
Superman, two careers lie open, and none other. If he live
the life of the house, he becomes Lord of the Wheel, a righteous
Lord of the Right, Rider of the four quarters, conqueror,
guardian of the people's good, owner of the Seven Treasures ;
his do those seven treasures become, to wit, the Wheel treasure,
the Elephant, the Horse, the J excel, the Woman, the Steward,
the Heir Apparent. More than a thousand sons are his,
heroes, vigorous of frame, crushers of the hosts of the enemy.
He, when he has conquered this earth to ' its ocean bounds, is
established not by the scoxirge, not by the sword, but by
righteousness. But if he go forth from his home to the home-
less, he becomes an Arahant Buddha Supreme, rolling back
the veil from the world ’ ? 2
Is not therefore my proposition true ?
8. Of entering on the Path of Assurance.
Controverted Point. — That the Bodhisat had entered on
the Path of Assurance and conformed to the life therein
during the dispensation 3 of Kassapa Buddha. 4 5
From the Commentary. — This discourse deals witli a belief, shared
by the Andhakas, 6 with reference to the account in the GhatTkara Sutta
of Jotipala joining the Order, 6 that [our] Bodhisat had entered the
1 On the five ‘ great dreams ’ see Anguttara-Nik, iii. 240 f.
2 Digha-Nik., iii. p. 145. Of. Dialogues, ii. 13.
3 Literally, teaching or doctrine (pavacan a).
4 This'was the Buddha next before 4 our ’ Buddha. See Dialogues ,
ii., p. 6. On 4 Assurance/ see Y. 4, and Appendix : 1 Assurance.’
5 See preceding extract.
6 Majjhima-Nik., ii. p. 46 f. Jotipala was a Brahmin youth who,
168 Of the Path of Assurance IV. 8.
Path of Assurance under Kassapa Buddha. Now Assurance (n i y a m a)
and the 1 higher life therein ’ (brahmacariya) are equivalents for
the Ariyan [Fourfold] Path. And there is no other entering upon that
Path for Bodhisats save when they are fulfilling the Perfections ; 1 other-
wise our Bodhisat would have been a disciple when Stream-Winner,
etc. The Buddhas prophesy ‘ he will become a Buddha ’ (as Ivassapa
is said to have prophesied concerning Gotama Buddha, then alive as
this Jotipala) simply by the might of their insight.
[1] Th. — II bo, [our] Bodhisat must have been a disciple
— i.e., one in the Ariyan Way — of Kassapa Buddha. You
deny. For if you assent, you must admit that he became
Buddha after his career as disciple. Moreover, a ‘ disciple ’
is one who learns through information from others, while
a Buddha is self-developed. 2
[2] Further, if the Bodhisat became Kassapa’s disciple,
[entering on the first Path and Fruit] , it follows that there
were only three .stages of fruition for him to know
thoroughly when under the Bodhi Tree. But we believe
that all four were then realized. 3
[3] Further, would one who had entered on the Path of
Assurance [as a disciple] have undergone the austerities
practised by the Bodhisat [in his own last life] ? And would
such an one point to others as his teachers and practise
their austerities, as did the Bodhisat in his last life ? 4
[4] Do we learn that, as the Venerable Ananda, and the
householder Citta and Hatthaka the Alavakan entered into
Assurance and lived its higher life as disciples under the
Exalted One, so the Exalted One himself, as Bodhisat,
acted under Kassapa Buddha ? You deny, of course.
[5] If they did so enter, under the Exalted One, as his
disciples, you cannot affirm that the Bodhisat entered on
the Path of Assurance, and lived its higher life under
KaBsapa Buddha without being his disciple. Or can a
against his will, was brought by Ghatikara, the potter, to hear Kas-
sapa Buddha, and became a bhikkhu. Gotama Buddha affirmed that
Jotipala was a former impersonation of himself.
1 Cf. Buddhist Birth Stories, p. 18 f. 2 S ayam-bhu.
3 Op. cit, 109. 4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 80, 245.
288-90. Appeals to Authority 1 60*
disciple who has evolved past one birth become a non-
disciple afterwards ? You deny, of course.
[6] A. U . — But if our proposition is wrong, is there not
a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said : ‘ Under the
Exalted One Kassapa, Anew da, I lived the higher life for
supreme enlightenment in the future ’ ? 1
[7] Th. — But is there not a Suttanta in which the
Exalted One said :
£ All have I overcome. All things I know,
’ Mid all things undefiled. Renouncing all,
In death of craving wholly free. My oivn
The deeper view. Whom should I name to thee
For me no teacher lives. I stand alone
On earth, in heav’n rived to me there’s none.
Yea, I am Ardhant as to this world,
A Teacher I above whom there is none.
Supreme enlightenment is mine alone.
In holy Coolness I, all fires extinct.
Now go I on seeking Benares town ,
To start the Wheel , to set on foot the Norm.
Amid a world in gloom and very blind,
I strike the alarm upon Ambrosia’s Drum ’ ?
‘ According to what time declarest, brother, thou art indeed
Ardhant, [“worthy” to be ] 2 conqueror world without end.’
‘ Like unto me indeed are conquerors
Who every poisonous canker have cast out.
Conquered by me is every evil thing,
And therefore am 1 conqueror, Updka ’ ? 3
[8] And is there not a Suttanta in which the Exalted
One said : “ 0 bhikkhus, it was concerning things unlearnt
before that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose
in me at the thought of the Ariyan Truth of the nature and
1 We cannot trace this, but cf. M ajj him a-Ni h. , ii., p. 54 ; Buddha-
vaysa, xxv. 10.
2 B r . and PTS editions read araha ’s i; Majjhima-Nik. (Trenhkner)
has araha si.
3 Vmaya Texts, i. 91 ; Majjhima-Nik., i. 171; Pss. Sisters, 129.
about Endowment
IV. 9.
'fact of III, ana that thin Truth was to be understood, and, was
understood by me. It teas concerning things unlearnt before
that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose in me
at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Cause of III, and
that this Truth was concerning something to be put away, and
was -put away by me. It was concerning things unlearnt before
that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose in me
at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Cessation of III,
and that this Truth was concerning something to be realized,
and was realized by me. It was concerning things unlearnt
before that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose
in me at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Course
leading to the cessation of III, and that this truth was to be
developed, ancl teas developed by me ’ C
How then can you say that the Bodhisat entered on the
Path of Assurance and lived the higher life thereof [as far
back as] the age of Kassapa Buddha ?
9. More about Endowment. 2
Controverted Point. — That a person who is practising in
order to realize Arahantship possesses [as a persistent
distinct endowment] the preceding three fruitions.
From the Commentary. — This discourse deals with the belief, shared •
by the Andhakas, 3 that a person as described holds the three Fruitions
as an acquired quality (p a tt a- dh a mm a- v a s e n a). It is to be
understood as like that on ‘ the four Fruits/
[1] Tli. — You. say, in fact, that such a person is endowed
with, or possesses four contacts, four feelings, four percep-
tions, volitions, thoughts, four faiths, energies, mindful-
nesses, concentrations, understandings 4 — which cannot be.
[2] Bo you make an analogous assertion as to one who
is practising for the Third or Second Paths ? An analo-
1 Sayyutta-N'Lk., v. 422.
2 This discourse is practically the same as IV. 4.
3 See Commentary on IY. 7.
4 The live spiritual-sense controls. See above, p. 148, n. 1.
292-8. The Lower is merged in the Hif§||g 171
gous paradox will apply in that case ; and yon must [3, 4]
be able to describe such persons in terms of lower stages,
e.g. one practising for the topmost stage in terms of one
who has only got to the first— which is anomalous. 1
[5] But can a person who is a proximate candidate for
Arahantship be described in terms of a Stream- Winner ?
Can he he both at the same time ? Even if he be a Never-
Returner, is he rightly so described when he is in process
of becoming Arahant? 2 [6] Similarly for a candidate for
the Third and Second Fruitions.
[7] Would you not rather maintain that a person prac-
tising in order to realize Arahantship had evolved past 3
the fruition of Stream-Winning?
[8] Or do you maintain that one so evolved was still
holding that first Fruit [as a distinctive quality] ? For
then you must also hold that he also remains possessed of
those evil qualities which as Stream-Winner he has evolved
out of — which is absurd.
[9-18] A similar argument applies to a proximater candi-
date for Arahantship (Fourth Fruit) and the Second Path
and Fruit ; to such a candidate and the Third Path and
Fruit ; to a proximate candidate for the Third Fruit and
the First and Second Paths and Fruits; and to a proximate
candidate for the Second Fruit, and the First Path and Fruit.
[19] U. A. — If our proposition is wrong, surely you would
nevertheless say that a person who is a proximate candi-
date for realizing Arahantship had both won the preceding
three Fruits, and had not fallen away from them ?
Th. — Yes, that is true.
U. A. — Surely then he is still possessed of them. [20-21]
And so for candidates in the Third, Second and First Paths.
[22] Th . — Assuming that he is still possessed of the
three Fruits, do you also admit that, having attained to all
four Paths, he is still possessed of all the Paths? Of
course you do not ; [ there at least you see my point]
1 Cf. above, I. 2, I. 6, and subsequently.
2 I.e., in the Fourth Path, striving to realize its Fruit.
3 See IY. 4, 8.
U172 • Of putting of the Fetters IV. 10.
[23, 24], neither do you admit a similar possession in
other candidates.
10. Of putting off the Fetters.
Controverted Point. — That the putting off of all the
Fetters is Arahantship.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion of the Andhakas —
namely, that Arahantship means the [simultaneous], unlimited putting
off of all the fetters. 1
[1] Th. — By your proposition you must admit that all
the Fetters are put off by the Path of Arahantship (the
Fourth) — which is not correct, you allow. The proximate
candidate for the Fruit of that Path is not occupied in
again getting rid of the theory of individuality, doubt, or the
infection of mere rule and ritual, already rejected in the
First Path. Nor [2] in getting rid of the grosser sensuality
and enmity conquered already in the Second Path ; nor
[3] of the residual sensuality put away without remainder
in the Third Path. [4] Was not his work pronounced by
the Exalted One to be the putting off without remainder
of lust for corporeal, and for incorporeal rebirth, conceit,
distraction and ignorance? 2
[5] A. — But if my proposition is wrong, do you not
nevertheless admit that for an Arahant all Fetters are put
off ? Surely then I may say that Arahantship is a putting
off all the Fetters ?
1 These were ten vicious states or qualities, to be put away gradually
by progress in the ‘ four paths,’ and not all at' once. See Compen-
dium, 172 f. ; Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 297-303. In the thesis there is no
copula, much less an emphatic one. But the two substantival clauses
are in apposition as equivalents.
2 Dialogues, ii. 98 f.
301. Ambiguity of the Teim 173
BOOK V
1. Of Emancipation.
Controverted Point. — That the knowledge of emancipation
has itself the quality of emancipation.
From the Commentary . — Four sorts of knowledge (or insight, n an a)
are grouped under knowledge of emancipation, to wit, insight or intui-
tion, path-knowledge, fruit-knowledge, reflective knowledge. In other
words, emancipation considered as (1) freedom from perceiving things
as permanent or persisting, or through perceiving the opposite ; (2) the
severance and renunciation effected by the Paths; (3) the peace of
fruition 1 ; (4) contemplation of emancipation as such. Now only the
peace of fruition is abstract, unqualified emancipation. The rest
cannot be called emancipated things. But the Andhakas say that all
four are such.
[1] Th. — Does not your proposition imply that any
knowledge of emancipation whatever has the quality of
emancipation? For instance, has reflective knowledge 2
that quality? Is such knowledge of emancipation as is
' possessed by one who has attained to the stage of Ariyan
adoption 3 of that quality? You deny both. [Then your
proposition is too general.]
[2] Again, it includes that knowledge of emancipation
possessed by one who is practising in order to realize the
Fruit of the First, Second, Third, Fourth Paths. 4 But
do you mean to convey that the knowledge of one in the
1 Phalar) patipassaddhi-vimutti.
2 Or retrospective. Of. Compendium , 58, 69 ; 132, n. 6 ; 207, n. 7.
3 G-otrabhu puggalo; cf. AngtUtara-Nih., iv. 373; v. 28;
Compendium,, 55, 215, n. 5 ; the preparatory stage to the First Path.
On this wider extension of the term cf. III. 3 and 4.
K174
Of Emancipation
V. 1.
First Path is equal to the knowledge of one who has won,
acquired, arrived at, realized the Fruit of that Path, and so
for the Second, Third, and Fourth ? Of course you deny.
[3] Conversely, do you mean to convey that, if the
knowledge of emancipation belonging to one who possesses
the Fruition of a Path has the quality of emancipation, the
knowledge of emancipation of one who is only practising
in order to realize that Fruition has the same quality ? Of
course you deny.
[4] Or in other words, let us assume, as you say, that
when a person has realized the fruition of any of the Four
Paths his knowledge of emancipation has itself the quality
or nature of emancipation. Now you admit that the
knowledge in question is the knowledge of one who has
won the Fruit, do you not ?
But do you maintain as much, if the person has not yet
realized, but is only practising to realize a given fruition ?
Of course you deny. . . .
2. Of the Knowledge of an Adept 1
Controverted Point. — That a learner has the insight of
an adept.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion of the Uttarapatkakas,
namely, that learners, as Ananda and others were, showed by their
confessions about the Exalted One, etc., that they knew who were
adepts, [and therefore understood that knowledge, the possession of
which made them adepts].
[1] Th.— Then you imply that the learner knows, sees 2
the ideas of the adept, lives in the attainment of having
seen, known, realized them, lives in personal contact there-
with. If not — and you do deny this — then you cannot
maintain your proposition.
[2] We grant of course that the adept knows, sees khe
ideas of the adept, lives in the attainment . . , and so oil.
1 A-sekha, literally, non-learner, proficient, expert ; in this cast-,
an Arahant. S e k h a is one who is being ‘trained.’ i
2 This idiom applies to those who arrive at their knowledge joy
themselves. — Corny.
304-05. The Reach of the Learncr\' Insight 175
But, as you have admitted, you cannot impute this know-
ledge to the learner. 1
Your position then is, that you credit the learner with
the insight of an adept, yet you deny that the learner
knows, sees the ideas of the adept, etc. But, the adept
having also of course the insight of the adept, if he be as
to insight on a level only with the learner, you must add
of the adept also that he knows not, sees not the ideas of
the adept, does not live in the attainment of having seen,
known, realized them, does not live in personal contact
therewith. Which is absurd, as you by your denial admit.
[3] You are ready to deny that a person in a lower Stage
of the Path has the insight as yet of the nest higher Stage,
or that one who is adopted 2 has yet the insight of even the
First Stage. How then can you ascribe the insight of those
who have finally attained to those wdio as yet have not ?
[4] U . — If my proposition is wrong, then how is it that
a learner, as Ananda was, knew the sublimity of the Exalted
One, or of the Elder Sariputta, or of the Elder Moggallana
the Great ?
3. Of Perverted Perception or Hallucination (in Jhdna).
Controverted Point. — That in one who has attained
Jhana through the earth-artifice, etc., 3 knowledge [of what
is seen] is perverted.
From the Commentary. — It is a belief among the Andhakas, that
when anyone has induced Jhana by the [self-hypnotizing] process of
gazing on [a portion of] earth and being conscious of earth, the content
of consciousness becoming other than earth [though his gaze is still
fixed thereon], his cognition may he called perverted, seeing one thing,
namely, the physical earth, and being conscious of something else,
to wit, the percept, or concept. 4 The Theravadin’s position is the
1 The PTS edition should read a negative reply here and at the
end of this section. 2 G o t r a b h ii, Y. 1, § 1.
3 This, as heading the list of ‘ artifices 5 (k a s i n a) for self-hypnosis,
is always cited as representing artifice in general. See p. 121 ; also
Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 48, and passim ; Vibhanga, 171, 178.
1 The opponent’s position is that the subject is really conscious of an
idea, which is never the original object, the mind being referred to
that by a process of hallucination.
176 Of Perverted Perception V. 3.
specialization of the meaning of ‘earth.’ It may mean the ultimate
quality of extension, physical (literally, structural) earth, a percept
or concept, a [nature-] (leva. The only real perversion of cognition is
to see permanence, persistence in the impermanent. There is no
hallucination or illusion, etc., properly so called, in Jhana. 1
[1] Th. — If your proposition is right, then do you imply
that this ‘perversion’ is the same as that involved in seeing
the permanent in the impermanent, happiness in 111, a soul
in what is not soul, the beautiful in the ugly ? Of course
you deny.
[2] Again, you imply that such a person’s knowledge
during Jhana is not proficient. But you do not wish to
imply this, but the opposite.
[3] You admit that the reversal of judgment which sees
permanence in impermanence is a bad judgment, and
those other judgments above-stated also. Yet you will not
admit that cognition during Jhana is badly accomplished.
[4] You hold on the contrary that it is well accomplished.
Yet a similar perversion in the case of those other four
judgments you consider bad.
[5] If it were an Arahant who so accomplished Jhana,
would you claim a perverted cognition for him? You
could not. [6] Or, if you could, you would have to make
him liable to reversals of perception, consciousness, and
views in general. 2
[7] A. — But if my proposition is wrong, do you hold
that, when any one attains Jhana by earth-cognition,
everything becomes earth to him ? 3 No, you reply. Then
surely his judgment is upset.
1 Because, when the subject is conscious of the percept or concept of
earth, the content of his consciousness is just that percept or concept.
2 Of. Compendium, p. 216, n. 4; 67. Vipariyesa, viparita
here used are tantamount to the term [preferred in later idiom]
‘vipallasa.’
3 There is even now a tendency among Burmese Buddhists, if not
well trained, to believe that Jhanic practice by any given ‘ artifice -
say earth-gazing — is only successful when every external thing seems
to become earth. This would be true hallucination. But here the
opponent thinks that the mind of the Jhanic subject is upset, because
the Theravadin’s denial in general includes the specific denial that the
content of consciousness becomes ‘earth.’
307.
Insight and Entrance
177
[8] Th . — Bat you will admit that the earth is there,
and that the subject enters Jhana by regarding earth as
■earth ? Where then is the perversion of cognition ?
You say that the earth is actually there, and that
in entering Jhana by the consciousness of earth as earth,
perception is perverted. Substitute for earth Nibbana:
would you still say that perception was perverted ? . . .
4. Of Assurance.
Controverted Point . — That one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance. 1
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Uttarapathakas, at present
hold this view on these grounds : The Exalted One judged that ‘ anyone
who will enter on the right Path of Assurance 2 is capable of pene-
trating the Truths.’ Therefore only the average worldling who has
not made sure has the religious insight requisite for entering.
. [1] Th. — If one who has not made sure has the insight
■for entering the Path of Assurance, then his opposite — one
who has made sure — must have the insight for not entering
it. 3 If you deny, your proposition falls through. If, by it,
you maintain that one who has made sure has not the in-
sight for not entering that Path, then you imply that one
who has not made sure has not the insight for entering
thereon. Which, by your proposition, is wrong.
[2] Again, if one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, do you then admit that
one who has made sure is in the same intellectual stage ? 4
You deny. And if you admit, on the contrary, that one
who has made sure has not [i.e., no longer] the insight
1 1 Assurance (niyama) is a synonym of the Path ’ [to Arahant-
Ahip]. — Corny. The expression ‘made sure, 1 niyato, is applied to
those who have entered on it, and are ‘ assured of ’ eventual attainment.
2 S a m m a 1 1 a - n i y a m a . Of. Sagytotta-Nik.^ iii. 225 (the last
clause is different) ; and Anguttara-Nik., i. 121.
3 Literally, for entering the opposite path of non-assurance.
4 ‘Inasmuch as for the initial purpose of the Path he no longer
needs the requisite insight.’- — Corny .
T.S. V.
12
Of Assurance
178
Y. 4.
for entering, then you must surely deny that insight also
to one who has not made sure.
[3] Again, in affirming that one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance, do you
admit that he has also the insight for not entering it?
You deny, that is, you affirm he has not the insight for
not entering it. Do you equally admit then that he has not
the insight for entering it ? You deny. . . A
[4] Does your proposition mean that there is a Path of
Assurance for one who has not made sure of entering? 2
You deny. Yet you admit that there is insight for enter-
ing upon it ! Does this insight consist in applications of
mindfulness and all the other factors of Enlightenment ?
You must deny, and [5] affirm that there is no such
Assurance, How then can your proposition stand ?
[6] You do not grant to one who is only in the prior
stage of adoption 3 the insight of the First Path? Or to
one who is practising for the insight of the First . . .
Fourth Fruition the insight of that Fruition ? How then
can you allow the insight of entering on the Path of
Assurance to one who has not made sure ?
[7] U. — If I am wrong, you must on the other hand
admit that the Exalted One knows that a person, M or N,
will enter the true Path of Assurance, and is capable of
penetrating the Truths.
1 We have given a full, if slightly free, rendering of this curious,
hout of ancient dialectic. At the end of each section the sectary is
brought up against the same rejoinder, compelling him either to-
contradict his proposition or to withdraw it. This may be shown
diagrammatically, A=one-who-has-made-sure ; B, entering-on-the-
‘Path’; C, insight-for ; a, b, c standing for the respective contradictories*
We then get,
aBC (thesis)
faBC
T.aBG
AbC
§ oj ABC
e Q abC
§ 3 jabc
Abe
§ 2 lABc
aBe
[aBe
[aBe
2 The Path proper being reserved for one who has made sure.
3 Gotrabhu puggalo. See V. 1, § L;
309-10.
All Knowledge is not Analytic
179
5. Of Analytic Insight. 1
Controverted Point. — That all knowledge is analytic.
From the Commentary . — It is a belief of the Andhakas that in an
Ariyan (that is, one who has ‘ made sure, 3 is in some Stage of the Path or
Way) all 1 knowledge 5 whatsoever is supramundane or transcendental. 2
Hence they conclude that it is also analytic.
[1] Th . — Then you must admit that popular knowledge
is analytic — which you deny. For if you assent, then all who
have popular, conventional knowledge, have also acquired
analytic insight — which you deny. The same argument
holds good if ‘knowledge in discerning the thought of
another ’ be substituted for ‘ popular . . . knowledge.’ 3
[2] Again, if all knowledge is analytic, then a fortiori
all discernment is analytic. Or, if you can assent to that,
you must therewith admit that the discernment of one
who attains Jhana by any of the elemental, or colour
‘artifices,’ who attains any of the four more abstract
Jhanas, who gives donations, who gives to the Order any
of the four necessaries of life, is analytic. But this you
deny.
[3] A. — If I am wrong, you admit that there is such
a thing as [spiritual or] supramundane discernment ;
is that not analytic ?
Th . — That I do not deny. 4
A. — Then my proposition is true. 6
1 Patisambhida, or analysis; literally, ‘resolving, continued
breaking-up. 3 On the four branches in this organon, see Appendix :
Patisambhida.
2 See p. 1S4, n. 4.
3 See pp. 180, 181.
4 The Thera vadin does not of course mean that all ‘ supramundane ’
knowledge is analytic. There is analytic, and there is intuitive supra-
mundane knowledge.
5 Namely, for Ariyans. This is another little joust of logomachy
What is the extension of the term h a n a, knowledge (see II. 2) ? And
what is the nature of an ‘ Ariyan ’ ?
180
Of Popular Knowledge
Y. 6.
6. Of Popular Knowledge.
Controverted Point. — That it is wrong to say : Popular
knowledge has only truth as its object and nothing else.
From the Commentary. — This discourse is to purge the incorrect
tenet held by the Andhakas, that the word 1 truth 5 is to be applied
without any distinction being drawn between popular and philo-
sophical truth. 1
[1] Andhaka. — You admit, do you not, that one who
attains Jhana by way of the earth-artifice, has knowledge ?
Does not that earth-artifice come under popular truth ?
Th.~ Yes.
A . — Then why exempt popular knowledge from the search
for truth ?
[2] The same argument applies to the other artifices,
and to gifts as stated above (Y. 5).
[8] Th. — Then according to you, popular knowledge has
only Truth as its object. But is it the object of popular
knowledge to understand the fact and nature of 111, to put
away the Cause, to realize the Cessation, to develop the
Path thereto ? You must deny. (Hence the need for a
distinction between truths.)
7. Of the Mental Object in Telepathy.
Controverted Point . — That insight into the thoughts of
another has no object beyond bare other-consciousness as
such. 2
1 Literally, truth in the highest or ultimate sense. On this ancient
Buddhist distinction, see above, p. 63, n. 2 ; also Ledi Sadaw’s exposi-
tion, JPTS, 1914, 129 1, and note : Paramattha.
2 ‘ Of another ’ is filled in, the supernormal power in question being
one of the six so-called abnormal knowledges, chal-abhinna,
attainable by gifted disciples. The Buddha is frequently shown, in
the Suttas, exercising it. See also Psalms of the Brethren, passim ;
Compendium , 63, 209. The psychological point can only be followed.
311-13. Pieacling Another’s Mind 181
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas at present, have
held this view, deriving it from just the [technical] expression ‘ insight
into a limited portion of the consciousness of another].’ 1 But this is
untenable, since in knowing consciousness as lustful and so on, the
object becomes essentially complex.
[1] Th . — You admit, do you not, that one may discern
a ‘lust-ridden consciousness,’ and so on 2 as such? Then
this disposes of your proposition.
[2] Again, you cannot deny that, in thought-discerning,
insight can have as its object contact, feeling, etc. [or any
of the concomitants of consciousness]. Where then is bare
consciousness as sole object ?
[3] Or do you dispute the statement that insight having
contact, or feeling, or the rest as its object, comes into
thought-discerning? ‘Yes’ you say? 8 But does not
thought-discerning include discerning the course of con-
tact, feeling, etc. ? This you now deny. 4
[4] A . — You say my proposition is wrong. But is not
this thought-discerning insight limited to a portion of the
course of thought [in others] ? Then surely I am right.
if the Buddhist distinction between (a) a bare continuum of conscious
moments, (6) various concomitants or coefficients of that bare con-
sciousness be kept in mind. See Compendium, 18. Thus the dispute
is really on the meaning or context of the term citta: bare fact of
consciousness, or the concrete, complex psychic unit as understood
in European psychology. The discussion is therefore of more than
antiquarian interest. See Buddhist Psychology , 6 f., 175.
1 Ceto pariyaye ha nap is usually so rendered, in this con-
nection, by Burmese translators. The opponent misconstrues ‘ limited, ’
holding that thought-reading is limited to the bare flux of conscious-
ness, without its factors.
2 The quoted phrase heads the list usually given in the Nikayas
when the thought-reading power is stated— e.g., Dialogues, i. 89 f.
3 Because, he holds, one cannot make a mental object of more than
one factor [at onee]. — Corny.
4 ‘Because there is no Sutta-passage about it.’ — Corny.
182
Of Knowledge of the Future
V. 8.
8. Of Insight into the Future.
Controverted Point . — That there is knowledge of the
future.
From the Commentary. — The future includes both what will happen
proximately and what is not just proximate. Concerning the former
there is absolutely no knowledge, any more than there is of what is in -
eluded in a single track or moment of cognition. But some, like the
Andhakas, incline to a belief that knowledge concerning any part of
•the future is possible.
[1] Th. — If we can know about the future [in general],
it must be [as in other knowledge] through knowing its
root; condition, cause, source, origin, upspringing, support, 1
basis, correlation, genesis. But you deny that we know
the future thus. . . . 2
[2] And it must be [as in other knowledge] through
knowing how it will be correlated by condition, base, pre-
dominance, contiguity, and immediate contiguity. 3 But
you deny here again. . . .
. [3] Again, if you are right, one in the stage of adoption
has insight into the First Path, one in the First Path has
insight into the First Fruition, and so on. But you deny
here again. . . .
[4] A . — If I am wrong, is there not a Suttanta in which
the Exalted One said : ‘ To Patna, Ananda, three disasters
will happen : by fire or by ivater or by rupture of friend-
ship ’ i 4 Surely then the future may be known.
1 Literally, ‘food.’
2 Presumably, the belief was in an intuitive vision, and not in a
process of inference. The ten terms are the ‘ root ’ and its nine
synonyms of the First Book in the Yamaha, I, p. 13.
3 These are the time-relations assigned in the doctrine of Relations
detailed in the Patthana , or last book of the A bhidhamma-Pitaka.
4 Dialogues, ii. 92. The orthodox position seems to have been, that
whereas events indefinitely future may be foretold through a super-
man’s intuition, the exact nature of molecular, or psychical, vital
change at any given moment is unpredictable. Cf. M. Bergson on this
point : Creative Evolution, ch. i., p. 6 passim.
314-15. Knowledge oj the Present is Retrospective 183
9. Of Knowledge of the Present.
Controverted Point. — That the present may be known.
From the Commentary. — Because of the Word : When all pheno-
mena are seen to be impermanent, the insight itself, as a phenomenon,
is also seen to be impermanent, some, as the Andhakas, have the
opinion that there is knowledge of the entire present, without distinc-
tion. Now if there be such knowledge, it [as present] must take place
at the present instant through itself. But because two knowledges
cannot be simultaneous in the one self-conscious subject, knowledge
of the present cannot be known by the same act of knowledge . 1
[1] Th. — If there be a knowledge of the present, does
one know that knowledge by the same act of knowledge ?
If you deny, your proposition must fall. If you assent, I
ask : Does one know that he knows the present by that
same act of knowledge? You deny, and your previous
assertion falls. If you assent, I ask : Is the conscious act
of knowing the object of the knowledge ? You deny, and
your previous assertion falls. If you assent, then you
imply that one touches contact by the contact, feels feeling
by that feeling, wills volition by that volition. So for the
initial and the sustained application of thought. So for
zest, for mindfulness, for understanding. You imply that
one cuts a sword with that sword ; an axe with that axe ;
a knife with that knife ; an adze with that adze ; that one
sews a needle with that needle ; handles the tip of a finger
with that finger ; kisses the tip of the nose with that nose ;
handles the head with that head ; washes off impurity with
that impurity.
[2] A. — I am wrong then? But when all things are
seen as impermanent, is not that knowledge also seen as
impermanent ? Surely then I am right.
1 In other words, self-consciousness is really an act of retrospection,
and its object is not present, but past.
184
Of Knowing Others’ Fruition
V. 10.
10. Of Knowing Others’ Fruition.
Controverted Point. — That a disciple can have knowledge
concerning fruition.
From the Coonnientary. — Some, like the Andbakas, have held that,
since it was said that both the Bnddhas and their disciples teach beings
the doctrine of the attainment of Ariyan fruition, disciples can. like
the Buddhas, state that this or that being has won some Bruit. Now
if that were so, they could also, by their insight, give details concerning
that attainment. But they cannot.
[1] Tli. — This implies that a disciple can make known
the property of each fruit j 1 that he possesses a knowledge
of the different degrees of development in fruitions, control-
ling powers, personalities ; [2] that he possesses a concep-
tion of aggregates, sense-fields, elements, truths, controlling
powers, personality ; [8] that he is a Conqueror, a Teacher,
a Buddha Supreme, omniscient, all-seeing, Master of the
Norm, the Norm-Judge of appeal ; [4] that he is one who
causes a Way to spring up where no Way was, one who
engenders a Way not engendered ; proclaims a Path not
proclaimed, knows the Path, is conversant with the Path, is
expert in the Path. All of which of course you deny. . . .
[5] A. — Yet you deny that the disciple lacks insight.
Surely then he may have insight into others’ fruition.
1 Bead phala-ssakatap. In line 5, for pahnapetiti read
the atthiti of the controverted proposition.
317.
Is Assurance Unconditioned ?
185
BOOK VI
1. Of Assurance [of salvation] 1
Controverted Point. — That ‘ Assurance ’ is unconditioned.
From the Commentary. — In the Word: ‘ Capable of entering into
Assurance , the culmination in things that are good, ’ 2 the Ariyan Path
is meant. But inasmuch as a person therein would not forfeit salvation
even if that Path which [for him] had arisen were to pass away,
therefore there is an opinion, among Andhakas for instance, that this
Assurance is unconditioned in the sense of being eternal. 3
[1] Th . — Then is Assurance [that other unconditioned
called] Nibbana, or the Shelter, the Cave, the Befuge, the
Goal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial? You deny. Yet
you would call both alike unconditioned. Are there then
two kinds of unconditioned? If you deny, you cannot
affirm ; if you assent, then [for all we know] there are two
Shelters . . . two Goals . . . two Nibbanas. If you deny,
you cannot affirm your proposition ; if you assent, then do *
you allow that of the two Nibbanas one is higher than the
other, gublimer than the other, exalted more than the
other ? Is there a boundary, or a division, or a line, or an
interstice 4 between them ? Of course you deny. . . .
[2] Again, are there any who enter into and attain
Assurance, cause it to arise, to keep arising, set it up,
continue to set it up, bring it to pass, to come into being,
produce it, continue to produce it ? ‘Of course,’ you say.
1 Niyamo, as before (Y. 4).
2 Anguttara-NIk., i. 122. Of. Sayyutta-Nilc., iii. 225.
3 Or permanent, n i c c a.
4 See above, II. 11.
Of Assurance
186
VI. 1.
But are these terms that you can apply to what is uncon-
ditioned ? Of course not. . . .
[3] Again, is the Path (the Fourfold) 'unconditioned?
‘ Nay,’ you say, ‘ conditioned.’ 1 Yet you would make Assur-
ance unconditioned ; the Path of Stream-Winning, Once-
Returning, Never-Returning, Arahantship, conditioned ; but
Assurance of Stream-Winning, etc., unconditioned ! . . .
[4] If then these four stages of Assurance be uncon-
ditioned, and Nibbana be unconditioned, are there five kinds
of the unconditioned ? If you assent, you are in the same
difficulty as before (§ 1).
[5] Finally, is false Assurance 2 unconditioned? ‘No,
conditioned,’ you say. But has true Assurance the same
quality ? Here you must deny. . . .
[6] A. — If I am wrong, would you say that, if Assurance
having arisen for anyone and ceased, his work of making
sure [his salvation] would be cancelled ?
Th. — No.
A. — Then Assurance must be unconditioned [that is, it
cannot begin and cease].
Th. — But your argument can be applied to false
Assurance. You would not therefore call that uncon-
ditioned !
2. Of Causal Genesis.
Controverted Point . — That the causal elements in the
law of causal genesis are unconditioned.
From the Commentary. — Because of the Word in the chapter on
causation — ‘ whether Tathagatas arise or do not arise, this elemental
datum which remains fixed,' 1 etc., some, as the Pubbaseliyas and the
Mahiijsasakas, have arrived at the view here affirmed.
[1] This is exactly similar to the opening argument in
Vi. Ml.
1 ‘ Since it is something that has a genesis and a cessation.’ — Corny.
2 Micchatta-niyama, assurance in the wrong direction,
applied to the five heinous crimes (p. 71, n. 4) which entail retribution
in the next existence.
320-21.
Is it Unconditioned ?
187
[2, 3] Th.- — Would you say that any single term in
each clause of the formula of causal genesis refers to some-
thing unconditioned, for instance, ‘ignorance,’ or ‘karma,’
in the clause ‘because of ignorance, karma,’ etc.? No?
Then how can you maintain your thesis ?
[4] P. M. — If we are wrong, why did the Exalted One
say as follows: Because of birth, bhikkhus, comes decay
and death ” : — whether Tathagatas arise or not, this element
stands as the establishing of things as effects, as the marking
out of things as effects, as the cause of this or that. Con-
cerning this element a Tailiagata becomes enlightened, and
penetrates it. Thus enlightened and penetrating, he declares,
teaches, makes known, lays it down, reveals, dispenses, makes
manifest, and behold! he saith: “ Because of birth, bhikkhus,
comes decay and death.” “ Because of the tendency to
become 1 comes birth. Because of .. . and so on, back to.”
“ Became of ignorance comes karma.” Thus, bhikkhus, this
element, stable, constant, immutable, is called a causal term
[in the law of causal genesis] ’ ? 2 * *
Surely then the causal element in that law is uncondi-
tioned.
[5] Th. — In the clause ‘Because of ignorance karma,’
the former is that which establishes, which marks out the
latter as its effect. And Nibbana is unconditioned — you
affirm both of these ? Yes ? Then are there two uncondi-
tioneds ? . . . two shelters . . . (as in § 1) ?
[6] And if in the next clause : ‘ Because of karma, con-
1 Or ‘ be reborn.’
2 Sayyutta-Nik., II. 25. ‘The sense in which each term (anga)
of the law of causal genesis is termed Paticca-samuppada is stated
in the Vibhanga on the Paticea-samuppad a. 5 — Corny. See
Vibhanga, ‘ Paccayakara-vibhanga,’ pp. 135-192. It is interesting
that this term for the Paticca-samuppada, peculiar, it may
be, to the Vibhanga, is not used by our Commentary. Causes by
which dhamma’s (things as effects) are established, are marked
out, are called the thitata, the niyamata, of dhamma’s.
These terms, with idappaccayata, are synonymous with
paticca-samuppada, and signify, not the abstract statement
of the law, but the concrete causal element.
Of the Four Truths
188
VI. 3.
sciousness,’ you affirm that karma is unconditioned, 1 are
there then three unconditioneds ? . . .
[7] And so on, affirming that each of the remaining
nine terms and Nibbana are unconditioned : — are there
then twelve unconditioneds? . . . twelve shelters, twelve
refuges, etc. ?
Of course you deny, hence you cannot affirm that the
causal term in the law of causal genesis is unconditioned. 2
3. Of the Four Truths.
Controverted Point. — That the Four Truths are uncon-
ditioned.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold this
belief, deriving it from the Sutta : ‘ These four, bhihhhus, are stable ,
constant,’ etc. 3 They draw a distinction between a ‘fact’ and a
1 truth,’ considering that the former is conditioned, the latter uncondi-
tioned. In the Third Truth they disallow the existence of any corre-
sponding fact. 4
[1] Th . — Do you then also admit [not one, but] four
Nibbanas? For if you do, is there among these four a
boundary, division, line or interstice, different degrees as
to loftiness, excellence or sublimity? 5 . . .
[2] You affirm, do you not, that each Truth is uncon-
ditioned. Take the first Truth on [the fact and nature of]
111 : is 111 itself unconditioned ? You deny — that is, you
mean that bodily ill, mental ill, grief, lamentation, melan-
choly or despair is conditioned ? Or the second Truth
on the cause of 111 — is that cause unconditioned? You
deny. . . . Then you must equally deny that desires of
sense, desire for [after-] life, or desire to end life, is uncon-
ditioned? Or the fourth Truth of the Path to Cessation of
1 The PTS edition gives erroneously a negative reply. Of. Bh
edition, and §§ 5, 7.
2 The point is that only Nibbana is unconditioned. 3 See below.
4 Lakkhana-saccar) (Truth) is the statement of the charac-
teristics of a vatthu-saccai) (fact) .
s See VI. 1, § 1 ; II. 11 .
323-5.
Are they Unconditioned t
189
111 — is the Path 1 itself unconditioned? You deny. . . .
Then you do not mean that right views, right inten-
tions . . . right concentration are unconditioned ?
[3] You admit then that III, its Cause, the Path are con-
ditioned, and all the factors of those facts are conditioned,
but deny that the [abstract] statement of each fact as a
‘ Truth ’ is conditioned 3 — which cannot be. . . .
[4] Take now the Third Truth on the Cessation of 111 —
is Cessation unconditioned? ‘ Yes,’ you say ? 3 Why then,
if the First Truth is unconditioned, is not 111 uncon-
ditioned ? Or the Cause ? Or the Path ? [5] In all but
the Third Truth, you maintain that the true thing is
conditioned — why not in the Third ?
[6] P.— But if I am wrong, why was it said by the
Exalted One : ‘ These four things, bhikkhus, are stable, con-
stant, immutable. Which are the four l “ This is III!” —
this, hhikkhus, is stable, constant, immutable. “ This is the
cause of III . . . the Cessation of III . . . the course leading
to the Cessation of III!” — this, hhikkhus, is stable, constant,
immutable. These are the four ’
Surely then the Four Truths are unconditioned. 4 5
4. Of the Four Immaterial Spheres [of Life and Thought],
Controverted Point. — That the sphere of infinite space is
unconditioned.
From the Commentary. — Because of the Word, ‘ the four Imma-
terial^ are imperturbable,' some hold they are all unconditioned.
[1] Th. — Are you implying that it is in this respect
identical with Nibbana, the Shelter, the Cave, the Befuge,
1 The Ariyan or Noble Eightfold Path, not the Eour Paths. The
latter are really one, divided into four stages, each of which has eight
factors (p. 188, n. 5).
2 In the PTS edition (p.323) the line Dukkhasaceap asan-
kbatam should read . . . sankhatam.
3 ‘Cessation’ (nirodha) is a synonym for Nibbana — the extinc-
tion of 111 and its Causes. Hence the opponent’s view.
4 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 430.
5 In the sense of being eternally, constantly, not occasionally, true.
190 Of the Four Immaterial Spheres YI. 4.
the Goal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial? You deny.
. . . Then you cannot so class it. If you affirm, we may
then have two Unconditioneds, two Nibbanas. . . .
[2] You admit, do you not, that the sphere of infinite
space is a form of rebirth, a destination, an abode of
beings, a sequel in living, a matrix of birth, a station for
reborn consciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Then
is the unconditioned to be so described ? Of course not. . . .
Is there karma which brings us to rebirth in that
sphere ? £ Yes,’ you say. Then is there karma which
brings about rebirth in the unconditioned ? Of course you
deny. . . . There are beings who for their deserts are
reborn in that sphere of infinite space, but are there any
who for their deserts are reborn in the unconditioned ? Of
course you deny. . . .
[3] Do any beings become born, decay, die, decease, and
spring up again in that sphere ? Yes ? But surely not in
the unconditioned. . . .
Does mind in its four constituents 1 exist in that sphere ?
Yes ? But hardly in the unconditioned. . . . You cannot
call the latter a plane of life with four constituents, as is
the former.
[4] Opponent —Uni did not the Exalted One say that
the four Immaterial spheres are imperturbable? 2 * * Surely
then we may call them unconditioned.
5. Of the attaining to Cessation.
Controverted Point . — That the attainment of Cessation is
unconditioned.
From the Commentary . — By the attainment of Cessation is here
meant the suspension of conscious procedure in Jhana. As something
1 Of the five ‘ aggregates 5 of being, only ‘ body ’ is absent.
2 Aneja, ana nja; Anguttara-Nik., ii. 184: he who has
entered into the Jhanas so called is said to have won the Imper-
turbable.
327-28.
Is Cessation Unconditioned ?
191
done^ attained, it is called ‘ completed,’ but it cannot be spoken of as
conditioned or unconditioned, since the features of one state or the
other are absent. But some, as the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas,
hold that, because it is not conditioned, it is therefore unconditioned.
[1] Th . — Does this mean that this state is Nibbana,
the Shelter, etc. ? You deny. Then are both similarly
described as unconditioned ? You affirm ? Then are there
two unconditioneds . . . two Nibbanas ? . . .
[2] Are there any who attain to Cessation, acquire it,
cause it to rise, to keep rising, set up, induce, produce,
bring to pass, make to be born, to happen ? If so, can you
so speak of the unconditioned ? Of course not. . . .
[3] Is there apparent such a thing as a purging through,
emerging from, 1 Cessation ? If so, is there the same from
the unconditioned ? Of course not. . . .
In attaining Cessation, first speech, then action, then
consciousness ceases. Can you so speak of attaining the
unconditioned ?
In emerging from Cessation, first consciousness, then
action, then speech occurs. Can you so speak of emerging
from the unconditioned ?
[4] After emerging from Cessation, one is in touch with
three contacts : that of the void, of the signless, of the
unhankered-after. 2 Can you so speak of emerging from
the unconditioned ? Or that, when one emerges from
Cessation, consciousness is inclined for, tends to, takes
shelter in solitude ?
[5] A. U. — If we are wrong, we would just ask you, Is
Cessation conditioned ? No, you say ; then it must be
unconditioned. 3
1 These two terms refer to the attainment of Fruition after
emergence. — Corny.
2 See above, pp. 142, n. 4, 143, n. 1.
3 Indian logic recognizes four alternatives to our two : is, is not,
is and is not, neither is nor is not. The reply here would be in terms
of the last. The state is outside that ‘universe of thought’ which com-
prises conditioned and its opposite, as much as green is outside music.
192
Of Space
YI. 8.
6. Of Space.
Controverted Point . — That space is unconditioned.
From the Commentary. — Space is of three inodes : as confined or
delimited, as abstracted from object, as empty or inane. Of these the
first is conditioned ; the other two are mere abstract ideas. But some,
like the Uttar apathakas and Mahigsasakas, hold that the two latter
modes also, inasmuch as [being mental fictions] they are not condi-
tioned, must therefore be unconditioned.
[1] Th. — If space is unconditioned, as yon affirm, you
must class it with Nibbana, or you must affirm two [sorts
of] unconditioned — and so two Nibbanas — all of which you
deny. . . .
[2] Can anyone make space where there has been no
space? Then one can make that which is conditioned
unconditioned — which you deny. ... So, too, for the
reverse process. . . .
[3] Again, if you admit that birds go through space,
moon, sun, and stars go through space, supernormal move-
ment is worked in space, 1 the arm or hand is waved in
space, clods, clubs, a supernormally moved person, arrows
are projected through space, you must state as much about
movement through or in the unconditioned — which you
cannot. . . .
[4] Again, if people enclose space when they make
houses or barns, do they enclose the unconditioned ? Or
when a well is dug, does non-space become space ? Yes ?
Then does the unconditioned become conditioned? Or,
when an empty well, or an empty barn, or an empty jar, is
filled, does { space ’ disappear ? If so, does the uncon-
ditioned disappear?
[5] U. M . — If then it is wrong to say space is un-
conditioned, is it conditioned ? You deny. Then it must
be unconditioned. 2
1 Akase . . . iddhirj vikubbanti.
2 On space see Bud. Psy. Eth., lviii. 194, and cf. MiUnda , ii. 103,
and 816 f.
330-31.
Is Void Space visible ?
193
7. Of Space as visible.
Controverted Point. — That space is visible.
From the Commentary . — This is the view, among the Andhakas for
instance, namely, that because we have cognition of enclosed space,
such as keyholes, etc., therefore all void space is visible. They argue
that in that case space is rupa, that is, material visible object. In
the absence of a Sutta authorizing this, the opponent rejects it, yet
insists on the testimony of pillar-interstices, etc., as visible things.
In such cases, however, what is seen are the pillars, trees, and so forth.
That what lies between is space, there being no visible objects, is an
act of ideation, not of sense-cognition.' 1 This applies throughout.
Hence the opponent’s argument is not conclusive.
[1] Th. — If this is so, you commit yourself to saying
that space is visible material, visible object and element,
and therefore, as such, is either blue-green, yellow, red, or
white, is cognizable by the eye, impinges on the eye or
organ of vision, enters into the avenue of sight — which you
deny. . . .
[2] Substituting ‘space’ for ‘visible object,’ you must
affirm or deny that ‘ because of eye and space visual con-
sciousness arises. 5 If wot, your proposition falls through.
If you agree, you cannot quote any Suttanta to establish
this. All that the Suttanta says is : ‘ Because of eye and
visible object visual consciousness arises,’ 2 as you agree.
Hence you must either call space visible object (with its
properties), or fail to maintain your position.
[3] A. — If I am wrong, you must nevertheless admit that
you ‘ see ’ the interval between two trees or two posts, the
space in a keyhole or in a window. Surely then space is
visible.
1 Manodvaravinnanap uppajjati, na cakkhuvin-
nanai). This advance in psychological explanation is a notable trait
in Buddhaghosa’s age.
2 Sayyutta-NiTc., ii. 72; iv. 33 ; Majjhima-Nih., i. 259.
T.s. V.
13
194
Of Visibles
YI. 8.
8. Of the Four Elements , the Five Senses, and of Action
as Visibles.
Controverted Point . — That each of these is visible.
From the Commentary . — This opinion is also maintained by such as.
the Andhakas, from the fact that we ‘ see ’ oscillations in stones, water,,
flames, trees, as well as colours of sentient surfaces and the shapes of
hands, feet, etc., on occasion of bodily intimations. The rest may be
understood by the text. 1
[1-9] The discourse is verbatim identical with VI. 7, each
of the ‘four elements,’ ‘the organ of sight’ alone, ancl ‘bodily
action ’ being substituted for ‘ space.’ The opponent’s rejoinders-
are severally as folloivs :
A . — But do we not see earth, a stone, a mountain ?
water? fire blazing? trees waving in the wind? The eye,
the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body? anyone advancing,
retreating, looking forward, looking backward, stretching
forth, retracting?
1 Pali-anusarena. The psychology is similar. The four ‘ele-
ments ’ were not the material compounds, earthy, etc., but the abstract
common qualities distinguishing the four groups so-called. I n d r i y a
is the controlling power or faculty exercised in sense. Kamma is
the notion of ‘ action ’ in overt physical movements. All that we
actually see are changing coloured surfaces. On D h a t u, I n d r i y a,
see Compendium: Notes s.vv.
335-6.
Are Universal# possible ?
