AB-KV-Ch3

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139

1. Of Powers.

Controverted Point. — That the powers of the Buddha are common to disciples.

From the Commentary. — This is an opinion among the Andhakas, derived from a thoughtless consideration of the ten Suttas in the Anurud- dha Sapyutta, 1 beginning : 'I, brethren, from practice and development of the Four Applications of Mindfulness, understand even as it really is the causal occasion 2 as such, and ivhat is not the causal occasion etc. Now of a Tathagata’s ‘ten powers,’ some he holds wholly in common with his disciples, some not, and some are partly common to both. All can share insight into extinction of intoxicants (a s a v a) ; he alone discerns the degrees of development in the controlling powers (indriyani), The causal occasion of anything, as well as seven other matters, a Tathagata knows without limit, the disciple knows them only within a certain range. 3 The latter can state them ; the former can explain them. But the Andhakas say that the whole of his power was held in common with his [leading] disciples.

[1] Th. — If your proposition is true, you must also affirm that power of the Tathagata is power of the disciple and conversely, whether you take power in general, or this or that power, or power of this or that sort. And you must also affirm that the disciple’s previous application, previous line of conduct, instruction in the Doctrine, teaching of the Doctrine, 4 are of the same sort as those of the Tathagata. But all these [corollaries] you deny. . ..

1 Sarjyutta-Nikciya, v. 304 1; Suttas 15-24.

d T h a n a p thanato, paraphrased'by Buddhaghosa (Corny, on A., iii. 417) as karanap kar an at o (reason).

3 Pa-desen a, cf. Jut., v. 457 (trans., v. 246, n. 3).

4 The Corny, calls these two pairs of terms two pairs of synonyms.

140

Of Knoivledges as Pozvers

III. 1.

[2] You affirm [of course] that the Tathagata is Con- queror, Master, Buddha Supreme, All-knowing, All-seeing, Lord of the Norm, the Fountain-head of the Norm. 1 But you would refuse these titles to disciples. Nor will you admit of the disciples, as you do of the. Tathagata, that he brings into being a Way where no way was, produces a Way that had not been called into being, proclaims a Way untold, is knower and seer of the Way and adept therein.

[8] If you affirm that [one of the Tathagata’s powers : that] of understanding as they really are the different degrees of development in our controlling powers ( in- driyani) is held by disciples in common with him, you must also allow that a disciple is all-knowing, all-seeing.

[4] A. 2 — But you will admit that if a disciple can distin- guish a causal occasion from an occasion that is not causal, it were right to say that genuine insight of this kind is common to Tathagata and disciple. [But you refuse to say this. 3 ] . ..

[5] Again, you will admit that if a disciple knows, in its causal occasion and conditions, 4 the result of actions undertaken in the past, future, and present, it were right to say that genuine insight of this kind is common to Tathagata and disciple. [This, too, you refuse to say. 6 ]

[6-11] A similar implication holds good with respect to the power of knowing the tendency of any course of action, of knowing the worlds of manifold and intrinsically different

1 Dhamm a-p atisaranap, the latter half is a neuter substantive applied to the Buddha, when appealed to for guidance and explanatory teaching. It means literally ‘resorting to, having recourse to, ! and thence the objective of such movement. See Bud. Psychology, 1914, p. 69.

2 The Andhaka is querist to the end.

3 The Theravadin draws the line at a coincident range of power. ‘These questions (§§ 4-11) are asked just to establish this : that the powers named are common to disciples just in so far as they know (jananamatta-samannen a).’ — Corny.

4 Thanaso hetuso, paraphrased, in Corny, an Angnttara-Nilc. , iii. 417, by pace ay at o cevahetutoca.

6 Because the power is not equally supreme in both.

141

230-31. Which Powers have they in Common?

elements; of knowing the manifold things beings have done from free choice, of knowing the attainments in Jhana or Deliverance or Concentration 1 — their impurities, their purity, and emergence from them; of knowing how to remember former lives ; of knowing whence beings are deceasing and where they are being reborn. All these corollaries, namely, that if a disciple knows, where a Tathagata knows, the knowledge is common to both, you deny. Finally, [12] are not the intoxicants as extinct for a disciple as for a Tathagata ? Or is there any difference between their extinction for a Tathagata and their extinc- tion for a disciple, or between the [ensuing] emancipation for a Tathagata and that for a disciple ? ‘ (None ’ you say ; 2 then surely my proposition holds.

