AB-KV-Ch7

Tipitaka >> Abhidhamma Pitaka >> Kathavatthu >> ‘’’Kathavatthu Ch7’’’

Pali Versions : Pali English Version and Pali Devanagri Version =Kathavatthu Chapter7=

-6.   Are Universal possible ? 195

1. Of the Classification [of things]. 1

Controverted Point. — That things cannot be grouped together by means of abstract ideas.

From the Commentary. —It is a belief held, for instance, by the Bajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, that the orthodox classification of particular, material qualities under one generic concept of ‘matter/ etc., is worthless, for this reason, that you cannot group things together by means of ideas, as you can rope together bullocks, and so on. The argument seeks to point out a different meaning in the notion of grouping. 2

[1] Th. — But you do not also deny that any things may combine or be included with other things under a concept of totality or universality. Hence, how can you deny that they may be grouped together ? [2] The organs of sense [3] and their objects are, you admit, computed under the material aggregate [of a living individual]. [4] Pleasant,

painful, or neutral feelings are computed under the aggre- gate of feeling. [5] Percepts on occasion of sense and idea- tion come under the aggregate of perception. [6] Volitions on occasion of sense and ideation come under the aggregate of conscious concomitants. [7] Consciousness on occasion of sense and ideation comes under the aggregate of con- sciousness. Hence, by admitting these inclusions, you must admit that things may be grouped by an idea.

1 The title should, in the Pali, he S a n g a h a not Sangahxta- katha.

2 Physical grouping is, of course, the bringing together a number of individuals. But things may be grouped mentally, i.e., included under a concept of totality involved in counting, or a general concept by generalizing.

196 Of Mental Facts as connected VII. 2.

[8] R. S. — Then you understand ‘ things being grouped together by ideas 5 in the same way as two bullocks may be grouped together by a rope or a yoke, an alms-bowl may be held together by a suspender, a dog may be held in by a leash ?

Tk. — [Yes; 1 and] hence it is not less right to say that some things may be grouped together by other things (ideas).

2. Of Mental States as mutually connected.

Controverted Point. — That mental states are not con- nected with other mental states.

From the Commentary. — This again is a view of some, for instance, the Rajagirikas and Siddhatthikas, namely, that the orthodox phrase ‘associated with knowledge ’ 2 is meaningless, because feeling or other mental states do not pervade each other (a n u p a v i t t h a) as oil pervades ses&mum-seeds. The argument is to show 1 connected ’ under another aspect. 3

[1] Th. — But you do not also deny that some things are concomitant, co-existent, compounded with other things, arise and cease together with them, have the same physical basis and the same object? Why then except the relation £ connected with ’?

[2] One aggregate, for instance, may be co-existent with another : feeling with perception, mental coefficients, con- sciousness, and so on. Surely then it may be ‘ connected with 5 that other.

R. S. — Then do, you understand that one such state accompanies, pervades another state, just as oil pervades sesamum, or sugar pervades cane?

Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . 4

1 B r [rightly] omits this. The Theravadin, concludes the Com- mentator, neither approves nor disapproves of the [material] simile, but by his rejoinder implies that ‘ even as you can’t deny the physical grouping, so must you admit the mental grouping by general concepts.

2 F.g., Dhamma-sangani, § 1, etc.

3 B r reads, as in the preceding katha, ahnen’ ev’ atthena for anne va sabbe va (PTS). The latter seems meaningless.

4 ‘This, namely, is not a proper parallel. We cannot assign an

388-39.

Are there Mental Properties ?

197

3. Of Mental Properties.

Controverted Point. — That they do not exist.

From the Commentary. — Once more, some, like the Eajagirikas and Siddhatthikas, hold that we can no more get ‘ mentals ’ (c e t a s i k a) from mind (c i 1 1 a), than we can get ‘ contactals ’ from contact, so that there is no such thing as a property, or concomitant, of mind. The Theravadin contends that there would be nothing wrong if custom permitted us to say ‘ contaetal ’ for what depends on contact, just as it is customary usage to call ‘mental’ that which depends on mind (c i 1 1 a-n i s s i t a k o).