195
BOOK VII
1. Of the Classification [of things]. 1
Controverted Point. — That things cannot be grouped
together by means of abstract ideas.
From the Commentary. —It is a belief held, for instance, by the
Bajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, that the orthodox classification of
particular, material qualities under one generic concept of ‘matter/
etc., is worthless, for this reason, that you cannot group things together
by means of ideas, as you can rope together bullocks, and so on.
The argument seeks to point out a different meaning in the notion of
grouping . 2
[1] Th. — But you do not also deny that any things may
combine or be included with other things under a concept
of totality or universality. Hence, how can you deny that
they may be grouped together ? [2] The organs of sense
[3] and their objects are, you admit, computed under the
material aggregate [of a living individual] . [4] Pleasant,
painful, or neutral feelings are computed under the aggre-
gate of feeling. [5] Percepts on occasion of sense and idea-
tion come under the aggregate of perception. [6] Volitions
on occasion of sense and ideation come under the aggregate
of conscious concomitants. [7] Consciousness on occasion
of sense and ideation comes under the aggregate of con-
sciousness. Hence, by admitting these inclusions, you must
admit that things may be grouped by an idea.
1 The title should, in the Pali, he S a n g a h a not Sangahxta-
katha.
2 Physical grouping is, of course, the bringing together a number of
individuals. But things may be grouped mentally, i.e., included under
a concept of totality involved in counting, or a general concept by
generalizing.
196 Of Mental Facts as connected VII. 2.
[8] R. S . — Then you understand ‘ things being grouped
together by ideas 5 in the same way as two bullocks may
be grouped together by a rope or a yoke, an alms-bowl
may be held together by a suspender, a dog may be held
in by a leash ?
Tk. — [Yes; 1 and] hence it is not less right to say that some
things may be grouped together by other things (ideas).
2. Of Mental States as mutually connected .
Controverted Point . — That mental states are not con-
nected with other mental states.
From the Commentary . — This again is a view of some, for instance,
the Rajagirikas and Siddhatthikas, namely, that the orthodox phrase
‘associated with knowledge ’ 2 is meaningless, because feeling or other
mental states do not pervade each other (a n u p a v i t t h a) as oil
pervades ses&mum-seeds. The argument is to show 1 connected ’ under
another aspect. 3
[1] Th . — But you do not also deny that some things are
concomitant, co-existent, compounded with other things,
arise and cease together with them, have the same physical
basis and the same object? Why then except the relation
£ connected with ’?
[2] One aggregate, for instance, may be co-existent with
another : feeling with perception, mental coefficients, con-
sciousness, and so on. Surely then it may be ‘ connected
with 5 that other.
R. S. — Then do , you understand that one such state
accompanies, pervades another state, just as oil pervades
sesamum, or sugar pervades cane?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . 4
1 B r [rightly] omits this. The Theravadin, concludes the Com-
mentator, neither approves nor disapproves of the [material] simile,
but by his rejoinder implies that ‘ even as you can’t deny the physical
grouping, so must you admit the mental grouping by general concepts.
2 F.g., Dhamma-sangani, § 1, etc.
3 B r reads, as in the preceding katha, ahnen’ ev’ atthena for
anne va sabbe va (PTS). The latter seems meaningless.
4 ‘This, namely, is not a proper parallel. We cannot assign an
388-39.
Are there Mental Properties ?
197
3. Of Mental Properties.
Controverted Point. — That they do not exist.
From the Commentary. — Once more, some, like the Eajagirikas and
Siddhatthikas, hold that we can no more get ‘ mentals ’ (c e t a s i k a)
from mind (c i 1 1 a), than we can get ‘ contactals ’ from contact,
so that there is no such thing as a property, or concomitant, of
mind. The Theravadin contends that there would be nothing wrong
if custom permitted us to say ‘ contaetal ’ for what depends on contact,
just as it is customary usage to call ‘mental’ that which depends on
mind (c i 1 1 a-n i s s i t a k o).
[1] Tk.— You surely do not also deny that some mental
phenomena are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined with
consciousness, have their genesis and cessation, physical
basis and object in common with it ? Why then exclude
the ‘mental?’ [2] Contact, for instance, is co-existent with
consciousness ; hence it is a ‘mental/ i.e., a property or
concomitant of mind. So are feeling, perception, volition,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding,
lust, hate, dulness, . . . indiscretion — all the ‘ mentals.’
[3] R. S. — You allow then that w r hat is co-existent with
consciousness is a ‘mental.’ Do you equally admit that
what is co-existent with contact is a ‘contaetal,’ or that
what is co-existent with each of those mental phenomena
is to be analogously regarded ; for instance, that what is
co-existent with indiscretion is an ‘ indiseretional ’?
Th. — Certainly. [4] And if you assert that there are
no mental phenomena corresponding to our term ‘ mentals/
was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ Yea ! verily this mind and mental states
Are void of soul for one loho understands.
Whoso discerns the low and high in both,
The seer, he knows that neither can endure'? 1
essential difference between sesamum and its oil as we can between
feeling and perception. “Sesamum” is the customary name for
something that is kernel, husk, and oil. When the former appearance
is changed, we call it oil.’— Corny. The MSS. and B r are discrepant
in detail here, but we believe we have given the intended meaning.
1 We cannot trace these verses.
198
Of Giving and Gift
VII. 4.
[5] Or again, was it not said by the Exalted One :
< Suppose in this case, Kevatta, 1 that a hhikklm can make
manifest the mind, and the mental [property], and the direction
and application of thought in other beings, other individuals,
saying : Such is your mind. This is your mind. Thus and
thus are yon conscious T 2
Hence there is such a thing as a ‘ mental 5 6 [that is,
a property, or concomitant, of eonciousness or mind] . 3
4. Of Giving and the Gift
Controverted Point .- — That dan a is [not the gift but] the
mental state.
From the Commentary. — D ana is of three kinds : 4 the will to
surrender [something], abstinence, the gift. In the line —
Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving ,
-we have the will to surrender something when opportunity occnrs. In
the phrase ‘ he gives security,' 1 abstinence, when opportunity occurs, is
meant. In the phrase ‘ he gives food and drink in charity, 5 a thing to
he given on a given occasion is meant. The first is dan a [in an
active sense] , as that which surrenders, or [in the instrumental sense]
as that by which something is given. Abstinence is giving in the
sense of severing from, cutting off. When it is practised, one severs,
cuts off the immoral will which we consider to be a fearful and
dangerous state. And this is a ‘ giving.’ Finally, dan a implies that
an offering is given. This triple distinction is in reality reduced to
two : mental and material. But the view held, for instance, by the
Bajagirikas and Siddhattikas, recognizes the former only. And the
object of the discourse is to clear up the confusion {lege sankara-
bhava p) 5 between the meanings of this dual distinction.
[1] Th . — II dan a be a mental state, is it possible to
give a mental state away to others ? If you deny, your
1 Or Kevaddha. The KV. MSS. read as above.
2 Digha-Nikaya, i. 213.
3 On cetasika see Compendium, 237 f. ; Buddh. Psychology , 175 f.
4 D a n a means grammatically both giving and gift and liberality.
Hence the necessity of retaining the Pali word.
6 So B r . The readings in the PTS edition are impossible.
339-41. Of Giving and Gift 199
proposition falls through. If you assent, 1 you then imply
that it is possible to give any mental property to others :
contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mind-
fulness, concentration, understanding.
[2] R. S. — If we are wrong, we ask you, is giving
attended by undesirable, disagreeable, unpleasant, barren
consequences ? 2 Does it induce, and result in, sorrow? Is
not rather the opposite true? Surely then dana is a
mental state.
[3] Th. — Granting that giving was pronounced by the
Exalted One to produce desirable results, is giving a robe,
or alms-food, or lodging, or materia medica and requisites
for illness dana? You admit they are, but you cannot
assert that these directly bring about desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicific mental results.
[4] R. S. — If we are wrong, let us quote the words
of the Exalted One :
‘ Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving : 1
These are the things that men of worth pursue ;
This, say they, is the path celestial.
Hereby we pass into the deva-ivorldl 3 4
[5] Again: * Bhikkhus, these Jive givings, the Great Dana's?
are supreme , secular, hereditary ; ancient [ customs ] , unmixed
now or in the past ; they are not mixed one with the other, nor
shall be, and they arc not despised by recluses or brahmins , or
by the ivise. What are the Jive ? First, there is the Ariyan
disciple who, having put away taking life, is opposed to it
Such an one gives to all beings without limit security, amity,
1 Oxl the ground that anything mental cannot he given as if it were
food, etc., the opponent denies ; when the question is insisted upon, he
recollects the Sutta on ' giving security, etc.,’ and assents. — Corny.
2 If dana means the material gift, and this be, say, a nauseons
medicine, the giver must reap corresponding undesirable fruit. —
Corny.
3 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 236.
i In his Commentary on Anguttara-Nik. Buddbaghosa calls these
4 the gifts of the will ’ (e e t a n a) , deliberate, intentional giving.
200
VII. 4.
Of Giving and Gift
benevolence. And having thus given ivithont limit, he himself
becomes partaker in that security, amity, benevolence. Secondly ,
the Ariyan disciple, having put away taking what is not given,
wrong conduct in sense-desires, lying, and occasions for indulg-
ing in strong drinks, is opposed to these. Thus renouncing,
bhihhhus, he gives to all beings without limit security, amity,
goodwill. And so giving, he himself becomes partaker in that
unlimited security, amity, goodwill. These, bhihhhus, are the
jive Great Dana's. . . 1
If the Suttanta says thus, then giving is a mental state.
[6] Tli . — According to you, then, dan a is not some-
thing to be given. But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ Take the case of one who gives food, drink, raiment, a carriage,
a wreath, a perfume, ointment, a couch, a dwelling, means of
lighting’ l 2 3 Surely then dan a is a thing to be given.
[7] B. S . — You say then that giving is a thing to be
given. Now you do not admit that the thing to be given
has as its direct result something desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicific, a happy capacity and consequence. On
the other hand, the Exalted One said that dana had such a
result. Now you say that a robe, alms-food, and the other
requisites are dana. Hence it follows that a robe and so
on has such a result, which cannot be. Therefore it is
wrong to say that dana is a thing to he given.
5. Of Utility.
Controverted Point . — That merit increases with utility.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the itajagirikas, Siddhattikas,
and Sammitiyas, from thoughtlessly interpreting such Suttas as
‘ merit day and night is aliuays growing ,’ and ‘ the role, bhikkhus,
which a bhikkhu enjoying the, use of . . ./ 3 hold that there is such
a thing as merit achieved by utility.
1 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 246.
2 Op. cit., iv. 239. This is a 1 stock’ catalogue ; cf. op. cit,, i. 107 ;
ii. 85, 203 ; Digha-Nik., iii. 259.
3 See below. •
343-44.
Does Utility increase Merit ?
201
[1] Th . — By your thesis you imply [that other mental
experiences are increasing quantities : — ] that contact, feel-
ing, perception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindful-
ness, concentration, understanding, can each keep growing 1
— which you deny. . . . And that merit keeps growing
just as a creeper, a liana, a tree, grass, or brushwood
grows — which you deny. . . .
[2] Again, in affirming it, do you also admit that a giver
acquires merit when, having given his gift, he does not
consider it further? 2 You do. But this is to imply, in
other words, that merit accrues to one who does not
consciously advert to, reflect upon, consider, attend to,
deliberate, anticipate, aim. Is not the opposite the case ?
You assent. Then it is wrong to say that merit goes on
growing with utility.
[3] Again, in affirming your thesis, do you also admit
that a giver may acquire merit w r ho, on giving a gift,
entertains sensual, malevolent, or cruel thoughts? ‘Yes/
you reply. Then have we here a combination of two con-
tacts, feelings, perceptions, volitions, cognitions ? No ?
Think ! * Yes,’ you now reply. 3 Then you are maintaining
that good and bad, guilty and innocent, base and noble,
sinister and clear mental states, can co-exist side by side
[at the same moment]. You deny. Think again ! ‘ Yes,’
you now reply. 4 But was it not said by the Exalted
One : ‘ There are four things, bhikkhns, very far ate ay one
1 Merit (punna) is an abstract notion or human estimate of the
balance of anyone’s chances of a surplus over unhappy experience in
the future in consequence of deeds done now. Thus, for both estimator
and the subject of the estimate, it is nothing else than a series of
mental phenomena, and should be considered as such, and not as some
external and mystic entity or continuum.
2 Na samannaharati, i.e., the ‘ adverting,’ having arrested the
subconscious life-flux, does not ‘ smoothly conduct ’ the will-to-give
(dana-cetana) along its own path.— Corny.
3 He now assents, because he includes the consciousnesses of both
donor and donee. — Corny.
4 He now assents, because by his opinion that which is derived ^m
sustained enjoyment is not a conscious phenomenon. — -Corny.
202 Is Utility the sole Standard of Merit! YII. 5.
from the other. What are the four ? The sky and the earth,
the hither and the yonder shore of the ocean, whence the sun
rises and where lie sinks, the Norm of the good and that of
the tricked.
‘ Far is the sky and far from it the earth lies ;
Far too the f urther shore of ocean, say they ;
And whence the radiant sun at day -dawn rises,
And where he goes, lightmaker, to his ending.
Yet f urther than all these asunder, say they,
The Norm of good men’s lives and that of had men.
Co-operation of the good can never perish,
True to its nature 'while it yet endureth.
But swift dissolves the intercourse of had men.
Hence far is Norm of good' from that of evil! 1
Therefore it is wrong to say that good and bad, etc.,
mental states, co-exist side by side in anyone.
[4] JR. S. S . — But, if your rejection is right, was it not
said by the Exalted One :
‘ Planters of groves and shady woods,
And they who build causeway and ■ bridge,
And wells construct and watering-sheds,
And to the homeless dwellings give : —
Of such as these by day and ' night
For ever doth the merit grow.
In righteousness and virtue’s might
Such folk from earth to heaven go I 2
Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.
[5] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One :
- Bhikkhus, there are these four streams of merit and of
good, sources of happiness and blissfid fate, resulting in
happiness, conducive to heavenly life, conducive to that which
is desirable, agreeable, and sweet, to welfare and happiness.
What are the four ? When a bhikkhu, enjoying the use of
robes, or of alms-food, or of shelter, or of medical requisites
1 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 50.
2 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 33.
346-47. Can Earthly Gifts sustain, elsewhere ?
203
given him, is able to attain to and dwell in infinite concentra-
tion of mind, to the giver each of these four gifts is an infinite
stream of merit and of good . . d? 1
Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.
[6] Th. — You still affirm your proposition. Now, does a
giver who has given a gift acquire merit when the acceptor,
having accepted the gift, throws it away, abandons it?
1 Yes,’ you reply. But you cannot possibly say of that
giver’s merit that it goes on growing.
[7] Or if, when the gift is accepted, kings, or thieves,
take it away again, or fire burns it, or water bears it away,
or hostile heirs take it back ? The same holds good.
Hence merit is not dependent upon utility.
6. Of the Effect of Gifts given in this Life.
Controverted Point. — That what is given here sustains
elsewhere.
From the Commentary. — It is held by some — for instance, the
Rajagiriyas and Siddhattkikas — that because of the Word :
‘By what is given here below
They share who , dead, 'mong Betas go,' 2
gifts of robes, etc., cause life to be sustained there.
[1J Th. — Your proposition commits you to the further
statement that robes, alms-food, lodging, medical requisites
for ailments, hard food, soft food, and drink, given in this
life, are enjoyed in the after-life — which you deny. . . .
And it commits you further to this [heterodox position] ,
that one person is the agent for another ; that the happi-
ness or ill we feel is wrought by others ; that one acts,
another experiences the consequences 3 — which you
deny. . . .
1 Anguttara-Nilc., ii. 54. 2 See next page,
3 Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 75 f. Judging by the Commentary on the
verses just below [§ 3], gifts to the memory of dead kinsfolk were made
to the Order, the donor specifying that he made them in the name of
204
Of '{the Effect of Gifts
VII. 6.
[2] JR. S. — You deny our proposition. But do not tl^e
Petas thank him who gives a gift for their advantage, are not
their hearts appeased, are they not interested, do they not
obtain gladness ? [8] Was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ As water rained upon high slope
Doth ever down the hillside run,
E’en so whate’er on earth is given
Doth reach the hapless Peta shades.
And as the brimming rivers run
To keep the mighty ocean, full,
E’en so whate’er, etc.
For ichere they dwell no husbandry
Nor tending dairy kine is there,
No merchant traffic as with us,
No goods to buy with precious coin.
By what is given here below
They share who, dead,, ’mong Petas go ' ? 1
Therefore our proposition is right.
[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘ Bhik-
khus, there are these five matters which parents, if wishing for
a child to be born to them, contemplate. Which are the Jive ?
Cared for ( they think) he will care for us ; or, he will do our
work; he 'will continue our family; he will inherit our
property ; he will institute offerings to the departed parent
shades (Petas).
‘ Wise Jolk who fain a child would have
Have five advantages in view ; —
Us by his wages he will keep ;
His will it be our work to do ;
such of Ms kin as might have been reborn as Petas. ParamaMha-
jotika (PTS, I., p. 204 f.); cf. Spence Hardy, Buddhism, p. 59
(Childers, s.v. Peta), whose view is that offerings were exposed for such
ill-plighted shades, not given for the use of the Order. The argument
in the Katha-Vatthu implies that the former procedure was followed.
The merit of the gift might avail to bless the Petas, but the material
gift itself could not nourish them, as the superstitious deemed.
1 Rhuddakapatha (PTS), 6 (VII.).
349-50. Earth not a Result of Karma 205
Our family will long endure ;
Our heritage to him tee leave ;
And then again an offering
To Peta-shades he’ll institute.
These matters fire keep well in vie w
The wise who fain a child would have.
Wherefore the pious and the good,
Children who know and grateful feel,
Support their mother and their sire,
Remembering all these did for them .
Their tasks they take upon themselves,
E’en as their parents toiled for them ;
Do their behests and them maintain,
Nor suffer that their race decay.
Praise to the child of filial heart,
With piety and virtue dight ’ 'l 1
Was it not so said ? Then is our proposition right.
7. Of the Earth and Karma.
Controverted Point. — That land is a result of action.
From, the Commentary . — Inasmuch as there is human action directed
to gain dominion and sovereignty over the soil, some, like the
Andhakas, hold that the earth itself is a resultant of such action (or
karma). The argument goes to show that (1) land has nothing in
common with the sentient results which are caused by karma ; 2 (2) that
such results are a matter of individual subjective experience, not
shared by others, myriads of whom do not even live upon the earth.
[1] Th. — As well say that the earth belongs to feeling 3
pleasant, painful, or neutral, or is conjoined [as mental]
with feeling or with perception, or volition, or cognition, that
the earth has a mental object, that she can advert to, reflect
upon, consider, attend, intend, anticipate, aim. Is not just
the opposite true of her ? Hence your proposition is wrong.
1 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 43. 2 S u k h a-v e d a n i y a, etc.
3 K a m m a-v i p a k a, or result of actions was, in its ultimate terms,
conceived as feeling experienced by the agent in this life, or by the
resultant of him in another life.
206 Of the Physical and the Moral YIL 7.
[2] Again, compare her [with something mental] — with
contact. Of contact you could say that it is both (i.) a
result of action and also that it (ii.) belongs to feeling, and
so on (as in § 1). But you cannot say both these things of
earth. Or if you affirm the former (i.) and deny the latter
predicate (ii.) of earth, you must be prepared to do no less
in the case of contact.
[3] Again, the earth undergoes expansion and contrac-
tion, cutting and breaking up. Can you say as much of
the [mental] result of action ?
Again, the earth may be bought and sold, located, collected,
explored. Gan you say as much of the result of action ?
Again, the earth is common to everyone else. But is
the result of [my] action common to everyone else? ‘Yes,’
you say. But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ This treasure to none else belongs,
No bandit hence may bear it.
The mortal who would fare aright
Let him work acts of merit '? 1
Hence it is wrong to say that a result of action is experi-
enced by everyone else.
[4] Again, you would admit that first the earth is es-
tablished and afterwards beings are reborn [on it]. But
does result first come to pass and afterwards people act to
insure result ? If you deny, you cannot maintain that earth
is a result of action.
[5] Again, is the earth a common result of collective
action? Yes, you say? Do you mean that all beings
enjoy the use of the earth? If you deny, you cannot
affirm your proposition. If you assent, I ask whether there
are any who pass utterly away without enjoying the use of
it ? You assent, of course. But are there any who pass
utterly away without exhausting the experienced result of
their actions ? Of course you deny. . . .
1 Khucldakajidtha, VIII. 9. The last two lines are discrepant.
The work quoted reads ‘ wise man ’ for e mortal,’ and, for the third line :
That treasure which doth follow him — viz. merit.
207
352-53. Age and Death no Effect of Karma
[6] Once more, is the earth a result of the action of a being
who is a world-monarch ? and do other beings share in the
use of the earth ? Yes, you reply. Then do other beings
make use of the result of his actions? You deny. . . .
I ask again, and you assent. But then, do other beings
share also in his contact, feelings, perception, volition, con-
sciousness, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, un-
derstanding ? Of course you deny. . . .
[7] A . — But if I am wrong, surely there is action to gain
dominion [over the earth], 1 action to gain sovereignty [on
the earth] ? If so, surely the earth is a result of action.
8. Of Decay and’ Death and Karma.
Controverted Point . — That old age and death are a result
of action.
From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as some action does conduce to
that deterioration we call decay or old age, and to that curtailing of life
we call death, some, like the Andhakas, hold that old age and death are
the ‘result (vip a ka) ’ of that action. Now there is between morally
bad action and material decay the relation known as karma, 2 but the
moral cause and the physical effect differ in kind. Hence the latter is
not subjective result (v i p a k a). It is unlike any mental state : — -con-
tact, feeling, etc. — such as is produced by karma. Besides, it is partly
due to the physical order (utu). 3
[1, 2] Th. — The first tivo sections are verbatim as in the
preceding discourse, save that instead of ‘ result of action ’
(kamma-vipaka), f result 1 (v i p a k a) only is used.
[3] Again, you admit, do you not, that the decay and
dying of bad states of mind is the result of previous bad
states ? But then you must also admit that the decay and
dying of good states of mind is the result of previous good
1 .Literally, lordship, ‘ here meaning large possessions? — Corny.
2 Kamma and vip 5k a (result in sentience) are two of the
twenty-four paccayas or correlations of things physical or mental.
Compendium, 191 f.
3 In the Corny, p. 101, last line (PTS), read : U t u s a m u 1 1 h a n ad i-
bhedena tap patilabhavasena ayuno ca. . . .
208 Any an Effects VII. 9.
states — which you deny. . . . But in denying the latter,
you imply denial of the former statement. . . .
[4] Or do you hold that the decay and dying of good
states of mind is the result of previous bad states? You
do, you say. Then you imply that the decay and dying of
bad states is the result of previous good states — which you
deny. . . . But in denying this, you imply denial of the
former statement. . . .
[5] Or do you affirm that the decay and dying of both
good and bad states of mind are the result of bad states ?
You do, you' say. Then you must say no less : c is the
result of good states ’ — which you deny. . . .
[6] A . — You say my proposition is false. But surely
acts conduce to the deterioration and to the curtailment of
life ? If so, my proposition is true.
9. Of the Ariyan Mind and its Remits .
Controverted Point. — That Ariyan states of mind have
no [positive] result. 1
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas, hold that the
fruits of religious life, being merely the negative putting away of corrupt
qualities, are not properly states of mind. By religious life is meant
the career of a recluse, or progress in the Paths, as it is said : ‘ I will
show you the religious life and the fruits thereof,’ 2 the former being
the Fourfold Path, 3 and the fruits thereof those of Stream-Winner,
Onee-Beturner, Never-Beturner, and Arahantship.
[1, 2] Th. — But you admit that the career of a recluse
or religious student is productive of great rewards — to wit,
the fruits of the Four Paths. How then can you deny
positive result ?
[8] Or, if you deny that these four kinds of fruit are
positive result — as you do — then you equally deny that
1 Yip aka — i.e., are they actions engendering for the subject no
positive psychical sequel, such as is always understood by this term ?
2 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 25.
3 Each stage of the Path has the eight factors (Eightfold Path) in
different degrees.
356-57.
Arc they positive ?
209
-there is positive result in the fruit of giving or of moral
•conduct, or of religious exercises, which you maintain. . . .
[4] Now in maintaining these propositions, you must no
less maintain that there is positive result in the fruits of
the Paths. . . .
[5] Again, you will of course admit that good done
in relation to life on earth or in the heavens, material or
immaterial, entails result. Does this not commit you to
admitting that good done in relation to path-graduating 1
also entails result [though you deny this by your proposi-
tion] ? Conversely, if you maintain that good done in
relation to path-graduating entails no result, must you not
also deny result to good done in relation to life on earth or
in heaven ?
[6] A. — [Well, but is not this a parallel case?] You
will of course admit that good done in relation to life on
earth or in the heavens, material or immaterial, entailing
result, makes for accumulation of rebirth. 2 Does this not
■commit you to admitting that good done in relation to
path-graduating, entailing [as you say] result, makes also
for accumulation of rebirth [though you of course deny
4his] ?
10. Of Results as again causing Results.
Controverted Point . — That f result ’ is itself a state en-
-tailing resultant states. 3
From the Commentary . — Because one result [of karma] stands in
relation to another result by way of reciprocity, 4 etc., some, like the
Andhakas, hold that the result is itself necessarily the cause of other
results.
1 Literally, non-worldly, or supramundane. The Commentary
■classes all good done for rebirth as lokiya, mundane. Path-
graduating militated against rebirth.
2 For Buddhaghosa’s definition of this term, see Bud. Bsy. Fth.,
p. 82, n. 2.
3 Vipakadhamma-dhammo. SeeBud. Psy. Eth., p. 253, n. 1.
4 Annamann a-p a c c a y o, or mutuality ; one of the twenty-four
relations. The statement here is from the Patthana.
T.S. V.
14
210
Of Results from Results
VII. 10.
[1] Th . — If your proposition is true it is tantamount
to saying that the result of that [result] entails [other]
results — which you deny. ... Or, if you assent, then you
are asserting that in a given series there is no making an
end of ill, no cutting off the round of birth and death,,
no Nibbana without residual stuff of life — which is contrary
to doctrine. 1
[2] Again, are you asserting that ‘ result ’ and £ state'
entailing resultant states ’ are identical, equivalent terms —
of one import, the same, of the same content and origin ?
[3] That they are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined,
connected, one in genesis, in cessation, in basis, and in
mental object? All this you deny. . . . 2 * *
[4] Again, do you mean that a given bad mental state is
its own result, a given good state its own result? That
the consciousness with which we take life is the very con-
sciousness with which we burn in purgatory ? That the-
consciousness with which we give a gift of merit is the very
consciousness with -which we rejoice in heaven? . . .
[5] A . — You deny my proposition ; but are not ‘ results,
[of karma] ' the four immaterial aggregates in reciprocal
relation ? If so, surely it is right to say that a result is
a mental state resulting from other mental states ?
1 A. ‘denies this for fear of contravening doctrine.’ — Corny. Cf.
above, I. 1 (p. 48 f.).
2 The opponent regards any one of the four mental groups as
‘ result entailing the other three as its results 5 in their mutual relation
at any given moment. — Corny. But this cannot be, since all four are.
mutually co-inhering at that moment as an indivisible whole.
Of Divers Destinies
211
BOOK VIII
1. Of Divers Destinies. 1
Controverted Point. — That there are six spheres of destiny.
From the Commentary. — There is an opinion among some schools
— the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas— that the Asuras form a sixth
plane of rebirth. The Theravadin contradicts this in virtue of the
hair-raising illustration of the five divisions of destiny in the Sutta :
‘ There are these five destinies, Sariputta 2 . . . It is true that a
troop of Asuras — that of Vepacitti 3 — was freed from the fourfold plane
of misery, but not to form a separate plane. They were taken up
among the devas. The Kalakanjakas were taken up among the Petas.
[1] Th. — Did not the Exalted One name five destinies —
purgatory, the animal kingdom, the Peta-realm, mankind,
the devas ? [2] And did not the Kalakanjaka Asuras, who
resembled the Petas in [ugly or frightful] shape, sex-life,
diet, and length of life, intermarry with them? [3] And
did not Vepacitti’s troop, who in the same respects re-
sembled the devas, intermarry with devas ? [4] And had
not Vepacitti’s troop been formerly devas ?
[5] A. U . — But since there is an Asura-group, it is
surely right to speak of it as a [possible] destiny? 4
1 Gati, literally, a going, or bourne, a career. On these, concisely
stated, see Compendium, p. 137.
2 Majjhima-Nik., i. 73.
3 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 221 f. Cf. Dialogues , ii. 289 : Pss. of the
Brethren, verse 749.
4 The Commentary includes between ‘in shape’ and ‘ sex-life,’ the
[bracketed] term bfbhaccha — BIbhaeeha ti virupa dud-
dasika. It also paraphrases samanabhoga (rendered as ‘re-
sembling ... in sex-life’) by sadisa-methuna-samacara;
and samanahara (‘ resembling ... in diet ’) by sadisa-khela-
singhanika-pubba-lohitadi-ahara.
212
Of an Intermediate State
VIII. 2.
2. Of an Intermediate State.
Controverted '■ Point. — That there is an intermediate state
of existence.
From the Commentary. — Some (as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas
and Sammitiyas), by a careless acceptation of the Sutta-phrase —
‘ completed existence within the interval ’ 1 — held that there is an
interim stage where a being awaits reconception for a week or longer.
The counter-argument is based on the Exalted One’s dictum that there
are three states of becoming only — the Kama-, the Kupa-, and the
Arupa-worlds. 2 And it is because of that dictum that the opponent
[in so far as he is orthodox] has to deny so many of the questions.
[1] Th.—li there be such a state, you must identify it
with either the Kama-life, or Rupa-life, or Arupa-life,
which you refuse to do. . . .
[2] You deny that there is an intermediate state between
the first and second, or the second and third, of these . . .
[3] you affirm, indeed, that is no such thing ; how then
can you maintain your proposition ?
[4] Is it a fifth matrix, a sixth destiny, an eighth station
for reborn consciousness, 3 a tenth realm of beings ? Is it a
mode of living, a destiny, a realm of beings, a renewal of
life, a matrix, a station of consciousness, an acquiring of
individuality? Is there karma leading to it? Are there
beings who approach thither? Do beings get born in it,
grow old, die in it, decease from it, and get reborn from it ?
Do the five aggregates exist in it? Is it a five-mode
existence ? All this you deny. How then can you main-
tain your proposition ?
[5-7] You admit that every one of these [categories or
notions] applies to each of the three planes of life named
above, the only difference being that the first two — Kama-
life and Rupa-life — are five-mode existences; the last —
1 I.e., died within the first half of the normal life-span in those
heavens. See I. 4, § 9.
2 Sayyutta-Nih., ii. 3, etc. Cf. Compendium, 81, n. 2, 138 f.
3 The seven ‘stations’ (vinnanatthitiyo), or opportunities for
the resultant rebirth-consciousness (the effect of a dying person’s
consciousness) to happen — are described in Dialogues, ii. 66 f.
361.
Of an Intermediate State
218
Arupa-life — is a four-mode existence (that is, -without
material qualities). If then there is an intermediate
stage of life, you must be able to predicate some or all of
these [notions or categories] of it. But you say you
cannot. . . .
[8] But you deny also that there is an intermediate life for
all beings. Hence your proposition is not universally valid.
[9-11] For whom then do you deny the intermediate
state? For the person whose retribution is immediate? 1
If you assent, to that extent your proposition is for you not
true. Or is it for the person whose retribution is not im-
mediate that you affirm this state ? Yes, you say. Then
you must deny it for his opposite.
You deny it also for one who is to be reborn in purgatory,,
in the sphere of unconscious beings, in the immaterial
heavens. Therefore to that extent your proposition is not
universally valid. Nevertheless, you maintain that there
is an intermediate stage of life for one whose retribution is
not immediate, for one who is not to be reborn in purga-
tory, nor among the ‘ unconscious beings,’ nor in the im-
material heavens. [Concerning these you have yet to state
in what respect, as a plane of life, it resembles, or differs
from, the three named by the Exalted One.]
[12] P.S . 2 — But are there not beings who ‘complete
existence within the first half of the term ?’ If so, are we
not right ?
[18] Th . — Granted that there are such beings, is there
a separate interval-state [between any two recognized exist-
ences] ? Yes, you say. But granted that there are beings
who ‘complete existence within the second half of the term,’
is there a separate state of life corresponding thereto ? If
you deny, you must also deny ypur proposition [since you
rest it on this basis].
The same argument applies to such cognate terms as
‘ beings who complete existence without,’ and again, ‘ with
difficulty and striving ’ (see above, I., 4, § 9, n. 1).
1 On this term, see Bud. Fsy. Eth., § 1028.
2 Pubbaseliya, Sammitiya. '
214 Of the Pleasures of Sense VIII. 3.
3. Of the Pleasures of Sense.
Controverted Point. — That the kama-sphere means only
the fivefold pleasures of sense.
From the Commentary. — This discourse is intended to teach those
who, like the Pubbaseliyas, contract the meaning of kama -dhatu
(element or datum of desire) to that of k a m a - g u n a (pleasurable
sensations), ignoring the difference in the meaning of the two terms.
It is true that in the Sutta — ‘ There are these five hinds of pleasurable
sensations , bhihhhus ’ 1 — the whole world of k a m a d h a t u is im-
plied. But generally kamadhatu may stand for vatthukama,
objects of sense - desire ; kilesakama, corrupt, worldly desires;
and kamabhava, or the eleven lowest planes of existence (from
purgatory to the six lowest heavens). In the first term kama
means ‘to be desired 5 ; in the second, it means both ‘ to be desired’
and ‘ to desire.’ But in the last term kama means ‘ to be desired ’
or ‘desiring,’ or * place where objects of sense happen.’ Dhatu, as
always, means self-existing ultimate, without entity, non-substantial. 2
[1] Th. — You admit, do you not, that desire, intention,
zest, and joy, and the passion or lust 3 that is involved in
•each, are all bound up with the fivefold pleasures of sense? 4
How then can you maintain that the kama-life is only those
pleasures ?
[2] Do you mean that human organs of sense are not co-
extensive with kama-life, the five organs of external sense
and the co-ordinating sense, or mind? No, 5 you say
(meaning only the pleasures of sense in your proposition) ;
but think again as to mind. . . . Yes, you now say, mind
is not kama-life. 6 But was it not said by the Exalted One:
1 Majjhmia-Nik., i. 85. See Vigha-Nih. , iii. 234, for other
references.
2 The PTS edition of the Commentary , through either corrupt
MSS., or printing errors, or defective punctuation, is here not
always intelligible. A perusal of the Br. edition will make the
meaning clearer.
3 Here kama dhatu means kilesakama. — Corny.
i As objects, kamagunar amnano. — Corny.
5 The opponent does not reject these as objects of desire (vatthu-
kama.). — Corny.
6 He recollects the sublimer and also the supramundane or spiritual
work of mind. — Corny. Read te-bhumaka-mano ( ib .).
366.
Is Kama-Life Sense-Pleasures only t
215
‘ Fivefold the world's sense-pleasures be,
And mind as sixth, our lore doth rede.
Whoso therein doth purge desire, 1
Is thus from ill and' sorrow freed’ l
Hence it cannot be said that the kama-life does not in-
clude the mind.
[3] Again, can you say that the pleasures of sense
amount to a sphere of life, 2 a destiny, a realm of beings,
to renewed life, to a matrix, a station for consciousness, an
acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma leading to
them ? Are there beings to be reborn in them ? Do beings
get born, grow old, die, decease, get reborn ‘in’ sense-
pleasures ? Are there the five aggregates in them ? Are
they a five-mode existence? Are Buddhas Supreme, Silent
Buddhas, Chief Pairs of disciples 3 reborn in them? [4] All
these things you can predicate of the ‘ kama-element,’ but
not one of them of the pleasures of sense.
[5] P. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : Bhik-
khus , there are these fivefold kdma-pleasures — which are
they ? Objects desirable, sweet, agreeable, dear, connected
with ‘kamaf and seductive, are cognizable by sight, hearing,
smell, taste, and touch — these are the five kinds of kdma-
pleasures ’ ? 4
Hence surely the kama-element is only those five.
4. Of Sense-Desires.
Controverted Point, — Whether the subjective sense-desires
or the objective five fields of sense constitute kama’s.
From the Commentary . — Going merely by the Sutta last quoted
above, some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold the latter view. The
1 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 16.
2 Here k amadhatu = kama - bha va or -loka.
3 See above, I. 3, §§ 9, 10.
4 Ang uttara-Nik., iii. 411, etc.
216 Of Sense-Desires YIII. 4.
Theravadin shows that ‘ corruptions 3 alone truly constitute sen-
suality. 1
[1] is verbatim = § 1 in YIII. 3, and [2] is verbatim— § 6,
save for the substitution of ‘ Hence sensuality consists in
only the five fields of sense-object.’
[3] Th . — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
‘ There are these fivefold pleasures of sense, bhikkJius: which
are the five? Objects desirable, . . . adapted to sense-desires
(kama), and seductive are cognisable by sight, hearing, etc. . . .
five kinds of [ objects associated tvith ] sense-pleasure. Never-
theless, bhikkhus, these are not sense-desires ; they are called
in the Ariyan discipline [ objects of] sense-pleasures [kama-
guna]. For kama is a mail’s lustful intention ’ ; 2
‘ The manifold of objects 5 in the world —
This in itself is not ‘desires of sense.'
Lustful intention 4 is man’s sense-desires.
That manifold of objects doth endure ;
The will thereto the wise exterminate ’ ? 5
Hence it is wrong to say that just the five kinds of sense-
objects constitute sense-desires.
1 Read kamabhavag, ‘ state of having kanaa’s.’ The translators’
difficulties increase in this discourse. But the Indian conception of
all the universe, save the higher and highest heavens, in terms of
‘ desire,’ is of great interest. See Ency. Religion and Ethics , ‘ Desire,
Buddhist/ by Mrs. Rhys Davids.
2 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 411. Br. does not support the reading of the
PTS text — Te ariyassa . . .—as verse, but agrees with Edmund
Hardy’s reading in the PTS edition of the Nikdya, which we have
mainly followed. Cf. ibid., the many differences of reading in the
MSS. consulted. The gathas occur, as above, in Sayyutta, i. 22.
In the Anguttara line 3 is prefixed to the verses, and repeated as line 4
(in translation above, line 8 in text).
3 The Pali for this phrase, yani c it rani — ‘the varied things
which ’ — is paraphrased in the Anguttara, Commentary with 1 objects ’ :
citra-citrarammanani.
4 26., paraphrased as sail kappa vasena uppannarage.
6 Or ‘ discipline 5 (v i n a y a n t i).
370.
Ambiguity of Rupa
217
5. Of the Rupa-element.
Controverted Point. — That the ultimate ‘ datum or ele-
ment of rap a ’ is things [cognized as] material.
From the Commentary.— The Theravadin criticizes this view —
held, for instance, by the Andhakas — on the ground that the ‘ Rupa-
element ’ includes all the spheres of life known as Eripa - bhava,
and is therefore more extensive than just material qualities of things. 1
[1] Th. — Is then rupa a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm
of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-con-
sciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma
leading to it, beings to be reborn in it ? Do they get born,
grow old, die, decease, get rebirth there? Are the five
aggregates ‘in’ rupa? Is it a five-mode existence? [2]
Now all these you can predicate of the Bupa-datum, but
not of rupa, or material quality. Hence the latter has not
all that is implicated in the former.
Again, if the EiTpa-datum consists only of material quali-
ties — and, as you will admit, there is material quality in the
ATimu-datum — is this latter datum the same as iftTpa-datum?
You say ‘ no.’ But think. You must admit it is. 2 Then
we get a man in two life-spheres at the same time. . . .
6. Of the Arupa-Element.
Controverted Point. — That the ultimate ‘ datum, or
element ‘ of ariupa is things [cognized as] immaterial.
From the Commentary. — Here the same method is followed.
Instruction is given by taking a certain immaterial notion — 1 feeling ’
— and asking if that is a sphere of life, etc. ; thus it is showed that in
no ease are the two identical.
[1] Th. — Is then feeling a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm
of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-
consciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Is there
1 Here there is the corresponding difficulty of the ambiguity of
rupa. See Compendium, 271 f. ; Bud. Psy. Eth., 43 f.
2 He denies, so as not to contradict the accepted triad of life-spheres.
When pushed, he assents, because of his thesis. — Corny:
218 Senses in the Bupa-Heavens YIII. 7.
karma leading to it? Are beings to be reborn in it? Do
they get old, die, decease from, get reborn in it ? Are the
five aggregates * in 5 feeling ? Is it a five-mode existence ?
[2] Now all these you can predicate of the Arupa-datum or
element, but not of feeling only.
Again, if the Arupa-element mean only immaterial things
— and you will admit there is feeling and other mental
aggregates in the Kama-element — are these two elements
or data identical ? Either you must deny (which were
unorthodox) or assent. In the latter case we get a person
in two spheres of life at the same time. The same argu-
ment holds good for Arupa and Rupa data. And if all
three be mutually identical, we get a person in three
spheres of life at the same time. . . .
7. Of the Senses in the Rwpa-Sphere.
Controverted Point.— That in the Rupa-sphere 1 the in-
dividual has all the six senses.
From the Commentary. — Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas and
Sammitiyas), judging by the Sutta-passage — ‘ having form , made of
mind, with all its main and lesser parts complete , not deficient in any
organ ’ 2 — imagine that the Brahma-group and the rest had sensations
of smell, taste, and touch.
[1] Th. — If that be so, and one in that sphere have, say,
the sense of smell, you must admit odorous objects for him
to smell ; and so too for the senses of taste and touch.
[2] But you deny the existence, in that sphere, of such
objects. [8-6] Yet it seems only rational that, admitting,
as you do, the existence in that sphere of both organ and
object in the case of sight, hearing, and [sense-co-ordination
or] mind, you should admit no less as to the other fields of
1 This includes sixteen grades of devas, the Brahma-heavens being
the lowest ( Compendium , p. 138).
2 Dialogues, i. 47. In the Rupa heavens, where ‘a subtle residuum
of matter is still met with ’ (Compendium, p. 12), only sight, hearing,
and intellectual co-ordination of these survives.
374.
Can Rujm-devas smell, taste, touch ?
219
sense, once von affirm the existence, in that sphere, of any of
the other sense-organs. [7-8] ‘ No,' you say. You are pre-
pared to admit organs of sight, hearing, and co-ordination,
and corresponding objects seen, heard, and cognized by
those organs; yet while you admit the other sense-organs,
you deny the existence of their objects. [9-10] In fact,
even if you were to concede the existence, in that sphere,
of objects odorous, sapid, and tangible, you would, you say,
deny they were apprehended by the corresponding organs,
though you admit the corresponding apprehension in the
case of sight, etc.
[11-13] But there are among you some 1 who would admit
this apprehension of odours, tastes, and touches by the re-
spective organs, the existence of which you affirm. I would
ask them whether there exists in that sphere the odour of
roots, pith, bark, leaves, flowers, fruit, raw flesh, poisonous,
pleasant, or evil odours; whether there exists there also the
taste of roots, pith, bark, leaves, flowers, fruit, or sour,
sweet, bitter, pungent, saline, alkaline, acrid, astringent,
nice, or nauseous tastes ; whether there exist there also
hard and soft, smooth and rough, pleasant and painful
contacts, heavy and light tangibles? 2 You deny that any
of these does exist in that sphere. . . .
[14] A. S.~ -But is there not in that sphere the wdiere-
withal 3 for smelling, tasting, touching?
Th.— Yes.
A. S. — Surely then it is right to say that in the Bupa-
element the individual has all six senses ?
1 Certain teachers who will have it that the fields of sense are there
complete, each organ having its function. — Corny.
2 These are standard formulas of enumeration. See Bud. Psy.
EtTi., pp. 187-89, 198.
3 Ghana-nimittarj, etc. But this is only a matter of external
appearance, not of organ and mental object, and is therefore a futile
reference. — Corny.
220
Is there a sublimated Matter ?
VIII. 8.
8. Of Matter in ArTqm-Sphere.
Controverted '■ Point,. — That there is matter among the
Immaterials.
From the Commentary. — Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas),
judging by the Word — ‘ Because of consciotosness there comes mind
and body’ 1 — imagined that, even in the Arupa-sphere of exist-
ence, there was a subtle, refined matter segregated from grosser
matter.
[1] Th. — Is then ‘matter’ (rwpa) a sphere of life, a
destiny, a realm of beings, renewed life, a matrix, an
acquiring of individuality ? This you deny ; but ail this
you can predicate truly of Arupa. Hence you cannot
maintain your proposition.
[2] You cannot predicate them truly of a five-mode
existence, one mode of which is material qualities. But
you can do so respecting a four-mode existence, that is,
with the material qualities omitted, as is the case with
Arupa. . . .
[8] You can predicate them truly of the Bupa-sphere,
where there yet is matter. But this sphere is not iden-
tical with the Arupa-sphere. [4] And if you predicate
matter of the Arupa-sphere, you must show that matter
agrees with the description you can truly give of the Arupa-
sphere as a state of existence, a destiny, etc.
[5] Again, did not the Exalted One say that the Arupa
was a way of escape from visible or material things ? If
that is true, do you still maintain your proposition ? Yes ?
Well, then, the Exalted One said that renunciation was a
way of escape from sense-desires. 2 Now, according to your
reasoning (if there is matter in the Immaterial), there are
sense-desires in renunciation, and there are intoxicants in
1 Dialogues , ii. 52 f. ; Sayyutta-Nik ii. 1, passim; Compendium,.
p. 188 ; Buddhism (Mrs. Rhys Davids), p. 91.
2 Nekkhamma...kama, a (very poor) word-play of exegetical
derivation. The former term = going out or down from. Of. Dlglia-
Nik„ iii. 289 f., 275; Anguttara-Nik. , iii. 245.
380.
Is Matter Moral ?
221
those who are freed from them, there are things ‘ included ’
(in intoxicant-infested states of the three spheres) among
the £ unincluded ’ 1 which is absurd.
9. Of Matter as ethically Good or Bad.
Controverted Point.— That physical actions [involved in
bodily and vocal intimations] proceeding from good or bad
thoughts amount to a moral act of karma.
From the Commentary . — Some (as, for instance, the Mahiijsasakas
and the Sammitiyas) hold that acts of body and voice being, as they
are, just material qualities, reckoned as bodily and vocal intimation 2
are morally good if proceeding from what is good, and morally bad
if proceeding from what is bad. But if, runs the counter-argument,
they are to be considered as positively moral, and not unmoral— as
we are taught 3 — then all the characteristics of the morally good or
bad must apply to them, as well as material characteristics.
[1] Th. — If that be so — if rCtpa involved in bodily action
be of morally good import — then it must have a mental
object, and the mental attributes of f adverting,’ ideating, 4
co-ordinated application, attending, willing, anticipating,
1 I.e., the Ariyan "Way or Order (niyama), with its Paths and
Fruits {Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 254, 335).
2 See Compendium, p. 264; Bud. Psy. Eth., 192 f. ; and below,
X. 10, 11.
3 Bud. Psy. Eth., p 169, especially n. 5.
4 Abhogo, from bhuj, to bend, turn (cf. our ‘bow,’ ‘bough,’
from the common Aryan root bhugh), is synonymous with avaj-
j ana (or a vat tana), the preceding term. Popularly equivalent to
manakkara (mind-doing, mentation), it is technically defined, with
the former term, as the adverting of consciousness, when attention is
arrested or roused. It is tantamount to ‘ what is in the mind ’ ; hence
the rendering ‘ ideating.’ Cf. Milinda (translation), i, 147 : ‘ Would a
wind that had died away acquiesce in being produced again ? No, it
can have no idea (abhogag), or will (cetanaq) to be reproduced
... it is an unconscious thing.’
222 The Physical and the Moral VIII. 9.
aiming, 1 -which you deny. But otherwise it is not
good.
[2] All these things you can predicate about the good
contact proceeding from good consciousness, as well as
about the good feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy,
mindfulness, concentration, understanding, that proceed
from good consciousness, and have an object of thought,
but you cannot do so about rupa involved in bodily action.
[3] Or again, you would admit that, if rupa of the kind
you name has no mental object, it will have no mental
adverting, ideating, and so on ; but you would deny that
contact, feeling, perception, and the rest, similarly pro-
ceeding from good thought — good, but without mental
object — lacked mental adverting, ideating, and so on.
[4] Now take the matter involved in the bodily action,
resulting from good thought: Is all of it morally good?
You deny. But then you cannot maintain your pro-
position as generally true. For instance, would you call
visible object which was the consequence of good thought,
‘ good ’ matter ? Are audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible
object, or the four elements : extended, cohesive, hot, and
mobile, [if they ‘ happened 1 as] the result of good thought,
£ good ’ matter ? You deny. [5] Then would you call any
of them, under the circumstances, indeterminate matter
(neither good nor bad) ? ‘ Yes 5 you say ; yet you deny that
the matter or material quality appearing, under the circum-
stances, as bodily action is indeterminate. That, you say,
would be ‘ good.’ . . .