[13] Again, you have admitted that a Tathagata shares the power of insight into the extinction as it really is of intoxicants, in common with the disciple. But you will not admit — though you surely must — that this is the case with his knowledge of real causal antecedents and such as are not real. . . 3 and also of the decease and rebirth of beings.

[14] You affirm then that the power of the Tathagata’s insight to discern as it really is a causal antecedent and one that is not, is not held in common by disciples. Yet you refuse to draw this line in the ease of the extinction of intoxicants. Similarly, in the case of the remaining eight powers — [which is absurd].

[15] Again, you admit that the power of the Tathagata’s insight to know as they really are the degrees of develop- ment in controlling powers is not held in common with the disciples. Yet you will not admit as much with regard to the insight into what are really causal antecedents and what

1 Buddhaghosa (on Anguttara-Nih., iii. 417) enumerates these as ‘the four Jhanas, the eight Deliverances (Dialogues, ii. 119), and the three samadhi’s (Digha-Nik., iii. 219), also the nine grades in elimination (ibid., 266).

2 Here the Theravadin admits there is no distinction in insight. — Corny.

3 Here supply the remaining powers, §§ 6-11.

142

Of the Quality called Any an

III. 2.

are not,. . . nor of the insight into the extinction of intoxi- cants. (Here, on the contrary, you find powers held in common.) 1

[16] On the other hand, you admit a common power 1 in the discernment of what is really a causal occasion. . . and of the extinction of intoxicants. But you will not equally admit a common power in discernment of degrees of development in controlling powers — how is this ?

2. Of Quality called] Ariyan.

Controverted Point. — (a) That the power of a Tathagata, e.g., in discerning as it really is the causal occasion of anything, and its contradictory, is Ariyan. 2

From the Commentary.— That, of the foregoing ten powers of dis- cernment or insight, not only the last (insight into extinction of intoxicants), but also the preceding nine were Ariyan, is a view of the Andhakas.

[1] Th. — If it be so, you should also affirm of that power that it is the (Ariyan) Path, [or other Ariyan doctrine, such as] Fruit, Nibbana, one of the Four Paths to Arahant- ship, or of the Four Fruits thereof, one of the Applica- tions in Mindfulness, Supreme Efforts, Steps to Potency, Controlling Powers, 3 Forces, or Factors of Enlightenment. But you do not agree to this.

[2] Or is [the concept of] Emptiness the object of that power? 4 If you deny, you cannot affirm your proposi- tion. If you assent, then you must affirm that one who is attending to the exercise of this power attends also to Emptiness. If you deny, you cannot affirm that Empti- ness is the object of the power in your proposition. If you

1 To the whole or to a limited extent. — See Corny, above.

2 See Rhys Davids, Early Buddhism, 49 ; Mrs. Rh. D., Buddhism, 69.

3 I.e., ethical or spiritual faculties. Cf. I. 2, § 15 ; Compendium, 179 f.

4 Sunnata. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 91, § 344 f. ‘ There are two Emptinesses: (1) In the aggregates of a soul (s at t a); (2) Nibbana, or detachment from all conditioned things. The Opponent denies because of the latter, assents because of the former. — Corny.

238-8. Ariyan and the Threefold Object 143

assent, then yon are claiming a combination of two (mental) contacts, two consciousnesses— which of course you deny.

[3] A similar argument holds good for the other two concepts of the ‘ Signless’ and the ‘ Not-hankered-after.’ 1

[4] [Or, to argue conversely], you admit that (1) the Applications in Mindfulness are Ariyan, and have as their object the concepts of ‘Emptiness,’ the ‘ Signless,’ and the c Not-hankered-after.’ But you deny that these are the object of that power of a Tathagata. Hence that power cannot be classified under things ‘ Ariyan.’

[5] This argument applies also to (2) the Supreme Efforts and (3-6) the Steps to Potency, etc. (§ 1).

[6] A. — You say then that my proposition is wrong — - that it is not Ariyan, and has not as its object Emptiness, the Signless, or the Not-hankered-after. Yet you do not deny that the six foregoing doctrines are Ariyan, and also have that Threefold object — why deny the same of that power of which my proposition speaks ?

