AB-KV-Ch16

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024.

Can One govern Another's Thoughts ?

303

BOOK XVI

1. Of Control.

Controverted Point. — That one can control the mind of another. 1

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasangliikas, hold that the attainment of power and authority in the world is only genuine if it include power to control the consciousness of others.

[1] Th. — Do you mean that one can bid the consciousness of another not to lust, not to hate, not to be bewildered, not to be corrupted ? Of course you deny. But how then can you maintain your view ? Or do you mean that one can bid any mental phase uprisen in another’s consciousness — reaction, feeling, perception, volition. . . understanding — to cease ? Equally you deny. ... [2] Or do you mean that anyone puts away lust, hate, or any evil mental coefficient 2 on account of another? Or practises the [Ariyan] Path, or applications in mindfulness, or any other set of the factors of enlightenment 3 because of another? Or masters the Eour Truths — understanding 111, putting away its Cause, realizing its Cessation, practising the Path thereto — because of another? Or finally, do you mean that anyone makes another the doer of his actions, that anyone’s happiness and ill are wrought by another, that one acts while another experiences? If you deny, you must deny your own view.

1 To knoio (or, as we say, ‘read’) the thoughts of another was one of the supernormal knowledges (see above, V. 7 ; Compendium, p. 209), but control or influence over another so as' to prevent corruption was not assumed for it.

2 See above, p. 229, n. 2.

3 See Compendium, p. 179.

804 Well-doing through Another's Mind. XYI. 2.

[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One : —

‘ ’ Tis thou alone dost work thine evil deeds ;

'Tis thou alone dost make thyself corrupt;

'Tis thou alone dost leave the wrong undone ;

’ Tis thou alone dost purify thyself

Self -wrought is cleanness and impurity.

None may his brother's heart 1 make undefiled ' P-

Hence it is surely wrong to say that one can control the mind of another.

[4] M. — But have not some admittedly won power and authority? Surely this includes control over others’ minds.

2. Of Assisting Another’s Mind.

Controverted Point. — That one can help the mind of another.

The Commentary merely ranges this -under the preceding discourse.

[1] Th. — Do you mean that one can so help another as to bid his consciousness not to lust or to hate, or to be bewildered, or to be corrupted ? . . . Or that one may bring forth in the heart of another any of the moral condi- tions, to wit, disinterestedness, love, understanding, or any of the five * controlling powers [of enlightenment], to wit, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, etc. .. , {the remainder agrees verbatim with XYI. 1).

8. Of making Another Happy according to his Deserts.

Controverted Point. — That one can bestow happiness on others. 3

1 Literally, ‘ another.’

2 Dhammapada, verse 164.

3 One can bestow the conditions of happiness to some extent, but not the actual state of mind.

527. Attention in Generalizing B05

From the Commentary. — This view is derived by its adherents, notably the Hetuvadins, from the Sutta quoted below. But the words of the Exalted One were spoken to show how the arising of happiness in others is conditioned. Producing happiness in others is not like bestowing food upon them ; hence the citation is inconclusive.

[1] Th. — Your proposition implies that one can also cause misery in others. But you deny this, while you maintain the opposite with respect to happiness.

[2] You imply further that you can hand over your own happiness to another ; or others’ happiness, or his own happiness, to another. You deny. To whom then ?

You imply, finally, that anyone causes another to act for him, that one’s own welfare and ill are wrought by another, that one acts while another experiences.

[3] H. — But did not the venerable Udayin say : £ Verily of many unhappinesses doth the Exalted One rid us, many happinesses doth he he store upon us, of many had things doth he rid its, many good things doth he bestow upon us ’. ?1

Hence one may hand on happiness to another.

4. Of Attending to All at Once.

Controverted Point. — That one can attend to everything simultaneously.

From the 'Commentary. — Attention has two aspects, according as ■we consider the method Or the object of attention. To infer from the observed transience of one or more phenomena that ‘ all things are im- permanent’ is attention as [inductive] method. But in attending to past things, we cannot attend to future things. We attend to a certain thing in one of the time-relations. This is attention by way of object of consciousness. Moreover, when we attend to present things, we are not able at the present moment to attend to the conscious- ness by which they arise. Nevertheless some, like the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, because of the Word, ‘ All things are impermanent,' hold that in generalizing we can attend to all things at once. 1 2 And because they hold that in so doing we must also attend to the con- sciousness by which we attend, the argument takes the line as stated.

1 Majjhima-Nik., i. 447.

2 Sab be sankhare ekato manasikar oti. — Corny.

20

T.S. v.