[6] Let us then take your £ good ’ bodily action which,
as matter, has no mental object : must you not equally
allow that visible or other sense-object, or those four
elements which, as matter, have no mental object, are
also, under the circumstances, £ good ’ ? But you deny.
. . . [7] Similarly you refuse to see that, if you allow
1 The last two are equivalents of cetana, volition. The former
is volition under the aspect of preparation, or exertion ; the latter is
the same, regarded as persistent.— Corny. The f ormer— p a 1 1 h a n a—
in its popular meaning, is ‘ praying,’ and is used as equivalent to
a sirj s a, :hope.
384.
Is Matter Moral ?
223
an 3 r sense-object, or any element brought about by good
thought, and having no mental object, to be indeterminate,
you must equally allow the ‘ matter ’ of bodily intimation
resulting from good thought and with no mental objeet, to
be indeterminate. . . .
[8] You call this bodily intimation, which is consequent
on good thought, ‘ good ’ matter [even though it is so un-
mental as] not to be conjoined with any [mental reaction
or] £ contact.’ Yet you would deny the possibility of this
if, for ‘ bodily intimation,’ you substitute any sense- object,
or one of the elements.
[9] Taken conversely, you allow that any object of sense
or an element consequent on good thought, but not con-
joined with any mental reaction, is indeterminate (neither
good nor bad). Yet you would deny the indeterminateness
if, for sense-object or element, you substitute matter
of bodily action born of good thought.
[10, 11] And if to ‘ not conjoined with mental reaction
or contact’ I add ‘not having a mental object,’ your
attitude is the same, in both alternatives [8, 9].
[12-15] The whole argument to he repeated for 1 vocal ’
instead of ‘ bodily intimation.’
[16] Next with respect to bodily intimation proceeding
from bad thought. You affirm similarly that this is ‘ morally
bad ’ matter. Then it too must have a mental object, and
those mental attributes named above, 1 which you deny.
But otherwise it is not morally bad. [17] All these things
you can predicate about the bad reaction, or ‘ contact,’ pro-
ceeding from bad consciousness, as well as about the bad
feeling, perception, volition, lust, hate and dulness, pride,
erroneous opinion, doubt, sloth, distraction, immodesty,
and indiscretion, that proceed from bad consciousness,
having a mental object, but you cannot do so about that
bodily intimation, which is r u p a , or of material quality
[18] 2 Or again, you will admit that, if bad rupa of the
kind you name has no mental object, it will have no mental
adverting and other mental attributes named above ; bht
1 See § [l]. ^ Cl §§ 3i 4 .
224 The Physical and the Moral ‘VIII. 9.
you will deny that contact, feeling, perception, volition,
lust, hate, and so on, proceeding from bad thought, bad
and having no mental object, lack mental adverting and
those other attributes. . . .
[19] Now this that you call ‘ morally bad ’ matter pro-
ceeding from bad consciousness : — is all of it bad ? Yes ?
Whether it be ‘ bodily intimation/ or other material quality ?
This you deny, so your proposition amounts to this : that
some material qualities resulting from bad consciousness
are bad, some not.
[20-28] And all that we have argued as to ‘ bodily
intimation ’ as £ bad ’ matter applies to 'vocal intimation.’
[24] 1 For instance, would you call visible object which
was the consequence of bad consciousness ‘ bad ’ matter ?
Or audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible matter ? Or any of
the four elements ? Or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat
(if any of them happened as the result of bad consciousness)
— would you call them £ bad ’ matter ? You deny. [25]
Then would you call any of them, under the circumstances,
indeterminate matter ? * Yes,’ you say. Yet you deny that
the matter or material quality appearing, under the cir-
cumstances, as bodily or vocal action, is indeterminate.
That, you say, would be ‘ bad.’ . . .
[26] 2 Let us then take your ‘ bad' vocal action, which,
as material, has no mental object : must you not
equally allow that any sense-object, or any of the four
elements, or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat, which
have no mental object, are also, under the circumstances,
‘ bad ’? But you deny. . . . [27] Similarly you refuse to
see that, if you allow any of these things, when brought
about by thought, and having no mental object, to be
indeterminate, you must equally allow the ‘ matter/ bodily
or vocal, of action resulting from bad thought, and with no
mental object, to be indeterminate.
[28-31] are simply repetitions of [8-11], substituting ‘ bad ’
for * good,' * vocal ’for ‘ bodily,’ and adding ‘ impure matter,
tears, blood, sweat’ to the sense-objects and four dements.
1 Cl [4], [5], 2 Of- [6], [7].
392.
Appeals to Authority
225
[32] M. S. — But il we may not say that matter is good
or bad, is not deed or word as an act good or bad ? [This
being quite orthodox,] our proposition must be right.
[33] Th. — But if you maintain that matter is good or
bad, you must not hesitate to say that all five organs and
objects of sense, the four elements and impure matter, etc.,
are (intrinsically) good or bad — which you deny. [34] If
body and bodily action be material, would you affirm that
mind and mental action are so ? If these, on the contrary,
are both immaterial, would you affirm that both body and
bodily action are immaterial ? Or if body is material and
bodily action immaterial, would you speak similarly of
mind and mental action? 1 [35] To say that bodily action
as well as body is material, involves such statements as
1 sense-consciousness is material because the sense-organs
are material.’
[36] You must not say that rupa, or matter, is action
(or karma). For was it not said by the Exalted One :
( X say, bhikkhus, that volition is karma; when we have willed,
then toe make action (or karma ) by deed, word, and thought?' 2
[37] And again : * When, Ananda, there is action, subjec-
tive pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by
the deed. So also when there is speech or thought, subjective
pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by the
action of speech or of thought .’ 3
[38] And again : ‘ There are, bhikkhus, three modes of
volitional acts of body, four modes of volitional acts of speech,
mid three modes of volitional acts of mind, all of which amount
to immoral deeds, bringing forth 4 ill and entailing it as result.
And there are a like number of modes of volitional acts of body,
1 The PTS adds a repetition of the first question in this section.
Br. omits both the repetition and also the third question. They are
all only so many parallel instances to show the unreasonableness of
implicating the whole of matter in statements about bodily and
vocal action.
2 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 415.
3 lb., ii. 157 f. ; Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 39 f.
- Bead dukkhudrayaij. So the Br. translation.
T.S. v.
15
226 Of Vital Power VIII. 10.
speech, and mind amounting to moral [karma], bringing forth
and entailing happiness as result.' 1
[39] Once more: ‘If, Ananda, this foolish man, Samiddhi,
when asked by the Wanderer Pdtaliputta, were to answer :
“ Brother Pdtaliputta, it is when anyone has acted intentionally
in deed, word, and thought that he comes to feel pleasant, or
painful, or neutral feeling, felt as pleasure, as pain, or as
neither:” so answering he 'would make right answer ’ ? 2
Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it is not right to say
Matter, or material quality, is karma (action).
10. Of Vital Power.
Controverted Point. — That there is no such thing as a
material vital power.
From the Commentary. — Some, as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas
and Sammitiyas, hold that, because vital power is an immaterial fact,
distinct from consciousness, therefore there is nothing material in it.
[1] Th. — If there is not, you imply also that, in material
(organic) phenomena, there is no such thing as 1 a term
of life, or a subsisting, no going on, being kept going on, no
progress, procedure or preservation of them’ 3 — but you
1 "VVe cannot trace this passage (cf. Compendium, pp. 145, 146).,
The Burmese translator adds a note : ‘ The Thera vadin takes k a y a,,
v a c I, m a n o, when compounded with k a m m a, to denote merely
a means (nimitta), and kamma by itself to denote volition
(e e t an a). But the opponent takes each compound to mean a moral
act (of deed, word, or thought).’ Hereby we see how certain purely
immoral actions involved in gestures and speech, proceeding from
moral thoughts, came to be regarded as also moral.
2 Majjhima-Nik., iii. 209. All four passages are quoted in Buddha-
ghosa’s Atthasfilim (PTS), p, 88.
3 This is the canonical formula for jlvitindriya, or vital power
(see Bud. Esy. Eth., § 9). The Burmese translator also reads thiti
as a separate synonym of a y u and the rest, and understanding each
in the instrumental sense, he renders the passage thus : ‘ Is there
no such thing as a means of living, subsisting, maintaining, moving,,
or preserving ?’
395. Is it only Psychical? 227
deny that; in fact, you maintain the opposite. Hence
your proposition falls through.
[2] With regard to the immaterial, you affirm both the
existence of immaterial vital power and also its continuity,
going on, etc. Why do you affirm the latter only, and
deny the former ?
[3] You admit that the life-term of immaterial organic
phenomena is immaterial vital power : why not admit the
corresponding counterpart in the case of material organic
power? Why is it wrong to deny the latter when you
admit the former ?
[4] You say that, for you, the life-term of material
organic phenomena is an immaterial vital power ? Would
you then maintain the contrary? No? Why not? [5]
Both vital powers, you say, are immaterial. It seems to
me you could with equal plausibility say that both were
material.
[6, 7] You will admit that vital power is still present in
one who has fallen into a cataleptic trance. 1 Yet you could
not call his vital power (he being unconscious) immaterial.
In which aggregates is the vital power included ? In that
of mental coefficients, 2 you say? But is that aggregate
existent in one who has attained trance? c No,’ you say?
I repeat my question. ‘Yes,’ you now say. But if anyone
in trance has mental coefficients, he will also have the
other mental aggregates — feeling, perception, cognitive
consciousness. ‘No,’ you say? I repeat my question.
‘ Yes,’ you now say. 3 Then that person cannot be in a
cataleptic trance.
1 Nirddha, literally cessation (viz., of consciousness) : the utmost
result of Jhana abstraction. Everything mental (immaterial) is
suspended for a time.
2 Sankhara. These, in the Suttas, are defined as activity in
deed, word, and thought; in Abhidhamma as fifty phases, more or
less of them present in states of consciousness. ‘ The opponent thinks
of the fifty, and denies ; then of the three activities, and assents.’ —
Corny. Cf. XIX. 2.
3 He denies with respect to mid-trance, but assents with respect to
entrance into and emergence from trance. — Corny.
228
Of Vital Power
VIII. 10.
[8, 9] If there be no material vital power, no vital power
can exist for the inmates of the unconscious sphere, 1 for
how can they have an immaterial (or mental) vital power?
The argument above as to mental coefficients, which you
say they have, applies to them also. They cannot be as
they are and yet possess all five aggregates, as in a five-
mode existence.
[10] [If vital power be wholly psychical, it must be
affected by mental conditions ; for instance,] you will admit
that vital power, springing from a consciousness that seeks
rebirth, must, when that consciousness breaks off, be itself
broken off in part. Now, would you say the same of a
purely mental phase such as * contact ’ (or mental reaction
to stimulus) ? Why not ? You mean that contact would
be broken off, not in part, but entirely ? Now, would you
say the same of vital power [it being, as you say, not
material] ? You deny. . . .
[11] P. S. — Are there then two vital powers (material
and immaterial) ?
Th . — Yes.
P. S. — Then you are committed to this — that we live
with two lives, die with two deaths ? 2
Th . — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
11. Of a Result of Karma,
Controverted Point . — That because of karma an Arahant
may fall away from Arahantship.
1 See above, I. 3 ; III. 11.
2 ‘At the moment of decease the two break off together.’ — Corny.
The Compendium, when treating of mind, takes note only of the
psychic vital power. Of. Introduction, p. 17 : ‘ The activities of will
and the other concomitant properties [or coefficients] are due to the
psychic life (jlvitindriya), which infuses mental life into one and
all, constituting the whole a psychosis or psychical state? But when
treating of matter, the author notices physical vital power (Com-
pendium, p. 156). The doctrine as to the two is clearly stated in
Vibhcmga, 123 : £ Vital power is twofold : material and immaterial.’
398. Karma and Arahantship 229
From the Commentary . — Such is an opinion held, for instance, by
the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas, the Arahant so falling being one
who, in a former birth, calumniated one who was then Arahant. For
any other comment, see the argument on the falling away from
Arahantship (I. 2, p. 64 f.).
[1, 2] Th . — How can you affirm this without also affirm-
ing — which you will not — that those in the three lower
stages of fruition may fall away from their fruit ?
[3] And your claim is that he may fall away, not because
of such karma., or prior action, as murder, theft, fornica-
tion, evil speech, matricide, parricide, Arahantieide, wound-
ing a Buddha, or schism-making, but because of having
calumniated Arahants. You affirm he may fall away be-
cause of having calumniated Arahants, but you deny that
everyone who calumniates Arahants realizes Arahantship. 1
Therefore your proposition that falling is due to calumnia-
tion is absurd.
1 ‘The opponent, not discerning the constancy (niyama) in the
attaining {leg. sampapunane) of Arahantship with such a karma,
denies.’ — Corny. The denial amounts to the admission that some who
calumniated Arahants realize Arahantship. The converse of this is
that all Arahants are not those who so calumniated. If those who
did not so calumniate fall at all, their fall cannot possibly be due
to calumniation, because they had not calumniated. Therefore the
opponent’s proposition is not universally valid on his own showing.
The orthodox view, however, is that there can never be a true falling,
because, among other reasons, all the previous karmas had been
exhausted. It is not necessary here to work out this obvious argu-
ment, all that is necessary being to disprove the opponent’s statement
by refuting him on his own grounds.
230
Of Release through realizing Danger
IX. 1.
BOOK IX
I. Of Release through seeing the Good. 1
Controverted Point . — That the Fetters are put off for one
who discerns a blessing (in store).
From- the Commentary. — In our doctrine we are convinced that
when anyone discerns (a) the ‘ world ’ (literally, ‘ the conditioned ’) as
full of peril, and (&) Nibbana as a blessing, the ‘ Fetters ’ are put off.
But some — for instance, the Andhakas — take one of these two alterna-
tive statements, and say it is only 2 by the latter discernment that
the Fetters are put off. It is to rebuke this partial view that the
Theravadin speaks.
[1] Th— But are not the Fetters also put off when the
world 3 is considered as impermanent? You admit this, of
course. But [then you should not confine yourself to the
optimistic side].
[2] You admit, too, they are put off when the world is
considered as full of 111, as disease, as a canker, a piercing
dart, as woe, as unbearable, 4 as an enemy, 5 as crumbling
away, as a calamity, as oppression, as peril, as trouble, as
fluctuating, as dissolving, as transient, as shelterless, as no
retreat, as no refuge, as without protection, as empty, bare
and void, as without soul, as full of danger, and mutable.
[But your statement hereby becomes one-sided.]
1 Anisapsa (literally, ‘praise,’ with two intensive prefixes; com-
mendable, because good ; profit, advantage). The argument is that
the realization of present actual evils is as strong a stimulus, as vis
a tergo, to betterment, as the faith in the happiness of that betterment
attained — the vis a f 'route.
2 In the PTS edition read va or eva for evat).
3 Sankhara.
4 Or 1 an affliction 5 (a b a d h a t o).
5 Literally, ‘ as other.’
401. Of Release through seeing the Good 231
[3] You admit then that (at the same moment) a man
can both consider the impermanence and so on of the
world, and see the blessings in Nibbana? No? But you
have admitted that he loses the Fetters when he does both.
You admit then that he can? But does this not involve us
in two simultaneous mental reactions, two consciousnesses,
and so on ?
[4] A. — You reject my proposition. But did not the
Exalted One say : ‘ Take, bhikhhus, the ease of a bhikkhu
who lives contemplating the happiness in Nibbana, perceiving
and feeling that happiness continually, constantly, and un-
diluted, convinced of it in his mind and permeated with it by
insight . . .
Surely then it is for one who discerns the happy prospect
that the Fetters are put off.
2. Of the Ambrosial 1 2 3 as an Object by which we are
hound. *
Controverted Point. — That the Ambrosial as an object of
thought is a ‘ fetter.’
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion held, for instance, by
the Pubbaseliyas, and due to careless inference from such passages as
‘ He fancies things about Nibbana. 33
1 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 14. Cf . the Commentary (Manoratba-
purani) on this passage. The K. V. Commentary concludes that
whereas the work of insight into the actual, the perilous present,
occupies the entrant at the threshold of the Ariyan Way, the Fetters
get removed, as, during his progress, he discerns the blessings of
Nibbana. The sense seems to require abbocchinnap, ‘without
a break,’ or ‘ uninterruptedly, 5 for abb okinn ai), ‘undiluted.’ One
is tempted to render cetasa adhimuccamano by ‘of his own
freewill.’
2 A m a t a, or ‘ not-dead.’ As this term does not for Puddhists, as
it might for Europeans, suggest immortal life, we have not rendered
it by ‘ the Immortal,’ but by a term which, though it literally does
mean that, has a vague suggestion of bliss.
3 See Majjhima-Nik. , i. 4. ,
232 Of the Ambrosial as a Fetter IX. 2.
[1] Th. — If you say that, are you prepared to admit
that the Ambrosial is the object of consciousness accom-
panied by ‘ Fetters,’ ‘ Ties,’ * Floods,’ ‘ Bonds,’ ‘ Hind-
rances,’ ‘Infections,’ ‘ Graspings,’ ‘Corruptions’? 1 Is
it not rather an object accompanied by the very oppo-
site ?
[2-4] You affirm that, on account of the Ambrosial occu-
pying the mind, lust, hate, ignorance may spring up. But
are you prepared to admit that the Ambrosial itself con-
duces to occasions for lusting, to lusting after, wishing for,
being inebriated, and captivated by, languishing for ?
That it conduces to occasions for hatred, anger, and resent-
ment? That it conduces to occasions for delusion, for
depriving of knowledge, for blinding vision, for suspend-
ing insight, for siding with trouble, 2 for failing to win
Nibbana ? Is it not rather the opposite ctf all these ?
How then can you say that, on account of the Ambrosial
occupying the mind, lust, hate, and ignorance spring up?
[5] All these things you may truly predicate as springing
up because of the occupation of the mind with material
qualities (rupa). But material qualities are not the
Ambrosial.
[6] You would not say that, whereas -the Fetters spring
up because of material qualities, the latter do not conduce
to Fetters, Ties, Floods, and all such spiritual defects and
dangers. How then can you affirm just the same of the
Ambrosial : that, whereas the Fetters spring up because of
it, it does not conduce to Fetters, and so forth ? Or that,
whereas lust, hate, and ignorance spring up because of the
Ambrosial, nevertheless the Ambrosial is not an occasion
for lusting and all the rest ?
[7] P. — But was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘He
perceives Nibbdna as such, and having perceived it he
imagines things about Nibbdna, with respect to Nibbdna,
1 On these spiritual categories ef. p. 115, § 1 ; and see Bud. Psy.
Eth., iii., chaps, v., x., xii., xiii.
2 Br, reads vighatapakkhiyaip
404. Of Matter as Subjective 238
things as Nibbana, that “ Nibbana is mine,” dallying with
the idea 1 ? 1
Therefore the Ambrosial is an object of thought not yet
freed from bondage.
3. Of Matter as Subjective.
Controverted Point . — Whether matter should be termed
subjective or objective.
From the Commentary. — It is an opinion of some — for instance,
the Uttarapathakas — that matter should be termed sarammana
(i.e., eo-objeet), not because it is so in the sense of making a mental
object [for itself], but inasmuch as it causes mental presentation.
The argument seeks to point out the distinction beween the two
meanings of arammana. 2
[1] Th. — If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or
body, that it has the mental features of ‘ adverting,’ idea-
ting, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, -willing,
anticipating, aiming 3 — things which you would, on the
contrary, deny of matter.
[2] All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental
properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, per-
ception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness,
concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit,
1 Majjhima-Nik., i. 4 : a Sutta, says the Commentary , which is
here inconclusive, because the Nibbana spoken of is simply temporal
well-being, so called. ‘ Falsely mistaken by the worldling for the real
thing ; a matter connected with the satisfaction of natural desires
only, 5 wrote Buddhaghosa in the Payanca Sudani ( Commentary on
the Majjhima-Nitc.).
2 So Br. edition : arammana-dvayassa vibhaga-das-
san’atthap. The PTS reading is not intelligible. Saram-
mana, in the orthodox view, means ‘subjective,’ because mind has
mental object. The opponent takes sarammana to mean ‘ objective,’
because matter is presented as object. This confusion of the terms
applicable to mind arises from the fact that he substitutes aram-
mana for p a c c a y a in the compound sappaccaya, and misreads
sarammanatthena sarammana g. Thus the word aram-
mana g has two meanings — ‘ object ’ and p a c c a y a. See § 4.
3 See VIII. 9, § 1.
234 Of Bias as without Mental Object IX. 4.
erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, im-
modesty, indiscretion — all of which you admit as subjective.
But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things
may not be affirmed of it.
[3] You deny in the case of matter all those mental
features — adverting, etc. — but claim for it the term * subjec-
tive,’ which is really applicable to £ contact,’ sensation, etc.
These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.
[4] U . — But is not matter correlated (as an object)? 1
Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right
to apply the term f subjective ’ to matter, etc. [since ‘ object ’
is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations].
4. Of Bias as without Mental Object.
Controverted Point. — That latent (immoral) bias 2 is with-
out mental object.
From the Commentary. — Some — for instance, the Andhakas and
certain of the U ttarapathakas — hold that what are called the (seven)
latent biases, being something distinct from mind, unconditioned,
indeterminate, are thereby without concomitant mental object. The
Tberavadin’s questions are to show what sort of phenomenon it is
that ‘ has no mental object.’
[1] Th. — Then the forms of latent bias must be either
material quality, or Nibbana, or one of the five organs or
five objects of sense, 3 * which you deny.
1 Dliammasangani, § 595: rupaij sappaecayarj (translated
as ‘ conditioned ’ in Bud. Psy. Eth.) ; Compendium, 194.
2 A nu say a. On this sevenfold ‘Category of Evil,’ see Com-
pendium, p. 172, n. 2. In the Yamaha it bulks very large. The
Commentary on that work attributes the metaphor to the relatively
ineradicable nature of the seven modes lying latent throughout the
life-term of the individual, and quotes the present argument as showing
a rejection of all the qualities claimed for anus ay a ( JPTS ,
1910-12, p. 86). This deep-rootedness is brought out in Pss. of
the Brethren, verses 12, 768. Herbert Spencer’s use of ‘ bias ; first
suggested to us the suitability for it. See JR AS, 1894, p. 324.
3 Only sense - co-ordinating and sensations as co-ordinated have
‘ mental objects 5 ( Vibhanga , 428).
407.
Is Latent Bias Mental ?
235
But let us take the first form, the bias of sense-desire.
If this is without mental object, must you not also affirm
the same of all manifestations and notions of sense-desire
— to wit, sense-desire as lust, as an outburst of lustful desire,
as a Better, as a Flood, as a Bond, as an Obstacle ? "Would
you not rather affirm just the opposite of these, that they
are concomitant with mental object ?
[2] Or again, in what aggregate is latent bias included ?
The aggregate of mental coefficients, 1 you say. But these
are concomitant with object not less than the other mental
aggregates : this you of course admit. How then can you
maintain your proposition ? [3] If you affirm that (a) the
bias of sense-lust has the aggregate of mental coefficients
involved with it, and yet is without mental object, you
must say no less of (&) sense-lust in general. But you
refuse (making of sense- lust as bias a thing apart).
[4] Thus you get : ( a ) aggregate of mental coefficients
without mental object; (6) aggregate of mental coefficients
with mental object.
Then is that aggregate partly with, partly without,
mental object ? Then must you affirm the same of all the
mental aggregates 2 . . . which you may not. . . .
[5] Or, passing over the next five latent biases — resent-
ment, conceit, mere opinion, doubt, lust of rebirth — as
disposed of by this same argument, take similarly the
seventh — nescience — if this as latent bias is without object,
it must be no less without mental object when figured as
Flood, Bond, Outburst, Fetter, Obstacle — which you deny
[keeping the latent bias a thing apart].
[6, 8] The argument about the aggregates applies no
less to this form of bias.
[9] A. U . — But is it not right to say that, when an
average man of the world is thinking of something that is
morally good or indeterminate, he may be described as
1 Sankhara's. Cf. p. 229, n. 2.
2 These were taught as being all ‘with mental object.’ See Vib-
hanga, p. 428.
236 Of Insight ancl its Object- IX. 5.
- having latent bias ’ ? And are not [at that moment] those
forms of bias [latent in him] without mental object ?
[10] Th . — But you could equally well say of him at such
a moment that he had lust in his heart, 1 and you deny
that lust is without mental object. 2 . . .
5. Of Insight as ivithout Mental Object.
Controverted Point . — That insight 3 is without mental
object.
From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as an Arahant cannot be said
to lack insight, that insight must, at least at times, be practically
without object, namely, when his visual consciousness is active, for
then he is occupied with the visible object engaging his sense of sight.
So think some, for instance, the Andhakas.
[1] Th. — Then insight must be either material quality,
or Nibbana, or one of the five organs of sense, or their five
external objects (since these are the things that are without
mental object). But this you deny. . . .
You deny also that understanding, as controlling power
or force, as right views, as the search for truth by intui-
tion, 4 is without mental object, affirming the contrary.
Then why exclude insight ?
[2-4] Here, too, you judge that the aggregate of mental
coefficients is involved. But as in the preceding discourse,
so here : you cannot say, a mental aggregate is without
object, or partly so. And you cannot affirm that under-
standing, which is involved in that aggregate, is with
mental object, while insight, also involved in it, is
without.
1 I.e., potentially, as something not extirpated.
2 ‘ Hence the objectlessness of ‘ latent bias ’ is not properly sub-
stantiated. 5 — Corny.
3 Nana p — i.e., Arahatta-magga-hana r) — insight belonging
to the highest Path, that of Arahantship.
4 Dhammavicayo. Cf. Bud. Pay. Fth., p. 18, n. 1 (reading
E.g. for I.e.), with Compendium , p. 180, n. 3.
410.
Can ice be Conscious of what is Past ?
287
[5] A . — You deny that insight is objectless. Is it right
to say that the Arahant is ‘full of insight,’ 1 while he is
visually cognitive?
Th. — Yes.
A . — Has his insight at that moment an object?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ... [6] But if you
substitute ‘ full of understanding’ for ‘full of insight,’ you
yourself admit that he is full of understanding while visu-
ally cognitive, and at the same time you deny that his
understanding, during that process, has an object. 2
6. Of Past Ideas.
Controverted Point .. — That consciousness of a past object
is without object.
From the Commentary. — Some— for instance, the Uttarapathakas —
hold that, since past and future mental objects are not actually
existing, therefore mind recalling a past object is mind without object.
[1] Th . — But you admit that there is such a thing as a
mental object that is past ? Then how can you make such
a self-contradictory statement? [2] Again, is there not
adverting of mind, ideation, co-ordinated application, atten-
tion, volition, anticipation, aim, concerning that which is
past? ...
7. Of Future Ideas.
ControveHed Point . — That a consciousness, having an idea
that is future, is without object.
The Commentary makes no separate comment.
[1, 2] are verbatim as in 6, ‘ future ’ substituted for ‘ past.
1 Nani. It is used as a synonym of pannava in § 6. Cf.
Anguttara-NIk iv. 340.
2 The insight is potential, not always actualized, i.e., exercised
about an object. There cannot be two mental objects at the same
instant of time.
238 Of Initial Application of Mind IX. 8.
[3] Th. continues. — You admit of course concerning
what is present, that there can be adverting of mind,
ideation, and so on (6, § 2), so that consciousness of a
present idea has its mental object. And you admit that
there can be adverting of mind and the rest about the past
and also about the future. Yet in both these cases mind,
you say, is without mental object. [4] Why not also say
then that, while there can be adverting of mind, etc., about
the present, mind occupied about a present object is mind
without object ?
[5] A . — But you admit that a ‘past object’ does not
exist [at the present moment] ? Surely then a mind occu-
pied with past object is occupied with no (that is, with a
non-existent) object. . . .
8. Of Initial Application of Mind and its Field of
Operation. 1 2
Controverted Point. — That initial mental application
‘ falls ’ on all consciousness.
From the Commentary . — This may happen in two ways : by way
of falling on consciousness as object, and by way of association, -2 as a
concomitant of the consciousness in which it operates. In the absence
of any rule 3 by which we can say, that such and such a consciousness
1 Vitakka is the distinguishable sense, or nuance, in a given state
of mental activity, of a 1 directing-on-to an object.’ In Buddhist
psychology it is an occasional or particular, not a constant, factor of
consciousness. See Compendium, 94 f., 238 f., 282. On the rather
unusual term anupatita, cf. Fhammapada, verse 302. Burmese
translators adopt two alternative renderings of vitakkanupatita:
(a) Those things which constantly accompany *' the initial application
or direction of the mind ; (b) those things on whieh this vitakka
constantly falls. The first alternative suggests the question : Does
vitakka operate in all consciousness ? The second suggests: Does
it operate on all consciousness ? While it may operate on all con-
sciousness as its object, it does not operate in all consciousness, since
it is absent in some, asinavitakka-citta.
2 Sampayogato.
3 Niyama.
413.
Mental Incidence
239
cannot become an object of initial application, we might say that the
thesis is true. But since some consciousness is brought to pass inde-
pendently of any initial application, this does not fall on (i.e., operate
in) all consciousness. [Hence the contradictory of the thesis is true.]
Those who maintain the thesis— for instance, the U fctarapathakas —
fail to draw this distinction.
[1] Th . — If that is true, you must also be prepared to
admit in detail that [other mental properties 1 ] sustained
application, zest, pleasure, pain, gladness, melancholy,
indifference, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration,
understanding, lust, hate . . . indiscretion fall on (or
operate in) all consciousness. ■ But you are not so pre-
pared. . . .
[2-4] Contrariwise, is there not concentration with sus-
tained application only, not initial application ; also con-
centration wherein there is neither kind of application?
Were not, in fact, three kinds of concentrative exercise
distinguished by the Exalted One: (1) With both modes of
.application ; (2) with the sustained mode only ; (3) with
neither ? 2
Hence your proposition is wrong.
9. Of Sound as purely Mental.
Controverted Point . — That sound is nothing more than a
diffusion of initial and sustained mental application. 3 4
From the Commentary. — Because it was said, ‘ Applied and dis-
cursive thinking is productive of speech,’ 4 therefore some — for
instance, the Puhbaseliyas— hold that sounds may occur even when
cognition is proceeding without work of sense, because they consist
merely in ‘ thrillings ’ #or irradiation] of initial and sustained applica-
1 C e t a s i k a. Cf . vii. 3.
2 Digha-Nik., iii. 219 ; Majjhima-Nik., iii. 162 ; Sayyutta-Nik.,
iv. 363 ; Anguttara-Nik., iv. 300.
3 In other words, that sounds are psychical ‘ thrillings ’ (v i p p h a. r a,
or reverberations, or vibrations).
4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 301, where it is said that speech is an activity
or co-efficient of mind, because there is first thought, then speech.
240 Of Speech conforming to Thought IX. 10.
tion of mind. 1 The Theravadin submits that if sound can be so
specialized, each mental property would send forth its own peculiar
sounds. If not, then we cannot speak of auditory cognition of a sound
that is merely a matter of intellect, and not an object of sense. But
the Word : ‘ Hearing a sound, an irradiation of initial application
of mind , he reveals ' 2 . . . shows there is auditory consciousness also.
[1] Th. — -If this be true, you must affirm no less that
sounds from mental contact are solely an irradiation of
mental contact; that such as are from feeling are solely
an irradiation of feeling. So also for such as are from
perception, volition, thought in general, mindfulness, un-
derstanding. This you will not do.
[2] Must you not also affirm of a sound that is an irra-
diation of mental application, that it is [none the less] to
be cognized by hearing, impinges on the ear, comes into
the auditory avenue? This you deny; you affirm that
such a sound is not cognizable by hearing, etc. How then
can you speak of it as sound ?
10. Of Speech conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point. — That speech does not accord with
thought.
From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as anyone can decide [to think
about one thing and] talk about another, therefore there is no accord,
no sequence, no conformity between thought and speech. Speech can
proceed even without thought. Such is the view of some — for instance,
the Pubbaseliyas.
[1J Th. — If this be so, then a fortiori neither does
speech accord with mental contact, feeling, perception,
volition, nor with any property of consciousness. But
surely, as you agree, the opposite is the case. 3
1 A phrase from Digha-Nik., iii. 104, and Anguttara-Nik., i. 170.
Digha-Nik., i. 213, in the same context, omits -vippharasaddar)
s u t v a, and uses slightly different inflexions.
2 See preceding references.
3 I.e., speech occurs to, or proceeds from, one who has ‘ mental
contact,’ etc.
241
416, 417- Of Action conforming to Thought
[2] You must, again, deny that speech accords with
.adverting, ideating, eo-ordinated application, willing, in-
tending, aiming — which you will not, the opposite being
true.
[8] You admit that speech which is provoked by thought
is co-existent, and one in its origin, with the thought. Yet
this is in contradiction to your proposition.
[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one speaks
•of what one does not wish to speak, discourses, addresses
[others], converses about what one does not wish. Surely
the opposite is the case.
[5] P . — You say I am wrong, but you must admit that
people can speak, discourse, address [others], converse
about something different [from that which is occupying
their minds]. 1 Hence my proposition is tenable.
11. Of Action conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point. — That action does not accord with
thought.
From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as anyone, when proposing to
go in one direction, can go elsewhere, some — for instance, the Pubbase-
liyas — hold that action is not in accord or conformity with, or consequent
upon, thought.
[1-3] Th. — (The argument is exactly similar to that in
IX. 10, §§ 1-3.)
[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one moves
forward and backward, or looks ahead and back, or bends or
extends, when not wishing to perform these respective acts.
Surely the opposite is the case.
[5] P. — You srfy, I am wrong, hut does it not happen
that some one, thinking ‘ I shall go in one direction,’ goes
in another, or . . . thinking ‘I shall hold forth something,’
holds forth another ? Hence my proposition is tenable.
1 The illustration given in the Corny, is that of one intending to
say civarag (robe) and saying drag (fibre), as if 'we were to say
14 coming’ for ‘ comforting.’ Speech not conforming to mental action,
■* no blame attaches to the speaker.’
T.S. V.
16
242
Of Past, Future, and Present
IX. 12.
12. Of Past, Future, and Present.
Controverted Point. — That a past or future experience is
actually possessed.
From the Commentary. — In this connection we must distinguish
between actual and potential possession. 1 The former is of the present
moment. But for a man who has acquired the Eight Attainments in
Jhana, the possession of them is potentially persistent, though not of
all at once. But some, not discerning this distinction — for instance,,
the Andhakas — speak of past and future Jhanas as something actually
and presently possessed.
- [lj Th. — But is not the past extinct, departed, changed,
come to an end, finished? [2] And is not the future-
unborn, not yet become, not come into being, not produced,
not brought to pass, not manifested? How then can you
call either something that is actually possessed ?
[3] Is one who possesses a present material or bodily
aggregate also in possession of a past and a future bodily
aggregate ? Then must you admit three bodily aggregates.
Similarly, if he is actually in possession of five past and
five future, as well as five present [bodily and mental]
aggregates, you must admit fifteen aggregates. . . .
[4-6] A similar argument applies to the organs and
objects of sense, to the eighteen elements, to the twenty-
two controlling powers.
[7] A . — But are there not those who, meditating on the-
eight stages of emancipation, can induce the four Jhanas
at their pleasure, can acquire the four serial grades? 21
Surely then it is right to say that one can have actual
present possession of past and future things?
1 More literally, ‘the notion of being in possession of (saman-
n a g a t a), and that of having acquired (p a t i 1 a b h a).’ — Corny.
- Anguttara-NiJc., iv. 410, 448. Buddhist Suttas (SEE XI.), 212,.
§§ 9, 10 ; Pss. of the Brethren, ver. 916, 917, 1172.
421.
Consciousness and Life
248
BOOK X
1. Of Cessation.
Controverted Point . — That before five aggregates seeking
rebirth have ceased, five operative 1 aggregates arise.
From the Commentary. — Some — for instance, the Andkakas — hold
that if, before a unit of sub-consciousness lapses, another unit of con-
sciousness, with its [operative] fourfold aggregate and the material
aggregate sprung from it, has not arisen, the living continuum must
be cut off. 2
[1J Th. — Is there then a congeries of ten aggregates?
Do ten aggregates arrive at actuality ? If you deny, where
is your proposition ? If you assent, you must answer for
two copies of each aggregate [which is unorthodox].
[2] The same argument holds if you maintain that only
four operative aggregates 3 may arise, substituting ‘nine"
for ‘ ten ’ [i.e., five plus four].
[8] And the same argument holds if you maintain that
only operative insight 4 arises, substituting ‘ six ’ for 4 nine ’
[i.e., five plus one] .
[4] A . — When the five aggregates seeking rebirth cease,
does the Path then arise ?
1 Kiriya, here meaning that which induces action, such as bodily
movement, etc. It is not specialized, as in Compendium, pp. 19,
285 f. ; and may therefore be consciousness entailing merit or demerit.
The aggregates (k h a n d h a ’ s) must be conceived as series of life-
moments.
2 Cf. op. cit., 126.
3 Excluding the material aggregate.
4 I.e., insight understood as in IX. 5. — Corny.
244
The Path and the Believer
X. 2.
Th. — Yes.
A. — What! do the dead, does one who has ended his
days, develop the Path? 1
2. Of the Path and Bodily Form.
Controverted Point. — That the physical frame of one who
is practising the Eightfold Path is included in that Path.
From the Commentary . — Those who, like the Mahiijsasakas, Sam-
mitiyas and Mahasanghikas, hold that the three factors of the Path :
— supremely right speech, action, and livelihood — are material, are
confronted with the contradiction that, since the factors of the Path
are subjective, they imply mental attributes lacking in matter.
[1] Th. — You must then be prepared to affirm also that
bodily form is [like the Path-factors] subjective, having
the mental attributes of adverting, ideating, co-ordinated
application, attending, volition, anticipating, aiming. You
deny this and rightly, for surely the opposite is true.
[2, B] The three factors of the Path [in which you deem
things corporeal to be included]— supremely right speech,
action, livelihood — these, you affirm, are not subjective, not
having the mental attributes above-named. [4-5] But the
other five factors of the Path — supremely right views,
aspiration, endeavour, mindfulness, concentration — these,
you admit, are subjective, and have the mental attributes
above-named.
[6, 7] If you affirm the absence of these mental charac-
teristics from those three factors of the Path, you must
also affirm their absence from all these five factors of the
Path.
[8] M. S. M. — But you admit that supremely right
14 By sophistry’ (chalavada, Corny.), he has shifted from
psychological to religious ground, then skips back again, drawing a
false analogy between the final death of any one life and momentary
death. The aggregates typify the life of worldly desires, which for
the convert is superseded by the higher life of the Path. Psycho-
logically and physically, the cessation of their continuity means death.
Cf. below, X. 3. ' . ,
424.
Intellect, not Sense, as Path- Instrument
245
speech, action, and livelihood are factors of the Path, [and
these are manifestations of corporeality]. Surely then
the practiser’s physical frame is included in the Path. 1
8. Of Path-Culture and the Senses.
Controverted Point. — That one may develop the Path
while enjoying the fivefold cognitions of sense.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas, with
reference to the Sutta : ‘ When he sees an object with the eye, he does
not grasp at it in idea ,’ 3 hold to the view stated above. The Thera-
vadin’s argument is that, if this be so, either the Path developed is of
a worldly nature, or the developer’s sense-experience must be of the
nature of the Path. But neither is possible, because sease-cognition
is worldly, and has not Nibbana as its object. 2
[1] Th. — But you will admit — (i.) that the five kinds of
sense-consciousness have a seat and an object that have
already sprung up; (ii.) that their seat and object are
antecedent; (iii.) that their seat is of the subject whi|e
their object is external, that seat and object are not yet*'
broken up while operative; (iv.) that seat and object are
of different varieties ; (v.) that they do not enjoy mutually
their respective ranges and fields ; (vi.) that they come to
pass not without co-ordinated application or attention 3 ;
(vii.) that they are not unmixed; (viii.) are not without
order in time ; (ix.) are without order of contiguity ; and
(x.) without any ideation? 4 Now if all this be true, your
proposition cannot be true.
1 I.e., in part of it. The opponents regard those three factors as
physical, the Theravadin as psychical. For instance, according to the
latter’s doctrine, sammavaca is not so much the right utterance
itself as that factor in the religious character by which right speech is
engendered.
2 The Path is a concern of inano, not of the five senses ; again, i. — x.
are not predictable of the Path. — Corny.
3 By the mind adverting to external object. — Corny.
4 Quoted from Vibhanga, 307. ‘ Leaving aside the automatic fall
(incidence in a presented object), there is not even the semblance of
minding about it [in sense].’ — Corny.
246 Path-Development and Seme- Cognition X. 3.
[2] Consider visual consciousness and one of the Path-
subjects — Emptiness 1 — does the former come to pass
■concerning the latter? If you deny, 2 you are opposing
your thesis. If you assent, I ask whether it is right doc-
trine to say not only :
- Because of the eye and the visible object visual con-
sciousness arises ,’
but also :
Because of the eye and Emptiness visual consciousness
arises ?
Is the Suttanta thus ? [Of course not.]
[8] Again, if your proposition be true, you must also
affirm that visual consciousness arises concerning the past
and the future. Also that it arises [not solely because of
visible object, but also] concerning mental contact, feeling,
perception, volition, thought, the organs of sight, hearing,
smell, taste, touch, and the objects of hearing, smell,
taste, touch — impossible affirmations.
Now you can admit that representative (ideational)
consciousness does arise concerning Emptiness, concerning
the past and the future, concerning phases of mind, factors
of experience, as stated just now.
And one may develop a Path while enjoying representa-
tive cognition concerning any one of those matters, but not
during the enjoyment of sense-consciousness, which as
such is not concerned with them.
[4] M. — Well, but was it not said by the Exalted One .•
‘ Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,
he does not grasp at the general characters nor at the details
of it, . . . or hears a sound, . . . or smells, . . . tastes, . . .
touches a tangible . . . ’ P
Surely here there is Path-practice by one who is enjoying
the five sorts of sense-consciousness ? . . .
1 Compendium, 67, 216, and above, iii. 2.
2 Because of the orthodox formula below. See Majjlmna-Nik.,
i. 259 ; Sayyutta-NiJc., iv. 87.
3 Anguttara-NiTc., i. 113 ; cf. Dialogues i. 80, n. on the terms
rendered by £ characters,’ ‘ details,’ and their being generally taken to
refer to sex-attraction. See also Appendix : N i m i 1 1 a .
427.
Are Sensations Ethically Positive 1
247
4. Of Sensations as Moral and Immoral.
Controverted Point. — That the five kinds of sense-con-
sciousness are good and bad (have positive moral quality).
The Commentary contributes no discussion.
[1-3] 1 2 Th. — ( Verbatim similar to X, 3, §§ 1-3.) The
argument being here , too , that the senses are limited to sense-
objects, ethical and intellectual matters being the concerns of
intellect, will, etc.
[4] M. — Well, but was it not said by the Exalted One :
- Here , bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,
he grasps, ... or again, does not grasp, at the general
characters, or the details of it, . . . or hears a sound, etc. . . .’ ?
Surely then the five sorts of sense-consciousness are good
and bad.
5. Of Sensations and Ideation.
Controverted Point . — That the five kinds of sense-con-
sciousness as such are co-ideational. ?
From the Commentary. — Here again the Mahftsanghikas, for
instance, carelessly interpret the Teacher’s words, quoted in the fore-
going. They hold them to mean that the five kinds of sensations as
such are accompanied by ideation, because sexual ideas are generated
by immoral thoughts.
( The argument is verbatim similar to the preceding, the
authority appealed to being that in X. 2.)
1 The Commentary refers also to the preceding discourse.
2 SabhogS. See VIII. 9, § 1, note.
248
Morals and the tligher Life
X. 6.
6. Of Two Codes of Morals.
Controverted Point. — That one who is engaged in the
Path is practising a double morality.
From, the Commentary. — From such passages in the Word as
‘ When a man is established in virtue he is gifted with wisdom ’ 1 some,
like the Mahasanghikas, hold that, inasmuch as the virtuous person is
developing the Path which is not of the world, with a morality that is
of the world, he must, at the moment of realization, be possessed
simultaneously of both a worldly and an unworldly morality. The
argument begins by showing that each morality would involve two
separate sets of mental processes.
[1] Th. — You must then be prepared to affirm that he
is possessed qf his dual morality with a dual mental con-
tact, dual feeling, dual perception, dual volition, dual
thought, dual faith, dual energy, dual mindfulness, dual
concentration, dual understanding. . . . [2] If his moral
code be worldly, those processes will be worldly. [8] If
his moral code be both, they will be double. The mental
contact, the feeling, etc., that he experiences, will be both
worldly as well as unworldly [or supramundane] — which you
of course deny. ...
And if you say that one actually engaged on the Path is
possessed of a worldly code of morals, you are calling such
an one in effect an average person or worldling — which you
of course refuse to do. . . .
[4-6] Your position, you say, is this: (1) one actually
engaged on the Path practises a worldly morality in the
three factors relating to conduct — right speech, right action,
right livelihood — but not in the five factors relating to
mental life. 2 (2) In those three factors his morals are
both worldly and supramundane, but they are only the latter
in the other five factors. My position is that you must
affirm one and the same higher morality for all the eight. 8
1 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 13, 165; quoted in Milindapahha, 34.
2 See X. 2.
3 Implied, not stated in so many words.
Is Virtue not Mental ?
483.
249
\ [7] M.—I Well, but does the Path come to be 1 when
worldly morality has ceased ?
Th. — Yes.
M. — What ! can anyone without morals — his virtue
defective, imperfect, cut off — develop the Path ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
7. Of Virtue or Morality as Automatic . 2
Controverted Point. — That virtuous conduct is automatic
(and not a property of consciousness).
F rom the Commentary . — It is held by some, like the Mabasangh-
ikas, that when there has been moral conduct, even though it has
ceased, there is an accretion of virtue, and hence the doer becomes
virtuous. The argument is analogous to that on giving as not mental
(VII. 4). '
[1] Th . — But is virtue either material qualities, or
Nibbana, or an organ or object of sense [since these are
the opposites of properties of mind] ? . . . [2] You would
not call mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, un-
mental. But if virtue cannot be identified with anything
that is not mental, it must be a property of mind. ...
[8-5] If virtue be no property of consciousness, you must
affirm that it has not a result consciously., sought after.
Is not the opposite true? But if it has a\result to be
desired, it is also something mental. . . . The mental
properties just enumerated — they have both bonseiously
desired results and are mental. In admitting this, you
must also admit that virtue is of the same dual character.
But you contend that virtue, on the contrary, is so
anomalous as to have a consciously desired result, yet to
be not mental. . . .
[6-8] Again, if virtue be not a thing of the mind, you
must admit that it has not a result, not an effect [in
1 Literally, * arise.’ 2 A-cetasikat).
250
Virtue as Mechanical
X. 8, 9.
future consciousness] 1 ; yet is it not precisely something
having such a result and effect? You would surely not
say that it is non-mental and not productive of effect, as
you would admit in the case of an organ or object of
sense ? Again, you would not consider that these non-
mentals have such a result; yet this is what you say of
virtue : — that it is both non-mental and yet fruitful of
results in consciousness.
[9-10] With reference to the Path-factors, you would
call the three factors relating to virtuous conduct non-
mental, while calling the other five mental [which you are
not justified in doing] .
[11] M . — But if I am wrong, you must then admit that
when virtuous acts have ceased, the doer becomes immoral.
You deny this? Then I am right to say that virtue is
[i.e., goes on] without mind, mechanically.
8. Of Virtue as conforming to Thought.
Controverted Point .— That virtue does not proceed in
adaptation to 2 thought.
From the Commentary. — This is merely a pendant to the previous
discourse.
[1-5] The argument is exactly similar ^,o X. 7, ‘does not
proceed in adaptation to thought ’ being substituted for ‘ is
automatic (or a property of consciousness), ’tmd the middle
sections [3-8] on ‘ result ’ and ‘ effect ’ being omitted.
9. Of Growth through Observance.
Controverted Point. — That virtue grows through [the
mere fact of] being undertaken.
From the Commentary.— Here, from a careless interpretation of the
verse in the Word, beginning —
‘ By planting pleasant parks and woods,'
1 See pp. 205, n. 8, 207, n. 2.
2 Literally, roll along after, in accordance with (ann-parivat-
tati). Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., §§ 671, 772.
440. Are Acts of Intimation Moral ? 251
wherein it is said —
‘ Merit doth grow continually /
some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that virtue grows naturally when
once the virtuous life has been undertaken, accumulating indepen-
dently of the mind’s action. The argument is similar to a previous
discourse.
[1-4] The argument is exactly similar to VII. 5 (p. 200),
‘ virtue grows through being undertaken ’ replacing ‘ merit
derived from a £pft . . . enjoyed keeps growing,’ § 2 being
omidtecl, and in § 3, ' the giver of a gift ’ being replaced by
‘ one who has undertaken a life of virtue.’