[7] Th. — Nay, why do you maintain that the power of a Tathagata, in discerning as it really is the decrease and rebirth of beings and its contradictory, is Ariyan, while you are not prepared to class that power with things we call Ariyan — the Path, and so on ? .

[8-12] The arguments in §§ 2-6 are then repeated for the Andhaka’ s propositions : — that the other po wers of a Tathagata discerning the decease and rebirth of beings as they really are, etc., are Ariyan.

[13] A. — You admit then that the tenth of the * Powers ’ ascribed to a Tathagata — insight into the extinction as it really is of intoxicants — is Ariyan, but you deny it in the case of the two powers named above. How can you affirm it of the tenth ?

[14] The Andhaka puts the case negatively.

[15, 16] As in [13, 14], with the addition of the ‘ Three Signs, ’ as ‘object,’ added to the predicate ‘is Ariyan .’

1 Animitta, Appanihita {Bud. Psy. Bth., p. 91, § 344 f.) ; Comp., 211.

144

Of Emancipation

III. 3.

3. Of Emancipation.

Controverted Point. — That ‘ becoming emancipated ! has reference to the heart being [at the time] in touch with lust, 1 etc.

From the Commentary. — Whereas it is true that, in minds or hearts devoid of e.g. lust, there is no need to get emancipated, the opinion held at present by such as the Andhakas is that, just as a soiled garment is released from its stains on being washed, so emancipation means that a heart beset with lust is emancipated from lust. 2

[1] Th. — You affirm this. Then you must equally affirm that ‘ becoming emancipated ’ refers to a heart which is accompanied by, co-existent with, mixed with, associated with, has developed with, goes about with, lust ; to a heart, again, which is immoral, worldly, in touch with intoxicants, allied with fetters, .ties, floods, bonds, hindrances, is in- fected, allied with grasping, corrupt — which you refuse to do.

[2] If the heart or mind which is in contact be emanci- pated, are both contact and mind emancipated? 'Yes’ you say. But then you must equally affirm that, if the heart which is in touch with lust be emancipated, both lust and heart are emancipated — which you refuse to do.

The same reasoning holds good not only of contact, but also of [the other properties of the mind] — feeling, per- ception, volition,. . . reason, or understanding.

1 Sara gar). The prefix sa corresponds to our co (or affix -f ul). S a implies contact (p h a s s a), and contact was ranked as the essential co-efficient of mind as receptive of, in touch with, sense.

2 In other words, the climax and crown of Path-graduation is de- graded to denote progress in the early stages. Emancipation is technically applied to release from rebirth, through release from the conditions thereof. Nib ban a is extinction of lust, hate, and nescience or delusion. Emancipation is the state of purity after the purging was done (cf. III. 4). The opponent holds the serious errors that the Arahant still has lust, etc., to get rid of, and that a preceding unit of consciousness is essentially identical with the succeeding unit. Cf. SayyuHa-Nih., iv. 251 ; ii. 171 and passim.

239-42. Emancipation instantaneously realized

145

[3] Once more, if mind which is in contact, and in touch with lust, be emancipated, are both contact and mind emancipated ? Yes, you say. But then you must equally affirm that both lust and mind are emancipated — which you refuse to do.

The same reasoning holds good of the other properties of the mind.

[4-6, 7-9] The same argument is then applied to ‘ emanci- pation ’ referred to ‘ hate,’ ancl to ‘ nescience or delusion ’ — the other tivo of the fundamental conditions of evil doing.

[10] A. — You say that we are wrong in affirming that a mind full of lust, hate and nescience undergoes emancipa- tion. But your denial that a mind which is devoid of all three undergoes emancipation rather confirms our view.

4. Of Emancipation as a Process.

Controverted, Point. — That spiritual emancipation is a [gradual] process of becoming free. 1

From the Commentary. — The opinion is questioned of those who ■confuse the emancipation by partial arrest in the exercise of Jhana •with that emancipation by complete severance experienced in a ‘ Path- moment.’ They think that the mind, partially liberated by the former, completes its emancipation by the gradual process of the latter.

[1] Th. — If your proposition is to stand, you must affirm also that such a mind is then in part freed, in part not. And if you assent to the second proposition, you must admit that your subject is part Stream-Winner, part not — in other words, that he has all the attributes of the Stream-Winner in part only. 2

[2-4] The same argument holds for the other three Paths.

