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282

Commingling of Good and Bad

xrv. 1.

BOOK XIV

I. Of the Mutual Consecutiveness of Good and Bad.

Controverted Point. — That a basis 1 of bad thought is con- secutive to a basis that is good, and conversely.

From the Commentary.— That which is good cannot directly and immediately follow after what is bad, nor conversely. Such reciprocal consecutiveness is anomalous. Some, however, like the Mahasanghi- kas, hold that, inasmuch as one can both like and then dislike the same thing, therefore there has been, in such a case, reciprocal con- secutiveness. Good and bad thoughts cannot occur consecutively during the stages of javana (apperception) in one and the same process of cognition, inasmuch as each course of good or of bad thought entails a distinct preliminary ‘ adverting ’ of consciousness,

[1] Th. — You are implying that the adverting, 2 the adjusting of the mind arising for ethically bad conscious- ness is precisely the adverting and adjusting of the mind arising for ethically good consciousness. You say ‘No,’ while insisting on your proposition. Then you must mean that the good consciousness can arise without our advert- ing or adjusting the mind ? You maintain the opposite to this? Then, if the good consciousness in question arise for a mind already adverted and adjusted, it must be

1 Literally, root, or conditioning state.

2 The seven terms characteristic of this work should here be supplied. See, e.g., VII. 5, 2. The Commentary here for the first time explains that ‘adverting 1 ( a v a tt an a=a v a j j a na) is the turning of the mind from the subconscious life-flux to full consciousness, and that ‘adjusting’ (or ‘aiming,’ panidhi) is the further 'move on to a definite mental object, and persistence thereon.

491. Commingling of Good and Bad 283

wrong to say that a basis of what is bad is consecutive to what is good.

[2] Does what is bad arise for wrongly directed atten- tion? You assent. Do you say as much of the good which, according to you, is consecutive thereto ? Is it not truer to say that the good consciousness w’as preceded by rightly directed attention? You agree. Then that bad thought cannot be immediately consecutive to this good thought.

[3] Again, are you prepared to admit that the idea of resignation follows immediately on that of sense-desires ? That the idea of benevolence follows immediately on that of malignity? That the idea of .kindness follows imme- diately on that of cruelty, the idea of love on that of malevolence, pity on unkindness, sympathetic joy on spleen, equanimity on resentment ? . ..

[4-6] The same argument is note applied to refute the second half of the proposition, to wit, ‘ that a basis of what is good is consecutive to a basis of what is bad ’?

[7] M. — But if I am wrong, you will admit that one can fall in and out of love with one and the same object ? Surely then my proposition is right, that a bad thing is consecutive to a good thing and conversely. 1

2. Of the Development of Sense-Organs.

Controverted Point. — That the sense-mechanism starts all at once to life in the womb.

From the Commentary. — Our doctrine teaches that at a [human] rebirth the development of the embryo’s sense-mechanism or mind is not congenital, as in the case of angelic 2 rebirth. In the human embryo, at the moment of conception, the co-ordinating organ (mama y at ana) and the organ of touch alone among the sense-organs,

1 The parallel drawn is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to passion and its opposite arising about the same object, not to the consecntion of the moral and the immoral,— -Corny.

2 Opapatika.

284

Embryonic Development

XIV. 2.

are congenital. The remaining four organs (eye and ear mechanism, smell and taste mechanism) take seventy-seven days to come to birth, and this is partly through that karma which brought about conception, partly through some other karma. 1 But some, like the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas, believe that the sixfold sense-organism takes birth at the moment of conception, by the taking effect of one karma only, as though a complete tree were already potentially contained in the bud.

[1J Th. — Do you imply that the sense-mechanism

enters the womb with all its main and minor parts com- plete, not deficient in any organ ? You deny. . . [Then

let us speak more in detail :] You admit that the organ

of sight starts by consciousness seeking rebirth ? 2 Now, you would not claim, for that questing consciousness that [at its taking effect] hands, feet, head,' ears, nostrils, mouth and teeth take their start? Why claim an exception in the case of the visual, or other sense-organs ?

[2] P.A. — Then you claim that four of the sense- organs — eye, ear, smell, taste — come later into being. Are you implying that, to bring this about, one makes karma in the mother’s womb ? Yon deny, but your position implies it.