10. Are Acts of Intimation Virtue ?
Controverted Point. — That acts of intimation are moral
acts.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas and
Sammitiyas, thinking that ‘ bodily intimation is karma of deed, vocal
intimation is karma of speech/ believe that such acts have a moral
quality. But intimation (as gesture or speech) is a material matter,
while morality or virtuous conduct is not so, but is a deliberate (i.e.,
mental) act of abstinence.
[1] Th. — But the conduct called moral — abstaining
from taking life, from stealing, from fornication, lying, and
strong drink — do you affirm that these are so many modes
of intimation ? You do not. . . .
[Acts intimating minor courtesies such as] salutation,
rising to welcome, presenting clasped hands, acts of pro-
priety, offering a seat, a couch, water for the feet, a towel 1
for the feet, rubbing the back in the bath 2 — are these
morality ? Yes, you say. But you would not affirm they
1 Padakathaliya. See Vin. Texts, i. 92 n. Of Buddhagho-
sa’s alternative renderings, there given, the Burmese translator of
the Kathd Vatthu uses the latter. The 4 footstool (padapltha) for
the washed feet ’ included in the Yinaya is here omitted.
2 The. same translator renders this word, n h a n e, by 4 with powder.’
252 Of Non-Intimation as Immoral X. 11.
are the five abstinences just named. Those are moral —
are these ?
[2] M. S . — But if acts of intimation are not moral, are
they immoral ? If not, then they are moral.
11. Of Non -Intimation as Immoral.
Controverted Point . — That acts not intimating [a moral
purpose] are immoral.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Makasanghikas, hold this
view, based on the idea of a possible accumulation of demerit [in the
past], and on the fact that moral precepts may be broken at the
dictates of another.
[1] Th . — But the conduct that is immoral — taking life,
theft, fornication, lying, intemperance — do you affirm that
these are so many modes of won- intimation ? You deny.
(Then they are intimative, and some immoral acts are
therefore intimative [of moral purpose].)
[2] Jf anyone giving in charity has resolved on some
evil deed, do his merit and his demerit both grow thereby ?
If you assent, you are involved in two sets of mental pro-
cedure. 1 And if you assent to this anomaly, you have
good and bad, low and excellent, sinister and radiant states
of mind simultaneously present, when, in fact, as the
Exalted One said, they are as far apart as earth and sky,
etc. 2 [3] Similarly for all courtesies shown by one who has
resolved on some evil deed.
[4] M . — But an evil deed, you admit, had been resolved
upon, hence it is right to say that acts non-intimative of
a moral thought behind them are immoral.
i As in X. 1.
2 As in VII. 5.
444.
Is Latent Bias Unmoral ?
253
BOOK XI
1. Of Three Facts about Latent Bias.
Controverted Points. — (i.) That latent bias 1 is unmoral
(indeterminate).
From the Commentary . — That latent bias in its seven forms is
(i.) unmoral, (ii.) without moral or immoral motive, (iii.) indepen-
dent of mind, is an opinion held, for instance, by the Mahasanghikas
and the Sammitiyas. They allege that it is not right to say that the
average man, while moral, or unmoral consciousness is going on, has
latent bias, since the motive or condition of such consciousness cannot
cause latent bias [to manifest itself], nor is such consciousness con-
joined with any form of bias.
[1] Th. — But are you prepared to identify latent bias
with any of the morally indeterminate ultimates— -with
resultant or with inoperative indeterminates, with matter
or body, with Nibbana, or with the organs and objects of
sense ? Of course you deny this. . . .
[2-8] Again, take each form of bias — unless you can
prove that each form is something different in kind or
degree from the corresponding kind of ‘ fetter,’ or ‘ outburst, 5
or ‘flood,’ or ‘yoke,’ or ‘hindrance,’ which are indisputably
immoral states, you cannot call the corresponding form of
bias unmoral, whether it be sensual desires, or enmity,
or conceit, or mere opinion, or doubt, or lust of life, or
nescience. 2
[9] M. S. — Well, but would you say that an average
man, while thinking moral or immoral thoughts, had latent
bias ?
Th. — Yes.
1 On. this term see III. 2 f. ; IX. 4.
2 The ‘ seven forms.’
254
XI. 1.
Of Three Facts about Latent Bias
M. S. — Do you tell me then that good and bad ideas
can come together side by side in consciousness ?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
M. S.~ — Then latent bias must be unmoral.
Th. — Then you must go further and admit that lust is
unmoral, because you will agree that the average man,
when thinking good or unmoral thoughts, has not got rid
the while of the root-condition of lust or greed. . . .
(ii.) That latent bias is without moral motive (or root-
condition). 1
[10] Th. — Since you cannot identify latent bias with
any ultimate [cf. § 1], these being admittedly independent
of the root-conditions or hetu’s, it only remains for you to
show that each form of latent bias is something different
in kind or degree from the corresponding kind of ‘fetter,’ or
‘ outburst,’ or ‘ flood,’ or ‘ yoke,’ or ‘ hindrance,’ which are
indisputably motived by the root-conditions of lust, or
enmity, or dulness. . . .
[11] M. S. — You urge that latent biases are not uncon-
ditioned by these root-conditions, and you still maintain
that an average person, while thinking moral or unmoral
thoughts, is possessed the while by forms of latent bias.
But you deny that these forms are conditioned by any of
the root-conditions accompanying those thoughts. Surely
then latent bias is unconditioned. 2
Th. — You admit that such an average person is still
possessed of lust, even while thinking moral or unmoral
thoughts. But you deny that that lust is conditioned by
the ‘ hetu ’ accompanying those thoughts. According to
you, therefore, lust is unconditioned — which is absurd.
1 On hetu, see Compendium, 279 f. ; ef. Duka-patthana (PTS), *
xii., xiii.
2 The argument is complicated by r a g a being classed as both
(i.) ‘ root-condition,’ or hetu (as such it is sometimes called
1 o b h a), and (ii.) the first in the list of seven forms of latent bias :
kama-raga.
450. Of Insight as Potential 255
(iii.) That latent bias is independent of consciousness.
[12-19] Argued verbatim as in IX. 4, §§ 1-8, substituting
‘independent of’ or ‘ conjoined with ’ ‘ consciousness ’ for
‘ without ’ or ‘ with ’ ‘ mental object ’ respectively.
[20] M. S . — You affirm that an average person is still
possessed of latent bias, even while thinking moral or
unmoral thoughts. But you deny that the latent bias is
conjoined with such thoughts. Surely then latent bias is
independent of mind.
Th. — If, as you admit, such a person is still possessed of
lust while thinking moral or immoral thoughts, your
denial that lust is conjoined with those thoughts does not
necessarily lead to the false conclusion that lust is inde-
pendent of mind.
2. Of Insight.
Controverted Point . — That it is wrong to say ‘he has
insight ’ of one who, though he has banished nescience,
has thoughts not conjoined with insight.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
one who, having banished spiritual ignorance by Path-insight, is
experiencing ordinary cognitions by way of sense, cannot at the time
be said to ‘ have insight , 5 since Path-conscionsness is then not active.
The criticism reveals their ineptitude in the notion of what an [Ariyan]
person is, and also the propriety of ascribing insight to one who,
having acquired insight [has it always potentially, if not actually ]. 1
[1] Th . — Then you must also admit it is not right to
say that, when lust has departed, a man has ‘ done with
lust.’ Similarly for hate, and for dulness, and for worldly
corruptions generally. [2] If, on the contrary, you main-
tain that it is right to affirm these latter propositions, then
it is no less right to say, of one for whom nescience is
departed, but for whom cognition not conjoined with insight
is active, that he has insight.
1 Cf, this borrowing of a modern turn (anticipated by Aristotle) in
X. 12, p. 243.
256 Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness XL 3.
[3] M . — But if it be right to say thus of that person, is
it in virtue of past insight? Can he be said ‘to have in-
sight ’ by an insight that has ceased, that is past, that has
subsided ? You deny this . . .
3. Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness.
Controverted Point. — That insight (ii a n a) is not con-
joined with consciousness.
From the Commentary . — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that,
inasmuch as an Arahant, who is said to have insight on account of
that which he has won by the Path, may experience sense- cognitions
which are not conjoined with that insight, therefore insight is inde-
pendent of ordinary consciousness. The criticism shows that, if
insight be detached from consciousness, it must be identifiable with
one of the categories of things that are other than consciousness.
[1] Th. — But are you prepared to identify insight
with all that is admittedly detached from consciousness :
— with matter, Nibbana, or the organs and objects of sense ?
Scarcely ! . . .
Or are you prepared to declare ‘insight’ as having
nothing in common with understanding? 1 For you will
admit that understanding, as controlling power or force, as
supremely right view, as intuitive search for truth, 2 is not
detached from, but is bound up with, consciousness ?
[2] Insight, again, as* we agree, includes, involves the
activity of the aggregate of the coefficients of conscious-
ness, [3] as also does understanding. Both of these are
conjoined with consciousness. How then can insight be
detached from it ? [4] Hence, if you maintain that insight
and understanding, both involving conscious coefficients,
are respectively detached from and conjoined with con-
1 Panna, It is possible to translate both terms by the same
English term, none fitting exactly. Both are aspects of ‘ knowledge/
Cf. Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 142 ; Mrs. Rh. D. : Buddhism, 1914,
pp. 94, 130, 201 ; also on the Patisambhiddmagga , JBAS, 1906, 239 f.
2 Cf. Dhamma-sangmi , § 292.
453.
257
Does Speech betray Insight t
seiousness, you are committed to this : that the aggregate
of coefficients is in part conjoined with, in part detached
from, consciousness — which you of course deny. . . .
[5] P. — You contend then that an Arahant who is
enjoying cognitions by way of sight, etc., may be said to
- have insight ’?
Th. — Yes.
P- — But is his insight conjoined with that consciousness
(sight, etc.)?
Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
P. — Then my proposition holds.
Th . — But such an argument holds equally for ‘under-
standing,’ if you substitute that for ‘insight.’ And you
have admitted the connection between understanding and
consciousness.
4. Of the Utterance, ‘ This is Pain and Sorrow /’
Controverted Point. — That from utterance of the word,
‘ This is 111 !’ insight into the nature of 111 is set working.
From, the Commentary.— -Some, like, the Andhakas, hold that this
befalls the devotee at the moment when he enters on the Path. 1 The
opponent’s reply admits both utterance and insight. In the last
■question, to which the opponent replies in the negative, he is asked
whether, by the procedure he upholds, he is not committed to allow
an insight issuing from each syllable : I-dag du-kkhap?
[1] Th . — But you deny that a similar result ensues on
the utterance of the other three Truths : This is the Cause,
this the Cessation, this the Path leading to the Cessation of
111. Why is this? [2] Why deny for these what you
affirm for the first Truth ?
[3] Or why deny, as you do, that insight into the im-
permanence of each of the five aggregates (body- mind)
follows from statement of the fact ? [4] Or, once more,
1 When he is fleeing from 111 rather than envisaging positive
happiness. See above, IX. 1 ; cf. II. 5, 6.
t.s. v.
17
258
The Magic Gift
XI. 5.
that insight into the soullessness of each aggregate follows
from a statement of the fact ? [5-6] On what grounds can
you defend the sequence in one case only out of the three
sets of five propositions ?
[7] Now do you mean to tell me that insight issues from
every syllable of this formula : — This — is — pain — and —
sor — row? 1
A. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. 2 . . .
5. Of the Force of the Magic Gift (I cl cl hi).
Controverted Point . — That one who has the gift of magie
potency might live on for a kappa [on earth] .
From the Commentary. — The interval, kappa, here means a ‘ great ”
cycle (m a h a k a p p a 3 ), not its fourth part, the ‘ incalculable cycle ’
(asankheyyakappa 4 ), nor the mere ‘life-term’ (a yu kappa).
Now some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold this view, because they have
not thoroughly grasped the real advantage lying in the development
of the steps to magic potency. The opponent, knowing that his vital
principle or functioning is but the result of karma, has to deny that,
his vital functions are determined by i d d h i. All that magic potency
can effect is to avert things that would bring about an untimely death.
[1] Th. — But is his life-span, is his destiny, is his.
acquisition of individuality a thing of magic potency [that
he should be able to prolong one interval of it] ? For this
is what you are herein affirming.
An d do you reckon the kappa as past or as future ?
[ An d why restrict yourself to one kappa ?] Why not say
‘ might live on for two, three, four kappas ’ ?
[2] Again, do you mean that, given life, he could live
on for the remainder of his life, or that he could live on
1 Dukkha includes both. In PTS text read du ti for ruci.
2 Ibid., read, for Am ant a, Na h’evai) vattabbe — pe— .
3 See Co?wpendium, 142, n. 1 (in which page, for [n.] 8 read 1, and
2nd fn. as 2). Cf, Anguttara-Nih., ii. 126, 142. On iddhi see
Bud. Psychology, 127, 161.
4 Cf. Childers’ Pali Dictionary , sub voce kappa.
259
456. Can it prolong Life ?
for the remainder of his life if there were no [organic] life
left?
M . — He could live on for the remainder of his life,
given life.
Th. — Then he could certainly not live on for a kappa. 1
M. — [Well then] if there were no [organic] life left.
Th. — What ! he could live on though dead, though
deceased ? . . .
[3] [Again, what could he effect by the magic gift in the
duration of consciousness?] Could he by it succeed in
preventing any phase of consciousness that had arisen
from ceasing, contact, for instance, or feeling, or perception,
or volition, and so on ?
[4] Or could he by it make any one of the five aggre-
gates (body-mind) permanent ?
[5] Or could he by it prevent (a) beings liable to re-birth 2
from being born ? Or ( b ) beings liable to grow old, from
old age? 3 Or ( c ) beings liable to disease, from disease, 4 or
(d) liable to die, from death ? . . .
[6] M. — But was it not said by the Exalted One:
‘ Ananda, ivhosoever has cultivated, developed, established,
built up, and persistently practised the four Steps to Iddhi,
so as to be able to use them as a vehicle and as a basis, he,
should he desire it, coidd remain in the same birth for a kappa,
or for that portion of the kappa which had yet to run ’ ? 5
Does not this support my proposition ?
1 The normal duration of human life being at the most 100 years
( Sayyutta-Nik ., ii. 94 f.). — Corny.
2 Literally, having the quality or nature of birth.
3 In the Netti (p. 23) it is said that by iddhi old age may be
deferred, and youthfulness prolonged till death.
4 From this it may be inferred that Buddhists did not attach much
importance to the therapeutic value of magic potency, or iddhi.
6 Dialogues, ii. 110 f. The four Steps are will, effort, thought, in-
vestigation, each united to earnest thought and the struggle against
evil. 4 Iddhi ’ means accomplishment. Of. Milinda, i. 198 f. (trans-
lation), where the question is again argued without reference to the
Kathavattlm. Whether kappa here meant ayukappa only or not, the
Mahasanghika takes it to mean mahdkappa.
260
Of Concentration
XL 6.
[7] Th . — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
‘ 0 bhikkhus' l against four things there is none that can be
surety, be he recluse or brahmin, be he deva, or Mara, or
Brahma, or anyone whatever in the world. Against which
four ? Against the old age of those subject to decay. Against
the infirmities of those liable to infirmities. Against the dying
of those whose nature it is to die. Against the coming to pass
of the consequences of the evil deeds done in the past — deeds
that were corrupt, tending to re-becoming, vain, of evil effect,
making for birth, decay, and death ’ ? 1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Hence it is not right to say that one who has the gift
of magic potency might live on for an aeon.
6. Of Concentration.
Controverted Point. — That the continuity of conscious-
ness 2 is concentration of mind (samadhi). 3
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Sabbatthivadins and
TJttarapathakas, hold that, because of the Word — ‘ to spend seven
days and nights motionless, speechless , in the experience of absolute
bUss’ — the flow of consciousness itself may constitute concentration.
They do not take the latter term as meaning collectedness of thought,
even when the coefficient of individualizing intentness (ekaggata)
has arisen in a momentary unit of consciousness.
[1] Th. — Your statement must include of course past
and future states of consciousness in the series. You
forgot that, and you must agree that the past having
ceased and the future being unborn, it is not right to say
that they form a [present] concentrated state of mind. 4
'■ Anguttara-Nik., ii. 172.
2 Citta-santati. See Compendium, 6, 153, n. 1; 157, n. 4; 2521
3 Samadhi means the placing, establishing of consciousness ex-
clusively and voluntarily on any single object. Ekaggata is the
essential factor in consciousness, the cultivation of which may bring
about the state called Samadhi.
4 There is no use in speaking of a ‘ state ’ without a ‘ function ’ of
mind. And only the present state can be functioning (paccup-
pannam eva eittar) kiccakararj hoti). — Corny.
458. Consciousness and Rapt Absorption 261
[2] S. U. — Then is concentration confined to a momen-
tary conscious unit ?
Th. — Yes.
S. U.~ But if you could affirm that concentration is
involved in each momentary unit of consciousness, you
should say no less that one had won the ecstasy 1 of Jhana
on the actual occasion of any sense-cognition, or at the
very moment of thinking immoral thoughts, accompanied
by lust, hate, dulness, or any of the ten corruptions. 2 3 . . ..
[8] Th. — If your proposition is true, it must also be
true [a fortiori ] that a series of bad conscious units is
concentration, whether it is accompanied by lust, hate, or
any of the ten corruptions. This you deny. . . .
[4] S. TJ . — But if we are wrong, did not the Exalted
One say: ‘ I , friend Jainas, s am able, ivithout moving the
body or using the voice, to spend seven nights and days in the
experience of absolute bliss ’ t 4
Surely then the flow of consciousness constitutes con-
centration of mind.
7. Of the Causality of Things. 5
Controverted Point. — That a cause of things is predeter-
mined. 6
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas, hold that,
because of the Word — ‘ There is a cause, and that is elemental ’ 7 —
1 Here appana-samadhi is meant ( Compendium , p. 56).
2 See above, pp. 65, 66, nn. 4 ; Compendium, p. 17S.
3 Nigantha Jains. 4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 94.
5 Dhamma tthitata — i.e., the state of being a cause by which
resulting things are established. See above, VI. 2, and Appendix.
G Parinipphanna. On nipphanna (here intensified by the
prefix) see Compendium, pp. 156 (c), 157, n. 6.
7 tSayyuMa-Nik., ii. 25 ; Anguttara-Nik., i. 286. In these passages
it is stated that, whether Tathagatas arise to point it out or not,
always the natural order holds good that (1) causation in the physical
and psychical world goes on ; (2) all things are impermanent, pregnant
with ill, soulless.
262
Of the Causality of Things XI. \7.
each term in the chain of Causal Origination is, as a cause, elemental,
and is therefore predetermined. The Thera vadin shows that, if it were
predetermined by another cause, this cause would in turn be pre-
determined by yet another, and so on ad infinitum-.
[1] Th . — Is then the cause of causes predetermined [by
something else] ? You deny. For if you assent, 1 you
commit yourself to this : that, because of the continued
eventuating due to endless causation, there can never be an
end made to 111, nor any cutting off the round of rebirth,
nor any Nibbana free from the residual stuff of rebirth.
[2] Again, is the cause of any one of the five aggregates
(body, mind) predetermined? If you assent, you commit
.yourself to the admission that the cause itself is predeter-
mined by something else. And if you deny — and I insist,
and take no denial — you, assenting, commit yourself to
this — that there is, for this endless causation, 2 no making
an end of 111, no cutting off of the round of rebirth, no
(Nibbana without stuff of rebirth. . . .
8. Of Impermanence.
Controverted Point . — That impermanence is predeter-
mined.
From the Commentary.— Some, like the Andhakas, hold that im-
permanence itself is no less predetermined than impermanent things,
such as the body, etc. By this they are involved either in a plural
order of impermanence, or in an interminable series of temporal
features, each predetermined in its own way, with no prospect of
coming to the end of predetermination . 3
[1-3] Th . — Then is impermanence predetermined by im-
permanence already predetermined. And if you admit this,
1 He judges that the correlation may hold by way of contiguity and
reciprocity (two of the twenty-fonr Paccayas or conditioning relations).
—Corny.
2 Literally, predetermination of one by the other.
3 The idea is that things possess impermanence as a characteristic
feature. If this characteristic were predetermined, it should possess
another feature of impermanence equally predetermined.
461 .
Is Impermanence Predetermined ?
263
you imply that there is no making an end of ill, no cutting
off the round of rebirth, no Nibbana without residual stuff
of rebirth. This holds good for both decay and death, the
two manifestations of impermanence.
[4-5] [Take now these manifestations of impermanence
in the five aggregates, body-mind :] body is undoubtedly
predetermined and characterized by impermanence in the
form of decay, dissolution, disappearance. But you cannot
equally affirm all this of impermanence, decay, or death
itself. So for the mental aggregates. . . .
264 Self-Restraint and Sense-Control XII. 1.
BOOK XII
1. Of Self-Restraint. 1
Controverted Point. — That self-restraint is [positive]
action (karma).
From the Commentary. — This is a view held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, and based on the Sutta : * When he sees an object,
hears a sound , etc., he grasps, etc., at the general characters thereof,’ 2
etc. They hold that both self-restraint and want of self-restraint amount
to overt action, or karma. In our doctrine it is volition that con-
stitutes karma. And it is argued that just as volition, proceeding by way
of deed, word, and thought, gets the name of action of body, speech, and
mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint, proceeding by
way of sense-control, would get the name of visual karmas, auditory
karmas, etc. This, as not warranted by the Suttanta, the opponent
rejects till the fifth sense is mentioned. Here he stumbles at the
ambiguity of k a y a : ‘sentient skin-surface ’ and ‘ intimating body.’
The Sutta quoted is concerned with the presence and absence of
self-restraint, not of karma, hence it is inconclusive.
[lj Th. — If this be so, you imply that ocular self-
restraint is moral action of the eye ; so for the other
senses — you cannot admit this. . . . But as to self-
restraint, involved in sense- control of body and in control
of mind, you at first deny it 3 to be moral action, and then
1 Cf. above, III. 10.
, 2 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 16 ; also Dialogues, i. 80, and elsewhere. The
‘general characters’ (nimitta), according to the Commentators, are
usually taken, in this connection, as referring to sex-features and sex-
attraction. Self-restraint is the carrying out of the volition (cetana),
whieh alone ranks as morally effective action— i.e., karma.
3 He rejects for kaya as organ of touch; accepts for it as the
vehicle of intimation. As to ‘ mind,’ he rejects it as organ of sense,
accepts it as an avenue of karma.
463. Are Acts or Omissions Moral ? 265
assent to the proposition that it is moral action. Why
then do you not concede this for the remaining four senses ?
That which you admit as true for mind, the co-ordinator
of sense, you must admit as true no less for the five senses.
[2] Want of self-restraint you admit of course is
[immoral] action (karma) : is it eye-karma when self-
restraint is not practised by the controlling power of
sight ? . . . ( proceed as in § 1).
[3] M. — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : ‘ Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu , when he sees an
object with the eye, grasps at the general characters thereof,’
. . . [again] { does not grasp at the external appearance, . . .
when he hears a sound, . . . cognizes a thing with the mind,
, . . does not grasp, etc’? 1
Surely both self-restraint and want of it are herein
shown to be morally effective action ?
2. Of Action.
Controverted Point . — That all action (karma) entails
moral result (vipaka).
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas again, hold
this view, basing their opinion on the Sutta quoted below. Now
whereas the Master, without any qualification, spoke of volition as
moral action (karma), the argument here shows that only good or
bad volition as entailing moral result was meant, and that volition
which is morally indeterminate is without moral result. The Sutta
quoted is inconclusive, since it refers to the experience of results in
actual life or lives, given the necessary conditions.
[1] Th . — Do you imply that all volition entails result
[volition being moral action] ? If you deny, then your
proposition is not universally valid. If you do imply that
volition entails result, then you are committed to this —
that volition which is indeterminate as to moral result
entails moral result ; that volition which is inoperative and
1 See preceding note . 2
266
Is Sound a Mental Phenomenon ?
XII. 2.
therefore indeterminate as to moral result entails such
result, whether such volition be exercised in any one of the
three spheres of life, or in that which is not included in
them. 1 ... All of this you must deny. ... [2] For do
you not hold that resultant or inoperative volition, which
is indeterminate as to moral result, cannot be said to entail
result ? Where then is your universal proposition ?
[3] M . — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : £ I declare, bhikkhus, that there can he no
annulment of voluntary deeds done and accumulated, without
experience of the results thereof, he it in this life or in the
after-life ’ ?
Wherefore all action surely entails result.
8. Of Sound as Result [■ of Karma],
Controverted Point . — That sound is a result of karma.
From the Commentary. — Here again some, like the Mahasanghikas,
from carelessly interpreting such passages as, ‘ He by the doing, the
accumulating, the augmenting, the abundance of that karma, is
gifted with the voice of a Brahma god,' have adopted this view. The
argument shows that ‘ result of karnaa ’ is a term applying to mental
states only, which have been transmitted by karma, hut does not apply
to material things. The retinue, for instance, attending a Superman is
not a v i p a k a, or specific result of karma. 3
[1] Th. — [Now what can rightly be predicated of a
- result of karma ’ ?] Such a result is a matter of feeling,
pleasant, painful, or neutral ; it is conjoined with feeling
1 Dhammasangani, § 583.
2 Anguttara-Nik., v. 292 ff.
3 But the pleasure derived from well-being of this kind is vip ak a.
V i p a. k a is essentially a subjective phenomenon, subjective experience,
emotional and intellectual. Sound, as object, is something ‘other,’ or
external. The importance of speech-sounds for thought doubtless
provoked the exceptional position claimed by the heterodox for sound.
Sadda means both sound and word; hence, without a qualifying
context, sadda means as much vocal sound as sound in general.
467.
Are Sense-Organs Results of Karma?
267
of these three kinds ; it is conjoined with mental contact,
feeling, perception, volition, thought ; it goes with a mental
object ; with it go adverting, ideating, co-ordinated applica-
tion, attention, volition, anticipation, aiming. Is sound
anything of this kind ? x Is it not rather the opposite '?
[2] Now mental contact is result of karma, and of
mental contact it is right to predicate any of the fore-
going characteristics, and wrong not to. But the opposite
holds with regard to sound.
[3] M . — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : ‘ He through haring u-rought, having accumu-
lated, having piled up, having increased, such karma, becomes
reborn with the voice of a Brahma god, like that of the
karavlka bird’? 1 2 Hence surely sound 3 is a specific result
of karma.
4. Of the Sense-Organs.
Controverted Point . — That the sense-organs are results
of karma.
From the Commentary. —'Koto again it is a Mahasanghika belief
that, because the sense-organs have arisen through the doing of past
actions, therefore they are results (understood as subjective or mental).
Of them the sixth, or co-ordinating, sense may at times be such a
result, but not the others.
[1-4] The argument folloivs that of the previous dialogue
verbatim, the * sixth sense’ (mari’dyatana) being omitted.
1 In the PTS edition the reply should here be, N a h ’ e v a g
vattabbe.
2 Blgha Nikdya, iii. 173.
3 Though, the sense-organs are well produced through karma, they
are not designated as vip aka’s. — Corny.
2G8
Of the Seven-Rebirths' -Limit
XII. 5.
5. Of the Seven-Rebirths' -Limit. 1
Controverted Point. — That he who is said to be liable to
seven more rebirths at most is assured of final salvation 2
only at the end of the seven-rebirths’ interval. 2
From the Commentary . — This is a belief held, for instance, by the
Uttarapathakas. The Theravadin’s object is to show that there is
no such immutably fixed order. There is only (1) the ‘ true order ’ of the
Ariyan Path, and (2) the * false order,’ 4 to which belong the five heinous
crimes entailing inevitable retribution in the very next existence.
[1] Th. — Is such an one capable of murdering mother,
father, or Arahant, of shedding with malign heart a Tatha-
gata’s blood, of creating schism ? You deny. . . .
[2] And is he incapable of penetrating Truth during the
interval? You deny. Then he cannot possibly become
guilty of those heinous crimes, which admit of no inter-
vening rebirth without retribution. You now assent, ad-
mitting that he is incapable of that penetration. Then
you imply that he may commit those crimes, which of
such a man you deny.
[8] Is there a fixed order of things 5 (among the Paths)
by which the seven-rebirths’-limit man is bound to go
through all the seven ? You deny. Then your proposition
cannot hold. Do you in other words hold that there are
applications of mindfulness, supreme efforts, steps to
potency, controlling powers, forces, factors of enlighten-
ment, by [culture in] which the seven-births’-limit person
is destined to go through all seven ?
¥
1 That is, seven at the outside, possibly fewer. See I. 4.
2 I.e., in the Ariyan fourfold Path and its climax. On niyato
see Y. 4 ; cf. VI. 1.
3 According to the Burmese translation of the text, the question
turns on whether such a person is subjectively assured of his own
state, or whether he must go through his last seven lives before he
becomes so assured ? The Commentary paraphrases -paramata
by -p ar am at Sy a, and the Br. translator takes this as either instru-
mental or locative. The sense is the s am e.
4 Cf. I. 3.
B On niyrnia and niyama, see Appendix : Assurance.
470.
Is it immutably fixed?
269
[4] Is not the opposite the ease ? And how then can
you maintain your proposition ?
[5] You maintain that such a person is not so destined
except by the fixed order of the First, or Stream-winner’s
Path. But are all who enter on that Path destined to go
through all the seven rebirths ?
[6] U . — You say I am wrong ; nevertheless you must
admit that the person in question is a seven-birth s’ -limit
person ? Surely then my proposition stands ? . . .
6. Sequel to the Foregoing.
[1] U. — Again, if you maintain it is wrong to say that the
k o 1 a n k o 1 a, 1 or one ranking in the First Path next above
him of the seven rebirths’ limit, is assured of salvation by
his rank, 2 1 ask, Does not his rank itself [guarantee that he
shall attain] ?
[2] And does not the next higher rank in the First Path,
that of eka - blj in, or ‘ one-seeder,’ also guarantee final
salvation ?
„ 7. Of Murder.
Controverted Point. — That a person who has attained to
sound views 3 may yet designedly commit murder.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that,
since a person who has attained to sound views has not entirely put
1 Explained by Buddhaghosa, commenting on Anguttara-Nik.,
i. 233, as meaning ‘a goer from family (kula) to family,’ ‘ kula
here standing for b h a v a ’ (rebirth). See above, p. 77, n. 3.
2 Burmese translators give alternative renderings — in or by his rank
— for kolankolata.
3 Ditthisampanno puggalo, a technical term of religious
life, wherein the word di^thi no longer means erroneous opinion,
but the opposite. Such an one is still a learner (sekha), but has
put away all but the last fetters and residual lust, hate, and nescience,
and is incapable, so the Buddha taught, of any of the misdeeds or of
the irreverence mentioned above. — Sayyutta-NiTc., ii. 43 f. ; vi. s.v.
I) it t hi ; Angnttara-Nik., iii. 488 f.
270
Of Murder
XII. 7.
away enmity, and since he who takes life has enmity in his heart,
therefore one who thinks rightly may yet commit wilful murder.
[1] Th . — Then you imply that he may designedly com-
mit [any murder, even the worst, to witj matricide, parri-
cide, Arahanticide, or with enmity at heart may wound a
Tathagata, or create schism in the Order. . . .
[2] You imply, moreover, that [since he may commit
such a deed] he can have no reverence for Master, Doctrine,
Order, or Training, [8] while you know, on the other hand,
that such a person feels just the opposite.
[4] You imply, moreover, that such a person may defile 1
Buddha shrines, desecrate them, spit on them, behave as
an infidel in presence of them ? 2 3
[5] But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Just as
the ocean, bhiJckhus, remains of the same nature, and passes
not beyond the shore, just so is the body of precepts which I
have established for those ivlw are hearers of my word, and
■which they their lives long do not pass beyond ’ ? 8
Hence it is not right to say that a person who has
attained to sound views may designedly deprive a living
creature of life.
8. Of Evil Tendency . 4 * * *
Controverted Point . — That for a person holding sound
views evil tendencies are eliminated.
From the Commentary . — This view is due to the lack of making
proper distinction, by such as the Uttarapathakas, between an evil
1 See Vin. Texts, iii. 277, n. 3.
Apabyamato, Br. as a b y ak a t o, Br. translation : abyasa-
kato. The Burmese scholar, U. Pandi, suggests we should read
apabyakato, by which he understands ‘blasphemously.’ The
Commentary on 8ar>yutta-Nih., i. 226, only remarks : apabyamato
karitya abyamato katva.
3 Vin. Texts, iii. 303. *
4 Duggati denotes evil destiny, and connotes the sense-desires
of beings involved therein. The orthodox position is, that one who
holds sound views may still possess sense-desires which may involve
such a destiny.
478.
Of Evil Tendency
271
destiny and the natural desires concerning objects of sense felt by
those who are involved in such a destiny.
[1-4] Tli . — But you concede that such a person [though
safe as to his destiny] may still get infatuated with any
purgatorial objects of sense, 1 may commit fornication with
females that are not human, whether demons, animals, or
fairies ; may keep worldly possessions, such as goats and
sheep, poultry and swine, elephants, cattle, horses and
mules, partridges, quails, peacocks and pheasants. 2 If
you assent to all this, your proposition cannot stand.
Moreover, you cannot possibly admit all this in the ease
of an Arahant. Contrariwise, you repudiate it for him,
while you admit (as you must) that it may prove true for
one who has [merely] sound views.
[5] TJ . — Then if I am wrong, you imply that the person
holding sound views may yet be reborn in purgatory, in
the animal kingdom, in the realm of the Petas ? If you
deny, you must also retract your contradiction. 3
9. Of Him ivho has reached the Seventh Rebirth}
Controverted Point . — That for a person in the seventh
rebirth evil tendencies are eliminated.
The text gives only the opponents rejoinder, similar to § 5
in the foregoing.
1 In PTS edition [1] the reply to the second question should also
be A manta.
2 See above, IV. 1. [5].
3 The Commentary finds the rejoinder inconclusive, because 'the
question refers to the tanha which may entail purgatorial retribu-
tion, but not to the tanha for purgatorial objects of desire.
4 Sattamabhavika, or Sattamaka, terms which we have
not met elsewhere. See XII. 5.
272
Of Age-Long Penalty
XIII. 1.
BOOK XIII
1. Of Age-Long Penalty.
Controverted Point . — That one doomed to age-long retri-
bution must endure it for a whole kappa.
From the Commentary . — This concerns those who, like the Raja-
girikas, hold the notion that the phrase, ‘ one who breaks up the
concord of the Order is tormented in purgatory for a kappa/ 1
means that a schismatic is so ‘tormented for an entire kappa. 52
[1] Th . — But this implies that the cycle may start
when a Buddha is born into the world, or when the Order
is dissolved, or when the condemned person is committing
the act incurring the penalty, or when he is dying. . . .
[2] It also implies that if he live for a past kappa, he
may live for a future one — nay, for two, three, or four. . . .
And if during his kappa there be a cosmic conflagra-
tion, 3 whither will he go ?
JR . — To another plane of the universe. 4
Th. — Do the dead go thither ? Do they go to the sky ?
R . — The dead go.
Th. — Can the act involving the penalty take effect in
a subsequent life ? You must deny. 5 . . . . Hence he must
go to the sky. This implies that he has the gift of iddhi 3 —
1 Itivuttaka, § 18.
2 On the loose significance of the time-term kappa, see above,
XI. 5. The orthodox view was that the purgatorial retribution lasted
for the remainder of the cycle or cosmic era.
3 Literally, ‘should the kappa burn.’ . . .
- Loka-dhatu. 5 See above, p. 260.
477.
Hope for the Doomed
273
else he could not. Now can one doomed to age-long
retribution practise the four steps to Iddhi — will, effort,
thought, investigation ? . . .
[3] R . — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One :
‘ Doomed to the Waste, to purgatorial woe
For age-long penalties, provoking schism,
Of discord fain, fixed in unrighteousness.
From the sure haven doth he fall away.
Breaking the concord of the Brotherhood,
Age-long in purgafry he waxeth ripe ’ F
Hence my proposition is true.
2. Of a Doomed Maids Morality .
Controverted Point. — That a person doomed for a kappa
may not acquire moral consciousness.
From the Commentary. — So, for instance, the Uttarapathakas,
making no distinction between that lower goodness of the world of
sense-desire, which such a person may alone acquire, and the sub-
limer,'or the highest goodness, by which he would be able to avert
his ; doom.
[1] Th. — Yet you admit that he may make gifts [to the
Order] — how then can your proposition hold ? And not
only gifts — namely, of raiment, alms, food, lodging, medica-
ments against illness, various kinds of food, drink — but also
that he may render homage at a shrine of older faiths, 2
decorate it with a wreath, with incense, with ointment,
salute it by marching round. 3 . . .
1 Itivuttalca, § 13. The Commentary adds that these stanzas
,£ were uttered by the Buddha with reference to the normal life-cycle
(a yu kappa) in purgatory. This is one-eightieth part of a great
kappa.’ As thus included it is also called an antarakappa.
2 C e t i y a, a pre-Buddhist term for anything worthy of being
revered as a memorial. Buddhism has applied it to the four classes
of recognized memorials — paribhoga-, dhatu-, Dhamma-,
.and udissa-cetiya’s. The last includes images .
3 In Br. abhidakkhinaij, or consummate offering.
T.S. V.
18
274
Immediate Retribution
XIII. 8.
[2] U . — You contradict my proposition. Now you admit
that he may acquire good consciousness arising out of that
[purgatorial discipline]. Yet this implies that he may also
acquire good consciousness belonging to the Kupa- and
Arupa-spheres, 1 and belonging even to the supramundaue
mind. . . .
B. Of Abettors of Cardinal Crimes.
Controverted Point. — That a person who, as abettor, is
involved in 4 immediate retribution ’ may enter on the
True Path of Assurance.
From the Commentary. — Such a person, who at death inherits the
immediate effect of karma, may have abetted any of the cardinal
crimes (matricide, etc.) in one of two ways — by a permanent or stand-
ing injunction to commit the crime, or by an occasional injunction.
An abettor of the former class is already assured of his doom along
the Wrong Path, because of the will to accomplish such a course
having arisen. He is incapable of entering the True Path. But the
other class of abettor is not incapable. So do we conclude in our
doctrine. But some, like the Uttarapathakas, judge of the latter class,
as we do of the former only.
[1] U . — Do you mean that such a culpable abettor can
enter on both the False and the True Path of Assurance ?
If you deny, neither can you affirm your proposition.
Again, if he become worried and uneasy after his con-
nection with the deed, how can he ever enter on the True
Path of Assurance ? 2
[2] Th . — You say he is incapable of entering on that.
Path. But are you assuming that one or other of the five
cardinal crimes has actually been committed [through his
abetment] ? Your proposition implies this. 2
1 In Jhana-ecstasy.
2 Stress is laid by the opponent on the evil character of worry
(kukkucca-pattimattai) gahetva). — Corny. It is one of th&
Five Hindrances, taken together with uddhacea (distraction, or
flurry). See Dialogues, i., p. 82, § 68.
3 ‘Actual commission of any one of the five is to be proved in-
capable of entering on the True Path of Assurance.’ — Corny. This,,
we judge, refers to the principal offender. If there be no actual
commission, the abettor is a fortiori not liable to severe retribution.
480.
Assurance
275
Again, you affirm that an abettor of such crimes, when
he has withdrawn his instigation, and has dispelled his
worry and remorse, is still incapable of entering upon the
True Path of Assurance. Hereby you imply that some one
of the grave misdeeds just named has been actually com-
mitted [at his instigation]. But can you maintain your
position in the face of his reforming before the commis-
sion of the act ?
[3] U . — But has he not previously instigated someone
to commit it? How then can you judge him capable of
entering on the True Path of Assurance ?
4. Of One whose Salvation is Morally Certain (n i y a t a).
Controverted Point . — That one who is morally certain of
salvation has entered the Path of Assurance. 1
From the Commentary. — Niyarna (Assurance) is of two kinds,
according as it is in the wrong or the right direction. The former
is conduct that finds retribution without delay, 2 the latter is the Ariyan
Path. And there is no other. All other mental phenomena happen-
ing in the three planes of being are not of the invariably fixed order,
and one who enjoys them is himself ‘ not assured? Buddhas, by the
force of their foresight, used to prophesy : ‘ Such an one will in future
attain to B 6 d h i ’ (Buddhahood). This person is a Bodhisat, who may
be called Assured (Niy at a), by reason of the cumulative growth of
merit. 3 * Now the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, taking the term
1 Assured 5 without distinction as to direction, assumed that a Bodhisat
was becoming fitted to penetrate the Truths in his last birth, and
therefore held that he was already 1 Assured.’
1 Here the text (both PTS and Br.) has niyarna, while the Com-
mentary has niyarna. The former is technically more correct. Bee
Y. 4, and Appendix : Assurance.
2 Anantariy akamma. See above, YIII. 9-11.
3 Bead for punnassa datva, puhn 5 ussadatta. The title
of Niyata is extended to a Bodhisat by courtesy, so to speak,
because his final salvation, through accumulating merit, amounts
almost to a certainty, is highly probable. Cf. IY. 8.
276 Hindrances and the Hindered XIII. 5.
[1] Th . — Do you imply that the so-called ‘Assured’
enters upon the True Path of Assurance when assured of
immediate retribution, and upon the False Path of Assur-
ance when assured of final salvation ? That having first
practised the Path, he afterwards enters upon the Assur-
ance ; that having first practised the Stream -Winner’s
Path, he afterwards enters upon the Assurance of the,
Stream- Winner, and so on ... That finally, entrant^
upon Assurance comes after practise of the applications
in mindfulness and the rest of the Factors of Enlighten-
ment ? /
[2] P.A . — But in contradicting us, you imply that the
Bodhisat was not fitted by that last birth to penetrate the (
Truths. , ■
Th. — Nay, I say not so.
P.A . — Then he was [already] assured of entering upon
the Path of Assurance.
5. Of One in the Toils.
Controverted Point . — That a Hindrance is cast off by one
who is entangled in it.
From the Commentary . — The Uttarapathakas are among those who
hold that, just as there is no purifying work left for the purified, so
it must be one entangled, obstructed, cloaked by the Hindrances, who
abandons them.
[1] Th . — Equally then he who is infatuated abandons
lust; he who is malign, stupid, corrupt, abandons hate,
dulness, corruptions, respectively. Now, does he cast off
lust by lust, hate by hate, and so on ?
U . — [If this is not so, you are suggesting that the
Hindrances are cast out by the Path.] Now you allow
that lust, for instance, and the Path are both conscious
experiences. But do you not hereby imply a combination
of two rival mental procedures ? Lust is immoral, the
Path is moral — does not your position imply that good and
bad, moral and immoral, radiant and sinister mental states
480.
Obstacles and the Obstructed
277
confront each other in the mind ? And was it not said by
the Exalted One : ‘ These four things are very far apart ; the
sky and the earth, the hither and the yonder shore of the
ocean, whence the sun rises and ivhere he sinks. . . . Hence
far is norm of good: from that of evil ?
Hence it is also wrong to say good and bad states con-
front each other in the mind at the same moment.
[2] Th . — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
- With consciousness thus concentrated, made pure, trans-
lucent, cleared, void of defilement, made supple, wieldy, firm,
imperturbable , he applies and bends over the mind to insight
into the destruction of Intoxicants ' P
[3] LL — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :
‘ He thus knowing, thus seeing, his heart is set free from the
Intoxicants — sense -desires, lust of becoming, error and
nescience ’ P
Hence surely it is one who is entangled by the Hindrances
who casts them off.
6. Of Captivity and Release.
Controverted Point . — That a Fetter is cast off by one
who is in thrall to it. 4
Fro?n the Commentary . — This follows the preceding argument. To
be ‘ in thrall to ’ means |o be up against the Fetters, to have reached
the state of being possessed of them.
The discourse is similar to XIII. 5.
7. Of Jhana as Enjoyment .
Controverted Point. — That the expert enjoys Jhana, and
the desire for Jhana has Jhana as its object. 5
1 Quoted in full on p. 201 f. 2 Dialogues, i. 92.
3 Ibid., 93. * This is inconclusive, not being spoken concerning one
still in the toils. 5 — Corny. With this discourse cf. III. 3.
4 Literally, is face to face with it.
5 Jh ana-exercises, rightly valued, are solely a means, not an end, the.
end, for the Ariyan, being adhicitta, or the consciousness called,
278 Pleasure in Jhana Retrospective XIII. 7.
From the Commentary . — This opinion, held, for instance, by the
Andhakas, is based upon the Word : ‘ He attaining to and abiding in
First Jlicina finds enjoyment in it .’
[1] Th. — Do you mean that a given Jhana is the mental
object to that same Jhana ? If you deny, 1 your proposi-
tion falls. If you assent, you must equally admit that he
touches a given mental contact with the same contact,
feels a given feeling with that feeling, and so on for per-
ception, volition, thought, applied and sustained intellec-
tion, zest, mindfulness, understanding. . . .
[2] You admit that desire for Jhana and Jhana itself
are forms of conscious experience? But are you prepared
to admit further that they constitute two conscious pro-
cesses going on at once ? You deny ; then your former
admission is invalid. And if you admit further that desire
for Jhana is wrong while Jhana itself is good, you bring
the good and the bad up against each other in the same
consciousness — things as ‘ far apart as earth and sky/ etc. 2
[8] A. — But, if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : * Take the case, hhikkhus, of a bhikkhu who,
aloof from sensuous ideas, aloof from evil ideas, entering into,
abides in First Jhana : he enjoys it, lie yearns over it, and
by it he is delighted ’ P
Hence surely the expert enjoys Jhana, and the desire for
Jhana has Jhana as a mental object. ,
especially in later books, supramundane. For the more worldly
aspirant the end was rebirth in the Rupa, or Arupa heavens.
1 For fear of not conforming to the Sutras. — Corny.
2 See YII. 5 ; XIII. 5.
3 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 126. Here such an expert is aspiring to the
Brahma-heavens (Rupa-loka) only, and is contrasted with the ‘ disciple
of the Exalted One.’ ‘ The passage is inconclusive, inasmuch as it
refers to pleasure in and desire for Jhana after, and not during the
exercise of it.’ — Corny.
485.
The Relativity of Taste
279
8. Of Lust for the Unpleasant.
Controverted Point . — That there is such a thing as lust-
ing for what is disagreeable.
From the Commentary. — In the Sutta-passage :• — 1 Whatsoever
feeling Tie feels , pleasant, painful, or neutral, he delights in and
commends that feeling ’ — the reference is to erroneous enjoyment. 1
But some, like the Uttarapathakas, emphasizing the ‘ delights in,’
hold that one can delight in painful feeling as enjoyment of passion-
lessness.
[1] Th . — Do you go so far as to maintain that of the
beings who delight in the painful, some wish for it, long
for it, seek, seareh, hunt for it, and persist in cleaving
to it? Is not rather the opposite your genuine belief’?
You assent. Then how do you maintain your proposi-
tion?
[2] Can anyone have at once a latent bias of lust for
painful feeling and' a latent bias of aversion from pleasant
feeling? 1 Will not these two forms of bias be [really]
directed inversely, the former craving pleasure, the latter
hating pain ?
[8] U . — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : £ He, thus, expert in complacency and anti-
pathy, delights in and commends whatsoever feeling lie feels,
pleasant, painful, or neutral, and persists in cleaving to
it’? 2
Hence surely there is such a thing as lusting for the
unpleasant ?
9. Of the Unmorality of a Natural Desire for Objects
of the Mind.
Controverted Point . — That to crave for objects of the
mind is unmoral.
1 I.e. to being subjugated to feeling.
' J Majjhima-Nik., i, 266. ‘ Delight,’ the Sutta goes on, ‘is grasping
after the things of sense, which cause the feelings.’
280
XIII. 9.
Is Every Desire Immoral ?
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that
the sixth kind of objects of sense-experience, 1 coming after any of the
five forma of sensations, is neither moral nor immoral.
[1] Th . — If that be so, this craving must belong to one
of the moral indeterminates — to wit, resultant or inopera-
tive indeterminates — matter, Nibbana, or the organs and
objects of the five senses. But you must deny this [as not
doctrinal].
Or what reason have you for dissociating this sixth
form of t a n h a [natural desire or craving] from the rest ?
If you admit that a craving for objects of sight, sound,
and so on is immoral, you must admit as much concerning
the co-ordination of these.
, [2] Did not the Exalted One call craving immoral ?
Does not this condemn your proposition ? Did he not call
appetite (or greed) immoral? and is not craving for objects
of the mind a kind of greed ?
[3] Your contention is that a craving for objects of the
mind is an unmoral appetite, but you are not justified in
using 1 6 b h a with this qualification, when in the other
five modes of sense it is called immoral.
[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ This
natural desire is concerned with rebirth, is accompanied by
delight and lust, dallying here and there — to wit, desires of
sense, desire for rebirth, desire not to live again ’ ? 2 . . .
[5] P. — But if I am wrong, is not this [threefold]
craving a craving for certain ideas or mental objects? 3
Hence surely such a craving is as such immoral.
1 The co-ordination of different successive sensations as a concrete
single percept and image — e.g., of orange colour, smell, roundness, and
certain other touches into an orange — was conceived by Buddhists as
a sort of sixth sense.