[5] You must also affirm as to whether [each conscious unit] is emancipated at the moment of its genesis, and in process of being emancipated as it ceases. 3 ...

1 The heresy seems to be analogous to that in III. 3, and to involve a misapprehension of the orthodox meaning of the term in question <vimutti).

2 Here and in [2-4] the same lists are given as in I. 4, §§ 1, 5, 9, 13.

3 Cf. II. 7, § 1 : ekag c it tag (unit of consciousness).

T.S. V.

10

146

Of Emancipation as a Process

III. 4.

[6] Opponent — You do not assent to my proposition ; but was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ For him who thus knows thus sees, the heart is set free from the intoxicants of sense-desires, of becoming, and of ignorance ’ ? 1 Is there no

‘ being emancipated ’ here of the emancipated mind ?

[7] Th. — But is there not also a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said : ‘ With heart thus made serene, made wholly pure, and very clean, freed from lust and from de- filement, become pliant, ready to ivork and imperturbable, he bends over the mind to insight in the destruction of intoxi- cants' 1 1 2 There is no process here of being set free.

[8] You would not speak of a mind partially lusting, hating, being bewildered, being corrupted. How can you then maintain your proposition? Would you not say [straight away] that the mind is lustful or not, mal- evolent or not, confused or not, suspended or not, destroyed or not, finished or not ? 3

5. Of the Eighth Man. 4

Controverted Point. — That for the person in the Eighth Stage, outbursts of wrong views and of doubt are put away.

From the Commentary. — Here the question is raised concerning a certain view of both Andhakas and Sammitiyas, namely, that, at the-

1 Dialogues, i. 9B.

2 Ibid., 92. It seems a little strange that this is not quoted as 1 the same Suttanta.’ There are, however, parallels in this work, e.g., p. 96 f. Cf. 98, n. 1.

3 ‘The mind’ (in our idiom) being, in Buddhist doctrine, a con- ditioned series of citt a’s, each as momentary as the ‘ moments’ of its attainments. Here the Theravadin resorts to the principle of Excluded Middle, ‘ there being no room in philosophic Reality for a third alter- native’ — paramatthato tatiya koti natthi. — Corny.

i Atthama-ko, literally Eightb-er. Of the Four Paths and. Pour Fruitions^ this is the lowest, the first reached, or eighth from Arahantship. The more correct view was that the victories alluded to- belonged only to the next stage— to the ‘ moment ’ of fruition— making the subject a genuine ‘ Stream-Winner.’

243-7.

His Fruitions are to come

147

moment of entering on the Path, after qualification and adoption, 1 two of the (ten) corruptions no longer break out in the eighth man— that is,, the person who has entered on the stream.

[1] Th. — Are you then also prepared to admit that the eighth man is a Stream-Winner, one who has won, obtained, arrived at, and realized the Fruit of Stream-Winning, and that, having achieved, he lives in personal contact therewith’? [2, 3] Are you further prepared to admit that he has put away the latent bias of doubt and wrong views ? And if these, then also the infection of mere rule and ritual? For your proposition involves all this. [4] Conversely, if you deny that these are put away by him, you must also deny that he has put away wrong views and doubt.

[5] How should he have already put away wrong views and doubt when he has not yet practised the Path wherein they get put away ? And not only the Path (the Eight- fold), but all the other factors of Enlightenment? 2

[6] For if he have not put away wrong views and doubt by the Path, or the other factors, he can surely not have put them away by means that is not the Path, but is worldly, co-intoxicant, etc. .. . 3 and corrupt.

[7-8] A. 8. — Since you deny that a person of the eighth rank has put away the [overt] outburst of wrong views find of doubt, I ask you, will these arise any more in him ?

Tlu — They will not.

A. S. — Surely then our proposition is true: they are put away.

[9, 10] Th. — Assuming that the outbursts will not again arise [i.e., become manifest in action], you say they are put away. But is the latent bias of wrong opinions, doubt, and belief in mere rule and ritual equally put away simply because these do not arise? And this you are not prepared to admit.