[1] Tk.— You surely do not also deny that some mental phenomena are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined with consciousness, have their genesis and cessation, physical basis and object in common with it ? Why then exclude the ‘mental?’ [2] Contact, for instance, is co-existent with consciousness ; hence it is a ‘mental/ i.e., a property or concomitant of mind. So are feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, lust, hate, dulness,. . . indiscretion — all the ‘ mentals.’

[3] R. S. — You allow then that w r hat is co-existent with consciousness is a ‘mental.’ Do you equally admit that what is co-existent with contact is a ‘contaetal,’ or that what is co-existent with each of those mental phenomena is to be analogously regarded ; for instance, that what is co-existent with indiscretion is an ‘ indiseretional ’?

Th. — Certainly. [4] And if you assert that there are

no mental phenomena corresponding to our term ‘ mentals/ was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ Yea ! verily this mind and mental states Are void of soul for one loho understands.

Whoso discerns the low and high in both,

The seer, he knows that neither can endure'? 1

essential difference between sesamum and its oil as we can between feeling and perception. “Sesamum” is the customary name for something that is kernel, husk, and oil. When the former appearance is changed, we call it oil.’— Corny. The MSS. and B r are discrepant in detail here, but we believe we have given the intended meaning.

1 We cannot trace these verses.

198

Of Giving and Gift

VII. 4.

[5] Or again, was it not said by the Exalted One : < Suppose in this case, Kevatta, 1 that a hhikklm can make manifest the mind, and the mental [property], and the direction and application of thought in other beings, other individuals, saying : Such is your mind. This is your mind. Thus and thus are yon conscious T 2

Hence there is such a thing as a ‘ mental 5 6 [that is, a property, or concomitant, of eonciousness or mind]. 3

4. Of Giving and the Gift

Controverted Point .- — That dan a is [not the gift but] the mental state.

From the Commentary. — D ana is of three kinds : 4 the will to surrender [something], abstinence, the gift. In the line —

Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving ,

-we have the will to surrender something when opportunity occnrs. In the phrase ‘ he gives security,' 1 abstinence, when opportunity occurs, is meant. In the phrase ‘ he gives food and drink in charity, 5 a thing to he given on a given occasion is meant. The first is dan a [in an active sense], as that which surrenders, or [in the instrumental sense] as that by which something is given. Abstinence is giving in the sense of severing from, cutting off. When it is practised, one severs, cuts off the immoral will which we consider to be a fearful and dangerous state. And this is a ‘ giving.’ Finally, dan a implies that an offering is given. This triple distinction is in reality reduced to two : mental and material. But the view held, for instance, by the Bajagirikas and Siddhattikas, recognizes the former only. And the object of the discourse is to clear up the confusion {lege sankara- bhava p) 5 between the meanings of this dual distinction.

[1] Th. — II dan a be a mental state, is it possible to give a mental state away to others ? If you deny, your

1 Or Kevaddha. The KV. MSS. read as above.

2 Digha-Nikaya, i. 213.

3 On cetasika see Compendium, 237 f. ; Buddh. Psychology, 175 f.

4 D a n a means grammatically both giving and gift and liberality.

Hence the necessity of retaining the Pali word.

6 So B r. The readings in the PTS edition are impossible.

339-41. Of Giving and Gift 199

proposition falls through. If you assent, 1 you then imply that it is possible to give any mental property to others : contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mind- fulness, concentration, understanding.

[2] R. S. — If we are wrong, we ask you, is giving attended by undesirable, disagreeable, unpleasant, barren consequences ? 2 Does it induce, and result in, sorrow? Is not rather the opposite true? Surely then dana is a mental state.

[3] Th. — Granting that giving was pronounced by the Exalted One to produce desirable results, is giving a robe, or alms-food, or lodging, or materia medica and requisites for illness dana? You admit they are, but you cannot assert that these directly bring about desirable, agreeable, pleasant, felicific mental results.