2 Sarjyutta-Nik., iii. 26 ; Vin. Texts, i. 95, reading ‘ non-existence ’
for * prosperity.’ (V i b h a v a may conceivably mean either ; but the
traditional reading is, as the Commentary to the Kathdvatthu says,
the goal of the Annihilationists.)
3 ‘This is inconclusive, because the citation shows nothing as to
a non-ethical nature, but refers to the process of natural desire
concerning a mental object.’ — Corny.
488.
Is Every Desire a Cause of III ?
2S1
10. Of Desire for Ideas and the Cause of III.
Controverted Point . — That the natural desire for objects
of mind is not the Cause of 111.
From the Commentary. — This, too, is an opinion of the Pubba-
seliyas and others. The argument follows the preceding.
[1] Th. — What reason have you for dissociating this
form of craving from the other five ? If you admit that
a craving for objects of sight, sound, and so on, is im-
moral, you must admit as much concerning the co-ordina-
tion of these as ideas (percepts or images).
[2-5] Continue to imitate the preceding argument, XIII. 9.
282
Commingling of Good and Bad
xrv. 1.
BOOK XIV
I. Of the Mutual Consecutiveness of Good and Bad.
Controverted Point . — That a basis 1 of bad thought is con-
secutive to a basis that is good, and conversely.
From the Commentary.— That which is good cannot directly and
immediately follow after what is bad, nor conversely. Such reciprocal
consecutiveness is anomalous. Some, however, like the Mahasanghi-
kas, hold that, inasmuch as one can both like and then dislike the
same thing, therefore there has been, in such a case, reciprocal con-
secutiveness. Good and bad thoughts cannot occur consecutively
during the stages of javana (apperception) in one and the same
process of cognition, inasmuch as each course of good or of bad
thought entails a distinct preliminary ‘ adverting ’ of consciousness,
[1] Th. — You are implying that the adverting, 2 the
adjusting of the mind arising for ethically bad conscious-
ness is precisely the adverting and adjusting of the mind
arising for ethically good consciousness. You say ‘No,’
while insisting on your proposition. Then you must mean
that the good consciousness can arise without our advert-
ing or adjusting the mind ? You maintain the opposite to
this? Then, if the good consciousness in question arise
for a mind already adverted and adjusted, it must be
1 Literally, root, or conditioning state.
2 The seven terms characteristic of this work should here be supplied.
See, e.g., VII. 5, 2. The Commentary here for the first time explains
that ‘adverting 1 ( a v a tt an a=a v a j j a na) is the turning of the
mind from the subconscious life-flux to full consciousness, and that
‘adjusting’ (or ‘aiming,’ panidhi) is the further 'move on to a
definite mental object, and persistence thereon.
491. Commingling of Good and Bad 283
wrong to say that a basis of what is bad is consecutive to
what is good.
[2] Does what is bad arise for wrongly directed atten-
tion? You assent. Do you say as much of the good
which, according to you, is consecutive thereto ? Is it not
truer to say that the good consciousness w’as preceded by
rightly directed attention? You agree. Then that bad
thought cannot be immediately consecutive to this good
thought.
[3] Again, are you prepared to admit that the idea of
resignation follows immediately on that of sense-desires ?
That the idea of benevolence follows immediately on that
of malignity? That the idea of .kindness follows imme-
diately on that of cruelty, the idea of love on that of
malevolence, pity on unkindness, sympathetic joy on
spleen, equanimity on resentment ? . . .
[4-6] The same argument is note applied to refute the
second half of the proposition, to wit, ‘ that a basis of what
is good is consecutive to a basis of what is bad ’?
[7] M . — But if I am wrong, you will admit that one
can fall in and out of love with one and the same object ?
Surely then my proposition is right, that a bad thing is
consecutive to a good thing and conversely. 1
2. Of the Development of Sense-Organs.
Controverted Point. — That the sense-mechanism starts
all at once to life in the womb.
From the Commentary . — Our doctrine teaches that at a [human]
rebirth the development of the embryo’s sense-mechanism or mind is
not congenital, as in the case of angelic 2 rebirth. In the human
embryo, at the moment of conception, the co-ordinating organ (mama
y at ana) and the organ of touch alone among the sense-organs,
1 The parallel drawn is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to
passion and its opposite arising about the same object, not to the
consecntion of the moral and the immoral,— -Corny.
2 Opapatika.
284
Embryonic Development
XIV. 2.
are congenital. The remaining four organs (eye and ear mechanism,
smell and taste mechanism) take seventy-seven days to come to birth,
and this is partly through that karma which brought about conception,
partly through some other karma. 1 But some, like the Pubbaseliyas
and the Aparaseliyas, believe that the sixfold sense-organism takes
birth at the moment of conception, by the taking effect of one karma
only, as though a complete tree were already potentially contained in
the bud.
[1J Th. — Do you imply that the sense-mechanism
enters the womb with all its main and minor parts com-
plete, not deficient in any organ ? You deny . . . [Then
let us speak more in detail :] You admit that the organ
of sight starts by consciousness seeking rebirth ? 2 Now,
you would not claim, for that questing consciousness that
[at its taking effect] hands, feet, head,' ears, nostrils,
mouth and teeth take their start? Why claim an exception
in the case of the visual, or other sense-organs ?
[2] P.A. — Then you claim that four of the sense-
organs — eye, ear, smell, taste — come later into being.
Are you implying that, to bring this about, one makes
karma in the mother’s womb ? Yon deny, but your
position implies it.
Th. — But you say, do you not, that in the embryo hair,
down, nails, teeth, bones, appear at a subsequent stage.
Do you imply a special embryonic karma done to bring
these to birth? You deny. Then why assail my posi-
tion ? [3] Or it may be you do not admit the subsequent
appearance of hair, etc. ? But was it not said by the
Exalted One :
‘ At first the “ k a 1 a 1 a ” takes birth, ami thence
The “abbuda.” Therefrom the “pesi” grows,
Developing as “ghana” in its turn.
Now in the “ghana ” doth appear the hair,
The down, the nails. And whatsoever food
1 These are technically called janaka-karma and u p a 1 1 b a m-
baka-karma (reproductive and maintaining karmas). — Compen-
dium, p. 143 f. (A. 1, 2).
2 I.e., the potential resultant of some dying man’s last conscious act.
495. Sensations as Heterogeneous Units 285
And drink the mother of him takes, thereby
The man in mother’s womb doth live ai d grow ’ ? 1
Hence it is right to assign a later appearance to hair,
and so forth.
8. Of Immediate Contiguity in Sense.
Controverted Point. — That one sensation follows another
as, an unbroken fused sequence.
From the Commentary. — In view of the swift alternations of seeing
and hearing at performances of dancing and singing, some, like the
Uttarapathakas, hold that the sense- cognitions arise in a mutually
unbroken succession.
[1] Th . — Do you imply that the mental adverting,
adjusting, etc., 2 conjured up by visual consciousness is the
same as that conjured up by auditory consciousness ?
Would you not affirm that this was wrong ? And if wrong,
do you mean that the auditory consciousness brings about
no adverting or adjustment of mind ? 3 Is not the opposite
true ? But if it be true, then your proposition falls.
[2] Again, you agree that f visual consciousness ’ occurs
to the person attending to a visible object. But you cannot
urge that auditory consciousness also occurs to such an
one attending to a visible object. ... In other words, if
visual consciousness have only visible object as its object,
and nothing else, the unbrokenly succeeding auditory con-
sciousness must have the same kind of object only and
nothing else. . . .
Our doctrine says : c Because of eye and visible objects
visual consciousness arises.’ 4 Can you substitute the words
, 1 SayyvMa-Nik., i. 206; Jdtaka, iv. 496; of. Milinda, i. 63. The
Pali terms denote four stages in foetal growth.
3 I.e. , can auditory consciousness possibly occur to one who has not
adverted or adjusted the mind ? The argument is similar to that in
XIV. 1. However swiftly one sense-operation follows another, it is
judged that ‘ adverting ’ is an essential preliminary in each.
3 See above, VIII. 9.
4 Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 72 f. ; cf. Majjhima Nik., i. 259.
2S6 Sen sations as Heterogeneous Units XIV. 3.
£ auditory eonscic usness ’ ? You deny this. 1 But I repeat
the question, and ask, Is the Suttanta thus? Nay, you
say, the former quotation was alone right. But if your
proposition be r'ght, you are implying that the given
visual consciousness is none other than the given auditory
consciousness.
[8-4] The same argument holds whichever two of the
five kinds of sense we take.
[5] U. — But if I am wrong [consider any kind of
dramatic performance], when there is dancing, singing,
reciting, does not the spectator see objects, hear sounds,
smell odours, taste tastes, and touch tangibles? Surely
then it is right to say that the five kinds of sense -cognition
arise in unbroken unitary sequence. 2
4. Of tlfe Outward Life of an Any an.
Controverted Point . — That the Ariyan ‘ forms ’ [of speech
and action] are derived from the four primary qualities of
matter. 3
From the Commentary . — The Uttar apathakas and others hold that
Ariyan speech and action are material qualities derived, as such, from
the four primary elements of matter, the Doctrine teaching that all
material qualities are the four primary qualities of matter , or are
derived from them .' 4
1 As heterodox.
2 ‘ The illustration is inconclusive, because it only alludes to a mixed
state of rapidly alternating grouped objects of mind, not to the succes-
sion in a unity.’ — Corny. It is tantalizing that our historical materials
concerning a drama, which was apparently ultra- Wagnerian in pro-
viding stimuli for all the senses, are so slender.
3 Extended, cohesive, hot, and mobile elements, popularly called
earth, water, fire, air.
4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 53 ; cf. 185.
498.
- Any an' a Spiritual Notion
287
[1] Th . — You admit that the qualities 1 of the Ariyan
are moral, and not unmoral. But the primary qualities of
matter are not moral ; they are unmoral. . . .
[2] Again, there is in these primary qualities nothing
akin to the absence of intoxicant, fetter, tie, flood, bond,
hindrance, infection, grasping, corruption, characteristic of
the Ariyan’s qualities. On the contrary, the former are
concomitant with these [ethically undesirable things].
[8] U. — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : { Whatever matter there is, bhikkkns, is the
four primary qualities and their derivatives ’ P Hence it is
surely right to say that the material qualities of the Ariyan
are derived from the primary qualities.
5. Of Latent Bias as Something Apart. 3
Controverted Point. — That latent bias, in any of the
seven forms, is different in kind from a patent outbreak of
the vice.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas, hold this view,
inasmuch as an average worldly person, while his thoughts are
ethically good or neutral, may be said to have latent bias for the seven
vices, but not to be openly manifesting them.
[1] Th. — Do you equally maintain that the lusts of
sense are different in kind from the lusts of sense openly
manifested? You deny, but you cannot then maintain
your proposition. You cannot maintain that the lusts of
sense are the same as those lusts manifested, and yet deny
1 Evidently rupa is here taken in the limited sense of ‘forms ’ of
speech and action — in fact, conduct. Cf. the Yamaha (i., p. xi), in
which book rupa is used in the sense of c forms ’ of consciousness.
It should also be recollected that the Path-factors — supremely right
speech and aetion — are mental properties through which corresponding
conduct is effected. See above, X. 2.
2 Anguttara-Nih., v. 348.
3 This theory was discussed in IX. 4 ; XI. 1.
288 Of Unconscious Outbursts of Corruption XIV. 6.
the identity in the case of the manifesting of them and the
latent bias.
[2-7] This argument holds good for the other sis forms
— enmity, conceit, erroneous opinion, doubt, lust of life,
ignorance.
[8] A . — But if I am wrong, may not an average worldly
man, while thinking what is good or unmoral, be said to
have latent bias, but not to be openly manifesting any of
its forms ?
Th . — If you conclude from this that your proposition is
right, you must equally admit that, whereas such a person
may also be said to have lust, though he be not openly
manifesting it, lust is different in kind from open mani-
festation of it.
6. Of Unconscious Outbursts of Corruption.
Controverted Point. — That outbursts of corruption take
place unconsciously.
From the Commentary. — The Andhakas, for instance, hold that lust
and other wrong states may arise even in one who is attending to
Impermanence, etc., and besides, it has been said : ‘ Sometimes,
Master JBharadvdja, when he is thinking : “ I will attend to the
unbeautiful he attends to it as beautiful.' 1 Hence we are liable to
involuntary outbursts of corruption.
[1] Th. — Yon imply that such outbursts come under the
non-mental categories — matter, Nibbana, organ or object
of sense. . . . Are they not rather to be classed as lust-
ridden, hate-ridden, dulness-ridden mind, as immoral, cor-
rupted consciousness, the existence of which you of course
admit ?
1 Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 111. The PTS text of the Sayyutta reads,
for subhato manasikaro tlti, subhato agaechati. The
speaker is King Udena conversing with Pindola-Bharadvaja. Cf.
Vin. Texts, i. 302 f. ; iii. 79 f. ; 382 f.
502.
hustings CelesUNBl
7. Of Desire as inherent in Heavenly Things.
Controverted Point. — That lust for the things of the Rupa
heavens is inherent to and included therein.
From the Commentary . — Just as sensuous lusts are inherent in the
world of sense-experience, and are said to be included in it, the lust
for life in the Rupa heavens and the Arupa heavens was held, by the
Andhakas and the Sammitiyas, to be as stated.
[1] Th. — You imply that the desire which seeks attain-
ment in Jhana, the desire which seeks rebirth in the
heavens, and the delighting, under present conditions, in
celestial bliss, 1 are all three concomitant, coexistent, asso-
ciated and conjoined with their respective kinds of con-
sciousness, are one in genesis and cessation, one in seat
and object with those kinds. If you deny your proposition
falls.
[2] Is a desire for sound inherent and! .included in the
sphere of sound, or is a desire for the other Objects of sense
inherent and included in their respective spheres? Why
not affirm here instead of denying ? If the desires are to
be denied here, neither can you affirm them in the case of
the heavens. 2
[3-4] The same arguments apply to the desire for the
things of the Arupa heavens.
[5] A.8. — But if you admit that we may speak of
sensuous lusts as inherent and included in the world of
sense-experience, it is surely right to affirm analogous
desires in the case of the Rupa and Arupa heavens. 3
1 According to the Commentary these three terms refer respectively
to moral (k u s a 1 a) consciousness, resultant (v i p a k a) consciousness,
and inoperative (kriya) consciousness — five modes in each of the
three — on the Rupa plane. Cf. Compendium, Part I., 2, §§ 8, 9.
2 For the point in this argument see XVI- 10, § 2.
3 The orthodox position is that such desires are inherent in and
confined to the world (earth, purgatory, lower heavens) of sense-
experience (K a m a 1 o k a).
TS. V.
19
290
Things ‘ Undeclared ’
XIV. 8.
S. Of the Unmoral and the Unrevealed.
Controverted Point. — That error is unmoral.
From the Commentary. — As to the term a-vy-a-kata, literally
‘ undeclared,’ applied to the four categories : result-in-conscious-
ness 1 (vipaka), inoperative consciousness 1 (kiriya), matter and
Nibbana, it means ‘ cannot be declared to be either moral or unmoral,
because of the absence of moral [or karmic] result-in-consciousness ’
(a v i p a k a 1 1 a ). Applied to speculative opinion on unproveahle
matters, it means undeclared (a k a t h i t a 1 1 a). 2 Now some, like the
Andhakas and Uttarapathakas, making no such distinction, speak of
erroneous views as unmoral in their result [itself a very erroneous view],
[1] Th. — Then you must he prepared to class it as one
of the unmoral categories — result, inoperative conscious-
ness, matter, Nibbana, organ and object of sense 3 — which
you may not do. You must also be prepared to admit
that other mental factors, the conscious processes or
acts accompanying erroneous opinion, are unmoral. Else
you have this anomaly : that all these together constitute
a state of immoral consciousness, while the erroneous
opinion alone is unmoral. 4
[2] Again, the unmoral has no moral fruit or result,
while erroneous opinion is of the opposite nature. Nay,
were not evil views ranked as paramount offences by the
Exalted One? 5 [8] Did he not say: ‘ Wrong views,
Vaccha, are immoral, right views are moral ’ 6 And did he
not say also: ‘For the holder of wrong views, Puma, I
declare one of tivo destinies, either purgatory or the animal
world ’? 7
1 See above, XII. 2,3. 2 A Christian, would say ‘unrevealed.’
3 See above, XI. 1, XIII. 9.
4 I) it thi - g a t a, or wrong views, is a factor in akusala-
cittarj, bad consciousness (Bud. Psy. Bth., pp. 98-101). The idea
here seems to be : How can a part be immoral, while the whole is
immoral ?
5 We cannot trace this phrase verbatim. The Br. translator reads,
for paramani (paramount), pamanani, ‘as their measure.’
e Majjlmna-Nik. , i. 490.
7 Cf. ibid., i. 388 ; Sayyutta-Nih., iv. 307.
504.
Things ‘ Undeclared ’
291
[4] A.U . — But did not the Exalted One say: ‘This,
Vaccha, is unsolved (a v y ah at a) : — that the world is eternal,
or that it is not eternal. This , too, is unsolved {av yak at a ) —
that the world is finite, or that it is infinite. And so, too, are
these : that the sold and the body are the same, or are different
things ; that a Tathagata comes to be after death, or not, or
both comes to be and does not come to be, or that neither
happens '? 1
Surely then erroneous opinions are unmoral.
[5] Th . — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ Of a person holding wrong views, bhikhhus, whatever karma
of deed, word and thought he completes and carries out in
accordance with those views, be it volition, aspiration, adjust-
ment of mind, or other activities, all those things conduce
to the undesirable, to the unpleasant, to the disagreeable, to
trouble, to ill ’ ? 2
Hence it is surely wrong to say that * erroneous opinions
are unmoral.’
9. Of the Unincluded.
Controverted Point . — That erroneous opinions [may enter
into] ‘ the Unincluded.’ 3
From the Commentary . — Inasmuch as when a man of the world
has attained to Jhana, he may he called passionless as to sense-
desires, but not free from erroneous opinions, some, like the Pubba-
seliyas, hold that erroneous views beset also that other consciousness
which is ‘ Unincluded.’
1 Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 393, 401 (neither is quite verbatim as the text).
2 Anguttara-Nilb. , v. 212.
3 The opponent would break down the exclusive content of the
term a-pariy apanna — the Umncluded— which, according to the
M>hidhamma-Pitaka, is reserved for the consciousness and conscious
experiences of those qualifying in the Path, and for Nibfcana
(Dhamma-sangani [Bud. Psy. Eth.\ §§ 992, 1287). Such conscious-
ness would not be shared by a ‘ man of the world ’ or ‘ average person ’
(puthujjana, literally, one of the many-folk, or hoi polloi).
It is ‘not included’ in the ‘mental range of one whose interests
are confined to any sphere of life in earth or in heaven,
292
Of the Uninclvdecl
XIV. 9.
[1] Th . — Then you must be prepared to class them
among the category of the ‘ Unincluded,’ to wit, as Path,
Fruit, Nibbana, as one of the Four Paths, or Four Fruits,
as one of the Factors of Enlightenment— which you may
not do.
[2] P . — But if I am wrong, why do you admit that a
worldly person [in Jhana] may be called passionless as to
sense-desires, but depy: that he has lost all erroneous
opinion ?
Surely then it is right to say that erroneous opinion
may enter into * the Unincluded.’
508.
Of Correlation as specifically fixed
293
BOOK XV
1. Of Correlation as specifically fixed.
Controverted Point. — That one phenomenon can be re-
lated to another in one way only.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
if anything be correlated to another as its moral condition or motive
(h etu), 1 it is not correlated to that other by way of [subject-]object,
or of contiguity, or of immediate succession. 3 Or again, if anything
be correlated to another as its object, it is not correlated to that other
by way of contiguity, or immediate succession.
[1] Tk . — Bat take the attitude of investigation, 3 is not
that correlated both as moral condition and as dominance ?
You assent. Then your proposition falls through.
Again, is not predominant desire-to-do the dominant
factor in coexistent mental states? If so, we ought to
admit a dual correlation by way of [i.] dominance, [ii.] co-
existence. [2] The same holds when energy is the dominant
factor. Or if dominant energy be considered as ‘controlling
power’ or faculty (indriya), we ought to admit a dual
correlation by way of dominance and controlling power.
Or if we consider dominant energy as a factor of the Path, 4
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance
and path or means (magga). [3] The same holds when
apperception 4 is the dominant factor. Or if dominant con-
sciousness be considered as nutriment (or cauBe, ahara),
1 See (Compendium, p. 279 f. 2 Ibid., 191, § 7.
3 Vimajsa. Ibid., 177, n. 3. This in terms of hetu is
amoha=pann a = intelligence, understanding, insight.
4 C i 1 1 a in this connection is an abbreviation for j a v a n a-c i 1 1 a,
apperceptional consciousness.
294 Of Correlation as specifically fixed XV. 1.
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of do min ance
and nutriment. [4] The argument holds when we consider
conscious dominance as controlling power, or investigation
as a dominant factor, or, again, as part of the Path, or
means.
Once more, if, on adequately revering an Ariyan
phenomenon, 1 reflection arises having that phenomenon
as its dominant object, we ought here to admit the dual
relation — dominance and object.
[5] Or again, if this or that previous moral consciousness
be related to this or that subsequent moral consciousness
as consecutive, and is also repeated, have we not to admit
here the dual correlation of contiguity and repetition? 2
[6] The same being valid for immoral states? [7] The
same correlation being valid if, for moral, or immoral, we
substitute ‘ inoperative ’ or ‘ unmoral ’ states ?
[8] M. — Nevertheless, you admit the definitely distinct
modes of correlation, such as ‘moral condition, or hetu,’
contiguity, immediate succession ? Then surely my pro-
position is right.
2. Of Reciprocal 3 Correlation.
Controverted Point. — That whereas actions are conditioned
by ignorance, we may not Say that ignorance is conditioned
by actions.
1 D ha mm a; i.e., a Path, a Fruit, Nibbana, corruptions ex-
tirpated, or not yet extirpated. On this specific culture see Com-
pendium, pp. 58, 69.
2 Asevana, from asevati, to serve over and over again (a + si,
or s i, to bind, hence to be a pendant, or dependent), is a difficult term to
translate. In the Compendium (p. 192, § 12) we used ‘ succession,' but
repetition, or even retention, is in some respects better. The Burmese
translators render by ‘repetition so as to form a habit’; hence,
habitual repetition.
3 Anna-m-anha, or one-another. The discourse shows that a
classification of relations in recent philosophy has been anticipated.
See Hon. Bertrand Bussell’s Our Knowledge of the External World,
etc., London, 1914, p. 47. See Appendix : P a c c a y a .
510.
Oj Asymmetrical Relations
295
From the Commentary. — This view, held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, is met by the opposite doctrine that there is a
reciprocal conditioning obtaining between ignorance and actions, and
so on. 1
[1] Th. — But is not ignorance coexistent with action? 2
If so, here is a reciprocal correlation [namely, of coexist-
ence].
[2] Again, £ grasping is conditioned by craving.’ Now, is
it wrong to say that craving is conditioned by grasping? 3
Yes, you say. But the argument above is valid here also.
[3] M . — £ Birth, bhikkhus, is conditioned by decay and
death, the tendency to become is conditioned by birth ’ — is
the Suttanta thus ?
Th. — No.
M. — Neither is the reciprocal conditioning correlation
between ignorance and activities reciprocal, nor that be-
tween craving and grasping.
[4] Th. — ‘ Mind and body, bhikkhus, are conditioned by
rebirth-consciousness, and this by mind and body ’ — is the
Suttanta thus ? 4 5
.M— Yes.
Th— Then the conditioning relation may be reciprocal.
3. Of Duration. 6
Controverted Point. — That duration is predetermined.
From the Commentary. — Taking the word duration (addha) in
the sense of period of time, they 6 who hold this opinion base it on the
1 Namely, in the Paticca-samuppada formula ; see VI. 2.
2 S a n k h a r e n a. ‘ Here only non-meritorious activity is meant.
The correlation between this and ignorance may be analyzed into
“related by way of co-existence, reciprocity, presence, continuance,
association.” ’ — Corny.
3 Here ‘grasping’ excludes k a m a-grasping (which =t an ha). —
Corny. On the four ‘graspings ’ see Bud. Psy. Btli., pp. 328 f.
4 Sayyutta-Nik., iii. 114.
5 The opponent evidently uses addha in this sense, suggestive of
M. Bergson’s concept of time.
0 No adherents are named. Possibly the Andhakas. See above, XI. 8.
296
Duration as Divisible Reality
XV. 1 8.
Suita quoted below. The argument seeks to show that no interval
whatever is predetermined, except as mere time-notion. But matter,
etc., when meaning the five aggregates (bodily and mental) is pre-
determined.
[1] Th. — Then must duration be one of the five aggre-
gates, which of course it is not. This holds good whether
you take past, 1 [2] future, or present duration. [8] Now,
you say that any past aggregate, bodily or mental, consti-
tutes past duration ; any future, any present aggregate,
future or present duration respectively. Then are there
five past durations, five future, five present durations ? . . .
[4] fifteen durations in all ? Or, if they are regarded as
twelve past, future, present organs-ancl-objects-of-sense,
are there thirty-six durations in all ? . . .
[6] Or if we consider them as eighteen elements, are
there fifty-four durations? or as controlling powers, 2 are
there sixty-six durations ?
[6] Opp. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ There are these three subjects of discourse , 3 hhikkhus —
which are the three ? One, may talk about past time :
“ Thus was it in times past.” Or about future time : “ Thus
will it be in future times.” Or about the present: “Thus is
it now at present ” ’ ? 4
Hence surely duration is predetermined ?
4. Of Instants, Moments , 5 Seconds of Time.
Controverted Point . — That any stroke of time is pre-
determined.
From the Commentary . — The same argument is followed as in the
foregoing.
1 Insert A manta in PTS edition.
2 See above, p. 15 f. 3 II a t h a v a 1 1 h u n i .
4 Anguttara-Nik i. 197. Cf. p. 95, § 60.
6 Khana, laya, muhutta: 10 £ instants’ = l ‘moment,’ 10
‘ moments’ = 1 ‘second.’ There is no measured coincidence between
second and muhutta.
514.
Is a Vitiating Thing Vice t
297
5. Of the Intoxicants ( Asava’s ).
Controverted Point. — That the four asava’s are them-
selves non-asava. 1
From the Commenta/ry. — The Hetuvadins hold that, inasmuch as
over and above the four Intoxicants there is no other Intoxicant with
which they can be said to be ‘ co-intoxicants,’ therefore they must
themselves be non-intoxicant.’
[1] Th. — Then yon must be prepared to classify them
with one of the [approved] non-asava’s — the Path, Fruit,
Nibbana, one of the four Paths or Fruits, one of the
Factors of Enlightenment — which you, of course, may
not do.
[2] H. — If I am wrong, I ask you to show me any other
asava, concomitant with which those four may be pro-
nounced co-asava. , . .
6. Of Decay and Death .
Controverted Point. — That the decay and death of
spiritual 2 things is itself spiritual. 3
From the Commentary. — Decay and death are not predetermined,
and therefore do not come under the categories ‘mundane,’ ‘supra-
mundane.’ The Mahasanghikas and others do not grasp this salient
feature.
[1] Th. — Then you must be prepared to classify it with
one of the [approved] spiritual things— Path, Fruit,
Nibbana, etc. 4 . . . For instance, is the decay and death
of the Stream- Winner’s Path the Path itself? If you
deny, your proposition falls through. If you assent, you
1 The four are sensuous desires [lust of] life renewed, erroneous
opinion, ignorance. See Compendium, 227; Biod. Psy. Eth., iii.,
ch. iv.
2 Or supramundane, or transcendental (lokuttara).
3 Of. above, XI. 8, on the falsely including the notion ‘imperma-
nence ’ among things impermanent. *
4 See XY. 5.
298
Decline and the Declining Thing
XV. 6.
must also apply your proposition to all the other stages,
and say, finally, that the decay and death of the fruit of
arahantship is itself fruit of arahantship — which you may
not. Nor will you he prepared to admit decay and death
as identical with any one of the Factors of Enlighten-
ment.
[2] M. — Then, is the decay and death of supramundane
things a mundane thing ? You deny. 1 Then it must be
supramundane.
7. Of Trance.
Controverted Point . — That to attain cessation of con-
sciousness is supramundane.
From the Commentary . — Inasmuch as what is called [trance or]
attaining cessation of feeling and perception is not a positive mental
state, but is the suspension of the mental aggregates, it is neither a
mundane nor a supramundane state. Some, however, like the
Hetuvadins, hold that since it is certainly not mundane, it must be
supramundane.
The argument is similar to that in XV. 5 [1], ancl 6 [2].
8. The Same ( continued ).
Controverted Point. — That to attain cessation of con-
sciousness is mundane.
[1] Th. — You must, then, be prepared to classify it as
one of the things admittedly mundane — the five aggregates,
or as belonging to one of the three spheres of life, that
of sense, or the Rupa or Arupa worlds — which you refuse
to do.
[2] Similar to 6 [2].
1 The Buddha himself did not clasB it as of either c&tegory^-Comy.
517.
Trance ancl Death
299
9. Of Trance (iii.).
Controverted Point. — That a person may die while in a
state of trance.
From the Commentary .—The Kajagirikas and others hold that
since life is so uncertain, even one who has attained in Jhana to trance
may die, no less than anyone else. The argument shows that there
is 1 a time for dying and for not dying.
[1] Th . — You must, then, admit that, while in that state,
he has all the mental symptoms 2 betokening death — to wit,
in mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, conscious-
ness. But you agree that all moribund mental symptoms
are absent. Hence your proposition falls through.
[2] You will further agree with this : not only that for
one in a state of trance is all mental life in abeyance, but
also that death is accompanied by contactual, emotional,
volitional, and cognitive symptoms. 2
[3] Moreover, can poison, weapons, or fire affect the body
of one in trance? You deny. 3 You assert, on the con-
trary, that those causes of death cannot affect him. Then,
can you maintain your proposition ?
[4] Or do you now maintain that poison, weapons, or
fire can affect his body? 4 Then, is his attainment not
genuine? . . .
US ' — But in opposing my proposition you imply that
there must be some principle of certainty (or uniformity)
by which one is assured of not dying while in trance. If
you say that such an assurance does not exist, your
proposition cannot stand.
[5] Th . — But one who is enjoying visual consciousness
is not dying, even though there be no uniform principle of
certainty by which he is assured of being kept from death.
Hence I assert as much of one who is in trance.
1 Bead, for samapannaya, samanaya.
2 This word is not in the Pali text.
3 Because of the abnormal power of his attainment. — Corny.
4 ‘ He assents because of the body’s natural liabilities. Hence there
is no abnormal power in the attainment? — Corny.
5 In Commentary , PTS edition, read, for sakavadissa, para-
v a d i s s a.
300
Spiritual Trance
XV. 10.
10. Of Trance as a Means of reaching the Unconscious
Sphere.
Controverted Point. — That trance conduces to rebirth in
the unconscious sphere*
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Hetuvadins, make no
distinction between the two kinds of trance-attainment : the merely
mundane, practised by worldly folks, and the supramundane, or
spiritual. The former does conduce to rebirth in the sphere of un-
conscious life, the latter does not.
[1] Th. — Can you say of anyone who has attained to
trance that [in his character] are the three moral conditions
— absence of greed, of hate, of dulness, also faith, energy,
mindfulness, concentration, and understanding? Is not
the contrary [usually] the case ? . . .
[2] You admit of course that one in trance is without
mental reaction, feeling, perception, volition, cognition?
But you cannot maintain that a Path 1 can he practised in
the absence of these.
[8] Finally, your proposition implies that all who attain
to trance are tending to rebirth in the Unconscious Sphere
— which you must deny. . . .
[4] II . But you admit, anyway, that in trance one is
unconscious, and in that sphere one is unconscious. Hence
I maintain that this tendency is a fact.
11. Of Karma and its Accumulation.
Controverted Point. — That karma is one thing, its accumu-
lation 2 is another.
From- the Commentary. — They who hold this view, for instance the
Andhakas and Sammitiyas, judge that the accumulating of karma
goes on automatically, independently of moral action, of mental action.
1 Magga, ‘path,’ is used, more generally, to denote a systematic
‘ means,’ or method conducing to celestial rebirth. It is only the
Ariyan Path or Paths that are means leading away from rebirth. —
Bud. Fay. Mh., pp. 43 f. ; 71 f. ; 82 f.
2 Upacaya may be rendered by ‘ conservation.’
520.
Karma as Process and Product
301
[1] TU . — Are you then prepared to admit that each
mental phase— mental reaction, feeling, perception, voli-
tion, cognition, also faiths energy, mindfulness, concen-
tration, understanding, also the ten corruptions (kilesa’s)
— is a different thing from its accumulation? Of course
not. Then neither can you affirm your proposition.
[2] Again, do you imply that karmic accumulation is
coexistent with karma? You deny? But think! You
assent. 1 Then [a fortiori ] meritorious (or good) karma is
coexistent with good karmic accumulation? No? Nay,
you must admit it is. Then [it follows that] karma, [being
inseparably] conjoined with feeling, is both coexistent with
its accumulation, and also inseparably conjoined with corre-
sponding feeling.
[3] Similarly for demeritorious (or bad) karma.
[4] Again, you admit of course that karma is coexistent
with consciousness and has a mental object, but you do not
admit as much of its accumulation. That is to say, you
agree that karma, being coexistent with consciousness, is
broken off [as mental process] when consciousness is
broken off. But, by your view of the different nature of
karmic accumulation, you hold that when consciousness
stops, karmic accumulation does not [necessarily] stop.
So that we may get a cessation of karma as conscious
process, and a continuation of karmic accumulation as
product !
[5] You admit, further, that karmic accumulation is
where karma is. 2 Surely this implies that an act (kamm a)
and its (accumulation or) conservation is one and the same
thing. . . . And that, the conservation of karmic energy
being where karma is, result is produced from that conserva-
tion ; and that you must conclude that there is no differ-
1 ‘ Karma is “ conjoined with, consciousness ” ; its accumulation, by
the thesis, is automatic, hence the vacillation/ — Corny.
2 K am m a m hi=k am me sati, or patitthite. ‘Where
there is karma, or where it is established, the “ accumulating” begins,
but the latter lasts till results mature. Just as the seed retains all
the plant-energy till it sprouts/ — Corny.
302
Karma as Process and Product
XY. 11.
ence in kind between karma, its conservation and its result. 1
Yet this you deny.
Now you have admitted that karma has a mental object, 2
and you also admit [of course] that result, which is pro-
duced from the conservation of karma, has a mental object.
But you deny that the conservation is of this nature, even
while you admit that where karma is, there, too, is its con-
servation, producing the result ! . . .
[6] Finally, was it not said by the Exalted One : Here,
Punna, is one who plans activities in deed, word and thought,
either malevolent or benevolent. In consequence hereof he is
reborn in a world either of malevolence or of benevolence ;
and when his mental reaction to good and bad shall set in,
his sensations are in accordance herewith, and Ms feel-
ings are a mixture of pleasure and pain, as is the case with
human beings, with certain of the devas, and with some of the
fallen angels . 3 Now thus, Punna, is the rebirth of creatures
conspicuous and obscure: 4 — by that which he does is he reborn,
and being reborn mental reactions affect him. And *so I
say, Punna, that beings are the heirs of their own actions
(karma) P
Hence it is not right to say that conservation of karma is
a thing apart from karma itself.
1 He asks concerning the oneness of these three.— Corny.
2 See above, § 4.
3 Vinipatika, asuras.
4 Bhutabhutassa. Gf. the term bhavabhavesu, Pss. of
the Brethren, 305, n. 4.
5 Majjhima-NiJc., i. 390.
024.
Can One govern Another's Thoughts ?
303
BOOK XVI
1. Of Control.
Controverted Point . — That one can control the mind of
another. 1
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasangliikas, hold that
the attainment of power and authority in the world is only genuine if
it include power to control the consciousness of others.
[1] Th. — Do you mean that one can bid the consciousness
of another not to lust, not to hate, not to be bewildered, not
to be corrupted ? Of course you deny. But how then can
you maintain your view ? Or do you mean that one can
bid any mental phase uprisen in another’s consciousness —
reaction, feeling, perception, volition . . . understanding —
to cease ? Equally you deny. ... [2] Or do you mean
that anyone puts away lust, hate, or any evil mental
coefficient 2 on account of another? Or practises the
[Ariyan] Path, or applications in mindfulness, or any other
set of the factors of enlightenment 3 because of another?
Or masters the Eour Truths — understanding 111, putting
away its Cause, realizing its Cessation, practising the Path
thereto — because of another? Or finally, do you mean
that anyone makes another the doer of his actions, that
anyone’s happiness and ill are wrought by another, that
one acts while another experiences? If you deny, you
must deny your own view.
1 To knoio (or, as we say, ‘read’) the thoughts of another was one
of the supernormal knowledges (see above, V. 7 ; Compendium , p. 209),
but control or influence over another so as' to prevent corruption was
not assumed for it.
2 See above, p. 229, n. 2.
3 See Compendium, p. 179.
804 Well-doing through Another's Mind. XYI. 2.
[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One : —
‘ ’ Tis thou alone dost work thine evil deeds ;
'Tis thou alone dost make thyself corrupt;
'Tis thou alone dost leave the wrong undone ;
’ Tis thou alone dost purify thyself
Self -wrought is cleanness and impurity.
None may his brother's heart 1 make undefiled ' P-
Hence it is surely wrong to say that one can control the
mind of another.
[4] M. — But have not some admittedly won power and
authority? Surely this includes control over others’
minds.
2. Of Assisting Another’s Mind.
Controverted Point. — That one can help the mind of
another.
The Commentary merely ranges this -under the preceding discourse.
[1] Th. — Do you mean that one can so help another as
to bid his consciousness not to lust or to hate, or to be
bewildered, or to be corrupted ? . . . Or that one may
bring forth in the heart of another any of the moral condi-
tions, to wit, disinterestedness, love, understanding, or any
of the five * controlling powers [of enlightenment], to wit,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding,
etc. . . , {the remainder agrees verbatim with XYI. 1).
8. Of making Another Happy according to his Deserts.
Controverted Point. — That one can bestow happiness on
others. 3
1 Literally, ‘ another.’
2 Dhammapada, verse 164.
3 One can bestow the conditions of happiness to some extent, but
not the actual state of mind.
527. Attention in Generalizing B05
From the Commentary . — This view is derived by its adherents,
notably the Hetuvadins, from the Sutta quoted below. But the words
of the Exalted One were spoken to show how the arising of happiness
in others is conditioned. Producing happiness in others is not like
bestowing food upon them ; hence the citation is inconclusive.
[1] Th. — Your proposition implies that one can also
cause misery in others. But you deny this, while you
maintain the opposite with respect to happiness.
[2] You imply further that you can hand over your own
happiness to another ; or others’ happiness, or his own
happiness, to another. You deny. To whom then ?
You imply, finally, that anyone causes another to act
for him, that one’s own welfare and ill are wrought by
another, that one acts while another experiences.
[3] H . — But did not the venerable Udayin say : £ Verily
of many unhappinesses doth the Exalted One rid us, many
happinesses doth he he store upon us, of many had things doth
he rid its, many good things doth he bestow upon us ’ . ?1
Hence one may hand on happiness to another.
4. Of Attending to All at Once.
Controverted Point. — That one can attend to everything
simultaneously.
From the 'Commentary . — Attention has two aspects, according as
■we consider the method Or the object of attention. To infer from the
observed transience of one or more phenomena that ‘ all things are im-
permanent’ is attention as [inductive] method. But in attending to
past things, we cannot attend to future things. We attend to a
certain thing in one of the time-relations. This is attention by way of
object of consciousness. Moreover, when we attend to present things,
we are not able at the present moment to attend to the conscious-
ness by which they arise. Nevertheless some, like the Pubbaseliyas
and Aparaseliyas, because of the Word, ‘ All things are impermanent,'
hold that in generalizing we can attend to all things at once. 1 2 And
because they hold that in so doing we must also attend to the con-
sciousness by which we attend, the argument takes the line as stated.
1 Majjhima-Nik., i. 447.
2 Sab be sankhare ekato manasikar oti. — Corny.
20
T.S. v.
306
The Range of Attention
XVI. 4.
[1] Th . — Do you imply that we know the consciousness
by which we so attend ? You deny. 1 But I ask you again
— now you assent. 2 Then do we know as consciousness the
consciousness by which we so attend ? You deny. But I
ask you again — now you assent. Then is the subject of
consciousness its own object ? You deny. But I ask you
again — now you assent. Then do we experience mental
reaction by the same mental reaction ? Do we feel a feel-
ing by that feeling? And so on for perception, volition,
cognition, applied thought, sustained thought, zest, mindful-
ness, understanding ? If you deny, you undo your previous
affirmations. ... ,
[2] When we attend to the past as past, do we then attend ,
to the future-as future ? You deny. But I ask you again
— now you assent. But this commits you to a collocation of
two parallel mental processes. . . . And this holds if I sub-
stitute * present ’ for ‘ future.’ . . . And if you claim that
we can, while attending to the past as past, attend also to
the future as such, and to the present as such, we get a
collocation of three parallel mental processes. . •. . And —
[3-4] [we may ring the changes with] the same argument
on other permutations of the time relations. ...
[5] P.A . — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ When he by wisdom doth discern ■ and see :
“Impermanent is everything in life.!”
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
Lo ! herein lies the way to purity.
When he by wisdom doth discern and see ,
That “ Everything in life is bound to III ! . .
That “ Everything in life is Void of Soul !”
Then he at all this suffering feds disgust.
Lo ! herein lies the way to purity ’ ? 3
Hence we can attend to all at once.
1 Because it cannot be subject and object at once. — Corny.
2 Because we are already aware of the nature of our thought in
general, or because of the thesis advanced. — Corny.
3 Baa. of the Brethren, verses 676-678; ascribed to Auiia-Kondafma,
the first among the first five disciples to grasp the new gospel.
582.
Matter and Motives
807
5. Of Matter as a Moral Condition (hetit). 1
Controverted Point. — That material qualities are moral
conditions.
From the Commentary. — ‘Condition’ [hetu] may signify more
specially one of the moral conditions or motives and their opposites :
appetite — disinterestedness, hate — love, dulness — intelligence; or, more
generally, any condition or causal relation whatever. Now, the TJttara-
pathakas make no such distinction, but relying on the letter of the
Word —‘the four primary qualities 2 are conditions {of secondary
qualities : ] — claim that bodily or material qualities may be [moral]
conditions.
[1] Th. — Your view implies that (i.) material qualities
must act as one or other of the six motives of moral or
immoral conduct ; (ii.) they have a mental object or idea,
having the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc. 3
From both of these implications you dissent, hence you
cannot maintain your position.
[2-3] Indeed, you are ready to maintain the contrary of
(ii.), that proposition being quite true when applied to the
six moral conditions, but untrue of material qualities.
[4] U. — But are not the four primary qualities conditions
of the secondary material qualities that are derived from
them? 3 Of course you assent. Hence, the four being
material, material qualities are conditions [however you
understand ‘ conditions ’].
6. Matter and Concomitant Moral Conditions.
Controverted Point . — That material qualities are accom-
panied by moral conditions.
1 On Buddhaghosa’s analysis of hetu, see Bad. Pay. Eth., p. 274,
n. 1. The alternative meanings above are known as h e t u-h e t u, or
mu la (root), and paccaya-hetu. On hetu, see Compendium ,
p. 279.
2 Extended, cohesive, calorific, and mobile elements ( Compendium ,
p. 288, and above.
3 See VIII. ?.
308 Matter and Morality XYI. 7.
From the Commentary . — The foregoing dissertation applies here also.
[1] Th . — That is (i.) they must be accompanied by one or
more of the sis motives or moral conditions, either good or
bad ; (ii.) they have a mental object or idea, having the
properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc. . . . (see
XYI 5 [1-2]).
[2] If you admit that disinterestedness, love, and the
other four, 1 as moral conditions, have a mental object and
involve mental adverting, adjustment, etc., then you must
describe material qualities in the same terms. [3] And if
that be so, you cannot deny either attribute to material
qualities without equally denying it to the moral conditions.
[4] U .~~ But is not matter in causal relations? You
agree. Then it is surely right to say material qualities are
accompanied by [moral conditions or] motives.
7. Of Matter as Morally Good or Bad.
Controverted Point. — That material qualities are (i.) good
or moral, (ii.) bad or immoral.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahigsasakas and Sam-
pni tiyas, relying on the Word — 1 acts of body and speech are good or
bad ’—and that among such acts we reckon intimations of our thought
by gesture and language, 2 hold that the physical motions engaged
therein are [morally] good or bad.
[1] Th. — Do you mean to imply that material quali-
ties have a mental object, and the properties of mental
adverting, of adjustment, etc. ? Surely you agree that the
opposite is true ? [2] And that, whereas you can predicate
those things of the three moral motives or conditions, and
of the five moral controlling powers, [3] they do not fit the
case of material qualities. . . .
(ii.) [4-6] The same argument holds good for material
qualities as immoral.
1 See XVI. 5, ‘ From the Commentary. ’
2 Bud. Psy. Eth, p. 217 ; Vibhanga , p. 13.
536.
Matter and Karma
309
[7] M.S. — But is not karma (moral action) of body and of
speech either good or bad ? Surely then material qualities
[engaged therein] are also either good or bad ?
8. Of Matter as Result .
Controverted Point. — That material qualities are results
[of karma] .
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas and Sammitiyas,
hold that, just as consciousness and its concomitant attributes arise
because of karina that has been wrought, so also do material [i.e.,
corporeal] qualities arise as results [of karma]. 1
[1] Tii. — Do you mean to imply that matter is of the
nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it
is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other
phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental
adverting, adjustment, ete. ? Is not the contrary the case?
If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
[2] All those things are mental characteristics, not
material. But you wish to see in matter a ‘result’ of
karma, without the mental characters which are the pro-
perties of ‘ result.’ . . .
[3] A.S. — But is not consciousness and its concomitant
attributes, which arise through actions done, ‘result’?
Surely then material qualities, which arise through
actions done, are equally ‘ result ’ ?
9. Of Matter as belonging to the Material and the
Immaterial Heavens.
Controverted Point, — That matter belongs to (i.) the
material heavens, (ii.) the immaterial heavens.
1 On ‘ result,’ v i p a k a, as technically a conscious or mental phe-
nomenon, see above, VII. 7, 8.
310
Of Celestial Matter
XVI. 9.
From the Commentary . — Some, like the Andhakas, hold that since
matter, which is the product of actions done in the world [and heavens]
of sense-desire, belongs therefore to that world, so if it be the product
of actions done in the material or immaterial heavens, it belongs
equally to those heavens.
[1] Th . — Then you must describe matter [in terms de-
scriptive of (i.) that is to say] as seeking attainment in
Jhana, as seeking rebirth on those planes, as living happily
under present conditions, as accompanied by a mind that
seeks that attainment and that rebirth, and that lives in
that happiness ; as coexistent with such a mind, associated,
conjoined with it, one with it in genesis, in cessation, in
physical basis, as having the same objects before it . . .
[2] and you must describe matter [in terms descriptive of
(ii.) that is to say] in the same terms as we apply to (i.).
But is not the contrary true as to both (i.) and (ii.) ? . . .
[S] A . — But is not matter which is due to actions done
in the world of sense-desires called ‘belonging to ?1 that
world ? If that is so, then matter due to actions done in
either of the other worlds of existence should surely be
called ‘ belonging to ’ either the Material Heavens or the
Immaterial Heavens.
10. Of Desire for Life in the Higher Heavens.
Controverted Point . — That lust for life in Bupa or Arupa
spheres is included among the data thereof.
From the Commentary . — So think the Andhakas, and by the same
analogy as they hold the previously stated opinion (XIV. 7) with regard
to celestial lustings in general. That is a view they share with the
Sammitiyas, but this is theirs alone.
[1] Th.— Similar to [1] in XVI. 9.
[2] And you cannot maintain your view without admitting
that a corresponding lust for the objects of hearing, smell-
1 1 Belonging to ’ is in Pah simply the name of the world in question
with adjectival import. On the extension of the term, ‘world of sense-
desire ’ (kamavac&ra), see Compendium, p. 81, n. 2.
539.
311
Concerning Rapa
ing, taste and touch is one of the data in the sphere of
each of these respectively. 1
[3] If you cannot affirm the latter, you cannot make an
exception of the former.
[4] Next with regard to (ii.) lust for life on the Arupa
[immaterial] plane as a datum thereof — my first argument
used above (XVI. 9) holds good. [5, 6], So does my second
used above (XVI. 10, 2). If your proposition is to stand,
then a desire for each sense-object must be among the
elemental data of the sphere of that particular object. You
cannot make an exception of the desire for life in the
immaterial sphere.
[7] A. — But is not desire for life in the plane of sense
[kamadhatu] among the elemental data of that plane? 2
Then surely you cannot make an exception as to desire
for life in the Rupa and Arupa spheres ?
1 Eupa may refer to (i.) matter, (ii.) visible object, (iii.) a sphere
or heaven of * celestial ! matter, where sight supersedes the more
animal senses. Lust for the objects of the other senses is introduced
in the argument not so much to oppose rupa as (ii.), to other sense-
objects, as to oppose conceivable if unfamiliar parallels — ‘ datum
included in the sphere (or heaven) of sound,’ smell, etc. — to the familiar
more ambiguous : 1 datum included in the sphere (or heaven) of Eupa.’