£11] Once more, you claim that the eighth man has put away wrong views and doubt. But you must then allow

1 See Compendium, pp. 55, 67 f. 2 129, n. 3, 170, n. 1.

2 See above, I. 2, §§ 14-20 ; III. 2, § 1.

3 For these elisions in the text, not ours, see above, III. 3, § 7.

148

III. 6.

Of the Eighth Man's Attainments

that one who has reached the stage in Jhana-meditation of concur.
 * adoption ’ 1 has put them away, and in this you do not

6. Of the Controlling Powers 2 of the Eighth Man.

Controverted Point. — That the five controlling powers are absent 3 in a person of the Eighth Stage.

From the Commentary. — Among the Andhakas it is held that, at the moment of entering the (first stage of the) Path, the ‘ Eighth Man ’ is in process of acquiring, but has not yet attained to, these powers.

[1] Th. — You must deny him faith, if you deny in him the controlling power of faith. So also for the other four. But you will not go as far as that. [2] Contrari- wise, you do allow that he [as Eighth Man] has faith and the rest, but you go no farther. [3] Yet you are prepared to admit, with respect to other controlling powers— -e.g., mind, gladness, etc.,. . and psychic life 4 — that whoso has the attribute, has also the controlling power of it. [4] Why draw the line at those five ? [5, 6] as, in fact, you do.

[7] You contend that, whereas the controlling power of faith is absent in him, faith itself is not absent. That whereas the controlling powers of energy, mindfulness, concentration, and reason are absent in him, he is neither indolent, nor heedless, nor unsteady or mentally vacillating, nor stupid, nor deaf, nor dumb.

[8], You acknowledge that his faith, energy, etc., are [of the saving kind called] forth-leading, 5 yet you do not credit him with the controlling powers [in which such attributes consist].

1 See above, from the Commentary.

2 The five spiritual (or moral) sense-faculties are faith, energy, mindfulness, 'concentration, reason, or understanding. We cannot point to any passage where they are, as a pentad., connected with the five ‘external’ senses. But they were considered, no less than the latter five, as capable of being raised to powers controlling the reciprocal interaction of the human being and his environment.

3 I.e., of course, not yet developed at this stage.

4 See Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 4 (xviii.) and p. 19, § 19 ; Compendium, 17.

5 N i y y a n i k a. Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., p 82, n. 2.

250-51. Appeal to Authority 149

[9-12] You admit the attainment both of the attributes and of these five controlling powers in the person who is practising that he may realize the fruit of Once-Returning, of Never-Returning, of Arahantship, but you deny the latter for the Eighth Man alone ; the one goes with the other !

[18] Finally, is there not a ' Suttanta in which the Exalted One said : ‘ The five controlling powers, bhikkhus — which are they ? The controlling po wers that are faith, energy , mindfulness, concentration , understanding. From the comple- tion and perfection of these five, a man becomes Arahant. Held in a weaker degree, the holder becomes one icho is practising that he may realize the Fruit of Arahantship ; in a yet weaker degree the holder becomes a Never- Returner ; in a yet toeaker degree,, one ivho is practising that he may realize the Fruit of Never - Returning; in a yet weaker degree, a Once-Returner ; in a yet rceaker degree, one toho is practising that he may realize the Fruit of Once-Returning ; in a yet -weaker degree, a Stream-Winner ; in a yet weaker degree, one who is prac- tising that he may realize the Fruit of Stream- Winning. In whom these five controlling powers are in every way, and everywhere wholly absent, he, I declare, is one icho stands without, in the ranks of the average man ’ ? 1

Yet you would not say that the Eighth Man stood thus without ? Hence you must concede that the five con- trolling powers are present in him.

7. Of the ‘Celestial Eye .’ 2

Controverted Point. — That the fleshly eye, when it is the medium of an idea, 3 becomes the celestial eye.

From the Commentary. — This is a view held by the Andhakas and Sammitiyas.

1 Sayyutta-Nikciya, v. 202.

2 Or vision. The power of apprehending, as visualized, things not accessible to the sense of sight.

3 E>hammupatthaddar). ‘ Medium ’ is, more literally, support, basis. D h a m m a may stand, as in § 1, for Fourth Jhana, or for the sensuous idea, or the spiritual idea, according to the context.

150 Of the Celestial Eye ILL 7.

[1] Th. — If you affirm this, you must also say that the fleshly eye is the celestial eye, and conversely,' that the two are like in kind, are, in fact, identical, the one having the same range, power, and field as the other. This you deny.