Th. — But you say, do you not, that in the embryo hair, down, nails, teeth, bones, appear at a subsequent stage. Do you imply a special embryonic karma done to bring these to birth? You deny. Then why assail my posi- tion ? [3] Or it may be you do not admit the subsequent

appearance of hair, etc. ? But was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ At first the “ k a 1 a 1 a ” takes birth, ami thence The “abbuda.” Therefrom the “pesi” grows, Developing as “ghana” in its turn.

Now in the “ghana ” doth appear the hair,

The down, the nails. And whatsoever food

1 These are technically called janaka-karma and u p a 1 1 b a m- baka-karma (reproductive and maintaining karmas). — Compen- dium, p. 143 f. (A. 1, 2).

2 I.e., the potential resultant of some dying man’s last conscious act.

495. Sensations as Heterogeneous Units 285

And drink the mother of him takes, thereby The man in mother’s womb doth live ai d grow ’ ? 1

Hence it is right to assign a later appearance to hair, and so forth.

8. Of Immediate Contiguity in Sense.

Controverted Point. — That one sensation follows another as, an unbroken fused sequence.

From the Commentary. — In view of the swift alternations of seeing and hearing at performances of dancing and singing, some, like the Uttarapathakas, hold that the sense- cognitions arise in a mutually unbroken succession.

[1] Th. — Do you imply that the mental adverting, adjusting, etc., 2 conjured up by visual consciousness is the same as that conjured up by auditory consciousness ? Would you not affirm that this was wrong ? And if wrong, do you mean that the auditory consciousness brings about no adverting or adjustment of mind ? 3 Is not the opposite true ? But if it be true, then your proposition falls.

[2] Again, you agree that f visual consciousness ’ occurs to the person attending to a visible object. But you cannot urge that auditory consciousness also occurs to such an one attending to a visible object. ... In other words, if visual consciousness have only visible object as its object, and nothing else, the unbrokenly succeeding auditory con- sciousness must have the same kind of object only and nothing else. . ..

Our doctrine says : c Because of eye and visible objects visual consciousness arises.’ 4 Can you substitute the words

, 1 SayyvMa-Nik., i. 206; Jdtaka, iv. 496; of. Milinda, i. 63. The

Pali terms denote four stages in foetal growth.

3 I.e., can auditory consciousness possibly occur to one who has not adverted or adjusted the mind ? The argument is similar to that in XIV. 1. However swiftly one sense-operation follows another, it is judged that ‘ adverting ’ is an essential preliminary in each.

3 See above, VIII. 9.

4 Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 72 f. ; cf. Majjhima Nik., i. 259.

2S6 Sen sations as Heterogeneous Units XIV. 3.

£ auditory eonscic usness ’ ? You deny this. 1 But I repeat the question, and ask, Is the Suttanta thus? Nay, you say, the former quotation was alone right. But if your proposition be r'ght, you are implying that the given visual consciousness is none other than the given auditory consciousness.

[8-4] The same argument holds whichever two of the five kinds of sense we take.

[5] U. — But if I am wrong [consider any kind of dramatic performance], when there is dancing, singing, reciting, does not the spectator see objects, hear sounds, smell odours, taste tastes, and touch tangibles? Surely then it is right to say that the five kinds of sense -cognition arise in unbroken unitary sequence. 2

4. Of tlfe Outward Life of an Any an.

Controverted Point. — That the Ariyan ‘ forms ’ [of speech and action] are derived from the four primary qualities of matter. 3

From the Commentary. — The Uttar apathakas and others hold that Ariyan speech and action are material qualities derived, as such, from the four primary elements of matter, the Doctrine teaching that all material qualities are the four primary qualities of matter, or are derived from them .' 4

1 As heterodox.

2 ‘ The illustration is inconclusive, because it only alludes to a mixed state of rapidly alternating grouped objects of mind, not to the succes- sion in a unity.’ — Corny. It is tantalizing that our historical materials concerning a drama, which was apparently ultra- Wagnerian in pro- viding stimuli for all the senses, are so slender.

3 Extended, cohesive, hot, and mobile elements, popularly called earth, water, fire, air.

4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 53 ; cf. 185.