2 Desire, ‘ lower ’ or higher, is always an element in the Eama loka
or world of matter, terrestrial, infernal, sub-celestial, but never, in
orthodox doctrine, in the Eupa or Arupa worlds.
312
The Arahant as beyond Merit
XVII. 1.
BOOK XVII
1. Of an Arahant having Accumulating Merit.
Controverted Point. — That there is accumulation of merit
in the case of an Arahant.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion carelessly formed by
such as the Andhakas : that because an Arahant may be seen dis-
tributing gifts to the Order, saluting shrines, and so on, he is accumu-
lating merit. Tor him who has put away both merit and demerit, if
he were to work merit, he would be liable to work evil as well.
[1] Th.—Ii the Arahant have accumulation of merit, you
must allow he may also have accumulation of demerit. . . .
And [2] you must equally allow that he achieves meritorious
karma, and karma leading to the imperturbable, 1 that he
does actions conducing to this or that destiny, or plane of
rebirth, actions conducing to authority, influence, riches,
adherents and retainers, celestial or human prosperity. . . .
[3] Yon must further admit that, in his karma, he is
heaping up or unloading, putting away or grasping, scat-
tering or binding, dispersing or collecting. 2 3 4 * * If he does
none of these things, but having unloaded, put away,
scattered, dispersed, so abides, your proposition is untenable.
[4] A . — But may not an Arahant give gifts — clothing,
alms, food, lodging, medicaments for sickness, food, drink ?
Maj 7 he not salute shrines, hang garlands on them, and per-
fumes and unguents? May he not make consummate
oblations before them ? You admit this. But these are all
merit-accumulating acts. . , .
1 See p. 190, n. 2. 2 See I. 2, § 63.
542.
Karmic Energy Indestructible
313
2. Of Arahants and Untimely Death.
Controverted Pojnt. — That an Arahant cannot have an
untimely death.
From the Commentary . — From carelessly grasping the Suita cited
below, some — to wit, the Rajagirikas and Siddhatthikas— hold that
since an Arahant is to experience the results of all his karma before he
can complete existence, therefore he cannot die out of due time.
[1] Th. — Then are there no murderers of Arahants ?
You admit there are. [2] Now when anyone takes the life
of an Arahant, does he take away the remainder of life
from a living man, or from one who is not living? If the
former, then you cannot maintain your proposition. If the
latter, there is no murder, and your admission is wrong.
[3] Again, you admit that poison, weapons, or fire may
get access to the body of- an Arahant. It is therefore clear
that an Arahant may suffer sudden death. [4] But if you
deny, then there can be no murderer.
[5] R.S. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ /
declare, bkikkhus, that there cannot be destruction [of karmic
energy ] ere the outcome of deeds that have been deliberately
wrought and conserved has been experienced, whether that
destruction be under present conditions, or in the next or in
a subsequent series of conditions ’ ? l
Hence there is no untimely dying for an Arahant.
1 Angihttara-NiTc., v. 292 f., and above, p. 266. The Commentary
paraphrases this passage in detail. The following is an approximate
rendering. The commentator follows the negative form of statement
in the Pali of the Sutta, which is rendered above in positive form:
1 I do not declare (n a vadami) the annulment — that is, the complete
cutting off of the recoil (parivatuma-pariechinnabhavap)
— of deeds done by free will without their result having been ex-
perienced — i.e., obtained, partaken of. Nor do I declare that such
destruction may be realized under present conditions, but not here-
after. Nor do I declare that such destruction may be effected in the
very next rebirth, or the rebirth next to that ; nor that it may be
effected in subsequent rebirths; nor that it may be effected in one
rebirth where opportunity of maturing results arises, and not in another
where no such opportunity arises. Thus in all manner of conditions.
314
Predeterminism
XVII. 3.
3. Of Everything as due to Karma,
Controverted Point. — That all this is from karma.
From the Commentary . — Because of the Sutta cited below, the
Bajagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold that all this cycle of karma,
corruptions and results is from karma.
'[1] Th . — Do you then include karma itself as due to
karma? 1 And do you imply that all this is simply the
result of bygone causes? 2 You are committed here to
what you must deny.
[2] Again, you imply, by your proposition, that all this
is [not so much from karma as] from the result of [still
earlier] karma. If you deny, 3 you deny your first proposi-
tion. If you assent, 4 you imply that one may commit
murder through [not karma, but] the result of karma.
You assent? 5 Then murder, [though a result], is itself
given renewed existence and eventuation of karmic result, there is no
place on earth wherein a living being may be freed from the con-
sequences of his own evil deeds. All this the Buddha implied in the
Sutta quoted. Hence the opponents’ premises for establishing his view
— that any act which has not obtained its turn of eventuation should
invariably be experienced by an Arahant as result-have not been well
established.’
For the opponents a k a 1 a (untimely) meant one thing, for the
Theravadin another. To judge by the Theragatha Commentary ( Pss .
of the Brethren , pp. 232, 266), the orthodox opinion was that no one,
in his last span of life, could die before attaining Arahantship.
1 This is rejected as fusing karma with its result. — Corny.
2 That the present is merely a series of effects and without initiative.
See on this erroneous opinion (stated in Anguttara-Nik., i. 173 ff. ;
Vibhanga, 367) Ledi Sadaw, JFTS, 1913-14, p. 118.
3 If all is from karma, then that causal karma effected in a past life
must have been the result of karma effected in a still earlier life. —
Corny.
4 A shoot cannot produce a shoot, but in the continuity of life a seed
is the product of another seed, and by this analogy karma is the result
of previous karma. So at first rejecting, he then assents. — Corny .
(freely rendered) .
5 He assents, because the murderous intent is, by his theory, the
result of previous karma. — Corny. The PTS edition ought here to
have Am ant a instead of the negation.
542.
315
Is Karma the One Cause?
productive of [karmic] result ? You assent ? Then the
result of karma is productive of result ? You deny ? Then
it is barren of result, and murder must a fortiori be barren
of [karmic] result. . . .
[3] This argument applies equally to other immoral acts
—to theft, to wicked speech — lying, abuse, slander, and
idle talk — to burglary, raiding, looting, highway robbery,
adultery, destroying houses in village or town. It applies
equally to moral acts : to giving gifts — e.g., giving the four
necessaries [to the religious]. If any of these is done as
the result of karma, and themselves produce karmic result,
then [you are on the horns of this dilemma : that] either
result-of-karma can itself produce effects [which is hetero-
dox], or any good or bad deed has no karmic result [which
is heterodox]. ...
[4] II. S. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
c ’ Tis karma makes the world go round,
Karma rolls on the lives of men.
All beings are to karma bound
As linch-pin is to chariot-ioheeV 1
£ By karma praise and fame are won.
By karma too, birth, death and bonds.
Who that this karma's divers modes discerns,
Can say “ there is no karma in the world ” ! ?' 2
Hence surely all this is due to karma ?
4. Of III ( Dukkha ) and Sentient Organisms .
Controverted Point . — That 111 is wholly bound up with
sentience.
From the Commentary.' —‘Ill’ [dukkha] must be understood in
two ways : as bound up with and as not bound up with life
[indriya’s]. According to the former, 111 is referred to the seat of
1 Sutta-Nipatu , verse 654.
2 We cannot trace these four lines.
316
Two Meanings of 1 Dukkha’
XVII. 4.
suffering ; according to the latter, 111 covers liability to trouble through
the law of impermanence with its ‘ coming to be and passing away.’
But the Hetuvadins, for instance, do not draw this distinction. They
hold that painful sentience alone constitutes that dukkha, to under-
stand which the holy life, according to the teachings of the Exalted
One, is led.
[1] Th . — But you commit yourself to saying this: that
only that which is bound up with sentience is impermanent,
and conditioned, has arisen through a cause, is liable to
perish, to pass away, to lose desire, to cease, to change. 1
But are not all these terms suitable to insentient things? 2
You assent ; but you refute your proposition in so doing.
[2] You mean, do you not, that what is not bound up
with sentience is impermanent, etc., and yet is not 111. 3
But if you call ‘ what is bound up with sentience ’ equally
impermanent, etc., must you not also say that ‘ this is not
ill.’? If you deny, [and by your proposition you must
deny], then must you not contrariwise include ‘ that which
is not bound up with sentient life ’ under the notion of what
‘ is ill ’ ?
[3] Did not the Exalted One call whatever is imperma-
nent 111 ? And is not the insentient also impermanent ?
[4] H. — You deny the accuracy of my proposition. 4
1 These all making up the content of the idea of 111 or sorrow or
suffering. Cf. Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, p. 133.
2 E.g., the earth, a hill, a rock, are insentient, and also impermanent.
— Corny.
3 Br., omits ‘ not. 5
i ‘Insentient objects cause both physical pain (dukkha) and
grief (domanassa) to a sentient subject; for instance, fire in hot
weather, or air in cold weather. Again, the destruction of property,
etc., is always a source of mental pain. Hence the insentient may
be called “ 111 ” even without a reference to the idea of impermanence ;
but as they are not produced by karma and corruption, they cannot be
said to constitute the Ariyan fact of “ 111.” Moreover, the destruction
of grass, wood, etc., and of such physical things as seed, etc., does not
constitute the Ariyan fact of the “ cessation of 111.” It is the
sentient that is both 111 and also an Ariyan fact. But the insentient
is the former only, and not the latter. The Theravadin in denying
the Hetuvadin’s proposition shows this difference.’-— Corny. \
548. Of III and the Truths 317
But you are thereby committed to this: that just as the
higher life is lived under the Exalted One for understand-
ing III as bound up with sentient life, it is also lived for
the purpose of understanding 111 that is not bound up with
sentient life.
Tli. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.
. H . — And you are further committed to this : that just as
111 that is bound up with sentient life, once it is thoroughly
understood, does not again arise, neither does it again arise
when it is not bound up with sentient life and is thoroughly
understood.
You deny 1 . . . but I hold my proposition stands.
5. Of ‘ save only the Ariyan Path!
Controverted, Point. — That save only the Ariyan Path, all
other conditioned things may be called £ 111.’
From the Commentary. — This is held by such as the Hetuvadins,
because the Ariyan Path was stated by the Exalted One in the Four
Truths as ‘ a course going to the cessation of III/ 2
[1] Tli. — Then you call the Cause of 111 3 also 111? If
you deny, you cannot maintain your proposition. If you
assent, do you mean that there are but three Truths ? 4 If
you deny, your proposition falls. If you assent, do you not
contradict the words of the Exalted One, that the Truths
are four — 111, Cause of 111, Cessation of 111, Way going to
the Cessation of 111 ?
[2] If now you admit that the Cause of 111 is also 111, in
what sense do you judge it to be so ?
1 Albeit the Theravadin makes these two denials, it is nevertheless
orthodox to include impermanent insentient things in the category
of 111. Hence his denials must not be taken as proving the opponent’s
proposition. — Corny.
2 In his first sermon, Buddhist Suttas (SBE, XI.), 148 f. ; Vinaya
Texts, i. 95 ; also in the Nikayas, passim.
3 The Second Truth.
i I.e., are the First and Second equal to each other?
318
Is the Order an Abstract Idea? XVII. 6.
H . — In the sense of impermanence.
Th , — But the Arijan Path, is that impermanent ?
H. — Yes.
Th . — Then is not that also III? . . .
You say then that the Path is impermanent but not 111,
while the Cause of 111 is both impermanent and III. [It is
impossible for you to maintain such a position]. . . .
[3] H . — But if the Path be * a way going to the cessation
of 111,’ I maintain that, when we speak of all other con-
ditioned things as 111, this Ariyan Path is excepted.
6. Of the Order and the Accepting of Gifts.
Controverted Point. — That it ought not to be said * The
Order accepts gifts.’
From the Commentary. — This view is now held by those of the
Vetulya[ka]s, who are known as the Mahasunnai avadins. 2 They believe
that the Order, in the metaphysical sense [paramatthato] of the
word, is the Paths and the Fruits. These cannot be said to accept
anything.
[1] Th. — But is not the Order worthy of offerings of
hospitality, of gifts, of salutations, as the world’s supreme
field of merit ? How then can it be wrong to say it accepts
gifts? [2] Were not its four pairs of men, its eight classes
of individuals 3 declared by the Exalted One to be worthy of
gifts ? [3] And are there not they who give to it ?
[4] Finally, was it not said by the Exalted One : —
1 A s doth the holy flame its offering,
As doth the bounteous earth the summer rain,
So dk>th the Order, in rapt thought expert,
The Gift accept ' ? 4
Hence surely the Order accepts gifts.
[5] M . — But can a Path accept ? Can Fruition ac-
cept? . . .
1 See XXIII. 1.
2 So PTS ed. Br. has ‘ Mahapunna-\adins. !
3 Digha-Nik., iii. 255. 4 We cannot trace this passage.
551.
Is the Order an Abstract Idea 7 :
319
7. Of the Order and the Purifying of Gifts.
Controverted Point . — That it ought not to be said that
- The Order purifies 1 gifts.’
From the Commentary . — Those who hold the view just discussed,
hold as a corollary that Paths and Fruits are not able to purify gifts.
[1, 2] Similar to XVII., 6, §§ i, 2.
[3] And are there not those who, having made a gift to
the Order, make their offering effective? 2
[4] M . — But does a Path, does Fruition ‘purify’? . . .
8. Of the Order and Daily Life.
Controverted Point. — That it should not be said that
‘ The Order “ enjoys,” “ eats,” “ drinks.” ’
The reason and the adherents as above.
[1] Th . — But you must admit that there are those who
partake of the meals of the Order, both daily and on special
occasions, both of rice-gruel and of drink.
[2] Moreover, did not the Exalted One speak of * meals
taken in company/ ‘in turn,’ ‘of food left over,’ and ‘not
left over ’ ? 3 [3] And did He not speak of eight kinds
of drinks: — ‘mango-syrup, jambu-syrup, plantain- syrup,
m6cha-syrup, honey-syrup, grape- juice, lily root- syrup, and
pharusaka-syrup’? 4 How then can you maintain your view?
[4] M . — But does a Path, does Fruition ' enjoy/ ‘eat,’
‘ drink ’ ? . . .
1 Visodheti — i.e., causes to fructify, makes more fruitful (in
merit). — Corny.
2 Dakkhinar) aradheti, a less obvious phrasing than the
instrumental phrase of the Sutta-Nipata, verse 488, aradhaye
dakkhineyyehi. ‘They gain, they win great fruit even by a
trifling offering. . . . Little (when so offered) becomes much, much
becomes more.’ — Corny. In the text the usual gifts to the Order are
then detailed. See above, p. 199, § 3.
3 Vinaya, Texts, i. 38 f.
4 Hid., ii. 132. The Commentary does not enrich our scanty know-
ledge about the less obvious kinds.
820
Wise Givers are blessed
XVII. 9.
9. Of the Order and the Fruit of Giving.
Controverted Point. — That it should not be said that ‘ a
thing given to the Order brings great reward.’
The reason and the adherents as above.'
[1, 2] Similar to XVII. 6, §§ 1, 2.
[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Give, lady
of the Gotamas, to the Order. In that giving thou shall also
render honour to me and to the Order’ ? l
[4] Again, was it not said to the Exalted One by Sakha,
ruler of the gods :
c Of men who bring their offerings,
Of creatures who for merit seek,
Makers of merit for fair doom : —
Where must they give to reap reward !-
The four ivho practise in the Paths,
The four established in the. Fruits : —
Such is the Order upright, true,
By wisdom and by virtue stayed.
Of men who bring their offerings,
Of creatures who for merit seek.
Makers of merit for fair doom,
Who to the Order make their gift : —
Theirs is’t to reap a rich reward .’ 2
‘ This Order sooth abounds ancl is grown great,
In measure as the waters of the sea,
These be the valiant students, best of men,
Light-bringers they ivho do the Norm proclaim.
They who because of them do give their gifts,
Oblations fair , and seemly sacrifice,
They to the Order loyal, firm in faith,
Commended by the wise, win great reward.
And mindful thenceforth of the off e rings made,
Joy is their heritage 3 while in this ivorld.
1 Majjhima-Nik. , iii. 253. 2 Sayyutta-NiJc., i. 233.
3 The V. V. Commentary explains vedajata by jatasoma-
nassa.
555.
I) ise Givers are blessed
321
Thereafter, conquerors of selfishness 1
And of the root thereof, free front all blame,
Lo ! to a brighter world they win their wan ' ' 2
Hence surely a thing given to the Order brings great
reward.
10. Of the Buddha and the Fruit of Giving.
Controverted Point. — That it should not be said that
‘ Anything given to the Buddha brings great reward. 5
From the Commentary. — From the same source comes the theory
that because the Exalted Buddha did not really enjoy anything, but
only seemed to be doing so out of conformity to life here below, nothing
given him was really helpful to him,
[1] Th. — Now was not the Exalted One of all two-footed
creatures the highest and best and foremost and uttermost,
supreme, unequalled, unrivalled, peerless, incomparable,
unique ? How then could a gift to Him fail to bring great
reward? [2] Are there any equal to Him in virtue, in
will, in intellect ?
[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘Neither
in this world nor in any other is any to be found better than,
or equal to the Buddha who has reached the summit of them
who are worthy of offerings, who are desirous of merit, who
seek abundant fruit 5 f 3 *
Hence surely anything given to the Buddha brings great
reward.
IX. Of the Sanctification of the Gift.
Controverted Point . — That a gift is sanctified by the giver
only, not by the recipient.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the U ttai apathakas, hold this
view for this reason : If a gift were sanctified by the recipient, it
would become a great blessing. Now if the donor gives and the donee
1 In the PTS edition read m a c oh era m ala ij samulag.
2 Vimdna- Vatthu , 84, 25-27.
? Not traced.
T.S. V. 21
322
Who Sanctifies the Gift ?
XVII. 11.
produces the result, this would mean that the former causing the latter
to act for him, his own happiness or misery would be wrought by
another. In other words, one would sowq another reap. [This is
heresy.] 1
[1] Th. — Now are not some who receive gifts ‘ worthy of
offerings, attentions, gifts, salutations, the world’s supreme
field of merit ’ ? [2] And did not the Exalted One pronounce
the four pairs of men, the eight kinds of individuals to be
worthy of gifts 2 [3] And are there not those who, having
offered a gift to a Stream-Winner, Once-Returner, Never-
Returner or Arahant, make the gift effective ? How then
can you maintain your proposition?
[4] U . — But if a gift may be sanctified by the recipient,
does not he become the agent for quite a different person ? 2
Does not one person work the happiness or the misery of
another? Does not one sow, another reap ?
Th. — Now was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ There
are four ways, Ananda, of sanctifying a, gift. Which are the
four ? A gift may he sanctified by the giver, not by the re-
cipient; a gift mag be sanctified by the recipient, not by the
giver ; or it rhay be sanctified by both;, or, again, by neither’ ? 3
Hence it is surely wrong to say: ‘A gift is sanctified
only by the giver, not by the recipient.’
3 See above, I. 1 (p. 43 f.) ; XYI. 1-5 ; a perverse application of the
doctrine of individual becoming and individual karma to two distinct
contemporaneous individuals. Gf. Buddhism , London, 1912, p. 184 .
2 Anno a n n a s s a k a r a k o. This question would be reasonable
if the opponent had meant that the donor’s will is moved to act
(literally, be done) by the donee. But he meant that the donor’s will is
sanctified, purified, in the sense of great fructification depending upon
the person of the donee. Hence the question is to no purpose. —
Corny.
2 Majjhima-Nik . , iii.258; cf. Dlgha-Nik., iii. 231 ; Anguttara-Nik.,
ii. 80 f. (order of third and fourth alternatives reversed in all three).
559. The Ideal Buddha 823
BOOK XVIII
1. Of the Buddha and thin World.
Controverted Point . — That it is not right to say ‘ The
Exalted Buddha lived in the world of mankind. 1
From the Commentary.— Some, like the Vetuly alias, 1 carelessly in-
terpreting the Sutta, ‘born in the world, grew up in the world, dwelt,
having overcome the world, undefiled by the world,’ hold that the
Exalted One, when born in the heaven of Delight, 2 dwelt there while
visiting this world only in a shape specially created. Their citation
of the Sutta proves nothing, since the Master was undefiled, not by
being out of the world, but by the corruptions of heart with respect
to the things in the world.
[1] Th . — But are there not shrines, parks, settlements,
villages, towns, kingdoms, countries mentioned by the
Buddha? 3 [2] And was he not born at Lumbinl, super-
enlightened under the Bodhi tree? Was not the Norm-
wheel set rolling by him at Benares? Bid he not renounce
the will to live at the Chapala shrine ? 4 Bid he not complete
existence at Kusinara ?
[3] Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ Bkikkhus, I was once staying at Uhkatthd in the Subhaga
1 See above, XVII. 6.
2 Tusita-bhavana. This was traditionally the Buddha’s last
celestial life (Pss. of the Sisters , 8).
3 Reading Buddha-vuttani with Br. and the PTS edition.
The Siamese printed edition reads -vutthani, 1 dwelt in by the
Buddha.’ Either compound is very uncommon in older Pali.
- Dialogues , ii. 113. ‘Sankhara’ may be used for c e t a n a, the
foremost of the sankhar a’s.
824
Buddh ist Docctism
XVIII. 2.
Wood by the King’s-Sdl Tree.’ 1 . . . ‘ I was once staying
at Uruveld by the Goatherds’ Banyan before I was super-
enlightened J 1 ... I was once staying at Rdjagaha in the
Bamboo Wood at the Squirrels’ Feeding -ground. ... I was
once staying at Saratthl in J eta’s Wood, Anathapuuliha’s
Baric. ... I was once staying at Vesdll in the Great Wood,
at the Gable House Hall 5 i
Surely then the Exalted Buddha lived among men.
[4] V . — But did not the Exalted One, 4 born in the world,
enlightened in the world, live, having overcome the world, mi-
defiled by the world ’ ? 3
Hence it is surely not right to say ‘The Exalted Buddha
lived in the world of mankind.’ 4
2. Of how the Norm was taught.
Controverted Point . — That it is not right to say 4 The
Exalted Buddha himself taught the Norm.’
From the Commentary. — This is another point in the foregoing
heresy. The created shape taught the Norm on earth to the Venerable
Ananda, while the Exalted One lived in the city of Delight and sent
forth that shape.
[1] Th . — By whom then was it taught ?
V . — By the special creation.
Th. — Then must this created thing have been the
Conqueror, the Master, the Buddha Supreme, the Omni-
1 Majjh/ima-NiTc., i. 326.
2 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 185. The Buddha is in many Suttas related to
have been staying at each of these places, and as telling ‘ blukkhus ’
that he had done so on this or that occasion.
3 Sayyutta-Nilc., iii. 140, where the first two words quoted— 1 ok e
j at o — seem to have been omitted.
4 On this 4 Doeetic ’ heresy, which throve later among Ma ajanist
Buddhists, Prof. Anesaki’s article, s.v. ‘ Docetism,’ Ency. Religion
and Ethics, should be consulted.
5(>0. Buddhist Docetism 825
scient, All-seeing, Lord of all things, Judge of Appeal of all
things !...?■
[2] I ask again : By whom was the Norm taught ?
V . — By the venerable Ananda.
Th . — Then must he too have been the Conqueror, the
Master, etc. [3] But was it not said by the Exalted One :
Sariputta, I may teach the Norm concisely and I may teach it
in detail, and I may teach it both mays. If is only they who
understand that are hard to find’ ?-
Hence surely the Buddha himself taught the Norm.
[4] And again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ By
the higher knowledge, bhikkhiis, do I teach the Norm, not
without the higher knowledge,- a Norm with [' reference to]
cause do I teach, not one without; a wonder-working Norm do
I teach, and none not wonder-working . And that I, bhikkhiis,
thus teach the Norm, a homily should be made, instruction
should be given, to wit, let this, bhikkhus, suffice for your con-
tent, let this suffice for your satisfaction and for your glad-
ness: — the Exalted One is Buddha Supreme l the Norm is
well revealed! the Order is well trained 1 Note token this
declaration was uttered , ten thousand world-systems trembled’ l 1 2 3
Hence surely the Exalted Buddha himself taught the
Norm.
3. Of the Buddha and Pity.
Controverted Point . — That the Exalted Buddha felt no
pity.
Prom the Commentary .— The procedure of those who have not
conquered their passions, on the occasion of misfortune, to the objects
of their affection, inclines the beholder to say that compassion is only
1 Of these eight titles, the first three are frequent in the Nikayas ;
the last four are found usually in later books; but Anguttara-Nik. ,
i. 199, has the last one : dhamma Bhagavarj-patisarana.
2 Anguttara-Nik., i. 133.
3 We have not succeeded in discovering this passage verbatim in the
Nikayas. The burden of it does not constitute one of the Eight Causes of
Earthquake enumerated in Dialogues, ii. 114 f. But cf. ibid. 112 ; i. 55.
326 ‘ Very Man of Very Man 1 XVIII. 4, 5.
passion. Hence some, like the Uttarapathakas, judge that the passion-
less Buddha felt no compassion.
[1] Th. — But this implies that neither did he feel love
or sympathetic joy or equanimity. You deny. [2] But
could he have these and yet lack pity ? 1
[3] Your proposition implies also that he was ruthless.
Yet you agree that the Exalted One was pitiful, kindly to
the world, compassionate towards the world, and went
about to do it good. 2 [4] Nay, did not the Exalted One
win to the attainment of universal pity? 3
[5] U . — But if there was no passion (r a g a) in the Exalted
One, surely there was in him no compassion (k a r u n a) ?
4. Of the Buddha and Fragrant Things.
Controverted Point. — That [even] the excreta of the
Exalted Buddha excelled all other odorous things.
From the Commentary . — Out of an indiscriminate affection for the
Buddha, certain of the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas hold this view.
[1] Th. — This would imply that the Exalted One fed on
perfumes. But you admit only that he fed on rice gruel.
Hence your proposition is untenable.
[2] Moreover, if your proposition were true, some would
have used them for the toilet, gathering, saving them in
basket and box, exposing them in the bazaar, making cos-
metics with them. But nothing of the sort was done. . .. .
5. Of a One and Only Path.
Controverted Point. — That the fourfold fruition of the
religious life is realized by one path only.
1 Referring to the Four Sublime Moods or Infinitudes, exercises in
the development of these emotions. See above, p. 76, n. 2. It is note-
worthy that the opponent does not reserve the last of them, ‘ equanimity,’
as alone predicable, from Ms point of view, of the Buddha.
2 Except the third, these phrases are hard to trace in the Nikayas,
albeit the ascription in other terms is frequent enough.
3 See Pahsariibhida-Magga, i. 126 f., 1 The Tathagata’s Insight by
Great Pity.’
563. Orderly Procedure of Spiritual Progress 327
From the Commentary . — The same sectaries, on the same grounds,
hold that the Exalted One, in becoming Stream- Winner, Onee-Returner,
Never-Beturner, Arahant, realized all these four Fruits by one single
Ariyan Path [and not in the four distinct stages each called a path],
[1] Th. — This implies a fusion of the four distinct con-
scious procedures [experienced in each stage of progress],
■which you deny.
Moreover, if there he one path only, which of the four
is it ?
-4. U. — The path of Arahantship.
Th. — But do we teach that by that path the three first of
the ten Fetters are removed — to wit, theory of soul, doubt,
and infection of mere rule and ritual ? Bid not the Exalted
One say that these are removed by the Stream-Winning Path?
[2] And are gross passions and malevolence removed by
the path of Arahantship ? Did not the Exalted One say
that the fruit of the Once-Returner was the state of having
reduced these to a minimum ? [3] And is it by the path
of Arahantship that that minimum is removed ? You know
it is not. If you assent, I can refer you to the words of the
Exalted One, who said that the fruit of the Never-Returner
was the state of having removed that minimum without
remainder.
[4] A . U . — But if we are wrong, and the Exalted One
developed each Path in succession, can he be called Stream-
Winner and so on? I’ou deny, but you have implied it. 1
[5J Th. — But if the Exalted One realized these four
fruits of the religious life by one Ariyan Path only, and the
disciples by four Paths, they have seen what he did not see,
they arrive, at where he did not arrive, they realize that
which he did not realize. You cannot admit this . . .
6. Of the Transition from One Jhdiia to Another.
Controverted Point . — That we pass from one -Jhana to
another [immediately].
1 On the theory, combated above, IV. 4, 9, that past acquisitions
remain permanent possessions instead of being wrought up into higher-
powers. See also p. 66, and Sayyutta-Nih , v. 356 f.
328 Each -Than a a Separate Ecstasy XVIII. 6.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahigs&sakas and certain
of the Andhakas, hold that the formula of the Four Jhanas [in the
Suttas] warrants us in concluding that progress from one Jh ana-stage
to another is immediate without any accessory procedure.
[1 ] Th. — Does this imply that one can pass over from
First to Third, from Second to Fourth Jhana ? You deny
[setting an arbitrary limit]. . . .
[2] Or take only a passing over from First Jhana attain-
ment to that of Second — which you affirm to be possible —
you are implying that the mental process — adverting, re-
flecting, co-ordinating, attending, willing, wishing, aiming 1
— called up for First Jhana is the same as that required for
Second Jhana. But you dissent. Do you mean that no
[preliminary] mental process of adverting, etc., is required
for Second Jhana ? On the contrary, you agree that Second
Jhana arises after a certain mental process — adverting, etc.
Therefore one does not pass over directly from First Jhana
to the next.
[3] [Again, take the objects and characteristics of First
Jhana.] The First Stage, you admit, may come to pass
while one is considering the harmfulness of sense-desires ; 2
moreover, it is accompanied by application and sustenta-
tion of thought. But neither that object nor these charac-
teristics, you must admit, belong to the Second Stage.
Yet your proposition really commits you to asserting identity
between First and Second Jhana.
[4] The same argument [2] applies to transition from
Second to Third Jhana. [5] [Again, take the specific objects
and characteristics of the Second Stage :] the Second Stage,
you admit, may come to pass while one is considering the
harmfulness of application and sustentation of thought ;
moreover, it is accompanied by zest. But neither that
object nor these characteristics, you must admit, belong to
the Third Stage. Yet your proposition really commits you
1 Cf. VII. 5, § 2.
2 Kama ; the object being to supersede earthly consciousness (that
of the Kama-lo k a) by a heavenly 'or angelic consciousness (that of
the E up a - lok a).
569. Fire fohl Series 329
to an assertion of identity between Second and Third
-Thana.
[6] The same argument [2, 4] applies to transition from
Third to Fourth -Thana. [7] [Again, take the specific
objects and characteristics of the Third Stage-.] the Third
Stage, you admit, may come to pass while one is considering
the harmfulness of zest ; moreover, it is accompanied by
happiness. But neither that object nor these character-
istics, you must admit, belong to the Fourth Stage. Yet
your proposition really commits you to an assertion of
identity between Third and Fourth -Thana.
[8] M. A . — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ Here, bkikkhus, ivhen a bhikklm, aloof from sense-desires, etc.
. attains to and abides in, First . . . Fourth - Thana ’ ? 1
According to that [formula] one does pass over
immediately from Jhana to -Thana.
7. Of Jhclna and its Intervals.
Controverted Point . — That there is an intermediate stage
between the First and Second Stages. 2
From the Commentary . — The Sammitiyas and certain other of the
Andhakas hold the view that, in the Fivefold Jhana series, 3 the
Exalted One did not intend to classify, but only to indicate, three
forms 4 of concentration. But not knowing that form of concentration
to be possible which is accompanied by sustained thought (savieara),
and counting only initial application (vitakka), they hold that the
former intervenes between First and Second Jhana, thus making up a
later fivefold series.
1 E.g., Dialogues, i. 84 f. ; passim in Nikavas.
2 The words ‘First,’ etc., to ‘ Fourth/ in this discourse must be
understood solely with reference to the fourfold classification.
3 I.e., when First Jhana is divided into two, according as it is
accompanied or unaccompanied by initial application of thought. See
Bud. Psy. Eth., cf. p. 43 with p. 52. The Four Nikayas recognize
only four stages.
4 Namely, as specified above, IX. 8, §§ 3, 4. The first and second
divide First Jhana into two aspects, the third refers to the other
three Jhanas.
830 Fourfold Classification of Jhana XVIII. 7.
[1] Th . — But this is to imply intervening stages between
contact or feeling, or perception. . . .
Again, why deny intermediate stages between Second
and Third, or Third and Fourth Jhana ? If you deny them
here, you must deny them between First and Second Jhana.
[8] You cannot maintain the intermediate stages between
First and Second Jhana only, [4] denying the existence of
such stages between the others.
[5] You say that concentration of mind accompanied by
sustained thought only, without its initial application, con-
stitutes the intermediate stage. But why make an excep-
tion in this way ? Or why not include the other two forms,
accompanied by both or by neither ? [6] If you deny that
concentration with or without initial and sustained applica-
tion of thought is a Jhanie interval, why not deny it in the
case of concentration without initial application, but with
sustentation of thought ?
[7] You maintain that in the interval between the mani-
festation of two stages of Jhana there is concentration in
sustained thought only, without initial application of
thought. But while such concentration is proceeding, is
not the first Jhana at an end and the second Jhana mani-
fested ? You assent, but you contradict thus your proposi-
tion.
[8] S. A. — If we are wrong, does concentration in sus-
tained thought only, without initial application of thought,
constitute any one of the Four Jhanas ? You say, no.
Then it must constitute an interim state — which is what
we affirm.
[9] Th. — But did not the Exalted One declare three
forms of concentration, namely, in both applied and sus-
tained thought, in the latter only, and where there is
neither? 1 If so, you cannot single out the second form of
concentration as a state intermediate between Jhanas.
1 Sayyiitta-Nik., iv. 363, etc. See above, IX. 8, § 4. For those
unacquainted with the classic procedure in Jhana, it may be explained
that whereas, in the first stage of attained ecstasy, consciousness
includes (a) initial and sustained application of thought, (&) zest,
572.
Rapt from Sense
381
8. Of Hearing in Jhana.
Controverted Point. — That one who has attained Jhana
hears sound.
From the Commentary . — The opinion is held by some — the Pubba-
seliyans, for instance — that because the Exalted One called sound a
thorn to First Jhana, and since sound, if not heard, cannot be a thorn
in the flesh of one who had attained that state, it was inferable that
such an one was able to hear.
[1] Th „ — If so, it must be equally allowed that he can
also see, smell, taste and touch objects. 1 This you deny
. . . You must also allow that he enters Jhana enjoying
auditory consciousness. You deny, for you agree that con-
centration arises in one who is enjoying mental objects as
such ? [2] But if you admit that anyone who is actually
^enjoying sounds hears sounds, and that concentration is
the property of one who is actually enjoying mental objects
as such, you should not affirm that one in the concentration
of Jhana hears sounds. If you insist that he does, you
have here two parallel mental procedures going on at the
same time. . . .
[3] P . — But was it not said by the Exalted One that
sound is a thorn for First Jhana ? 2 Hence one in Jhana can
surely hear sound.
Tk . — You say that one in Jhana can hear sound, and
quote the Word as to it being for First Jhana a f thorn.’
Now it was further said that thought applied and sustained
is a thorn for Second Jhana — does one in Second Jhana
have applied and sustained thought ? . . . Again, it was
further said that the mental factor last eliminated is a thorn
(c) pleasure, in the second stage (a) is eliminated, in the third (b), and
in the fourth (o) are eliminated. Now, in ‘ fivefold Jhana,’ (a) was
resolved into two stages. ( TheragdtM , 916, gives a different pafi-
c&ngiko samadhi.)
1 ‘But there is no five-door procedure (of sense) in Jhana.’ — Corny.
2 Anguttara - Nik., v. 183-135. ‘ This was said because sound
induces distraction. When a loud noise strikes the ear, one is aroused
from First Jhana.’ — Corny. See above, p. 123.
332
Dot’s the Et/r see ?
XVIII. 9.
for the stage newly attained — zest for Third, respiration
for Fourth -Than a. 1 perception of visible objects for con-
sciousness of space-infinity, this perception for that' of con-
sciousness as infinite, this perception for that of nothingness,
perception and feeling for cessation of these in trance. Now
is £ the thorn ’ actually present on the winning of the stage
whence it is pronounced to be a thorn ? If not, then how-
can you say that the e thorn ’ of hearing sound is present
to one in First Jhana ?
9. Of the Eye and Seehuj.
Controverted Point. — That we see visible objects with
the eye.
From the Commentary . — Here, judging by the Word — ‘ When he
sees an object with the eye ’ — some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
the sentient surface in the eye is that which ‘ sees.’
In the quoted passage the method of naming a necessary instrument
is followed, 2 as when we say 1 wounded by a bow,’ when the wound
was inflicted by an arrow. So the words ‘ sees with the eye ’ are
spoken of a seeing by visual consciousness.
[1] Th . — Then you hold that we see matter by matter. . . .
You deny. But think ! And if you now assent, 3 you imply
that matter is able to distinguish matter. You deny. But
think ! And if you now assent, you imply that matter is
mind. . . . 4
[2] Again, you are implying that the eye can ‘ advert ’
or reflect, co-ordinate, will, etc., 5 albeit you agree that the
contrary is true.
1 So the Sntta. We should have expected sukha (pleasure or
happiness). See Jhana formula.
3 Sambhara-katha. Cf. Attliasdlim, 399 f. in Bud. Psy. Eth.,
p. 851, n. 2.
3 ‘First he rejects, because of the [separate] category, “object of
vision then assents, with respect only to the eye.’ — Corny.
4 Eupai] manovinfianap.
5 As in VII. 5, § 2. If the ‘eye’ sees, it should be immediately
preceded by ‘ adverting ’ in the same way as the sense of sight
(e a k k h u - v i h n a n a).— Corny.
333
378. ’ Does the Eye nee?
[3, 4] .These arguments hold good for similar claims put
forward by you for the other four senses.
[5] M . — But was it not said by the Exalted One : * Here ,
hhikkhus, a bhikkliu seen objects icith the eye, hears sounds,
and so on ’ / 1 Hence surely tve see visible objects with the
eye and' so on.
1 Dhammasangani, § 597, gives the passage verbatim as to the
process — cakkhuna . . . rfipaij . . . passati; but though allu-
sions to the visual process abound in the Nikayas, we have not traced
the exact passage as in an exhortation to hhikkhus, except in the
‘ Guarded Doors ’ formula, e.g., Sayy-utta-NiJc, iv. 104, where the
formula has d i s v a, 1 having seen,’ for p a s s a t i, ‘ sees.’
834
Of getting rid of Corruption
XIX. 1.
BOOK XIX
1. Of getting rid of Corruption.
Controverted Point. — That we may extirpate corruptions
past, future, and present. 1
From the Commentary . — Inasmuch as there is such a thing as
putting away corruptions, and for one in whom this is completed both
past and future, as well as present, corruptions are put away, there-
fore some — certain of the Uttarapathakas, for instance— hold that we
can now put away the corruptions of our past, etc.
[1] Th. — In other words, we may stop that which has
ceased, dismiss that which has departed, destroy that which
is destroyed, finish that which is finished, efface that which
has vanished. For has not the past ceased? Is it not
non-existent ? . . .
[2] And as to the future, you imply that we can produce
the unborn, bring forth the non-naseent, bring to pass the
unhappened, make patent that which is latent. . . . For
is not the future unborn ? Is it not non-existent ? . . .
[8] And as to the present : does the lustful put away
lust, the inimical put away hate, the confused put away
dulness, the corrupt put away corruption ? Or can we put
away lust by lust, and so on? You deny all this. But
did you not affirm that we can put away present corrup-
tions ? . . .
Is lust and is ‘ Path’ a factor in conscious experience? 2
You assent, of course. But can there be a parallel con-
1 For the ‘ ten corruptions,’ see above, pp. 65, n. 4, 66, n, 4. On [1] f.
cf. p. 85, § 2 f.
2 Literally, ‘ conjoined with consciousness.’ We cannot at the same
time give play to immoral thought and be developing the Ariyan mind.
57 8. Implications of 1 the Void ’ 385
scious procedure [of both] at the same time ? . . . If lust
be immoral, and e Path ’ moral consciousness, can moral
and immoral, faulty and innocent, base and noble, sinister
and clear mental states co-exist side by side [at the same
moment] ? You deny. Think again. Yes, you now reply.
But was it not said by the Exalted One : 4 There are four
things, hhikkhus, very far away one from the other : ichat are
the four ? The sky and the earth, the hither and the yonder
shore of the ocean, ivhence the sun rises and where he sets, the
norm of the good and that of the wicked. Far is the sky,
etc.
Hence those mental opposites cannot co-exist side by side.
[4] TJ . — But if it be wrong to say 4 we can put away past,
future, and present corruptions,’ is there no such thing as
the extirpation of corruptions ? You admit there is. Then
my proposition stands. 2
2. Of the Void.
Controverted Point. — That ‘ the Void ’ is included in the
aggregate of mental co-efficients (sankharakkhandha).
From the Commentary. — 4 The Void [or Emptiness] has two im-
plications : (a) Absence of soul, which is the salient feature of the five
aggregates [mind and body]; and (&) Nibbana itself. As to (a), some
marks of ‘ no-soul ’ may be included under mental coefficients (the
ourth aggregate) by a figure of speech. 3 Nibbana is not included there-
under. But some, like the Andhakas, drawing no such distinction, hold
the view stated above.
[1] Th.— Do you then imply that the 4 Signless,’ that
the 4 Not-hankered-after ’ is also so included ? If not, 4 the
1 See VII. 5, § 3, for the full quotation.
2 The putting away of corruptions, past, future, or present, is not a
work comparable to the exertions of a person clearing away rubbish-
heaps. With the following of the Ariyan Path having Nibbana as its
object, the corruptions are ‘put away’ simply because they don’t get
born. In other words, the past has ceased ; the cure as to present and
future is preventive. — Corny.
3 Ekena pariyayena. Marks of other aggregates cannot be so
included, even by way of figurative speech.
836 Of Spiritual Fruition XIX. 3.
Void : cannot be, 1 [2] for you cannot predicate of the last
that which you deny of the former two.
[3] Again, if the fourth aggregate be made to include
‘ the Void,’ it must be not impermanent, not arisen through
a cause, not liable to perish, nor to lose lust, nor to cease,
nor to change !
[4] Moreover, is the £ emptiness ’ of the material aggre-
gate included under the fourth aggregate ? Or the £ empti-
ness 5 of the second, third, and fifth aggregates thereunder ?
Or is the ‘ emptiness 5 of the fourth aggregate itself included
under any of the other four ? [5] If the one inclusion is
wrong, so are all the other inclusions.
[5] A . — But was it not said by the Exalted One:
£ Empty is this, 2 hkikkhus — the s a n h h d r a ’ s — either of soul
or of what belongs to soul 7
8. Of the Fruits of Life in Religion.
Controverted Point . — That the fruit of recluseship is
unconditioned.
From the Commentary . — Our doctrine has judged that the term
' fruits of life in religion ’ means the mind in general which results
from the processes of thought in the Ariyan Path, and occurs in the
mental process attending the attainment of its Fruits. But there are
some, like the Pubbaseliyas, who, taking it otherwise, mean by it just
the putting away of corruptions and success therein. 3 *
1 All three being names for Nibbana, they are adduced to expose
the daw in a theory which does not discriminate. — Corny . Cf. Com-
pendinm, p. 216.
2 See I. 1, §§ 241, 242. The nearest verbatim reference that we can
trace is Sayyutta-Nik . , iv. 296 ; but even there the word sankhara,
which here seems dragged in by the opponent, is omitted. ‘ The
Theravddin suffers it to stand, because it is not inconsistent with the
orthodox “sabbe sankhara anicca,” where sankhara stands
for all five aggregates [exhausting all conditioned things].’— -Corny.
3 Hence unconditioned, i.e., unprepared, uncaused, unproduced by
the our conditions — karma, mind, food, or physical environment
(utu). Cf. Compendium, p. 161.
579. Of Spiritual Fruition 337
[1] Th . — Do you then identify that e fruit ’ with
Nibbana: — the Shelter, the Cave, the Refuge, the G-oal, the
Past-Decease, the Ambrosial? 1 Or are there two ‘uncon-
ditioned’s ’? You deny both alternatives [but you must
assent to one or the other]. If to the latter, I ask are
they both . . . Nibbanas, and is there one higher than the
other, ... or is there a boundary ... an interstice between
them? 2
[2] Again, do you imply that recluseship itself is uncon-
ditioned ? ' No, conditioned,’ you say. Then is its fruit or
reward conditioned ? . . .
[3, 4] You admit, again, that the four stages in the
recluse’s Ariyan Path — the Four Paths — are conditioned.
Yet you would deny that the Four Fruits are conditioned !
.[5] In fact, you would have in these four and Nibbana
five ‘unconditioned’s.’ Or if you identify the four with
Nibbana, you then get five sorts of Nibbana, five Shelters,
and so on. . . .
4. Of Attainment (patti).
Controverted Point. — That attainment is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.— Some, like the Pubbaseliyas again, hold
that the winning of any acquisition is itself unconditioned.
[1] Is similar to § 1 in the foregoing.
[2-4] Th. — Again, do you imply that the winning
[through gifts] of raiment, almsfood, lodging, medicine,
is unconditioned ? But if so, the same difficulty arises as
in the case of attainment in general (§ 1). In fact, you
would have in these four and Nibbana five ‘ unconditioned’s.’
[5, 6] A similar argument is used for the winning of any
of the Rupa Jhanas (4), or of the Arupa Jhanas (4), or of
the Four Paths and Four Fruits, concluding with : —
In fact, you would have in these eight and Nibbana nine
‘unconditioned’s,’ etc.
1 Cf. YI. l, § 1.
2 Ibid. The text abbreviates even more than we do.
22
T.S. V.
338
Of ‘ Thusness ’
XIX. 5.
[7] P . — But if I am wrong, can you identify winning
with any one of the five aggregates, bodily or mental ?
If not, then it is unconditioned.
5. Of ‘ Thusness.’
Controverted Point . — That the fundamental character-
istics of all things ( sabba-dhamma ) are unconditioned.
From the Commentary . — Some, like the Uttarapathakas, hold that
there is an immutable something called thusness (or suchness) 1 in the
very nature of all things, material or otherwise [taken as a whole].
And because this ‘ thusness ’ is not included in the [particular] con-
ditioned matter, etc., itself, therefore it is unconditioned.
[1] Tit . — Do you then identify those fundamental charac-
teristics or ‘thusness’ with Nibbana, the Shelter . . . the
Goal, the Past-deceased, the Ambrosial ? Or are there two
‘unconditioned’s’? You deny both alternatives [but you
must assent to one or the other]. If to the latter, I ask,
are there two kinds of Shelters and so on ? And is there
a boundary or . . . interstice between them ?
[2] Again, assuming a materiality (rupata) of matter or
body, is not materiality unconditioned ? You assent. Then
I raise the same difficulties as before.
[3] I raise them, too, if you admit a ‘hedonality ’ of feel-
ing, 2 a ‘pereeivability’ of perception, 2 a sankharata or
1 Tathata. The Er. translation renders this by ' immutable
reality.’ Cf. VI. 3, above. Br. reads here, differently from PTS
edition: sabbadhammanaij rupadibha vasankhata tathata
namaatthi. On the metaphysical expansion of the notion, rendered
by those who have translated Ai-svaghoia from the Chinese as t a t h a t a
see T. Suzuki’s Awakening of Faith , p. 53, etc. Tathata does not
occur again throughout the Pitakas. The Commentary attaches no
increased interest or importance to the term, and the argument in the
text is exactly like that in the foregoing discourse. But because of
the importance ascribed to 4 thusness ’ or 4 suchness ’ by certain of the
Mahayanists, and because of the unique abstract forms coined for the
argument, we do not condense this exposition.
2 Vedanata, sahnata.
584.
Nibbdna as Unmoral
889
co-efficiency of mental co-efficients, a consciousness of
being conscious. 1 If all these be unconditioned, are there
then six categories of 'unconditioned’s’?
[4] U . — But if I am wrong, is the * thusness ’ of all things
the five aggregates [taken together] ?
Th. — Yes.
U . — Then that ‘ thusness ’ of all things is unconditioned.
6. Of Nibbdna as Morally Good.
Controverted Point. — That the element (or sphere) 2 3 of
Nibbana is good.
From the Commentary. — All ‘good’ mental states are so called,
either because they can, as faultless, insure a desirable result-in-
sentience (v ip aka), or because they as faultless are free from
the corruptions. The idea of faultlessness is applied to all except
immoral states. The desirable result takes effect in a future rebirth,
either at conception or later. The first term in the triad : — good, bad,
indifferent — applies to the moral cause producing such a result. But
the Andhakas makes no such distinction, and call Nibbana ‘good’
just because it is a faultless state.
[1] Th. — Do you imply that it has a mental object,
involving a mental process of adverting, reflecting, co-
ordinating, attending, willing, desiring, aiming? Is not
rather the opposite true ?