[4] R. S. — If we are wrong, let us quote the words of the Exalted One :

‘ Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving : 1

These are the things that men of worth pursue ;

This, say they, is the path celestial.

Hereby we pass into the deva-ivorldl 3 4

[5] Again: * Bhikkhus, these Jive givings, the Great Dana's? are supreme, secular, hereditary ; ancient [ customs ] , unmixed now or in the past ; they are not mixed one with the other, nor shall be, and they arc not despised by recluses or brahmins, or by the ivise. What are the Jive ? First, there is the Ariyan disciple who, having put away taking life, is opposed to it Such an one gives to all beings without limit security, amity,

1 Oxl the ground that anything mental cannot he given as if it were food, etc., the opponent denies ; when the question is insisted upon, he recollects the Sutta on ' giving security, etc.,’ and assents. — Corny.

2 If dana means the material gift, and this be, say, a nauseons medicine, the giver must reap corresponding undesirable fruit. — Corny.

3 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 236.

i In his Commentary on Anguttara-Nik. Buddbaghosa calls these

4 the gifts of the will ’ (e e t a n a), deliberate, intentional giving.

200

VII. 4.

Of Giving and Gift

benevolence. And having thus given ivithont limit, he himself becomes partaker in that security, amity, benevolence. Secondly , the Ariyan disciple, having put away taking what is not given, wrong conduct in sense-desires, lying, and occasions for indulg- ing in strong drinks, is opposed to these. Thus renouncing, bhihhhus, he gives to all beings without limit security, amity, goodwill. And so giving, he himself becomes partaker in that unlimited security, amity, goodwill. These, bhihhhus, are the jive Great Dana's. .. 1

If the Suttanta says thus, then giving is a mental state.

[6] Tli. — According to you, then, dan a is not some- thing to be given. But was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ Take the case of one who gives food, drink, raiment, a carriage, a wreath, a perfume, ointment, a couch, a dwelling, means of lighting’ l 2 3 Surely then dan a is a thing to be given.

[7] B. S. — You say then that giving is a thing to be given. Now you do not admit that the thing to be given has as its direct result something desirable, agreeable, pleasant, felicific, a happy capacity and consequence. On the other hand, the Exalted One said that dana had such a result. Now you say that a robe, alms-food, and the other requisites are dana. Hence it follows that a robe and so on has such a result, which cannot be. Therefore it is wrong to say that dana is a thing to he given.

5. Of Utility.

Controverted Point. — That merit increases with utility.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the itajagirikas, Siddhattikas, and Sammitiyas, from thoughtlessly interpreting such Suttas as ‘ merit day and night is aliuays growing ,’ and ‘ the role, bhikkhus, which a bhikkhu enjoying the, use of. . ./ 3 hold that there is such a thing as merit achieved by utility.

1 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 246.

2 Op. cit., iv. 239. This is a 1 stock’ catalogue ; cf. op. cit,, i. 107 ; ii. 85, 203 ; Digha-Nik., iii. 259.

3 See below. •

343-44.

Does Utility increase Merit ?

201

[1] Th. — By your thesis you imply [that other mental experiences are increasing quantities : — ] that contact, feel- ing, perception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindful- ness, concentration, understanding, can each keep growing 1 — which you deny. . . . And that merit keeps growing just as a creeper, a liana, a tree, grass, or brushwood grows — which you deny. . ..

[2] Again, in affirming it, do you also admit that a giver acquires merit when, having given his gift, he does not consider it further? 2 You do. But this is to imply, in other words, that merit accrues to one who does not consciously advert to, reflect upon, consider, attend to, deliberate, anticipate, aim. Is not the opposite the case ? You assent. Then it is wrong to say that merit goes on growing with utility.