306

The Range of Attention

XVI. 4.

[1] Th. — Do you imply that we know the consciousness

by which we so attend ? You deny. 1 But I ask you again — now you assent. 2 Then do we know as consciousness the consciousness by which we so attend ? You deny. But I ask you again — now you assent. Then is the subject of consciousness its own object ? You deny. But I ask you again — now you assent. Then do we experience mental reaction by the same mental reaction ? Do we feel a feel- ing by that feeling? And so on for perception, volition, cognition, applied thought, sustained thought, zest, mindful- ness, understanding ? If you deny, you undo your previous affirmations. ... ,

[2] When we attend to the past as past, do we then attend , to the future-as future ? You deny. But I ask you again — now you assent. But this commits you to a collocation of two parallel mental processes. . . . And this holds if I sub- stitute * present ’ for ‘ future.’. . . And if you claim that we can, while attending to the past as past, attend also to the future as such, and to the present as such, we get a collocation of three parallel mental processes. . •. . And — [3-4] [we may ring the changes with] the same argument on other permutations of the time relations. ...

[5] P.A. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ When he by wisdom doth discern ■ and see : “Impermanent is everything in life.!”

Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.

Lo ! herein lies the way to purity.

When he by wisdom doth discern and see ,

That “ Everything in life is bound to III ! ..

That “ Everything in life is Void of Soul !”

Then he at all this suffering feds disgust.

Lo ! herein lies the way to purity ’ ? 3

Hence we can attend to all at once.

1 Because it cannot be subject and object at once. — Corny.

2 Because we are already aware of the nature of our thought in general, or because of the thesis advanced. — Corny.

3 Baa. of the Brethren, verses 676-678; ascribed to Auiia-Kondafma, the first among the first five disciples to grasp the new gospel.

582.

Matter and Motives

807

5. Of Matter as a Moral Condition (hetit). 1

Controverted Point. — That material qualities are moral conditions.

From the Commentary. — ‘Condition’ [hetu] may signify more specially one of the moral conditions or motives and their opposites : appetite — disinterestedness, hate — love, dulness — intelligence; or, more generally, any condition or causal relation whatever. Now, the TJttara- pathakas make no such distinction, but relying on the letter of the Word —‘the four primary qualities 2 are conditions {of secondary qualities : ] — claim that bodily or material qualities may be [moral] conditions.

[1] Th. — Your view implies that (i.) material qualities must act as one or other of the six motives of moral or immoral conduct ; (ii.) they have a mental object or idea, having the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc. 3 From both of these implications you dissent, hence you cannot maintain your position.

[2-3] Indeed, you are ready to maintain the contrary of (ii.), that proposition being quite true when applied to the six moral conditions, but untrue of material qualities.

[4] U. — But are not the four primary qualities conditions of the secondary material qualities that are derived from them? 3 Of course you assent. Hence, the four being material, material qualities are conditions [however you understand ‘ conditions ’].

6. Matter and Concomitant Moral Conditions.

Controverted Point. — That material qualities are accom- panied by moral conditions.

1 On Buddhaghosa’s analysis of hetu, see Bad. Pay. Eth., p. 274, n. 1. The alternative meanings above are known as h e t u-h e t u, or mu la (root), and paccaya-hetu. On hetu, see Compendium , p. 279.

2 Extended, cohesive, calorific, and mobile elements ( Compendium, p. 288, and above.

3 See VIII. ?.

308 Matter and Morality XYI. 7.

From the Commentary. — The foregoing dissertation applies here also.

[1] Th. — That is (i.) they must be accompanied by one or more of the sis motives or moral conditions, either good or bad ; (ii.) they have a mental object or idea, having the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc. .. . (see XYI 5 [1-2]).

[2] If you admit that disinterestedness, love, and the other four, 1 as moral conditions, have a mental object and involve mental adverting, adjustment, etc., then you must describe material qualities in the same terms. [3] And if that be so, you cannot deny either attribute to material qualities without equally denying it to the moral conditions.

[4] U. But is not matter in causal relations? You agree. Then it is surely right to say material qualities are accompanied by [moral conditions or] motives.

7. Of Matter as Morally Good or Bad.

Controverted Point. — That material qualities are (i.) good or moral, (ii.) bad or immoral.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahigsasakas and Sam- pni tiyas, relying on the Word — 1 acts of body and speech are good or bad ’—and that among such acts we reckon intimations of our thought by gesture and language, 2 hold that the physical motions engaged therein are [morally] good or bad.

[1] Th. — Do you mean to imply that material quali- ties have a mental object, and the properties of mental adverting, of adjustment, etc. ? Surely you agree that the opposite is true ? [2] And that, whereas you can predicate those things of the three moral motives or conditions, and of the five moral controlling powers, [3] they do not fit the case of material qualities. . ..