[2] These things we can predicate of all morally good
mental states — of disinterestedness, love, intelligence, faith,
energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding. But
if we cannot predicate them of Nibbana, then is the element
of Nibbana not rightly called morally good.
[3] A. — But is not the element of Nibbana faultless?
If so— and you do assent — then it, not being immoral, is
moral.
1 Yinnauassa vinnanata.
2 Nibbana- d h a t u, Nibbana considered in itself, independently
coming to pass, ultimate, irreducible.
340
Eternal Doom and Final Salvation XIX. 7.
7. Of Assurance which is not Final.
Controverted Point. — That the average man may possess
final assurance. 1
From the Commentary. — Certain of the Uttarapathakas, judging by
the Sutta — ‘ once immersed is so once for all * etc . 2 — hold the view
above stated.
[1] Th . — Do you mean that he has that assurance even
if he commit the worst crimes — matricide, parricide,
Arahanticide, wounding a Buddha, breaking up the Order ?
‘Nay/ you say. 8
Again, could an average man holding that assurance feel
doubt aboutit? ‘Yes, 5 you say. Then he cannot feel assured.
[2] Surely you agree that, if he feel assured, he cannot
feel doubt. 4 Now has he put away doubt ? ‘ No,’ you say. 5
But think! You now assent. 6 Then has he put away
doubt by the First Path ? or the Second, Third, or Fourth
Path ? How, then ?
U. — By a bad path.
Th. — [Do you tell me that] a bad path leads aright,
goes to the destruction [of lust, hate, etc.], goes to en-
lightenment, is immune from intoxicants, is undefiled ? Is
it not the opposite of all this ? . . .
[3] Could the Annihilationist view be adopted by a
person assured and convinced of the truth of the Eternalist
1 Accanta, i.e., ati+anta, very final. The Br. translator
renders this by ‘ true,’ because all assurance for a finite period is not a
true assurance. Thus our conviction that the sun will rise to-morrow,
though it is exceedingly likely to he justified, is based only on a belief
that no cosmic dislocation will intervene, and is therefore no ‘ true ’
assurance either.
2 See next page.
3 ‘ The heretic, incorrigible as a tree-stump, is more or less assured
of cherishing his fixed opinions in other future existences. But the
matricide, etc., is assured of retribution in the next existence only.
Hence he must reject.’ — Corny.
4 ‘ He assents, because a man cannot doubt his own opinion if it be
repeatedly cherished.’ — Corny,
6 ‘ Because it has not been put away by the Ariyan Path.’— Corny.
8 Doubt not overriding the cherished opinion. — Corny.
586. Eternal Doom and Final Salvation 341
view? 1 ‘ Yes,’ you say. Surely then the assurance ot the
average man in his Annihilationist convictions is no ‘in-
finite assurance.’
[4] If you now deny in reply to my question, I ask again,
has he put away [the Annihilationist view]? If so, by whieh
of the Four Paths ? You reply, as before, * By a bad path.’
That is to say, by a bad path he puts away a bad view. . . .
[5, 6] A similar argument may be put forward for an
Annhilationist who adopts the Eternalist view.
[7] ZJ.—It I am wrong, 2 was it not said by the Exalted
One : ‘ Take the case, bhikkhus, of a person whose mental
states are entirely black-hearted 3 and immoral — he it is who,
once immersed, is so once for all’? 4
Surely then any average man can attain infinite
assurance.
[8] Th . — Is that which you have quoted your reason for
maintaining your proposition ? You admit it is. Now the
Exalted One said further : ‘ Take the case, bhikkhus, of a
person ivho, having come to the surface, is immersed.’ Now
is this [supposed to be] happening all the time ? 5 Of course
not. ... [9] But again he said : ‘ Take the case, bhikkhus,
of a person who, having emerged, so [remains]; of one ivho,
having emerged, discerns, glances around; of one who, having
emerged, swims across ; of one who, having emerged, wins a
footing on the shore.’
Now is each of these persons doing so all the time ?
And does any of these cases furnish you with a reason
for saying that any average person can have final assurance
[in his convictions] ?
1 In the eternal duration of soul and universe. The former view
holds that the soul ends at death. Dialogues , i. 50, § 32.
2 In the Commentary, PTS edition, p. 181, line 14, read puceha
paravadissa. Suttassa. . . .
3 Ekanta-kalaka . . . dhamma.
4 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 11, the ‘water-parable 3 of seven classes of
persons. Discussed in Puggala-Pannatti, 71.
6 The Theravadin asks this question in order to show the necessity
of a critical study, by research, of the spirit of Texts, without relying
too much on the letter. — Corny.
342
Moral Controls
XIX. 8.
8. Of the Moral Controlling Powers. 1
Controverted Point. — That the five moral controlling
powers— -faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, under-
standing — are not valid as £ controlling powers ’ in worldly
matters.
From the Commentary. — This is an opinion held by some, like the
Hetuvadins and Mahirjsasakas.
[1] Th.~~ Do you imply that there can be no faith, or
effort, or mindfulness, or concentration, or understanding
in worldly concerns ? You deny. [2] On the other hand,
you maintain that there is faith, etc., in such a connection,
but that none of them avail for moral control.
[3] You admit that both mind and mind as a controlling
power are valid in worldly matters. And you admit a similar
validity in both joy and joy as a controlling power, in both
psychic life and psychic life as a controlling power.
[4] Why then exempt those five ?
[5] Again, you admit that there is both a spiritual 2
faith and a controlling power of that faith — why not both
a worldly faith and a worldly controlling power of faith ?
And so for the rest. [6] Why accept in the one case, deny
in the other ?
[7] Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ And I,
bhikkhus, ivith the eyes of a Buddha surveying the world, saw
beings living whose vision was dim with dust, in some but
slightly, greatly in others, beings whose faculties were here keen,
there blunt, of good disposition . . . apt to learn . . . some
among them discerning the danger and defect of [rebirth iri\
other worlds ’? 3
Surely then the five moral controlling powers are valid in
worldly matters.
1 Or five faculties or factors of £ moral sense ’ (i n d r i y a). See
above, pp. 16 ; 65 f. ; 194, n. 1. These five are pre-eminent in* doctrine
as ranking among the ‘ thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment.’
2 Or supra-mundane and mundane.
3 Dialogues, ii. 31 f. The two lacunae (of one word each) occur in
both Br. and PTS editions.
593.
Criminal Intent the Essence of Crimes 343
BOOK XX
1. Of Unintentional Crime.
Controverted Point . — That the five cardinal crimes, even,
when unintentionally committed, involve retribution im-
mediately after death.
From the Comrnentary. - Inasmuch as the grounds for immediate
retribution after death are very weighty and grave, some — for instance,
the U ttarapathakas — hold that even the unintentional infliction of such
injuries calls for it.
[1] Th . — But you imply that if I accidentally take away
life, I am a murderer, [2] and [similarly as to two of the
other four wicked deeds forbidden by morality] that if I
accidentally take what is not given, I am a thief . . .
if I utter untruths unintentionally, I am a liar. You
deny. Yet you wish to make exceptions [to the relative
innocence of such acts] in just those five serious eases. . . .
[3] Gan you cite me a Sutta judging twtintentional
crime like that which says : ‘ He that intentionally takes
Ids mother’s life incurs immediate retribution’? 1 You cannot.
Neither can you maintain your proposition.
[4] U . — But does not the fact remain that the mother’s
life is taken ? 2 3 4 Surely then the unintentional slayer also
incurs immediate retribution. [5-7] Similarly, too, does
1 We cannot trace this passage. So far as his own future is con-
cerned, the individual’s mental acts rather than his deeds create it.
Of. Majjhima - Nik. , i. 372 f ; cf. iii. 207. See above, 80, n. 5 ; ef. 274.
2 This question is answered in the affirmative with reference to
accidental loss of life under medical treatment. — Corny.
344
Criminal Intent the Essence of Crimes XX. 1.
one who unintentionally kills father or Arahant, or sheds a
Buddha’s blood, incur a like doom.
[8] Th . — [Now as to the fifth of such crimes] : do you
imply that all schismatics incur such a doom ? You deny.
But think again ! You now assent. 1 But does a schismatic'
who is conscious of right incur it ? You deny. But think
again ! You now assent. But was it not said by the
Exalted One : * There is a kind of schismatic, Upali, who
incurs disaster, purgatory, misery for an won, who is incur-
able ; there is a kiiul of schismatic, Upali, who does not incur
such a doom, who is not incurable I 2
Hence it is not right to say that a schismatic who is
conscious of [stating what is] right incurs such a doom.
[9] U. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ He
who breaks up the Order is doomed to remain for an won in
states of suffering and woe ’ ?
‘ He who delights in party strife, and adheres not to the
Dhamma, is cut off from Arahantship . 3 Having broken up
the Order when it was at peace, he must be cooked for an ceon
in purgatory 7 4
Hence surely a schismatic incurs retribution immediately
after death.
2. Of Insight.
Controverted Point . — That * insight ’ is not for the average
man.
From the Commentary.— 1 Insight ’ (nana) is of two kinds — worldly
and spiritual. The former is intellection concerned with various
1 He denies, because he is judging such an one to be convinced that
his side is in the right ; he assents, in the case of one who knows that
right is on the other side.— Corny. Cf. Anguttara-Nik., i. 85 f.
Similarly in the following change of reply. — Corny.
2 Vinaya, ii. 205, v. 202, 203 ; Vinaya Texts, iii. 268. The latter
mistakes had doctrine or discipline for good, good doctrine or discipline
for bad, and records his opinion by his acts. His intentions are good.
In the Vinaya passage atthi, ‘there is,’ is rendered as siya,
‘ there may be. 7
3 Literally, from the y o g a k k h e m a, or safety, salvation. Cut off
that is, while thiB world-cycle lasts. 4 Ibid.
595. Intuition and Analysis 345
attainments, and in noting the course of karma by way of righteous
acts of giving, etc. ; the latter is intuition concerned with the Paths
and their Fruits, Path-intuition being learned by analysis of truth. 1
Now some, like the Hefruvadins, failing to distinguish this, accept only
Path-intuition as insight. 2 Hence they deny it in the average man.
[1] Th . — But you imply that a worldly man has no
analytic discernment, no analytic understanding, no ability
to investigate or examine, no faculty of research, no ability
to mark well, observe closely, mark repeatedly. 3 Is not the
opposite true ?
[2] Again, you admit, do you not ? that there is not one
of the four Rupa-jhanas or of the four Arupajhanas to
which a man of the world may not attain, and that he
is capable of liberality towards the Brethren as to the four
requisites : raiment and so forth. Surely then it is not
right to say a worldly man can have no insight.
[3] H . — If he can have insight, does he by that insight
recognize the truth about 111, eliminate its cause, realize
its cessation, develop the Path going thereto ? You
admit that he does not. Therefore, etc. . . .
3. Of the Guards of Purgatory.
Controverted Point. — That in the purgatories there are
no guards.
From the Commentary. — Some — for instance, the Andhakas — hold
that there are no such beings, but that the hell-doomed karmas in the
shape of hell-keepers purge the sufferers.
[1] Th . — Do you imply that there are no punishments
inflicted 4 in the purgatories ? You maintain the contrary ?
But you cannot maintain both propositions.
1 The instantaneous penetration (ekabhisamaya'l of truth by
one who has reached the Path is intuitive, but he is also able to
analyze truth. See Appendix : article 4.
2 On the ambiguity of this term, see also II. 2.
3 Cf. Bhamma-sangani, § 16. All these are synonyms of 2. a n a. —
Corny. We have brought out the force of the prefix ‘pa’ in the
first two (panna, pajanana).
4 Kamma-karanani. On this term, see JFTS, 1884, 76, and
references given.
346
Infernal Custodians
XX. 3.
[2] You admit that on earth there are both punishments
and executioners ? Yet you deny that the latter exist
in purgatory. . . .
[3] Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One :
‘ Not Vessnbhu nor yet the Petas' King,
Soma, Yama, or King Vessarana —
The deeds that were his own do punish him
Who ending here attains to other worlds Y 1 2
Hence there are guards in purgatory.
[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘Him,
hkikklms, hell's guards torture a with the fivefold punishment ;
they thrust a hot iron stake through one hand, then another
through the other hand , then one through the foot, then another
th ough the other foot ; they thrust a hot iron stake through
the middle of the chest. And he thereupon feels painful,
piercing, intolerable suffering, nor does he die till that evil
deed of his is cancelled Y 3
[5] Again, was it not said [further] by the Exalted One :
‘ Him, bhikkhus. hell’s guards make to lie down and flay him
with hatchets . . . they place him head downioards and flay
him with knives . . . they bind him to a chariot and drive
him to and fro over burning, blazing, glowing ground . . .
they lift him up on to a great hill of burning, blazing,
white-hot coals and roll him down the fiery slope . . .
they double him up and cast him into a hot brazen jar,
burning, blazing, glowing , where he boils, coming up like a
bubble of foam, then sinking, going now to this side, now
to that . 4 There he suffers fierce and bitter pain, nor does he
die till that evil karma is cancelled. Him, bhikkhus, they
cast into the Great Purgatory. Noiv this :
1 We cannot trace these verses, hence cannot indicate the context.
2 Our text has kammar) karenti; the Nikaya (PTS edition)
has . . . k a r o n t i.
3 Majjhima-Nik., iii. 182 f. ; Anguttaru-Nik., i. 141. The Br.
translation here and below reads : ‘ and he dies till that evil deed/ etc.
4 Milinda, ii. 261 (translation) ; Jdtaka, iii. 46 (text).
598.
Of Animals in Heaven
847
In districts measured out foursquare jour-doored.
Iron the ramparts bounding it, with iron roofed,
Iron its soil welded by fiery 1 heat,
Spreading a hundred leagues it stands for aye ' ? 2
Hence there surely are guards in purgatory.
4. Of Animals in Heaven.
Controverted Point. — That animals may be reborn among
the devas.
From the Commentary. — Among devas many — for instance, Eravana
- — assume animal shapes, such as those of elephants or horses, but
no animals are reborn as such among them. Some, however, like the
Andhakas, assume that because such celestial shapes have been seen,
therefore these were celestially reborn animals.
[1] Th. — Do you then imply that conversely devas are
reborn as animals? Or that the deva-world is an animal
kingdom? That there may there he found moths, beetles,
gnats, flies, snakes, scorpions, centipedes, earthworms?
You deny all this. Then you cannot maintain your pro-
position. ...
[2] A. — But is not the wondrous elephant Eravana there,
the thousand- wise yoked celestial mount ? 3
[3] Th. — But are there also elephant and horse stables
there, and fodder and trainers and grooms ? . . .
5. Oj the Any an Path.
Controverted Point . — That the Path is fivefold [only], ■
From the Commentary . — Some, such as the Mahipsasakas, hold
that in general terms the [Ariyan] Path is only fivefold. They infer
1 The Br. and the Nikdya have jalita; the PTS alita maybe
a misprint.
2 Majjhima-Nik., ibid. ; Anguttara Nik., ibid.
3 Yana, literally vehicle. See above, p. 127, n. 4.
348 The Eightfold Path XX. 5.
this both from the' Sutta, ‘ One who has previously been quite pure,’
etc., and also because the three eliminated factors— speech, action,
and livelihood — are not states of consciousness like the other five. 1
[1] Th. — But was not the Path pronounced by the
Exalted One to be eightfold — namely, right views, right
purpose, right speech, action, and livelihood, right effort,
mindfulness, and concentration? [2] And did he not
also say :
- Of all the means the Eightfold Path is best,
And best of all true things the Stages Four ;
Best state of mind disinterestedness , 2
And of all bipeds best the man-who-sees 7 s
Surely, then, the Path is eightfold.
[3] But you tell me that though these three — right
speech, right action, right livelihood — are factors of the
Path, nevertheless they are not path, [4] while the other
five are both factors of the Path and Path. Why this
distinction ?
[5] M. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : l For him
who has hitherto been quite pure in karma of deed and of word
and of livelihood, this Ariyan Eightfold Path zoill go to per-
fection of development 7 4
Hence surely the Path is fivefold.
[6] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘In what-
soever doctrine and discipline, Subhadda, the Ariyan Eightfold
Path is not found, neither in it is there found a saintly man 5
of the first, or of the second, or of the third, or of the fourth
degree. And in whatsoever doctrine and discipline , Subhadda,
the Ariyan Eightfold Path is found, in it is such a saintly
man found. Now in this doctrine and discipline, Subhadda,
1 As discussed above, X. 2.
2 Virago, absence of greed or passion.
3 JDJiammapada, ver. 278.
4 We have not traced this passage. Purity of act, word, and life, is
essential as a preliminary qualification for the Path; much more are
these three factors of the Path.
6 Samano.
602.
Insight and Norm-Wheel
349
is found the Ariyan Eightfold Path, and in it, too, are Joimd
men of saintliness of all four degrees. Void are the systems
of other teachers, void of saintly men ’P
Hence surely the Path is eightfold.
6. Of Insight.
Controverted Point . — That insight into the twelve-fold
base is spiritual. 2
From the Commentary. — There is an opinion— held by the Pub-
baseliyas, for instance — concerning the 1 twelve constituent parts ’ in
the First Sermon, ‘The Turning of the Norm- Wheel’ — namely, that
knowledge based on those twelve belongs to the Four Paths and Fruits.
[1] Th. — Do you mean that there are twelve kinds of
insight ? You deny. I ask again. You admit. 3 Then are
there twelve [First or] Stream-winning Paths? or Fruits
thereof ? Or twelve of any of the other Paths or Fruits? . . .
[2] P. — But was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘(A, i.) That
this Ariyan Truth concerning III, 4 0 bhikkhus, was not among
the doctrines handed down, hut there arose in me the vision,
there arose in me the insight (nan ay), there arose in me the
wisdom, there arose in me the understanding, there arose in
me the light ; (ii.) that this Ariyan fact of III must he com-
prehended; (iii.) that it was comprehended ; (B, i.) that this
was the Ariyan Truth concerning the Cause of III; (ii.) that
the Cause of III was to be put away . . .; (iii.) was put away;
(C, i.) that this was the Ariyan Truth concerning the Cessa-
tion of III; (ii.) that this Cessation was to he realized; (iii.) had
been realized ; CD, i.) that this was the Ariyan Truth concern-
1 Dialogues, ii. 166.
2 Lokuttara-. See above, p. 134, n. 4.-
3 He first denies because of the oneness of the Paths ; he then assents
because of the diverse knowledge — as to nature, the need to do and
the being done — respecting each Truth. — Corny.
- The Br. translator renders ‘ That this 111 constitutes an Ariyan
fact.’
350 Insight and Norm- Wheel XX. 6.
ing the Path going to the Cessation of III ; (ii.) that that Path
ivas to be developed; (iii.) that it had been developed ’ l 1
Hence surely the insight based on these twelve parts is
spiritual.
1 Vinaya Texts , i. 96 f. ; Buddhist Suttas (SBE, XI.), 150-152.
1 The citation is inconclusive, as it does not show the twelve kinds of
Insight of the Ariyan Path, but merely a distinction between prior and
later knowledge. — Corny.
604.
The. Sasands Capacity for being Recant
35]
BOOK XXI.
1. Of oar Religion.
Controverted Point. — That our religion is (has been an d
may again be) reformed. 1 2 3
From the Commentary.— Because after the three Councils at which
the differences in our Religion were settled, some— for instance, certain
of the Uttarapathakas— hold that it has been reformed, that there was
such a person as a Reformer of the Religion, and that it is possible
yet to reform it.
[1] Th. — What, then, has been reformed — the Applica-
tions in Mindfulness? the Supreme Efforts? the Steps to
Iddhi ? the Moral Controls ? the Moral Forces ? the Seven
Branches of Enlightenment? Or was that made good
which had been bad ? Or was that which was allied with
vicious things — Intoxicants, Fetters, Ties, Floods, Yokes,
Hindrances, Infections, Graspings, Corruptions— made free
herefrom ? You deny all this, but your proposition [a s
.stated] implies one or the other.
[2] Or do you mean that anyone has reformed the
religion founded by the Tathagata? If so, in which of
the doctrines enumerated has he effected a reform ? Again
you deny. . . .
[3] Or if you hold that the religion may again be re-
formed, what in it is there that admits of reformation ?
1 Literally, ‘made new.’
852 Consciousness and Individuality Inseparable. XXL 2.
2. Of Experience as Inseparable from Personality.
Controverted Point. — That an ordinary person is not
exempt 1 from experiencing the phenomena 2 of all the three
spheres of life.
From ■ the Commentary . — That is to say, at one and the same
moment, since his understanding -does not suffice to distinguish the
three kinds. Our doctrine only entitles us to say that the individual
is inseparable from such [mental] phenomena as arise at present in him.
[1] Th. — You imply that an ordinary person is insepar-
able from the contacts, the feelings, perceptions, volitions,
cognitions, faiths, efforts, mindfulnesses, concentrations,
understandings, belonging to all three spheres? You deny;
but what else can you mean?
[2] Again, you imply that ■when he makes a gift, say,
of raiment, etc , at that moment he is enjoying not only the
giver’s consciousness, but also the Rupa-consciousness of
the Four Jhanas, the Arupa-consciousness of the four
Arupa-Jhanas.
[3] Opponent. — But is an ordinary person capable of
distinguishing whether his actions leading to a Rupa-world
or Arupa-worid ? If not, then surely he cannot be separated
from actions leading to all three spheres.
3. Of Certain Fetters.
Controverted Point.— That Arahantship is won without
a certain ‘ Fetter ’-quantity being cast off.
From the Commentary.— Some — for instance, the Mahasanghikas —
hold this view with respect to the Tetters of ignorance and doubt, for
the reason that even an Arahant does not know the whole range of
Buddha-knowledge.
- Avivitto, rendered below ‘ inseparable?
2 D h a m m e h i. The Br. translator of the text (unlike the Br.
translator of the Commentary) reads here ka mm eh i (actions), as
in the final sentence of this discourse.
606.
Lid hi
353
[1] Tk . — Do you imply that Arahantship is won without
the extirpation of theory of soul, or doubt, or contagion of
mere rule and ritual, or lust, or hate, or dulness, or indis-
cretion? 1 You deny that you do, but your proposition
cannot then be maintained.
[2] Or do you imply that the Arahant is prone to lust,
hate, dulness, conceit, pride, despair, corruption? Is not
the opposite true of him ? How then can you say there
are certain Fetters he has not cast off?
[3] M . — [If I am wrong, tell me] : does an Arahant know
with the complete purview of a Buddha? You agree he
does not. Hence I am right.
4. Of Supernormal Potency ( iddhi ).
Controverted Point. — That either a Buddha or his dis-
ciples have the power of supernormally performing what
they intend.
From the Commentary. — 1 Iddhi’ is only possible in certain direc-
tions. It is absolutely impossible by it to contravene such laws as
that of Impermanence, etc. 2 But it is possible by iddhi to effect
the transformation of one character into another in the continuity of
anything, 3 or to prolong it in its own character. This may be accom-
plished through merit or other causes, as when, to feed bhikkhus, water
was turned into butter, milk, etc., and as when illuminations were
prolonged at the depositing of sacred relics. This is our orthodox
doctrine. But some, like the Andhakas, hold that iddhi may always
be wrought by will, judging by the venerable Pilindavaeeha willing
that the palace of the king be all of gold. 4
[1] Th . — Do you imply that the one or the other could
effect such wishes as ‘ Let trees be ever green ! ever blos-
1 It is curious that the Theravadin does not confine himself to one
or other of the Better-categories. However, there was more than one
category, and the ' list given may have formed another of them. Cf.
Bud. Psy. Bth ., p. 803.
2 I.e., of 111 (as inseparable from life), and of No-soul, and other
natural laws, as in the text.
3 Santati. See Compendium, p. 252
4 Vinaya Texts , ii. 65.
ts. v.
23
354
Mutual Resemblance in Buddhas
XXL 5.
soming ! ever in fruit ! Let there be perpetual moonlight! 1
Let there be constant safety ! Let there be constant
abundance of alms ! Let there be always abundance of
grain ’ ? [2] Or such wishes as ‘ Let this factor of con-
sciousness that has arisen [contact, feeling], etc., not cease!’
[3] Or such wishes as 1 Let this body, this mind, become
permanent !’ [4] Or such wishes as ‘ Let beings subject to
birth, old age, disaster, death, not be born, grow old, be
unfortunate, die !’ All this you deny. Where then is your
proposition ?
[5] A. — But if I am wrong, how was it that when the
venerable Pilindavaccha resolved : ‘ Let the palace of Seniya
Bimbisara, King of Magadha, be only of gold !’ it was
even so ? . . .
5. Of Buddhas.
Controverted Point . .— That Buddhas differ one from
another in grades.
From, the Commentary. — We hold that, with the exception of
differences in body, age, and radiance, 2 at any given time, Buddhas
differ mutually in no other respect. Some, however, like the Andhakas,
hold that they differ in other qualities in general.
[1] Th . — Wherein then do they differ — in any of the
matters pertaining to Enlightenment? 3 in self-mastery? 4
in omniscient insight and vision ? . . .
1 . 6- Of All- Pervading Power.
Controverted Point . — That the Buddhas persist in all
directions*
1 J u n h a p. The Br. translator renders this by ‘ growth.’
1 Some manuscripts read pabhava-mattap, measure of power,
which is scarcely plausible for a Buddhist. Pacceka Buddhas are
presumably not taken into account.
3 See p. 65.
4 Vasibhava, literally, the state of one who has practice.
608.
Buddha- Pervasion
355
From the Commentary . — Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
a Buddha 1 exists in the four quarters of the firmament, above, below,
and around, causing his change of habitat to come to pass in any
sphere of being.
[1] Th. — Do you.. mean that they persist 2 in the eastern
quarter ? You deny. Then you contradict yourself. You
assent. 3 Then lash, How is [this Eastern] Buddha named?
What is his family? his clan? what the names of his
parents ? or of his pair of elect disciples ? or of his body-
servant ? What sort of raiment or bowl does he* bear ? and
in what village, town, city, kingdom, or country ?
[2] Or does a Buddha persist in the southern . . .
western . . . northern quarter ? or in the nadir ? or in the
zenith ? Of any such an one I ask you the same ques-
tions. ... Or does he persist in the realm of the four '
great Kings? 4 or in the heaven of the Three-and-Thirty ?
or in that of the Yama or the Tusita devas ? or in that of
the devas who rejoice in creating,. or of those who exploit
the creations of others ? 5 or in the Brahma-world ? If you
assent, I ask you further as before. ...
7. Of Phenomena.
Controverted Point . — That all things are by nature im-
mutable. 6
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas and certain of
the Uttarapathakas, hold this, judging from the fact that nothing
1 In the PTS edition for bud dh a read buddho atthiti.
2 Titt.hanti, lit, 4 stand the word used in XIII. 1 for ‘endure. 1
3 He denies with respect to [the locus of] the historical Sakya-
muni [ sic\ ; he assents, since by his view the persisting is in different
places. — Corny.
4 On the possible birthplace of these deities, see Moulton, Zoro-
astrianism, 22-27, 242.
5 Cf. Compendium , p. 140 f.
6 Niyata. On this term, see above, V. 4; YI. 1. 4 Not fixed’
below is a-niyato. On the three alternatives in § 1, see Childers’s
Dictionary, s.v. rasi. The three are affirmed in Dlgha-Nih., iii. 217.
356 Things as Immutable XXI. 7.
[however it may change] gives up its fundamental nature, matter,
e.g., being fixed as matter, and so on.
[1] Th . — Do you mean that they all belong to that Order
of things, by which the wrong-doer is assured of immediate
retribution on rebirth, or to that other Order by which the
Path-winner is assured of final salvation ? Is there not a
third congeries that is not fixed as one or the other ? You
deny. But think. Surely there is ? You assent. Then
you contradict your proposition. And you must do so, for
did not the Exalted One speak of three congeries ?
[3] You affirm [as your reason] that matter is fixed as
matter, and that mind (or each mental aggregate) is fixed
as mind. Well, then, under which of those three congeries
do you find them fixed? 1
[4] A . U . — But if I may not say that matter, or mind
is fixed as matter, or mind respectively, tell me, can body
become mind, can become one of the four mental aggre-
gates, or conversely? Of course not. Surely then I am
right.
8. Of Karma.
Controverted Point . — That all karmas are inflexible. 2
From the Commentary . — The same parties hold also this opinion,
judging by the fact that karmas which work out their own effects
under present conditions in this or the next life, or in a posterior series
of lives, are fixed with respect one to the other.
[1, 2] Similar to §§1,2 in the foregoing.
[3] Th . — Bo you mean that karma which eventuates in
1 They are not immutable in badness, nor in goodness, wrongness,
nor rightness. Therefore, since these are the only two categories
admitted as immutable, they must come under the third or mutable
‘non-fixed’ category or congeries (r a si).
2 There are two uniformities in Nature, by one of which the worst
offenders are assured of immediate retribution after death, and by the
other of which the Path-winner is assured of final salvation. And
there is a third alternative group which is neither.
611.
Karma as Rigid
357
this life is a fixed fact as such ? You assent. 1 Then does
it belong to either of the fixed orders ? You deny. [Then
it belongs to no fixed order.] The same holds good with
respect to karma, results of which will be experienced at
the next rebirth, or in a succession of rebirths.
[4] A. U . — But you admit, do you not, that none of
these three kinds of karma is mutually convertible with
the other two ? How then am I wrong ?
1 This kind of karma, if capable of eventuating at all, [invariably]
works out its effects in this very life; if not, it becomes inoperative
[ahosi-kamma]. So the Thera vadin assents.— Corny. That is,
each of these three kinds of karma retains its own characteristics.
35S
Final Passing Away
XXII. 2.
BOOK XXII
1. Of the Completion of Life.
Controverted Point. — That life may be completed without
a certain Tetter-quantity having been cast off.
From the Commentary . — Inasmuch as the Arahant completes
existence without casting off every Fetter with respect to the range
of omniscience, some, like the Andhakas, hold the aforesaid view,
similar to what has been noticed above (theory of the Mahasanghikas,
XXL 3).
The dialogue resembles XXI. 3, verbatim.
2. Of Moral Consciousness.
Controverted Point . — That the Arahant is ethically con-
scious when completing existence at final death.
From the Commentary . — Some, like the Andhakas, hold this view
on the ground that the Arahant is ever lucidly conscious, even at the
hour of utterly passing away. The criticism points out that moral
(ethical or good) consciousness inevitably involves meritorious karma
[taking effect hereafter]. The doctrine quoted by the opponent is
inconclusive. It merely points to the Arahant’s lucidity and aware-
ness while dying, to his ethically neutral and therefore inoperative
presence of mind and reflection at the last moments of his cognitive
process [j a v a n a]. But it was not intended to show the arising of
morally good thoughts.
[1] Th. — You are implying that an Arahant is achieving
karma of merit, or karma of imperturbable character; 1 that
1 Or ‘for remaining static,’ anenj ab his an k h ar ap. See the
same line of argument in XVII. 1. The alternatives refer to the
sensuous and to the immaterial planes of existence.
613. Final Passing Away 359
he is working karma affecting destiny, and rebirth, con-
ducive to worldly authority and influence, to wealth and
reputation, 1 to beauty celestial or human. . . .
[2J You are implying that the Arahant, when he is pass-
ing away, is accumulating or pulling down, is eliminating
or grasping, is scattering or binding, is dispersing or collect-
ing. 2 Is it not true of him that he stands, as Arahant,
neither heaping up nor pulling down, as one who has pulled
down? That he stands, as Arahant, neither putting off
nor grasping at, as one who has put off? As neither
scattering nor binding, as one who has scattered? As
neither dispersing nor collecting, as one who has dispersed ?
[3] A . — But does not an Arahant pass utterly away with
lucid presence of mind, mindful and aware ? You agree.
Then is this not £ good ’ consciousness ? 3
3. Of Imperturbable ( Fourth Jlicma) Consciousness.
Controverted Point— That the Arahant completes ex-
istence in imperturbable absorption (anehj e).
From the Commentary . — Certain of the Uttar apathakas hold that
the Arahant, no less than a Buddha, when passing utterly away, is in a
sustained Fourth Jhana 4 [of the Immaterial plane].
[1] Th. — But does he not complete existence with
ordinary (or normal) consciousness? 5 You agree. How;
then do you reconcile this with your proposition?
1 Literally, great following or retinue.
2 Cf. I. 2, § 63.
3 On the technical meaning of ‘kusala, a - lens ala ! (good, had),
see above, p. 339, ‘From the Commentary.’ ‘Good’ meant ‘pro-
ducing happy result.’ Now the Arahant had done with all that.
4 Wherein all thinking and feeling have been superseded by clear-'
ness of mind and indifference. See p. 190, n. 2 ; Dialogues, i. 86 f.
6 Pakati-ciite — i.e., sub-consciousness (unimpressed conscious-
ness, bhavangacitta). All sentient beings are normally in tills
mental state. When that ends, they expire with the (so-called act
of) ‘decease-consciousness [cuti-citta, which takes effect, in itself
ceasing, as reborn consciousness in a new embryo]. The Arahant’s
360
Of Inherited Intellect
XXII. 4.
[2] You are implying that he passes away with an
ethically inoperative consciousness. 1 Is it not rather with
a consciousness that is pure ‘ result ’? [3] Whereas accord-
ing to you he passes away with a consciousness that is
unmoral and purely inoperative, I suggest that it is with a
consciousness that is unmoral and purely resultant.
[4] And did not the Exalted One emerge from Fourth
Jhana before he passed utterly away immediately after? 2
4. Of Penetrating the Truth.
Controverted Point. — That an embryo is capable of pene-
trating the truth.
Front the Commentary. — Some— that is, certain of the Uttara-
pathakas — hold that one who in his previous birth was a Stream-
winner, and remains so, must have [as a newly resultant consciousness]
grasped the Truth while an embryo. 3
[1] Th. — You are implying that an embryo can be
instructed in, hear, and become familiar with the Doctrine,
can be catechized, can take on himself the precepts, be
normal mind when on the Arupa plane would be imperturbable. But
the question is asked with reference to the life-plane of all five
aggregates’ (not of four immaterial ones only). — Corny.
1 Kiriyamaye citte. Buddhism regards consciousness, under
the specific aspect of causality, as either (1) karmic — i.e,, able to
function causally as karma ; (2) resultant (v i p a k a), or due to karma ;
(B) non-causal (kir iy a), called here ‘ inoperative.’ Cf. Compendium ,
p. 19 f. I.e., certain resultant kinds of consciousness, effects of karma
in a previous birth, can never be causal again so as to effect another
result in any moral order in the sense in which effects may become
causes in the physical order. Again, there are certain ethically neutral
states of consciousness consisting in mere action of mind without
entailing moral consequences. The Buddhist idea is that the normal
flux of consciousness from birth to death, in each span of life, is purely
resultant, save where it is interrupted by causal, or by ‘ inoperative ’
thought.
2 Dialogues, ii. 175.
3 The UttarSpathakas were perhaps ‘ feelhig out’ for a theory of
heredity.
Pre-Natal and Dream-Attainment
361
guarded as to the gates of sense, abstemious in diet, devoted
to vigils early and late. Is not the opposite true ?
[2] Are there not two conditions for the genesis of right
views — £ another’s voice and intelligent attention?’ 1
[3] And can there be penetration of the Truth by one
who is asleep, or languid, or blurred in intelligence, or
unreflective ?
5. Three Other Arguments : ( a ) On Attainment of A rahant-
ship by the Embryo; (6) on Penetration of Truth by a
Dreamer; ( c ) on Attainment of Arahantship by a
Dreamer.
From the Commentary.— The attainment of Arab ant ship by very
young Stream-winners, [notably the story of] the [phenomenal] seven-
vear-old son of the lay-believer Suppavasa, 2 led the same sectaries to
believe in even ante-natal attainment of Arahantship. 3 They, hold
further, seeing the wonderful feats, such as levitation, etc., that are
experienced in dreams, that the dreamer may not only penetrate the
Truth, but also attain Arahantship.
In all three cases the argument is simply a restatement
of XXII. 4, § 3.
6. Of the Unmoral.
Controverted Point . — That all drearu-consciousness is
ethically neutral.
From the Commentary. — From the Word, 1 There is volition , and
that volition is negligible ’ 4 some — that is, certain of the Uttara ■
pathakas — hold the aforesaid view. But this was spoken with refer-
1 Anguttara-Nik., i. 87.
2 This was a favourite legend. See Pss. of the Brethren, lxx. ‘ Sivali, 3
the child-saint in question ; Jdtaka, No. 100 ; Uddna , ii. 8 ; Dhamma-
pada Commentary, iv. 192 f. Also on the mother, Anguttara-Nik.,
ii. 62.
3 The embryonic consciousness carrying the force of previous,
culminating karma into effect. See previous page, n. 1.
- Vimaya, iii. 112, commenting on Vinaya Texts, ii. 226. Abbo-
hari-ka (or -ya), i.e., a-voharika, not of legal or conventional
status.
362
Habitual Repetition
XXII. 7.
ence to ecclesiastical offences. 1 Although a dreamer may entertain
evil thoughts of murder, etc., no injury to life or property is wrought.
Hence they cannot be classed as offences. Hence dream-thoughts are
a negligible quantity, and for this reason, and not because they are
ethically neutral, they may be ignored. 2
[1] Th . — You admit, do you not, that a dreamer may
(in dreams) commit murder, theft, etc. ? How then can
you call such consciousness ethically neutral ?
[2] U . — If I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted
One that dream-consciousness was negligible? If so, my
proposition bolds good.
7. Of Correlation by Repetitions
Controverted Point. — That there is no correlation by
way of repetition.
From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as all phenomena are momen-
tary, nothing persisting more than an instant, nothing can be so
correlated as to effect repetition ; hence there never is repetition.
This is also an opinion of the Uttarapathakas.
[I] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ The.
taking of life, bhikkhus, when habitually practised and 'multi-
plied, is conducive to rebirth in purgatory, or among animals,
or Petas. In its slightest form it results in, and is conducive
to, a brief life among men’? [2] And again: 'Theft,
bhikkhus, adultery , lying, slander, uttering harsh words, idle
talk, intoxication, habitually practised and multiplied, arc
each and all conducive to rebirth in purgatory, among animals,
or Petas. The slightest theft results in, conduces to destruc-
tion of property ; the mildest offence against chastity gives
rise to retaliatory measures among men ; the lightest form
of lying exposes the liar to false accusation among men; the
mildest offence in slander leads to a rupture of friendship
1 A p a 1 1 i, explained (after an exegetic fashion) as a 1 1 a ij p 1 1 a n a ij
p a j j a t i t i, ‘ is come to infliction of punishments.’
2 Of. Compendium, pp. 47, 52.
3 Asevana. See p. 294, n. 2.
620.
368
Eternal Things and Duration
among men ; the lightest result of harsh words creates sounds
jarring on the human car ; the slightest result of idle talk
is speech commanding no respect 1 among men ; the mildest
inebriety conduces to leant of sanity among men ’P [3, 4] And
again : 4 Wrong views, bhikkhus, wrong aspiration, effort,
speech, activity, livelihood mindfulness, concentration — each
ami all, if habitually practised, developed, and multiplied,
conduce to rebirth in purgatory , among animals, among Petas ’ ?
And again: ‘Bight views, right purpose, etc, habitually
practised, developed, and multiplied, have their base and their
goal and their cud in the Ambrosial ’P
8. Of Momentary Duration .
Controverted Point. — That all things are momentary
conscious units.
From the Commentary. — Some — for instance, the Pubbaseliyas and
the Aparaseliyas — hold that, since all conditioned things are imper-
manent, therefore they endure but one conscious moment. Given,
universal impermanence — one thing ceases quickly, another after an
interval — what, they ask, is here the law ? The Theravadin shows it
is but arbitrary to say that because things are not immutable, therefore
they all last but one mental moment.
[1] Th. — Do you imply that a mountain, the ocean,
Sineru chief of mountains, the cohesive, fiery, and mobile
elements, grass, twigs, trees, all last [only so long] in con-
sciousness ? You deny. . . .
[2] Or do you imply that the organ of sight coincides 4 for
the same moment of time with the visual cognition ? If
you assent, I would remind you of what the venerable
Sariputta said : 4 If, brother, the eye within be intact, but the
object ‘without does not come into focus, and there is no so*
ordinated application of mind resulting therefrom, then a cor -
responding state of cognition is not manifested. And if the
1 Cf. the positive form of this term in Vinaya Texts, iii. 186, § 8.
2 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 247.
3 Sa?jyutta-Nih, v. 54, but the word a s e v i t o is wanting.
4 S a h a j a t a 3, ‘ come into being and cease together.’ — Corny.
864 Eternal Things and Duration XXII. 8.
organ of sight within be intact, and the object without come
into focus, but no co-ordinated application of mind result
therefrom, a corresponding state of cognition is not manifested.
But if all these conditions be satisfied, then a corresponding
state of cognition is manifested ’ l 1
Where now is your assertion about coincidence in time ?
[8] The same Suttanta reference may be cited to refute
you with respect to time-coincidence in the other four senses.
[4] P, A . — But are ail things permanent, enduring, per-
during, immutable ?
Th . — Nay that cannot truly be said. . . .
1 Majjhima-Nik., i. 190.
622.
United Resolve
365
BOOK XXIII
1. Of United Resolve.
Controverted Point . — That sexual relations may be entered
upon with a united resolve. 1
From the Commentary. — Such a vow may be undertaken, some
think — for instance, the Andhakas and the Yetulyakas 2 — by a human
pair who feel mutual sympathy or compassion 8 [not passion merely],
and who are worshipping, it may be, at some Buddha-shrine, and
aspire to be united throughout their future lives.
[1] Th. — Do you imply that a united resolve may be
undertaken which does not befit a recluse, does not become
a bhikkhu, or that it may be undertaken by one who has
cut off the root [of rebirth], or when it is a resolve that
would lead to a Parajika offence? 4
Or when it is a resolve by which life may be slain, theft
committed, lies, slander, harsh words, idle talk uttered,
burglary committed, dacoity, robbery, highway robbery,
adultery, sack and loot of village or town be committed ?. . . 6
[You must be more discriminating in your use of the
term * with a united resolve ’ !]
1 Ekadhippayo. There is nothing objectionable in the relation
so entered upon, except, of course, for the recluse or a member of
the Order.
2 See XVII. 6.
3 Karuhha, ‘pity,’ not the term anukampana, which does
much duty in Buddhism to express affection in social and conjugal
relations. See Ency. Beligions, ‘ Love, Buddhist.’ On the belief in
such repeated unions, see Maha, Kassapa’s legend, Pss. of the Brethren,
p. B59 1, and Bhadda’s (his wife’s) verses, Pss. of the Sisters, p. 49.
4 Meriting expulsion from the Order.
5 Dialogues , i. 69.
366
The Bailhimt's Choice
XXIII. 3.
2. Of Bogus Arahants.
Controverted Point . — That infra-human beings, taking the
shape of Arahants, 1 follow sexual desires.
From the Commentary . — This belief arose in consequence of the
dress and deportment of evil-minded bhikkhus, and is held by some —
for instance, certain of the Uttar apathakas.
[1] Th . — Would you also say that such beings, resem-
bling Arahants, commit any or all such crimes as are stated
above (XXIII. 1) ? You deny ; but why limit them to
one only of those crimes ?
3. Of Self governed Destiny.
Controverted Point. — That a Bodhisat (or future Buddha)
(a) goes to an evil doom, ( h ) enters a womb, (c) performs
hard tasks, (d) works penance under alien teachers of his
own accord and free will.
From the Commentary. — Some— for instance, the Andhakas— judge
that the Bodhisatta, in the case of the Six-toothed Elephant Jataka 2
and others, was freely so reborn as an animal or in purgatory, that
he freely performed difficult tasks, and worked penance under alien
teachers.
[1] (a) Th . — Do you mean that he so went and endured
purgatory, the Sanjlva, Kalasutta, Tapana, Patappia, San-
ghataka, Boruva, and Aviehi hells ? If you deny, how can
you maintain your proposition ? Can you quote me a
Sutta to support this ?
[2] (h ). — You maintain that he entered the womb of his
own free will. 3 Do you also imply that he chose tp be
reborn in purgatory, or as an animal ? That he possessed
1 It should be remembered that in a wider, popular sense, any
religieux were — at least, in the commentarial narratives — called
Arahants — i.e., ‘worthy ones,’ ‘holy men.’ Cf. Pss. of the Sisters,
p. 130 ; Dhammapada Commentary , i. 400.
2 No. 514. 8 The PTS edition omits Am ant a here.
Of Bogus Consciousness
367
625.
magic potency ? You deny. 1 I ask it again. You assent. 2
Then did he practise the Four Steps to that potency — will,
effort, thought, investigation ? Neither can you quote me
here a Sutta in justification.
[3] (<?). — You maintain further that the Bodhisat of his
own free will performed that which was painful and hard
to do. Do you thereby mean that he fell back on wrong
views such as £ the world is eternal,’ etc., or £ tha world is
finite,’ etc., or £ infinite,’ etc., ‘ soul and body are the same,’
. . . £ are different,’ £ the Tathagata exists after death,’ £ does
not exist,’ £ both so exists and does not,’ £ neither so exists
nor does not ’ ? Can you quote me a Sutta in justification?
[4] (d). — You maintain further that the Bodhisat of his
own free will made a series of penances following alien
teachers. Does this imply that he then held their views ?
Can you quote me a Sutta in justification ? . . .
4. Of Counterfeit States of Consciousness.
Controverted Point. — That there is that which is not
(a) lust, (b) hate, (e) dulness, (d) the corruptions, but which
counterfeits each of them.
From the Commentary. — Such are with regard to (a) amity, pity,
approbation ; with regard to (6) envy, selfishness, worry ; with regard
to (c) the sense of the ludicrous ; with regard to ( d ) the suppressing of
the discontented, the helping of kindly bhikkhus, the blaming of the
bad, the praising of the good, the declaration of the venerable Pilinda-
Vaccha about outcasts, 3 the declarations of the Exalted Ones about the
incompetent or irredeemable. 4 Such is the opinion held, for instance,
by the Andhakas.
1 Free will, as liberty to do what one pleases through a specific
power -or gift, is practically a denial of karma. Hence this question. —
Corny.
2 He denies with reference to iddhi as accomplished by practice,
then assents with reference to iddhi as accomplished by merit.—
Corny.
3 Y a s a 1 a. Uddna , iii. 6,
4 Mogha-purisa — e.g., Sunalckhatta, the Liechavi ( Dtgha -
Nik., iii. 27 f.). The term is preceded by khelasika-vadap,
‘ declaration about spittle- eaters,’ presumably a term of opprobrium,
but the context of which we cannot trace
368
Dukkha as the. Cosmic Order XXIII. 5. 626.
[1] Th. — Do you imply that there is that which is not
contact, not feeling, not perceiving, not volition, not cogni-
tion, not faith, not energy, not mindfulness, not concen-
tration, not understanding, but which simulates each of
these ?
[2] Similarly for (b) -, (c), (d).
5. Of the Undetermined
Controverted Point. — That the aggregates, elements, con-
trolling powers — all save 111, is undetermined. 1 2
From the Commentary. — Such is the opinion held by some — for
instance, certain of the Uttarapathakas and the Hetuvadins. Their
authority they find in the lines :
’Tis simply III that riseth, simply III
That doth persist, and then fadeth away.
Nought beside III it is that doth become ;
Nought else but III it is doth pass away.' 1
[1] Th. — Do you then maintain that [the marks of the
conditioned are lacking in, say, the material aggregate —
that] matter is not impermanent, not conditioned, has not
arisen because of something, is not liable to decay, to perish,
to be devoid of passion, to cessation, to change? Is not
the opposite true ?
[2] Do you imply that only 111 is caused ? Yes ? But
did not the Exalted One say that whatever was impermanent
was 111? Hence, if this be so, and since matter is imper-
manent, you cannot maintain that only 111 is determined.
[3] The same argument holds good for the other four
aggregates (mental), for all the mechanism of sense, 3 for all
controlling powers. 4
END OF THE TRANSLATED TEXT
1 Aparinipphanna. See p. 261, n. 6.
2 Verses of Vajira, Bhikkhunl. Sayyutta-Nik., i. 185 ; Pss. of the
Sisters, p. 191. Cf. above, p. 61.
3 This includes the categories 22-51, enumerated on p. 15 f.
- This includes those enumerated (52-78) on p. 16.
A PPENDIX
TS. V.
369
24
NOTES ON—
1. Paeamattha, saccika: the Reai, - - - - 371
2. Thxti : the Static ------ 374
3. Sabbam atthi: ‘Everything Exists ’ - - - 375
4. Patisambhida. : Analysis ----- 377
а, Patisambhida, Abhisamaya : Analysis and Penetration - 381
б. (A) Niyama, R i yam a : ‘Assurance’ - 888
(B) Niyama and Karma - - 384
7. Thitata, Ni yam at a ------ 333
8. Nimitta - - - - - - - 887
9. Sangaha : Classification - - 388
10. Paribhoga: Utility - - - - - - 389
11. Paccaya : Correlation - 890
12. Time and Space 392
13. Accanta : Finality ------ 394
14. Aparinipphanna : Undetermined - 395
15. Willing, Anticipating, Aiming - 393
1. Paramattha, saccika: the Eeal.
(I. 1., p. 9.)