[3] Again, in affirming your thesis, do you also admit

that a giver may acquire merit w r ho, on giving a gift, entertains sensual, malevolent, or cruel thoughts? ‘Yes/ you reply. Then have we here a combination of two con- tacts, feelings, perceptions, volitions, cognitions ? No ? Think ! * Yes,’ you now reply. 3 Then you are maintaining that good and bad, guilty and innocent, base and noble, sinister and clear mental states, can co-exist side by side [at the same moment]. You deny. Think again ! ‘ Yes,’

you now reply. 4 But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ There are four things, bhikkhns, very far ate ay one

1 Merit (punna) is an abstract notion or human estimate of the balance of anyone’s chances of a surplus over unhappy experience in the future in consequence of deeds done now. Thus, for both estimator and the subject of the estimate, it is nothing else than a series of mental phenomena, and should be considered as such, and not as some external and mystic entity or continuum.

2 Na samannaharati, i.e., the ‘ adverting,’ having arrested the subconscious life-flux, does not ‘ smoothly conduct ’ the will-to-give (dana-cetana) along its own path.— Corny.

3 He now assents, because he includes the consciousnesses of both donor and donee. — Corny.

4 He now assents, because by his opinion that which is derived ^m sustained enjoyment is not a conscious phenomenon. — -Corny.

202 Is Utility the sole Standard of Merit! YII. 5.

from the other. What are the four ? The sky and the earth, the hither and the yonder shore of the ocean, whence the sun rises and where lie sinks, the Norm of the good and that of the tricked.

‘ Far is the sky and far from it the earth lies ;

Far too the f urther shore of ocean, say they ;

And whence the radiant sun at day -dawn rises,

And where he goes, lightmaker, to his ending.

Yet f urther than all these asunder, say they,

The Norm of good men’s lives and that of had men. Co-operation of the good can never perish,

True to its nature 'while it yet endureth.

But swift dissolves the intercourse of had men.

Hence far is Norm of good' from that of evil! 1

Therefore it is wrong to say that good and bad, etc., mental states, co-exist side by side in anyone.

[4] JR. S. S. — But, if your rejection is right, was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ Planters of groves and shady woods,

And they who build causeway and ■ bridge,

And wells construct and watering-sheds,

And to the homeless dwellings give : —

Of such as these by day and ' night For ever doth the merit grow.

In righteousness and virtue’s might Such folk from earth to heaven go I 2

Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.

[5] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One :

good, sources of happiness and blissfid fate, resulting in happiness, conducive to heavenly life, conducive to that which is desirable, agreeable, and sweet, to welfare and happiness. What are the four ? When a bhikkhu, enjoying the use of robes, or of alms-food, or of shelter, or of medical requisites
 * Bhikkhus, there are these four streams of merit and of

1 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 50.

2 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 33.

346-47. Can Earthly Gifts sustain, elsewhere ?

203

given him, is able to attain to and dwell in infinite concentra- tion of mind, to the giver each of these four gifts is an infinite stream of merit and of good. . d? 1

Therefore merit goes on growing with utility.

[6] Th. — You still affirm your proposition. Now, does a giver who has given a gift acquire merit when the acceptor, having accepted the gift, throws it away, abandons it? 1 Yes,’ you reply. But you cannot possibly say of that giver’s merit that it goes on growing.

[7] Or if, when the gift is accepted, kings, or thieves, take it away again, or fire burns it, or water bears it away, or hostile heirs take it back ? The same holds good. Hence merit is not dependent upon utility.

6. Of the Effect of Gifts given in this Life.

Controverted Point. — That what is given here sustains elsewhere.

From the Commentary. — It is held by some — for instance, the Rajagiriyas and Siddhattkikas — that because of the Word :

‘By what is given here below They share who, dead, 'mong Betas go,' 2

gifts of robes, etc., cause life to be sustained there.

[1J Th. — Your proposition commits you to the further statement that robes, alms-food, lodging, medical requisites for ailments, hard food, soft food, and drink, given in this life, are enjoyed in the after-life — which you deny. . . . And it commits you further to this [heterodox position] , that one person is the agent for another ; that the happi- ness or ill we feel is wrought by others ; that one acts, another experiences the consequences 3 — which you deny. . ..