[2] Again, if you make the two thus on a par, you are affirming that something grasped at [as effect by previous karma] 1 becomes something not so grasped at, that ex- perience in the universe of sense is experience in the universe of ‘Rupa,’ that experience, analogously reasoning, in the universe of Rupa is experience in the universe of the remoter heavens, that the things included in these universes are ‘the f7n-included ’ 2 — which is absurd.

[B] Further, you are, by your proposition, also admitting that the celestial eye, when it is the medium of a sensuous idea [in Jhana], becomes the fleshly eye. And, again, that, when it is the medium of a [spiritual] idea, it then becomes the eye of understanding — which you must deny.

[4] Further, you are also admitting that there are only two kinds of vision (or ‘ eye ’). If you deny, your proposi- tion falls. If you assent, I would ask whether the Exalted One did not speak of three kinds of vision — the fleshly, the celestial, and the eye of understanding, thus : ‘ Three, bhikkhus, are the modes of sight 3 — lohich are they 1 The fleshly eye, the celestial eye, the eye of understanding 1

‘ The eye of flesh, the heavenly eye,

And insight’s eye, vision supreme :■ —

These are the eyes, the visions three Revealed by the man supreme.

The genesis of fleshly eye,

The may of eye celestial,

Horn intuition took its rise : —

The eye of insight unsurpassed.

Whoso doth come that eye to know,

Is from all ill and sorrow freed .’ 4

1 See Compendium, 159, n. 6. 2 Gi. Bud. Psy. Eth., xc.; 254, n. 1.

3 Literally, ‘are these eyes.’ 4 Iti-vuttaka, § 61.

254-7. Does Celestial Visioji explain Destiny ? 151

8. Of the Celestial Ear.

Controverted Point. — That the fleshly ear, when it is the medium of an idea, is the celestial ear.

[1, 2] correspond exactly to the same sections in III. 7.

[3] Th. — Further, you are, by your proposition, also admitting that the celestial ear, when it is the medium of a [sensuous] idea, becomes the fleshly ear. Further, you are also admitting that there is only one ear, or sense of hearing. If you deny, you cannot maintain your pro- position. If you assent, I would ask whether the Exalted One did not speak of two ears — the fleshly ear and the heavenly ear? 1

9. Of Insight into Destiny according to Deeds.

Controverted Point. — That the celestial eye amounts to insight into destiny according to deeds.

From the Commentary. — This is an opinion arising from a care- less interpretation of the Sutta-passage : ‘ With purified celestial eye surpassing that of men he sees being s as they pass away from one form of existence and take shape in another ... he knows their destiny as being according to their deeds,’ 2 namely, that the vision of itself was also an explanation of the things seen.

[1] Th. — Your proposition involves this also : that in the act of vision, attention is also paid to the sequence of the Karma — which you did not allow. Or, if you do allow this, you are further implying a combination of two con- tacts and two consciousnesses — which you do not allow. [2] Either, I repeat, you refuse to admit, that the act of seeing with the celestial eye involves judgment: — 3 ‘these beings, sirs, have plenty of evil deeds, words, and thoughts in their past: 4 they are accusers of Ariyans, holders of erratic views, undertakers of actions in conformity there- with ; now that their living frame is broken up, they are

1 Cf. Dialogues, i. 89, and elsewhere, e.g., Majjhima-Nik., ii. 19.

2 Digha-Nik., i. 82 ( Dialogues, i. 91), and elsewhere.

3 Manasikaroti, or attending.

i Literally, ‘are endowed with.’ So below.

152 Of Insight into Destiny III. 9.

reborn in purgatory, in the abode of the fallen, the destiny of evil-doers, a woeful doom ; but those folk, sirs, on the other hand, have plenty of good deeds, words, and thoughts to their account : the opposite of the foregoing ; they are now reborn in a heaven to a happy destiny ’ ; or, you accept this implication in celestial sight, and concede that [in what is really one act of consciousness] there are two contacts (or mental stimuli) and two consciousnesses.

[3] Again, if there have been those who, without this celestial vision, without having obtained, arrived at, and realized it, have had insight into destiny as being accord- ing to deeds, your proposition cannot stand. [4] The venerable Sariputta, as you imagine, was such an one. Did he not say :

‘ Nor to attain the vision of my past,

Nor for the means to see — the eye divine —

The mystic power to read the thoughts of men, Discern decease, rebirth in earth and heaven,

Nor for the ear celestially attuned Cared I to strive ’ ? 1

10. Of Moral Restraint.

Controverted Point. — That there is self-control among devas.