(ii.) [4-6] The same argument holds good for material qualities as immoral.

1 See XVI. 5, ‘ From the Commentary. ’

2 Bud. Psy. Eth, p. 217 ; Vibhanga, p. 13.

536.

Matter and Karma

309

[7] M.S. — But is not karma (moral action) of body and of speech either good or bad ? Surely then material qualities [engaged therein] are also either good or bad ?

8. Of Matter as Result.

Controverted Point. — That material qualities are results [of karma].

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas and Sammitiyas, hold that, just as consciousness and its concomitant attributes arise because of karina that has been wrought, so also do material [i.e., corporeal] qualities arise as results [of karma]. 1

[1] Tii. — Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, ete. ? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.

[2] All those things are mental characteristics, not material. But you wish to see in matter a ‘result’ of karma, without the mental characters which are the pro- perties of ‘ result.’. ..

[3] A.S. — But is not consciousness and its concomitant attributes, which arise through actions done, ‘result’? Surely then material qualities, which arise through actions done, are equally ‘ result ’ ?

9. Of Matter as belonging to the Material and the Immaterial Heavens.

Controverted Point, — That matter belongs to (i.) the material heavens, (ii.) the immaterial heavens.

1 On ‘ result,’ v i p a k a, as technically a conscious or mental phe- nomenon, see above, VII. 7, 8.

310

Of Celestial Matter

XVI. 9.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas, hold that since matter, which is the product of actions done in the world [and heavens] of sense-desire, belongs therefore to that world, so if it be the product of actions done in the material or immaterial heavens, it belongs equally to those heavens.

[1] Th. — Then you must describe matter [in terms de- scriptive of (i.) that is to say] as seeking attainment in Jhana, as seeking rebirth on those planes, as living happily under present conditions, as accompanied by a mind that seeks that attainment and that rebirth, and that lives in that happiness ; as coexistent with such a mind, associated, conjoined with it, one with it in genesis, in cessation, in physical basis, as having the same objects before it. . . [2] and you must describe matter [in terms descriptive of (ii.) that is to say] in the same terms as we apply to (i.). But is not the contrary true as to both (i.) and (ii.) ? . ..

[S] A. — But is not matter which is due to actions done in the world of sense-desires called ‘belonging to ?1 that world ? If that is so, then matter due to actions done in either of the other worlds of existence should surely be called ‘ belonging to ’ either the Material Heavens or the Immaterial Heavens.

10. Of Desire for Life in the Higher Heavens.

Controverted Point. — That lust for life in Bupa or Arupa spheres is included among the data thereof.

From the Commentary. — So think the Andhakas, and by the same analogy as they hold the previously stated opinion (XIV. 7) with regard to celestial lustings in general. That is a view they share with the Sammitiyas, but this is theirs alone.

[1] Th.— Similar to [1] in XVI. 9.

[2] And you cannot maintain your view without admitting that a corresponding lust for the objects of hearing, smell-

1 1 Belonging to ’ is in Pah simply the name of the world in question with adjectival import. On the extension of the term, ‘world of sense- desire ’ (kamavac&ra), see Compendium, p. 81, n. 2.

539.

311

Concerning Rapa

ing, taste and touch is one of the data in the sphere of each of these respectively. 1

[3] If you cannot affirm the latter, you cannot make an exception of the former.

[4] Next with regard to (ii.) lust for life on the Arupa [immaterial] plane as a datum thereof — my first argument used above (XVI. 9) holds good. [5, 6], So does my second used above (XVI. 10, 2). If your proposition is to stand, then a desire for each sense-object must be among the elemental data of the sphere of that particular object. You cannot make an exception of the desire for life in the immaterial sphere.

[7] A. — But is not desire for life in the plane of sense [kamadhatu] among the elemental data of that plane? 2 Then surely you cannot make an exception as to desire for life in the Rupa and Arupa spheres ?

1 Eupa may refer to (i.) matter, (ii.) visible object, (iii.) a sphere or heaven of * celestial ! matter, where sight supersedes the more animal senses. Lust for the objects of the other senses is introduced in the argument not so much to oppose rupa as (ii.), to other sense- objects, as to oppose conceivable if unfamiliar parallels — ‘ datum included in the sphere (or heaven) of sound,’ smell, etc. — to the familiar more ambiguous : 1 datum included in the sphere (or heaven) of Eupa.’

2 Desire, ‘ lower ’ or higher, is always an element in the Eama loka or world of matter, terrestrial, infernal, sub-celestial, but never, in orthodox doctrine, in the Eupa or Arupa worlds.