1 Anguttara-Nilc., ii. 54. 2 See next page,

3 Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 75 f. Judging by the Commentary on the verses just below [§ 3], gifts to the memory of dead kinsfolk were made

to the Order, the donor specifying that he made them in the name of

204

Of '{the Effect of Gifts

VII. 6.

[2] JR. S. — You deny our proposition. But do not tl^e Petas thank him who gives a gift for their advantage, are not their hearts appeased, are they not interested, do they not obtain gladness ? [8] Was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ As water rained upon high slope Doth ever down the hillside run,

E’en so whate’er on earth is given Doth reach the hapless Peta shades.

And as the brimming rivers run To keep the mighty ocean, full,

E’en so whate’er, etc.

For ichere they dwell no husbandry Nor tending dairy kine is there,

No merchant traffic as with us,

No goods to buy with precious coin.

By what is given here below

They share who, dead,, ’mong Petas go ' ? 1

Therefore our proposition is right.

[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘ Bhik- khus, there are these five matters which parents, if wishing for a child to be born to them, contemplate. Which are the Jive ? Cared for ( they think) he will care for us ; or, he will do our work; he 'will continue our family; he will inherit our property ; he will institute offerings to the departed parent shades (Petas).

‘ Wise Jolk who fain a child would have Have five advantages in view ; —

Us by his wages he will keep ;

His will it be our work to do ;

such of Ms kin as might have been reborn as Petas. ParamaMha- jotika (PTS, I., p. 204 f.); cf. Spence Hardy, Buddhism, p. 59 (Childers, s.v. Peta), whose view is that offerings were exposed for such ill-plighted shades, not given for the use of the Order. The argument in the Katha-Vatthu implies that the former procedure was followed. The merit of the gift might avail to bless the Petas, but the material gift itself could not nourish them, as the superstitious deemed.

1 Rhuddakapatha (PTS), 6 (VII.).

349-50. Earth not a Result of Karma 205

Our family will long endure ;

Our heritage to him tee leave ;

And then again an offering To Peta-shades he’ll institute.

These matters fire keep well in vie w The wise who fain a child would have.

Wherefore the pious and the good,

Children who know and grateful feel,

Support their mother and their sire, Remembering all these did for them.

Their tasks they take upon themselves,

E’en as their parents toiled for them ;

Do their behests and them maintain,

Nor suffer that their race decay.

Praise to the child of filial heart,

With piety and virtue dight ’ 'l 1

Was it not so said ? Then is our proposition right.

7. Of the Earth and Karma.

Controverted Point. — That land is a result of action.

From, the Commentary. — Inasmuch as there is human action directed to gain dominion and sovereignty over the soil, some, like the Andhakas, hold that the earth itself is a resultant of such action (or karma). The argument goes to show that (1) land has nothing in common with the sentient results which are caused by karma ; 2 (2) that such results are a matter of individual subjective experience, not shared by others, myriads of whom do not even live upon the earth.

[1] Th. — As well say that the earth belongs to feeling 3 pleasant, painful, or neutral, or is conjoined [as mental] with feeling or with perception, or volition, or cognition, that the earth has a mental object, that she can advert to, reflect upon, consider, attend, intend, anticipate, aim. Is not just the opposite true of her ? Hence your proposition is wrong.

1 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 43. 2 S u k h a-v e d a n i y a, etc.

3 K a m m a-v i p a k a, or result of actions was, in its ultimate terms, conceived as feeling experienced by the agent in this life, or by the resultant of him in another life.

206 Of the Physical and the Moral YIL 7.

[2] Again, compare her [with something mental] — with contact. Of contact you could say that it is both (i.) a result of action and also that it (ii.) belongs to feeling, and so on (as in § 1). But you cannot say both these things of earth. Or if you affirm the former (i.) and deny the latter predicate (ii.) of earth, you must be prepared to do no less in the case of contact.