From the Commentary. — The question is raised concerning the view of those who hold that among the devas, beginning above the Thirty-Three, inasmuch as there was no committal of the five vices, 2 there is self-control.

1 Theragdtha, 996, 997. Cf. Psalms of the Brethren, p. 345. The inference drawn by the translator from the Commentary to that work tallies with the tradition. But we may conclude that Sariputta, who stood foremost in wisdom and insight ( Anguttara-Nik ., i. 23) could, according to tradition, have exercised those powers, had he cared to.- Cf. the contrasted temperament in Moggallana, verse 1182-84. The verse is cited {a) to dissipate {Corny,, lege vikkheparj karonto) any misinterpretation through a wrong impression that the Thera could not had he wished, (6) to refute the opponent on his own ground.

2 Verani : taking life, theft, fornication, false, slanderous, idle speech, taking intoxicating drinks.

258-60. Do Devos exercise Self-Control? 153

[1] Th. — Since you affirm its existence, you imply also [that there may be] absence of it among devas. You deny this, meaning that there is no want of it among devas. Then you imply that there is no [need of] self-control among them — this again you deny, by your proposition.

[2] Granting that virtue is restraint from absence of self-restraint, does this restraint exist among devas? ‘Yes,’ you say, but you are hereby implying also the co-existence of absence of self-restraint. And this you deny.

[S] Yet you admit the co-existence among humans. Why not among devas ? [4] For instance, you say £ devas

abstain from taking life, from intoxicating drinks.’ Yet you deny that these vices are found among them. [5] You contend they are not found among them, yet you will not allow that restraint from them is not found either, [6, 7] although you allow the co-existence of both among men.

[8] Opponent. — But if moral restraint is absent among devas, surely you are implying that all devas are takers of life, thieves, etc. 1 They are not, hence, etc. .. .

11. Of Unconscious Life.

Controverted Point. — That there is consciousness among the denizens of the sphere called Unconscious. 2

From the Commentary.- —This belief is of the Andhakas, derived partly from, the Word : ‘ mind [at rebirth] is conditioned by previous actions,’ 3 so that, in their view, there is no living rebirth without mind, partly from this other Word : ‘ those devas decease from that group as soon as consciousness arises in them.’ 4 They concede con- sciousness to those devas of the unconscious sphere at the moment of rebirth and of decease.

1 Asagvara = sagvaritabb o — that over which self-restraint ought to be used. — Corny. Hence, ‘ a viee. J If there were no vice, self-restraint would be meaningless. Presence of vice denotes absence of self-restraint.

2 Cf. Compendium, p. 1S6. A sphere in the mid-heavens called Rupa-loka. Of. n. 4.

, 3 4 Vibhanga, 135 f. ; Sanyufta-Nih., ii. 2 passim.

4 Dig ha- Nik., iii. 33. ‘Mind* (v inn an a) and consciousness (s a h n a) are here used in a synonymous and very general sense.

154

Of Unconscious Life

III. 11.

[1] Th. — But you surely cannot admit that such a being has conscious life or destiny, dwells among conscious beings, fares onward with conscious continuity from birth to birth, has consciousness as his birthright, has acquired a conscious personality ? Is not the opposite of all these terms true of him ? [2] Is their life, etc., fivefold in its constituents ? Is it not rather a life, destiny. . . acquisition of personality, of a single constituent? 1 Hence, even if we grant your proposition, you cannot say that such a being, when consciously functioning, functions by just that [act of] consciousness you ascribe to him ; nor do you claim this.

[3] If, in § 1, you substitute for ‘unconscious beings’ ‘ men,’ you could and would describe the latter further as ‘ having conscious life, and destiny, and so on.’ And you would describe them, further, as having a life, destiny, habitation, further rebirth, constitution, acquisition of personality [as determined for them] by five organic constituents. But when I say you have committed your- self to all this with respect to unconscious beings, in virtue of your proposition, you deny. Similarly for § 8, if we substitute ‘ man ’ for ‘ such a being, ’

[4] Let us assume the truth of your proposition, ad- mitting, of course, that there is consciousness in the human sphere — why do you go on to affirm, for those devas, an unconscious life, destiny, habitation, further rebirth, con- stitution, acquisition of personality, but deny it for men ? And why do you go on, further, to affirm a life, destiny, etc., of one organic constituent for those devas, but deny it for men? Why, finally, do you deny, for the un- conscious beings, the functioning in consciousness by just that [quota of] consciousness you assign to them, but affirm it in the case of human beings ?