In the phrase paramatthena, saccikatthena,
rendered £ in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,’ these
two terms are used synonymously. Saccika is also
stated to be something existent (a 1 1 h i) : and this ‘ existent,
as being not a past, or future, but a present existent, is
explained to be v i j j a m a n a, s a p v i j j a m a n a : — some-
thing veritably or actually existing (p. 22) . V i j j a m a n a,
a very important synonym of paramattha, means
literally £ something which is being known,’ present
participle of the passive stem vid -ya, £ to be known.’ It
is rendered into Burmese by the phrase ' evidently exist-
ing.’ Upalabbhati (p. 8, n. 3), ‘to be known as
closely as possible,’ is the subjective counterpart of the
existing real. Par am a- is, by the Corny., defined as
£ ultimate,’ uttama, a word traditionally defined, in the
Abhidlianappadipika-sucl, as that which has reached [its]
highest — u bbhtito atayattham uttamo.
According to Dhammapala, in the KatliarattliH-anutiha,
parama means patthana, £ pre-eminent,’ * principal,’
because of irreversibility (a-viparltabhavato) or, in-
capacity of being transformed. And he further thought
that the reality of that which is parama depends upon its
being a sense-datum of infallible knowledge (a v i p a r I-
tassa nanassa visayabhavatthena sacci-
ka 1 1 h o.
In his Abltidhammattha-tdbhavanl, 1 Summangalasami
follows the K.Y. Corny., but annexes Dhammapala’s
£ irreversibility.’
1 Corny, on the Compendium of Philosophy ; see ibid., p. ix.
371
372
Paramattha, saccika
Ariyavaijsa 1 judged that utfcama, applied to para m a,
excludes the other meaning of pamana-atireka, ‘ sur-
passing in measure.’ And he, too, agrees with Dham-
mapala, that a thing is * ultimate ’ because it is incapable
of further transformations, or of analysis, and because it
is the sense-datum of infallible knowledge.
A 1 1 h a, in the term paramattha, Europeans usually
render by ‘ meaning.’ It refers rather to all that is
meant (meaning in extension, not intension) by any given
word. In its present connection it has nothing to do with
the verbal meaning, import, sense or significance of a word.
According to Ariyavaijsa, it means either a thing per sc
(sabhdra), or a sense-datum ( risaya ). In the former sense,
paramattha becomes an appositionai compound of two
terms, both applying to one and the same thing. In the
latter sense, the compound is resolvable into paramassa
a 1 1 h o. If, with Sumangalasami, we read uttamai]
n a n a ij into p a r a m a, we get, for paramattha in this
latter sense, sense-field of highest knowledge.
Now r , there are Buddhists in Burma who hold that if the
c real ’ can only be fitly described in terms of highest know-
ledge, only a Buddha can know it, and average folk can
therefore only know the shadow of it (paramattha-
chaya). We, i.e., know the phenomenon but not the
noumenon. This transcendentalism, however, is not ortho-
dox doctrine.
Turning finally to the term saccika, or the more
familiar s a e c a, 2 this may mean abstract truth (1 a k-
kh ana - saccaij), as of a judgment, or concrete fact
(vatthu -saccaij), as of a reality. 3 ‘Truth’ by no
means always fits sacca. See, e.g., our translation of
the Four Ariyan ‘ Truths,’ p. 215 of the Compendium. The
Second Sacca is reckoned to be a thing to be got rid of like
1 In the Mauisd ra-mauj ns a, Tika on that Corny. ; fifteenth cen-
tury, A.D.
1 Sac cam eva saccikar], Mamsdra-tnanjusa. For English
readers it may he stated that the doubled c (pron. cch) results from
s a t - y a.
3 P. 188, n. 4.
poison. But we do not wish to discard a Truth. Hence
we have substituted 4 fact,’ following Sumangalasami, who
comments on the term 4 Ariyan Truths ’ in the passage
referred to as meaning 4 realities ’ or * facts ’ which
4 Ariyanize those who penetrate them/ making them
members of one stage or another of the Ariyan Path. Or,
again, 4 realities so-called because Ariyans penetrate them
as their own property, or because they were taught by the
greatest of Ariyans.’ *
Ariyavaijsa, sub-commenting, holds that sacea imports
actual existence, not liable to reversion ; for instance, the
reality of the characteristics of fire or other natural forces. 1 2
Finally, in this connection, Ledi Sadaw’s disquisition on
conventional or nominal truth and real, ultimate, or philo-
sophical truth in 4 Some Points of Buddhist Doctrine ’
( JPTS , 1913-14, 2 : >- 129) and in his 4 Expositions ’
(■ Buddhist Review, October, 1915), expanding the section in
the Iv.V. Corny., (p. 68, n. 2), of this volume should be
considered. In his own Corny, on the Compendium of
Philosophy — Paramattha-dlpanZ — he examines more closely
the terms we are discussing. ‘Attha,’ he says, 4 may
mean : (a) things per se (s a b h a v a - s i d d h a) ; or (b) things
merely conceived (p a r ik a p p a - sid dh a). The former
(a) include mind, etc., verifiable existents, severally, by their
own intrinsic characteristics, and, simply, without reference
to any other thing. The latter (h) are not such verifiable
existents. They exist by the mind . . . 4 being,’ ‘person,’
etc., are 4 things ’ created by mental synthesis. 3
Of these two classes, only things per se are termed
paramattha, real. Attha may therefore be defined
as that thing which is intelligible to mind and represent-
able by signs, terms or concepts. Paramattha is that
reality which, by its truly verifiable existence, transcends
1 See III., p. 81, of Saya Pye’s Tikagyaw and Mauisdramanjusu.
3 Op. et loc. cit. . . . aggalakkhanay viya lokapakati
viya.
3 Or ‘logical construction,' as Mr. Bertrand Bussell would say
(Lowell Lectures, 1914, p. 59).
374
Thiti
concepts. . . . Ultimate facts never fail those who seek for
genuine insight. Hence they are real. Concepts, on the
other hand, not verifiably existing, fail them ’ (pp. 14-16).
2. Thiti: the Static.
(I. 1., p. 55.)
In the passage here quoted from the Suttas: — 'of con-
ditioned things the genesis is apparent, the passing away
is apparent, the duration (as a third distinct state amidst
change) is apparent’ — the three stages of ‘becoming’ in
all phenomena, always logically distinguishable, if not
always patent to sense, are enunciated. That the midway
stage is a constant like the others : that between genesis
and decay there was also a static stage (perhaps only a
zero point of change), designated as thiti (from
titthati [stha], to stand), was disputed by some — e.g.,
Ananda, the author of the Ttka on the three Abidhamma
Commentaries by Buddhaghosa. But the Compendium
itself states the traditional and orthodox tenet in the case
of units of mental phenomena : ‘ one thought-moment con-
sists of three time-phases, to wit, nascent, static, and
arresting phases ’ {Comp., pp. 25, 26, 125).
In the Sutta the word rendered by * duration ’ is not
thiti, but thitanap, gen. plur. of thitaij, or static
[thing]. Commentarial philosophy tended to use the
abstract form. It also distinguished (or commented upon
as already distinguished) two kinds of duration (or enduring
things): kh anika-thiti, ‘momentary duration,’ and
pabandha-thiti, or combined duration. The latter
constitutes the more popularly conceived notion of j a r a :
decay, old age, degeneration in any phenomenon. The
Puggalavadin was thinking of this notion when he answered
the first question.
Now if, in the Sutta, duration was to be understood as a
static stage between genesis and decay, it would almost
certainly have been named in such an order. But it was
named last. And it may well be that the more cultured intel-
' Everything Exists ’
375
lect of the propounder of the Sutta did not accept the popular
notion of any real stationariness (thiti) in a cosmos of
incessant change, but only took it into account as a com-
monly accepted view, expressing it, not as one positive phase
in three positive phases of becomings but negatively, as this
£ otherness 5 of duration (he., a state of duration other than
genesis and passing away) appears to ordinary intelligence.
3. Sabbam atthi : ‘ Everything Exists.’
(I. 6, p. 84 f.)
At first sight it would appear that the emphasis is on the
first word: ‘everything,’ ‘all.’ This would be the case if
the thesis were here opposed toekaceam atthi: ‘ some
things exist, some do not,’ which is discussed in the next
discourse but one. But the context shows clearly that, in
both these theses, the emphasis is really on the word
‘atthi’: ‘ is,’ in the sense of ‘ exists.’
Now the Burmese translator supplies after sab bap, a
term which, in Pali, is dhamma-jataq. This, dis-
connected, is d h a m m a s s a j a t a ij : the arising or
happening of dhamma; anything, that is, which exists
as a fact, as opposed to a chimeera, or in the Pali idiom,
a hare’s horn. (We use the term ‘ thing ’ not in the sense of
substance, or having a substrate, but as anything which is
exhausted, as to its being, by some or all of the known twenty-
eight qualities of body or matter, and by the facts of mind.
Should s a b b a q be understood collectively — ‘ all,’ or
distributively — ‘ everything ’ ? Taken by itself, one of the
questions in § 1, p. 85 : “ Does ‘ all ’ exist in all [things] ?”
would incline us at first sight to the former alternative, at
least in the case of the locative term. Yet even here we do
not read the question as : Is there in the whole a whole ?
but as : Does the whole exist in everything, or every part ?
taking the nominative, sabbaij, collectively, the locative,
s a b b e s u, distributively. And the context in general leads
us to the latter alternative. The Sabbatthivadin believes
in the continued existence of any particular [thing] past,
376
Scibbam atthi
present, and future. The Commentator accounted for this
belief by that school’s interpretation of this postulate :
No past, present, or future dhamma’s (facts-as-cognized)
abandon the kh andha-nature (sabbe pi atltadi-
bheda dhamma khandha-sabhavaij na vijahanti).
Once a dhamma, always a dhamma. The live aggre-
gates (kh and ha’s), in other words matter-mind, however
they may vary at different times, bear the same general
characteristics all the time.
Perhaps the following quotation from John Locke’s critics,
taken from Green and Grose’s Hume, vol. i., p. 87, may
help to show the Commentator’s meaning with reference to
the rupakkhandha, or material aggregate : ‘ But of
this (that is, of another thing which has taken the place of
a previous thing, making an impact on the sensitive tablet
at one moment, but perishing with it the next moment),
the real essence is just the same as the previous thing,
namely, that it may be touched, or is solid, or a body, or a
parcel of matter; nor can this essence be really lost. . . .
It follows that real change is impossible. A parcel of
matter at one time is a parcel of matter at all times.’
Thus, the Sabbatthivadin might say, because a parcel of
matter to which we assign the name 'gold'’ was yellow,
fusible, etc., in the past, is so now, and will be so in future,
therefore gold £ exists.’ Again, because fire burned yester-
day, burns to-day, and will burn to-morrow, therefore fire
exists.
In some such way this school had come to believe in the
immutable existence, the real essence of all or everyt hin g,
taken in the distributive sense of everything without excep-
tion ; but not always excluding the collective sense.
Pupa — e.g., in § 3 : 'Do past material qualities exist?’ —
refers to the rupakkhandha, i.e., in a collective sense.
That, however, does not preclude any one of the twenty-eight
qualities of body ( Compendium , pp. 157-160) from being
taken distributively, or prevent any material object com-
posed of eight or more of these qualities from being discussed
separately. •
' Everything Exists ’
377
In the heckling dialectic of the paragraph numbered 23
(p. 89, f.), we have found it necessary to supply certain
terms chosen according to the context, and from the Com-
mentary. The Pali reader should consult the Burmese
edition of the latter, since there are errors of printing and
punctuation in that compiled byMinayeff (PTS edition p.45).
It may prove helpful if we give in English the Burmese
translation of the Commentary from p. 45, 1. 18, PTS
edition : ‘ A t h a nap Sakavadl:yadi te.’ . . .
Theravadin : ‘Let that thing of yours, which, on becom-
ing present after having been future, be taken into account
as “having been, is.” And let it equally be spoken of as
“ again having been, is.” Then a chimeera which, not having
been future can not become present, should be spoken of as
“not having been, is not.” But does your chimeera repeat
the negative process of not having been, is not? If so,
it should be spoken of as “again not having been, is not.” ’
The Opponent thinks: ‘An imaginary thing cannot,
having been future, become present, because of its very non-
existence. Let it then be spoken of as “ not having been, is
not” (“na hutva na hoti nama tava hotu.”)
But how can such a thing repeat the negative process
(literally ‘ state ’ : b h a v o) ? If not, it cannot be spoken of
as “ again not having been, is not.”
The Sabbatthivadin is here and throughout represented
as dealing with mere abstract ideas of time — i.e., with
abstract names for divisions of time — and not with things
or facts. The object of the Theravadin, in introducing
imaginary things, is to refute arguments so based. His
opponent is not prepared to push his abstractions further
by allowing a repetition of a process which actually never
once takes place.
4. Patisambhida ; Analysis.
(See p. 179, V. 5.)
In this, the earliest Buddhist doctrine of logical analysis,
the four branches (or * Four Patisambhida’s), frequently
referred to are (1) Attha-patisambhida: analysis
878
Patisamhhidd
of meanings * in extension.’ (2) Dhamma-patisam-
b h i cl a : analysis of reasons, conditions, or causal relations.
(3) Nirutti- patisambhida: analysis of [meanings ‘in
intension ’ as given in] definitions. (4)Patibhana-pati-
sambhida: analysis of intellect to which things knowable
by the foregoing processes are presented.
1. ‘Attha’ does not refer to verbal meanings. Lecli
Sadaw and U. Pandi agree with us that it means the
£ thing ’ signified by the term. Hence it is equivalent to
the European notion of denotation, or meaning in extension.
2. The latter authority holds that dhamma refers to
terms. [He has, by the way, a scheme of correspondence
between the branches of the literary concept havi, and the
above-named branches : —
Attha-kavi . . .
Suta-kavi
Cinta-kavi
Patibhana-kavi
Attha-patisambhida.
Dhamma- ,,
Nirutti- ,,
Patibhana ,,
suggested by the mutually coinciding features.] But in
the A bhidh anappad ipi I;.ci-su cl, art. dhamma, this term, in
the present connection, is taken to mean hctu, or paccaya
(condition, or causal relation) : hetumhi nanai)
dhamma - patisambhidiiti adlsu hetumhi
p a c e ay e .
8. Nirutti ( n i [ r ] : ‘ de u 1 1 i : ‘ expression ’) means,
popularly, * grammar technically it is ‘ word-definition ’
(viggaha, vacanattha). E.g., Bujjhatiti Buddho
— ‘Buddha is one who knows ’ — is a definition of the word
‘Buddha.’ Such a definition is nirutti, the meaning
being now expressed or uttered. Hence nirutti may
stand for the European connotation, or meaning in intension.
4. Patibhana ( p a t i : ‘ re ’ ; b h a : ‘to become ap-
parent ’) is defined in the A bhidh an appadjpiha-s del :
patimukha bhavanti, upatthahanti neyya
etenati patibhanap: ‘Patibhana’ means that
by which things knowable (1, 2, 8) become represented,
are present. The representative or ideating processes are
Analysis 379
not themselves patisambhida, but are themselves (as
knowables) analyzed in ‘ analytic insight ’ (patisam-
bhida - h a n a ij ) ^
Thus the scope of this classic doctrine is entirely logical.
And while it is regarded as superior to popular knowledge,
it is distinct from intuition. Men of the world may develop
it, but not intuition. Ariyans, who attain to intuition,
might not have developed it to any great extent.
Patisambhida in the Yihhanyu.
(PTS edition, chap, xv., p. 293 f.)
The definition quoted above, § 2, cites this work :
hetumhi nanap d h a mm a p a ti sambhida, p. 293.
In the list of exegetical definitions of the four branches,
entitled ‘ Suttanta-bhajaniyap,’ we find (1) Attha-pati-
sambhida defined as analysis of phenomena, dhamma,
or things that £ have happened, become, . . . that are mani-
fest’; (2) dhamma-patisambhida, defined as knowledge
of conditions ( hetu ), of cause and effect (lietuphala), ‘ of
phenomena by which phenomena have happened, become,’
etc. Thus (1) may be knowledge of decay and death ;
(2) is then knowledge of the causes ( samudaya ) of decay and
death. Similarly for the third and fourth Truths (Cessation
and the Path). But (2) may also refer to the Doctrine, or
Dhamma : — ‘ knowledge of the Suttas, the Verses,’ and the
rest.
1 Patibhana is here defined as a technical term of Buddhist
philosophy. Its popular meaning of fluency in literary expression is
well illustrated in the Vangisa Sayyutta (i. 187 of the Nikciya).
Vangisa, the irrepressibly fluent ex-occultist, is smitten with remorse
for having, because of his rhetorical gifts (patibhana), despised
friendly brethren, and breaks forth once more to express his re-
pentance, admonishing himself — as G-otama, i.e., as the Buddha’s
disciple {Corny.) — to put away conceit. "When the afflatus was upon
him in the Buddha’s presence, he would ask leave to improvise with
the words : 1 It is manifest [is revealed] to me, Exalted One !’ The
response is : ‘ Let it he manifest to thee, Vangisa !’ And he would
forthwith improvise verses. Cf. Pss. of the Brethren, p. 395, especially
pp. 399, 404.
380 Patisambhida
Of the third and fourth branches, nirutti-patis ° is
always, in this chapter, defined as abhilapa, or verbal
expression, or statement. And p a t i b h a n a-p a t i s° is always
defined as * knowledge in the knowledges,’ as if it referred
to psychological analysis.
In the following section or Abhidhammabhajaniyaij, we
find an inverted order in branches 1, 2. The dhamma’s
considered are all states of consciousness. If they are
moral or immoral — i.e., if they have karmic efficacy (as
causes) — knowledge of them is called d h a m m a-analysis.
Knowledge of their remit, and of all an moral or inoperative
states, which as such are results, is called a 1 1 h a-analysis.
As to 3, 4 : knowledge of the connotation and expression of
dhamma’s as p a nnatti’s (term-concepts) isnirutti-
analysis. And * the knowledge by which one knows those
knowledges ’ (1-3) is p a t i b h a n a-analysis.
We are greatly indebted to the kindness of Ledi Sadaw
Mahathera for a further analysis of Patisambhidii:
‘ In this word, p a t i means v i s up v i s u i) (separately,
one after another) ; s a m means * well,’ ‘ thoroughly ’
b h i d a means to ‘ break up. 1 Thus we get : Patisam-
bhida is that by which Ariyan folk well separate, analyze
[things] into parts.
This, as stated above, is fourfold :
1. At th a- patisambhida includes — (a) Bhasit’attha,
meaning in extension, things signified by words; (b) Pac-
cayuppann’attha, things to which certain other things
stand in causal relation ; (c) Yi p a k ’ a 1 1 h a, resultant
mental groups and matter born of karma; (cl) Kiriy’-
attha; inoperative mental properties — e.g., ‘advertings’
of the mind, etc. ; (e) N i b b a n a, the unconditioned.
2. Dhamma-patisambhidii includes — (a) Bhasita-
d h a m m a, or words spoken by the Buddha ; (b) P a c e a y a -
dhamma, things relating themselves to other objects by
way of a cause ; (c) Kusala-dhamma; (d) Akusala-
dhamma, thoughts moral and immoral ; '(«) Ariya-
magga-dhamma, the Ariyan Path.
Analysis and Penetration 381
8. N i r u 1 1 i-p a t i s a m b h i d a is grammatical analysis
of sentences.
4. Patibhana-patisambhida is analytic insight
into the three preceding (1-8).
Further details may be found in the Commentaries
on the Patisam bhidamagga 1 and the Vibhanga.
5. Patisambhida, Abhisamaya : Analysis and Penetration.
(II., 9, 10.)
The latter term means literally £ beyond-well-making-go,’
and, in this physical sense, is used once or twice in the
Vedas and the Upanisads. Mental activity, however,
borrowed the term now and then in the older Upanisads, so
that the double usage obtained contemporaneously, just as
we speak of £ getting at,’ or £ grasping ’ either a book, or a
meaning in it. In Buddhist literature the secondary
psychological, and metaphysical meaning would seem alone
to have survived. Buddhaghosa, commenting on the I)igha-
Xik. (i. p. 32: ‘ samaya’), distinguishes three uses of
the compound term, one of which is that which is used
in the discourse in question, namely, pativedha, or
penetration, piereing, that is, by, as it were, an in thrust
of mind. In the opening of the £ Abhisamaya-vagga,’
Sayyntta-Nil'., ii., 133, it is applied to one who compre-
hends, and is used synonymously with ‘ acquiring a vision
(eye) for things’; in the £ Vacchagotta-Sapyutta ’ (ibid.,
iii. 260) it is used synonymously with insight, vision,
enlightenment, penetration. In the Milinda questions,
again, we find it associated with pativedha: ‘Who have
penetrated to a comprehension of the Four Truths (or
Facts) ’ (transl. ii. 237). Similarly in the Dhammapada
Corny.: ‘ Aggasavaka-vatthu ’ (i. 109 f.).
The analytic aspect of intellectual activity being, as we
1 This work itself describes the four branches with some fulness.
See PTS edition, ii. 147 f.
382
Patisambliid, A bhisam aijad
have seen, so emphatically developed in the doctrine of
Patisambhida, we are brought up against a dual view
of cognition in Buddhist philosophy, suggestive of the
sharper and more systematically worked out distinction in
Henri Bergson’s philosophy between Vintelligence — the
mind as analytic— and intuition, or that immediacy of in-
sight which 4 by a sort of intellectual sympathy ’ lire. s-,
or recreates that which it is coming-to-know.
In the Ariyan — to resume Hr. Ledi’s note on Pati-
s a m b h i d a — intuition or insight (a r i y a - m a g g a - h a n a)
is accompanied by analysis. In the case of puthuj-
j ana’s (‘average sensual folk,’ or it may be clever or
learned, but not truly religious folk), much analytic insight
may be developed after adequate studies. But that which
they may thus acquire by s u t a m a y a - h a n a (cf . XX., 3) ,
i.e., intellect developed by information, is not so much
a genuine intuitive insight as erudite insight. Thus
in the Commentaries it is said : — “ But the worldling-
wins no intuitive insight even after he has acquired much
learning.” But there is no Ariyan who has not attained
intuitive insight. And it is peculiarly his to practise that
ekabhisamaya, or penetration into the unity of the
real and the true, which is arrested and dismembered in
analysis. His endeavour is, in the metaphor of the
Katha-vatthu (II. 10), not to be content with the wand,
wooden or gold, of language, pointing only at, but never
revealing that which it tries to express, but to enter into
the ‘ heap of paddy or of gold.’ That power of penetration,
according to Ledi Sadaw (, JPTS ., 1914, p. 154 L), he can
attain by persistent cultivation transforming his analytic,
inferential knowledge. When won, its distinctive quality
is the power of cognizing the purely phenomenal, the
purely elemental stripped of the crust of the pseudo-
permanencies : — 4 person,’ 4 being,’ 4 self,’ ‘ soul/ 4 persistent
thing.’ The wand of language points to all these crust-
names. By a bhisam ay a, pativedha, intuition,' he
gets beneath them.
- Assurance ’
383
6. (A). Niyama, Niyama : ‘ Assurance.’
(V., 4, p. 177 ; VI., 1, p. 185 ; XIII., 4, p. 275.)
Niyama means ‘ fixity,’ but niyama is ‘ that which
fixes.’ The former is derived from ni-yam-ati, to fix;
the latter from the causative: niyameti, to cause to be
fixed. When the Path — i.e., a certain direction, course,
tendency, profession, progressive system of a person’s life
— is called sammatta, or, contrariwise, micehatta-
niyama, both forms are understood in the causal sense.
Thus the former * path ’ inevitably establishes the state of
exemption from apaya’s (rebirth in misery), and the
latter inevitably establishes purgatorial retribution after
the next death. Niyama, then, is that by which the
Niyama (the fixed, or inevitable order of things) is estab-
lished, or that by which fixity is brought about, or marked
out in the order of things. 1 (With reference to the appa-
rently indiscriminate use of niyama, n i y a m a — see
p. 275, n. 1 — the Burmese are wont carelessly to write the
former for the latter, because they always pronounce the
a short and quick.' 2 )
Our choice of Assurance may seem to give an undue
subjectivity to the pair of terms. It is true that it lends
itself here to criticism. And we confess that the -wish to
get a term with the religious expressiveness that Assurance
bears with it for readers nurtured in Christian tradition
overbore our first thought of choosing certainty, fixity,
fixed order. We may, however, add to our apology (1) that
in XIX. 7, § 1, ‘ assurance ’ is opposed to ‘ doubt,’ which is
unquestionably subjective ; (2) that both * assurance ’ and
the Greek pleroplioria 3 have both an objective and a sub-
jective import. ‘ Assurance ’ may mean a means or orderly
arrangement through which we attain assured feeling, say,
1 Cf. Buddhism , London, 1912, p. 119 f.
2 Gf. English ‘drummer,’ which gives the sound of the short
Indian a,
3 See Rom. xiv. 5 ; Col. ii. 2 ; 1 Thess. i. 5 ; Heb. vl 11 — ‘ to the
full assurance of hope to the end.’
384
Nii/ama, N iy a m a
about our property. The Greek word is simply a ‘full
conveyance,’ to wit, of news or evidence.
We should not therefore be far from the truth in con-
sidering our twin terms rendered by Assurance as the more
subjective aspect of the Buddhist notion of course or destiny
popularly and objectively expressed as Path (magga) —
path good or bad : — the Way, narrow or broad, the Path,
hoclos , via, of Christian doctrine, ‘the way of his saints,’
‘the way of the evil man’ of the -Jewish doctrine (Pror.
ii. 8, 12).
6. (B). Nmm and Karma.
(XXL 7, 8.)
The two discourses so numbered deal with the belief or
disbelief in a rigid, inexorable uniformity of cause and
effect in the cosmos, as obtaining not only as a general law,
but also in all particular successions of cause-effect.
In other words, can we predict for every phenomenon
(dhamma), for every act (kamma), a corresponding,
assignable result ? Is this result the immutable invariable
result of that cause ?
The term for such an immutable fixed result, for the
Buddhist, is n i y a t a, an adjectival past participle corre-
sponding to niy fima, on which see note A. The idea of
predictability is also taken into account — see the interesting
little discourse, V. 8 : — Of Insight into the Future — but the
more prevailing notion qualifying the belief in cosmic order
is that of fixity and of flexibility.
The orthodox view is that, in the whole causal flux of
‘ happenings ’ — and these comprise all dhamma’s, all
kamma’ s — there are only two rigid successions, or orders
of specifically fixed kinds of cause-and-effect. These are —
(1) The sammatta-niy am a; (2) the micehatta-
niyama. By or in the latter, certain deeds, such as
matricide, result in purgatorial retribution immediately
after the doer’s next death. By or in the former, the Path-
graduate will win eventually the highest ‘ fruit ’ and
‘ Assurance ’
385
Nibbana. Neither result is meted out by any Celestial
Power. Both results are inherent to that cosmodicy or
natural order which includes a moral order (k a m ma-
niyama), and which any judge, terrestrial or celestial,
does or would only assist in carrying out. To that a Bud-
dhist might adapt and apply the Christian logion : — ‘Before
Abraham was, I am ’ — and say : — ‘ Before the Judge was,
it is.’ That some happenings are moral, some immoral, is
not so because of any pronouncements human or divine.
The history of human ideas reveals mankind as not
creating the moral code, but as evolving morally in efforts
to interpret the moral order . 1
But these two fixed orders do not exhaust the universe
of ‘ happenings.’ There is a third category belonging to
neither. Hence the objection of the Theravadin to the
word ‘all.’ Dhamma’s is a wider category than
kamma’s or karma. "What is true of dhamma’s is
true of kamma’s, for the former category includes the
latter. But the line of reasoning in the discourse on
dhamma’s refers to mind and matter as exhausting the
universe of existence.
As regards matter, we may illustrate by a modern
instance. The opponent would maintain that both radium
and helium are substances immutably fixed, each in its
own nature, because of the, as yet, mysterious radio-active
properties of the former, and because of the — so to speak
— ‘ heliocity 1 of the latter. Now the Theravadin would nob
know that radium may change into helium. But from his
general point of view he would reply that anyway neither
radium nor helium is immutably fixed, because they do
not belong to either of the fixed orders recognized in
his doctrine. Thus would he conclude respecting all
dhamma’s that are not kamma’s.
Concerning these, that is, moral and immoral acts, the
opponent submits that the universal law of causation is
uniform to this extent, that every kind of action must
invariably, inevitably have its specific reaction, that the
1 Cf. Buddhism, London, 1912, chap. v.
TS. V.
25
386
Thitata, Niyamata
same k a m m a must have the same effect. This is accepted
as true in tendency, and as a general theory only. But
whereas Buddhist philosophy did not anticipate the Berg-
sonian insight into the effects of vital causes amounting to
new and unpredictable creations, it did and does recognize
the immense complexity in the eventuation of moral results.
Kamma’s, it teaches, are liable to be counteracted and
deflected, compounded and annulled in what might be
called the ‘composition of moral forces.’ 1 Hence there
is nothing rigid, or, as we should say, definitely predictable,
about their results in so far as they come under the Third
or residual category mentioned above, and not under either
of the two ‘ fixed ’ n i y a t a orders.
7. Thitata, Nixamata.
(YI. 1, p. 187 ; XI. 7, p. 261.)
T h i t i may be used to mean cause. And the yet more
abstract form thitata, although, in the latter reference,
we have called it ‘ state of being a cause,’ is used concretely
as in the former reference (see n. 2), meaning 4 causes ’
by which resulting things are established. For in Abhi-
dhamma only bhava-sadhana definitions — i.e., defi-
nitions in terms of ‘ state,’ are recognized (see Compendium,
p. 7). Hence dhiitu-dhamma-thitata becomes that
which, as cause, establishes elements as effects. Thus it is
applied to each term in the chain of causation (p a t i e c a -
samuppada): to ignorance as the cause of karma
(sankhara’s), to these as the cause of consciousness,
and so on.
Synonymous with this is the term dhamma-niyamata,
meaning that which as cause invariably fixes thin gs, in
our minds, as effects.
Bearing these implications in mind, we may render the
commentarial discussion of the Sutta-passage (p. 187, § 4,
as follows: ‘What I have described above as dhatu-
dhamma-thitatci, or - niyamata, is no other than
1 See, e.g., on classes of karma, Compendium , p. 143 f.
Thitata, Niydmata 387
the terms “ ignorance,” etc. Whether the Tathagata has
arisen or not, volitional actions of mind (karma) come into
being because of ignorance, and rebirth-consciousness
comes into being because of volitional actions of mind, etc.
Hence in the phrase “ because of ignorance the actions of
the mind,” ignorance is termed dhammathitata,
because, as a cause or means, it establishes the dkamma’s
which are actions of mind. Or again, “ignorance” is
termed dhamma-niyamata because, as cause or
means, it invariably fixes or marks them.’
The difference between the two synonyms would seem
to be that -thitata is objective, -niyamata is sub-
jective. In other words, the basic principle ‘ignorance,’
or any other a n g a in the chain, is there as a cause per se,
whether Tathagatas arise or not. But because of the
stability of the law of causality, or uniformity in the order
of phenomena (dhamma-niyamata), or orderly pro-
gression of the Norm, we are enabled by the principle of
induction to infer the effect from the cause.
It is clear, from our Commentary, that d h a m m a in
this connection means ‘ effects ’ [in the Chain of Causa-
tion]. Moreover, the A bhid hart appadtpikci-s u cl refers both
synonyms to effect thitd v a sd dhdtu dhammathitata
dhamma-niyamata dduu ‘ paccayuppannc ’ — i.e., ‘in the
effect.’ This last term —paticca-samuppaiuia, and is op-
posed to p a e c a y a : cause, condition, and p a t i e c a -
samuppada: any concrete cause (in the causal formula) .
See ‘ Paccaya.’
8. Nimitta.
(X. 3, § 4, p. 246.)
Nimitta is derived by some from ni + ma, to limit ;
and is defined as ‘ that which limits its own fruit (effect) ’ :
attano phalar) niminateti (X bid diulna ppad'tpikd-
silcl). According to this definition it denotes a causal
factor, limiting, determining, conditioning, characterizing,
etc., its own effect. 1 Hence anything entering into a causal
1 Cf. p. 226, n. !:■
888
Nimitta
relation, by which its effect is signified, marked, or charac-
terized, is a nimitta. An object, image, or concept
which, on being meditated upon, induces samadhi
(Jhana) is a nimitta (see the stages specified in Com-
pendium, p. 54). False opinion (ditthi) engendered by
hallucination concerning impermanence — in other words,
a perverted view of things as permanent — is a nimitta
{ibid., p. 217). This functions either as a cause of ‘ will-to-
live,’ or as a sign of worldliness. Emancipation from this
nimitta is termed animittavimokkha (ibid.,
p. 216). Again, sexual characters are comprised under
four heads: linga, nimitta, akappa, kutta, nimitta,
standing for outward characteristics, male or female (Bud.
Psy. Eth., §§ 633, 634).
Later exegeses, deriving the word from the root mih,
to pour out, are probably derivations cV occasion.
Now in this argument (X. 3) the opponent confuses the
n a n i m i 1 1 a [-g a h i] — ‘ does not grasp at the general [or
sex] characters of the object seen, heard, etc.’ — of the
quotation with animitta, a synonym, like ‘ emptiness ’
(suniiata) of Nibbana. He judges that the Path-
graduate, when he is not -n i m i 1 1 a-grasping, is grasping
the a-n i m i 1 1 a or signless (Nibbana) , instead of exercising
self-control in presence of alluring features in external ob-
jects, whether these be attractive human beings or what not.
According to the Commentary the expression cited,
‘does not grasp at, etc.,’ refers ‘not to the moment of
visual or other sense-consciousness, but to the javana-
k k h a n a, or moment of apperception ; hence even in the
worldly course of things it is inconclusive.’ This is made
clearer in the following discourse (X. 4), where ethical
matters are stated to lie outside the range of sense-con-
sciousness as such.
9. Sangaha: Classification.
(VII. '1, p. 195.)
This little discourse is interesting for its bearing on the
historic European controversy between Universals and
Sangaha : Glassification 389
Particulars, dating from Herakleitus and Parmenides, two
and a half centuries before the date of our work, with
the problems : How can the Many be One ? How can the
One be in the Many? Both the Kathavatthu and its
Commentary oppose the limiting of groupable things to
mental facts. If certain things be counted one by one,
they reach a totality (gananag gacchanti), say, a totality
of five. This total needs a generic concept to express itself.
If the five units happen to possess common, say, bovine,
attributes, we apply the concept ‘ bullocks/ ‘ cows.’ So
with the concept ‘ dog,’ which holds together all individuals
possessing canine attributes. Again, if we were to count by
groups, say, three bullocks and three dogs, the units would
reach the same total. But we should require a more
general, a ‘higher’ concept — ‘animal,’ or the like— to
include both species. Now whether we have relatively
homogeneous units under a general notion, or relatively
heterogeneous groups under a wider notion, they reach
hereby an abridged statement (u d d e s a g gacchanti)
in the economy of thought. 1
The Theravadin, as we have recorded, does not approve
of the crude rope simile, because the material bond is
necessarily different from the mental concept, and the
term, physical and mental, binding units together. Neither
does he altogether disapprove of the simile, since language,
rooted in sense-experience, compels us to illustrate mental
processes by material phenomena.
10. Paribhoga : Utility.
(VII. 5.)
Paribhoga is enjoyment. Utility, as ethicists and
economists use the term, is enjoyability, positive benefit.
1 It is interesting to compare the g an an a (number), sangaha
(class), uddesa (abridged statement), of Tissa’s Katha-vatthu with
such disquisitions on number, class, general term, as that by Mr.
Bertrand Bussell in his examination of Frege’s Grundlagen der
Arithmetic in 1 Our Knowledge of the External World,’ p. 201 f.
390
Paccaya : Correlation
And the opponents claim that ‘ there is merit consisting in
the fact, not that the good deed was done with benevolent
intention, but that the deed done is bestowing enjoyment
or utility.’ The orthodox argument seeks only to prove the
unsoundness of this way of reckoning merit (for the doer),
either on grounds of psychological process [1] or of ethics
[2, 3]. His own position, stated positively, is that the
donor’s will (cetana) or intention is the only standard,
criterion, ultimate court of appeal, by which to judge of
the merit (to himself) of his act. Posterity may bless him
for utility accruing to it. But if he gave as a benefactor
malgre hi, he will in future be, not better, but worse off.
11. Paccaya: Correlation.
(XV. 1, 2.)
The word paccaya, 1 used in popular diction, together
with h et u, for ‘ cause ’ or ‘ reason why,’ is closely akin to
our * relation.’ Be and petti (paccaya is contracted from
pati-aya) are coincident in meaning. Ay a is a causative
form of i, ‘ to go,’ giving ‘ go back ’ for the Latin [re]latus,
- carry back.’ Now ‘ relation,’ as theory of ‘ things as having
to do with each other,’ put into the most general terms
possible, includes the class called causal relation, viz.,
things as related by way of cause-effect. But paccaya,
as relation, implies that, for Buddhist philosophy, all modes
of relation have causal significance, though the causal
efficacy, as power to produce the effect, may be absent.
To understand this we must consider everything, not as
statically existing, but as ‘happening,’ or ‘event.’ We
may then go on to define paccaya as an event which
helps to account for the happening of the paceayup-
panna, i.e., the effect, or ‘ what-has-happened-through-the-
paccaya.’ These two terms are thus ‘ related.’ Dropping
our notion of efficient cause (A as having power to pro-
duce B), and holding to the ‘ helping to happen ’ notion,
1 Pronounce pdch-chdya with the same cadence as ‘ bachelor.’
Paccaya : Correlation
391
we see this recognized in the definition of paccaya as
‘ that which was the essential mark of helping, of working
up to (upakaraka),’ namely, to a given happening. 1 It
may not produce, or alone bring to pass, that happening ;
but it is concerned therewith.
Calling it the paccaya. A, and the other term, the
other happening, B, the paccayuppanna, and referring
to the tw’enty-four classes of relations distinguished in
Abhidhamma, A may ‘ help ’ as being ‘ contiguous,’ ‘ re-
peated,’ a ‘ dominant ’ circumstance, or by ‘ leading towards,’
as ‘ path ’ (m a g g a - p a c e a y a) or means. But only such
a paccaya as ‘ will ’ (c e t a n a) related, as ‘ karma,’ 2 to a
result (v ip aka), is adequate to produce, or to cause that
result B.
In the expression idappaccayat a — 4 conditionedness
of this — ‘ this ’ (i d a) refers to B, but the compound refers
to A: A is the ‘pace ay a-of-t/uV The abstract form
is only the philosophic way of expressing paccaya.
The terms discussed above — dhamma-thitata,
dhamma-niyamat a — are synonymous with i d a p -
paccayata, and mean B is established through A, is
fixed through A. This does not mean ‘ is produced (solely)
by A,’ but only ‘happens whenever A happens,’ and
‘ happens because, inter alia, A happens.’ In other words,
by a constant relation between A and B, we are enabled to
infer the happening of B from the happening of A.
The classification of relations by the Hon. B. Bussell,
referred to on p. 294, n. 3, is as follows : — ‘ A relation is
symmetrical if, whenever it holds between A and B, it also
holds between B and A;’ asymmetrical, ‘if it does not hold
between B and A.’ But of yet greater interest is it to see
this learned author, ignorant to all appearances of perhaps
one subject only — Buddhist philosophy — generalizing the
whole concept of causality in terms of relations, namely,
‘ that what is constant in a causal law is not ’A or B,
1 Buddhist Psychology , London, 1914, p. 194 f.
3 In the mode called janaka-kamma (reproductive karma).
See Compendium , loc cit.
392
Time and Space
‘ but the relation between A and B . . . that a causal law
involves not one datum, but many, and that the general
scheme of a causal law will be ‘ Whenever things occur in
certain relations to each other, another thing, B, having a
fixed relation to those A’s, will occur in a certain time-
relation to them ’ (op. cit., 215 i). Or again, ‘ The law of
causation . . . may be enunciated as follows : — There are
certain invariable relations between different events,’ etc.
(p. 221). These ‘invariable relations ’ are, for Buddhists,
the twenty-four kinds of paeeayas, including the time-
relation, which are conceived, not as efficient causes, but as
‘ events 5 which in happening ‘ help ’ to bring about the
correlated event called paccayuppanna.
12. Time and Space.
In the Abhidhanappadlpilca-sucl 1 time is defined under
three aspects : —
1. ‘ Time is a concept by which the terms of life, etc., are
cpunted or reckoned.
2. * Time is that “ passing by ” reckoned as “ so much has
passed,” etc.
8. ‘Time is eventuation or happening, there being no
such thing as time exempt from events.’
The second aspect refers to the fact of change or imper-
manence ; the third brings up the fact of perpetual becom-
ing. From perpetual becoming we get our idea of abstract
time (m a h a - k a 1 a), which is eternal, and lacks the com-
mon distinction of past, present, future, but which, to adopt
M. Bergson’s phraseology, ‘looked at from the point of view
of multiplicity, . . disintegrates into a powder of moments,
none of which endures.’ 2 3 ...
1 For the general reader we may state that this valuable book, by
the venerable scholar Subhiiti Maha-Thera, published at Colombo
1893, is an Index and Corny, on a work on Pali nouns, written by the
rammarian Moggallana in the twelfth century a.d.
3 Introd. to Metaphysics , 51.
393
Time and Space
Now it is clear from the Kathavatthu 1 that, for Budd-
hism, time-distinctions have no objective existence of their
own, and that reality is confined to the present. The
past reality has perished ; the future reality is not yet
become. And when Buddhist doctrine says that reality is
present, both these terms refer to one and the same thing
per se. When this gives up its reality, it gives up its
presence ; when it gives up being present, it ceases to be
real . 2
Things in time are not immutably fixed . 3 In Ledi Sadaw’s
words : — As in our present state there is, so in our past has
there been, so in the future will there be, just a succession
of purely phenomenal happenings, proceedings, consisting
solely of arisings and eeasings, hard to discern . . . because
the procedure is ever obscured by our notion of continuity .’ 4
Thus they who have not penetrated reality ‘ see only a
continuous and static condition in these phenomena .’ 5
Now each momentary state or uprising of mind 6 is logically
complex and analyzable, but psychologically, actually, a
simple indivisible process. There is a succession of these
states, and their orderly procession is due to the natural
uniformity of mental sequence — the Chitta-niyama . 7
And they present a continuous spectrum of mind in which
one state shades off into another, laterally and lineally, so
that it is hard to say ‘where,’ or when one ends and the
other begins.
The laws or principles discernible in these mental con-
tinua of the Chitta-niyama are, according to Buddhist
philosophy, five of the twenty - four casual relations
(paeeaya), to wit, ‘contiguity,’ immediate contiguity
(in time), absence, abeyance, sufficing condition. Ex-
plained without such technicalities, the past state, albeit
1 See I. 6-8. 2 See I. 6, § 5. 3 See I. 10.
4 1 Some Points of Buddhist Doctrine,’ JPTS , 1918-14, p. 121.
6 Ibid., 155.
6 Ehakhkanika-cit tupp d d a .
7 See Mrs. Bh. D., Buddhism , 1912, p. 119, and Ledi Sadaw’s
‘Expositions’ ( Buddhist Beview , October, 1915).
894
Accanta : Finality
it is absent, gone, has become wrought up into its imme-
diate successor, the present state, as a new whole. These
five are compared to the five strands of a thread on which
are strung the pearls of a necklace . 1 But each indivisible
whole was real only while it lasted.
Matter, no less than mind, is logically resolved into
different qualities, which we group, classify, explain. But
nature gives us simple, indivisible wholes, qualities mutu-
ally inseparable, even in a dual existence such as that of
intelligent organisms. The whole is actually indivisible,
body and mind being inseparable.
Now what time is to life, space is to matter. Space, like
time, is a permanent concept or mental construction, which
constitutes a sufficing condition for the movement of bodies.
It is void, unperceivable, without objective reality.
13. Accanta : Finality.
(XIX. 7.)
Accanta is ati-anta : 2 beyond the end, or the very
last. Like e k a n t a, it is rendered by Burmese translators
‘ true,’ and for this reason : The only assurance we get
from science that the sun will rise to-morrow, and at
a given time, is our belief in the uniformity of Nature,
a belief established by past observation yielding no excep-
tion to the rule. The belief amounts, as we say, to a moral
certainty — i.e.,we can act upon it. But since, for all w’e know,
some unforeseen force may divert the relative positions of
sun and earth, the uniformity of physical nature is not an
order of things which has reached finality in certainty. In
other w r ords, it is not ‘ true ’ absolutely.
1 Cf. Compendium, p. 43 ; Mrs. Eh, D., Buddhist Psychology,
1914, p. 194 1
2 This, when pronounced atyanta, slips into the full cerebral
double c (which is pronounced cc:7t). Cf. p a c c a y a (see Note 11).
N ipphan n a, Par in ipph aim a
895
14. N IPPH ANN A, PaRINIPEHANNA : DETERMINED,
PREDETERMINED.
(XI. 7 ; XXIII. 5).
This word is, according to the Abhidhdn appadlp ikasucl ,
derived from the root ‘ pad,’ ‘ to go,’ through its causal
verb ‘ padeti,’ £ to move or set agoing.’ The prefix £ ni ’
alters the meaning of £ being set agoing ’ into £ being
accomplished’ (aid dhiy a g). Ledi Sadaw qualifies this
meaning by ‘accomplished by causes, such as karma, etc.’
(kammadihi paccayehi nipphaditap). Now
karma is psychologically reduced to volition (cetana)*
Hence anything accomplished by volition is £ accomplished
by causes,’ or £ determined.’ And if karma happens to be past,
the word under discussion implies £ predetermination.’ This
term is technically applied to the eighteen kinds of material
qualities, 1 the remaining ten, in the dual classification of
matter, being termed anipphannarupa’s, or £ un-pre-
determined.’
The following quotation from the Abhidhammavatara
(p. 74 PTS. Ed.) is in point: — ‘(It may be urged that) if these
(ten) be undetermined, they would be unconditioned. But
how can they be unconditioned when they are changing
their aspects (vikaratta)? These (un-) determined, too,
are conditioned. Thus the conditionedness of the (un-)
determined may be understood.’ Prom the Buddhist point
of view, Nibbana alone is unconditioned. Therefore the
Conditioned includes both the £ determined ’ and the
£ undetermined.’
The Katha XXIII. 5 indicates the general use of the
term parinipphanna. The Burmese translators do
not distinctively bring out the force of the prefix £ pari.’
A paticcasamuppannadh amma, i.e., anything that
springs into being through a cause, is necessarily con-
ditioned (sankhata). And one of the characteristic
marks of the conditioned is impermanence. The universal
1 See A bJvidhamm ava to ra, loc. cit. ; Compendium, p. 156.
396 Nipplianna, Parinipphanna
proposition — ‘ Whatever is impermanent is ill ’ — is a Bud-
dhist thesis. Mind and matter are both impermanent and
are, therefore, ill. In other words, our personality — or
more analytically, personality minus craving — constitutes
the First Ariyan Fact of 111. Ill, thus distributed, is
determined. But the opponent errs in regarding the
content of the term parinipphanna as exhausted by
111 proper. By this unnecessary restriction he errs in his
application of the contrary term aparinipphanna to
other factors of life.
Since a Dhamma or phenomenon other than Nibbana is
conditioned, it follows that each link in the chain of causa-
tion is conditioned. Take mind-and-body (n a m a r u p a) :• —
this we have shown to be a patiecasamuppanna
because it comes into being through causes. And though
it may also act as a paticcasamuppada or causal
antecedent in turn, it is not determined as such, i.e., qiul
cause. Dhammathitata is nothing more than a
paticcasamuppada stated in an abstract form. Now
in XI. 7 the opponent regards ‘ the state of being a cause ’
as different from the causal element and, therefore, as
determined separately from the thing itself. In other
words, the opponent holds that causality or causation itself,
connoted by the term dhammathitata, is determined.
Again, aniccata and j a r a t a, as mere aspects of
‘ determined ? matter, are two of the admittedly anipphan-
narupa’s. And by analogy, aniccata of mind would
be equally undetermined. In fact, aniccata, as a mere
mark of the conditioned, is not specially determined, as the
opponent, in XI. 8, would have it to be.
15. Willing, Anticipating, Aiming.
(VIII. 9, § 1, p. 221 f.)
Since sending this discourse to press, we have discovered
that the triad : — e willing, anticipating, aiming ’ ( cetand ,
patthand, panidhi ), so often in the present work added to
Willing, Anticipating, Aiming
397
the four other mental activities : { adverting, ideating, co-
ordinated application, attending,’ occurs in the Anguttara-
Nikaya, v. 212 f. E.g. 4 when a person has all the
attributes of the Ariyan Eightfold Path, coupled with true
insight and emancipation, whatever he does in accordance
with the rightness of his views, what he wills, anticipates,
aims at, whatever his activities : — all these will conduce to
that which is desirable, lovely, pleasant, good and happy.’