[3] Again, the earth undergoes expansion and contrac- tion, cutting and breaking up. Can you say as much of the [mental] result of action ?

Again, the earth may be bought and sold, located, collected, explored. Gan you say as much of the result of action ?

Again, the earth is common to everyone else. But is the result of [my] action common to everyone else? ‘Yes,’ you say. But was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ This treasure to none else belongs,

No bandit hence may bear it.

The mortal who would fare aright Let him work acts of merit '? 1

Hence it is wrong to say that a result of action is experi- enced by everyone else.

[4] Again, you would admit that first the earth is es- tablished and afterwards beings are reborn [on it]. But does result first come to pass and afterwards people act to insure result ? If you deny, you cannot maintain that earth is a result of action.

[5] Again, is the earth a common result of collective action? Yes, you say? Do you mean that all beings enjoy the use of the earth? If you deny, you cannot affirm your proposition. If you assent, I ask whether there are any who pass utterly away without enjoying the use of it ? You assent, of course. But are there any who pass utterly away without exhausting the experienced result of their actions ? Of course you deny. . ..

1 Khucldakajidtha, VIII. 9. The last two lines are discrepant. The work quoted reads ‘ wise man ’ for e mortal,’ and, for the third line : That treasure which doth follow him — viz. merit.

207

352-53. Age and Death no Effect of Karma

[6] Once more, is the earth a result of the action of a being who is a world-monarch ? and do other beings share in the use of the earth ? Yes, you reply. Then do other beings make use of the result of his actions? You deny. . . . I ask again, and you assent. But then, do other beings share also in his contact, feelings, perception, volition, con- sciousness, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, un- derstanding ? Of course you deny. . ..

[7] A. — But if I am wrong, surely there is action to gain dominion [over the earth], 1 action to gain sovereignty [on the earth] ? If so, surely the earth is a result of action.

8. Of Decay and’ Death and Karma.

Controverted Point. — That old age and death are a result of action.

From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as some action does conduce to that deterioration we call decay or old age, and to that curtailing of life we call death, some, like the Andhakas, hold that old age and death are the ‘result (vip a ka) ’ of that action. Now there is between morally bad action and material decay the relation known as karma, 2 but the moral cause and the physical effect differ in kind. Hence the latter is not subjective result (v i p a k a). It is unlike any mental state : — -con- tact, feeling, etc. — such as is produced by karma. Besides, it is partly due to the physical order (utu). 3

[1, 2] Th. — The first tivo sections are verbatim as in the preceding discourse, save that instead of ‘ result of action ’ (kamma-vipaka), f result 1 (v i p a k a) only is used.

[3] Again, you admit, do you not, that the decay and dying of bad states of mind is the result of previous bad states ? But then you must also admit that the decay and dying of good states of mind is the result of previous good

1 .Literally, lordship, ‘ here meaning large possessions? — Corny.

2 Kamma and vip 5k a (result in sentience) are two of the twenty-four paccayas or correlations of things physical or mental. Compendium, 191 f.

3 In the Corny, p. 101, last line (PTS), read : U t u s a m u 1 1 h a n ad i- bhedena tap patilabhavasena ayuno ca. .. .

208 Any an Effects VII. 9.

states — which you deny. . . . But in denying the latter, you imply denial of the former statement. . ..

[4] Or do you hold that the decay and dying of good states of mind is the result of previous bad states? You do, you say. Then you imply that the decay and dying of bad states is the result of previous good states — which you deny. . . . But in denying this, you imply denial of the former statement. . ..

[5] Or do you affirm that the decay and dying of both good and bad states of mind are the result of bad states ? You do, you' say. Then you must say no less : c is the result of good states ’ — which you deny. . ..

[6] A. — You say my proposition is false. But surely acts conduce to the deterioration and to the curtailment of life ? If so, my proposition is true.