[5] A. — If it is wrong to say ‘ there is consciousness in

1 I.e., of material quality only, not of this, plus the four classes of mental constituents. Voliara is here used for khandha. Bud- dhist tradition connects it with kar-ma. Yividhena visuq visur) karlyati:‘is made by various ways and alternatives.’ Cf. Vibhanga, 419; Yamaha, passim.

262-63. Are Unconscious Devas at Times Conscious ? 155

the Unconscious devas, 1 let me remind you of a Suttanta in which the Exalted One said : There are devas, hhikkhus, called the Unconscious Beings ; now those devas, token con- sciousness does arise, decease from that group? But our view really is this, that [6] they are only conscious sometimes.

X7i. That is to say, they are sometimes conscious beings, having conscious life, having fivefold organic life, and sometimes unconscious beings, having unconscious life, having a single organic life — which is absurd.

[7] Again, at what time are they conscious, at what time not ?

A. — At decease and at rebirth, but not during life.

Th. But then the same absurd transformation must happen.

12. Of [the plant r] ivhcrein Consciousness neither is nor

is not. 2

Controverted Point. — That it is tvrong to say that, in the plane wherein consciousness neither is nor is not, there is consciousness.

From the Commentary. — This inquiry was directed against those who, like the Andhakas of our time, hold that, from the Word : — ‘ the sphere of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness,’ 3 — it is not right to say that in that realm of life there is consciousness.

[1] Th. — But you would not describe that plane as one of life, destiny, habitation of beings, continued existence, birth, acquired personality that is unconscious ? [2] Nor

as a life, etc., of one constituent only ? Would you not call it a life of four constituents ? 4

1 See p. 153, n. 4.

2 In the Pali summary, at the end of Book III., the title becomes
 * of the topmost sphere of life.’

3 Of. any account of the more abstract Jhanas (e.g., Bud. Psy. Eth., 74), or of the remoter heavens (e.g., Vibhanga, 421).

4 I.e., of the four mental aggregates. Wo are now concerned with the remotest, Arupa or immaterial heavens. The PTS ed. has here omitted a sentence. Of. the next § (2), and also III. 11, § 1. For H aiici a s a nn a b h a v o, etc., read. . . sannabhavo.

156

Of a Heaven negatively described

III. 12.

[3] If we deny consciousness among the Unconscious Beings, and call that sphere a life, destiny. . . personality without consciousness, how can you deny consciousness to this plane where consciousness neither is nor is not, with- out describing it in the same terms ? Or how can we speak of that sphere as a life of a single organic constituent with- out describing this plane in the same terms ? [4] If your

proposition be right, and yet you describe this plane as conscious life, etc., then similarly, in refusing conscious- ness to the Unconscious sphere, you must describe that sphere as conscious life, etc., which is' absurd. So also for the fourfold organic life. [5] Bor if you deny conscious- ness to this plane, and yet call it a life of four [mental] constituents, then your proposition obviously falls through.

[6] You grant me that this plane, wherein consciousness neither is nor is not, is a life of four constituents, saying the while that there is no consciousness in this plane — you allow, do you not, that in the [lower] plane called ‘ infinity of space ’ there is consciousness ? And that there is consciousness in the [nest higher] planes : ' infinity of consciousness, ’ and £ nothingness.’ Why not then for our [fourth and highest] plane? [7] How can you admit consciousness for those three and not for this, while you allow that each is a life of four [mental] constituents ?

[8-10] Do you object to this : — in this plane consciousness either is or is not ? Yes ? but why, when you admit the co-presence of those four constituents ? Why, again, when you admit them in the case of the other three planes, and allow that there, too, consciousness either is or is not ?

[11] You admit that the plane in question is that wherein is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness, and yet you maintain that it is wrong to say : in that plane consciousness neither is nor is not ! [12] But take

neutral feeling — is it wrong to say that neutral feeling is either feeling or not feeling ? ‘ Yes,’ you admit, ‘that can- not truly be said.’ Then how can the other be said?