9. Of the Ariyan Mind and its Remits.

Controverted Point. — That Ariyan states of mind have no [positive] result. 1

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas, hold that the fruits of religious life, being merely the negative putting away of corrupt qualities, are not properly states of mind. By religious life is meant the career of a recluse, or progress in the Paths, as it is said : ‘ I will show you the religious life and the fruits thereof,’ 2 the former being the Fourfold Path, 3 and the fruits thereof those of Stream-Winner, Onee-Beturner, Never-Beturner, and Arahantship.

[1, 2] Th. — But you admit that the career of a recluse or religious student is productive of great rewards — to wit, the fruits of the Four Paths. How then can you deny positive result ?

[8] Or, if you deny that these four kinds of fruit are positive result — as you do — then you equally deny that

1 Yip aka — i.e., are they actions engendering for the subject no positive psychical sequel, such as is always understood by this term ?

2 Sayyutta-Nik., v. 25.

3 Each stage of the Path has the eight factors (Eightfold Path) in different degrees.

356-57.

Arc they positive ?

209

-there is positive result in the fruit of giving or of moral •conduct, or of religious exercises, which you maintain. . ..

[4] Now in maintaining these propositions, you must no less maintain that there is positive result in the fruits of the Paths. . ..

[5] Again, you will of course admit that good done in relation to life on earth or in the heavens, material or immaterial, entails result. Does this not commit you to admitting that good done in relation to path-graduating 1 also entails result [though you deny this by your proposi- tion] ? Conversely, if you maintain that good done in relation to path-graduating entails no result, must you not also deny result to good done in relation to life on earth or in heaven ?

[6] A. — [Well, but is not this a parallel case?] You will of course admit that good done in relation to life on earth or in the heavens, material or immaterial, entailing result, makes for accumulation of rebirth. 2 Does this not ■commit you to admitting that good done in relation to path-graduating, entailing [as you say] result, makes also for accumulation of rebirth [though you of course deny 4his] ?

10. Of Results as again causing Results.

Controverted Point. — That f result ’ is itself a state en- -tailing resultant states. 3

From the Commentary. — Because one result [of karma] stands in relation to another result by way of reciprocity, 4 etc., some, like the Andhakas, hold that the result is itself necessarily the cause of other results.

1 Literally, non-worldly, or supramundane. The Commentary ■classes all good done for rebirth as lokiya, mundane. Path- graduating militated against rebirth.

2 For Buddhaghosa’s definition of this term, see Bud. Bsy. Fth., p. 82, n. 2.

3 Vipakadhamma-dhammo. SeeBud. Psy. Eth., p. 253, n. 1.

4 Annamann a-p a c c a y o, or mutuality ; one of the twenty-four relations. The statement here is from the Patthana.

T.S. V.

14

210

Of Results from Results

VII. 10.

[1] Th. — If your proposition is true it is tantamount to saying that the result of that [result] entails [other] results — which you deny. ... Or, if you assent, then you are asserting that in a given series there is no making an end of ill, no cutting off the round of birth and death,, no Nibbana without residual stuff of life — which is contrary to doctrine. 1

[2] Again, are you asserting that ‘ result ’ and £ state' entailing resultant states ’ are identical, equivalent terms — of one import, the same, of the same content and origin ?

[3] That they are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined, connected, one in genesis, in cessation, in basis, and in mental object? All this you deny. . . . 2 * *

[4] Again, do you mean that a given bad mental state is its own result, a given good state its own result? That the consciousness with which we take life is the very con- sciousness with which we burn in purgatory ? That the- consciousness with which we give a gift of merit is the very consciousness with -which we rejoice in heaven? . ..

[5] A. — You deny my proposition ; but are not ‘ results, [of karma] ' the four immaterial aggregates in reciprocal relation ? If so, surely it is right to say that a result is a mental state resulting from other mental states ?

1 A. ‘denies this for fear of contravening doctrine.’ — Corny. Cf. above, I. 1 (p. 48 f.).

2 The opponent regards any one of the four mental groups as

‘ result entailing the other three as its results 5 in their mutual relation

at any given moment. — Corny. But this cannot be, since all four are.

mutually co-inhering at that moment as an indivisible whole.