498.


 * Any an' a Spiritual Notion

287

[1] Th. — You admit that the qualities 1 of the Ariyan are moral, and not unmoral. But the primary qualities of matter are not moral ; they are unmoral. . ..

[2] Again, there is in these primary qualities nothing akin to the absence of intoxicant, fetter, tie, flood, bond, hindrance, infection, grasping, corruption, characteristic of the Ariyan’s qualities. On the contrary, the former are concomitant with these [ethically undesirable things].

[8] U. — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One : { Whatever matter there is, bhikkkns, is the four primary qualities and their derivatives ’ P Hence it is surely right to say that the material qualities of the Ariyan are derived from the primary qualities.

5. Of Latent Bias as Something Apart. 3

Controverted Point. — That latent bias, in any of the seven forms, is different in kind from a patent outbreak of the vice.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas, hold this view, inasmuch as an average worldly person, while his thoughts are ethically good or neutral, may be said to have latent bias for the seven vices, but not to be openly manifesting them.

[1] Th. — Do you equally maintain that the lusts of sense are different in kind from the lusts of sense openly manifested? You deny, but you cannot then maintain your proposition. You cannot maintain that the lusts of sense are the same as those lusts manifested, and yet deny

1 Evidently rupa is here taken in the limited sense of ‘forms ’ of speech and action — in fact, conduct. Cf. the Yamaha (i., p. xi), in which book rupa is used in the sense of c forms ’ of consciousness. It should also be recollected that the Path-factors — supremely right speech and aetion — are mental properties through which corresponding conduct is effected. See above, X. 2.

2 Anguttara-Nih., v. 348.

3 This theory was discussed in IX. 4 ; XI. 1.

288 Of Unconscious Outbursts of Corruption XIV. 6.

the identity in the case of the manifesting of them and the latent bias.

[2-7] This argument holds good for the other sis forms — enmity, conceit, erroneous opinion, doubt, lust of life, ignorance.

[8] A. — But if I am wrong, may not an average worldly man, while thinking what is good or unmoral, be said to have latent bias, but not to be openly manifesting any of its forms ?

Th. — If you conclude from this that your proposition is right, you must equally admit that, whereas such a person may also be said to have lust, though he be not openly manifesting it, lust is different in kind from open mani- festation of it.

6. Of Unconscious Outbursts of Corruption.

Controverted Point. — That outbursts of corruption take place unconsciously.

From the Commentary. — The Andhakas, for instance, hold that lust and other wrong states may arise even in one who is attending to Impermanence, etc., and besides, it has been said : ‘ Sometimes, Master JBharadvdja, when he is thinking : “ I will attend to the unbeautiful he attends to it as beautiful.' 1 Hence we are liable to involuntary outbursts of corruption.

[1] Th. — Yon imply that such outbursts come under the non-mental categories — matter, Nibbana, organ or object of sense. . . . Are they not rather to be classed as lust- ridden, hate-ridden, dulness-ridden mind, as immoral, cor- rupted consciousness, the existence of which you of course admit ?

1 Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 111. The PTS text of the Sayyutta reads, for subhato manasikaro tlti, subhato agaechati. The speaker is King Udena conversing with Pindola-Bharadvaja. Cf. Vin. Texts, i. 302 f. ; iii. 79 f. ; 382 f.

502.

hustings CelesUNBl

7. Of Desire as inherent in Heavenly Things.

Controverted Point. — That lust for the things of the Rupa heavens is inherent to and included therein.

From the Commentary. — Just as sensuous lusts are inherent in the world of sense-experience, and are said to be included in it, the lust for life in the Rupa heavens and the Arupa heavens was held, by the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas, to be as stated.

[1] Th. — You imply that the desire which seeks attain- ment in Jhana, the desire which seeks rebirth in the heavens, and the delighting, under present conditions, in celestial bliss, 1 are all three concomitant, coexistent, asso- ciated and conjoined with their respective kinds of con- sciousness, are one in genesis and cessation, one in seat and object with those kinds. If you deny your proposition falls.

[2] Is a desire for sound inherent and!'' .included in the sphere of sound, or is a desire for the other Objects of sense inherent and included in their respective spheres? Why not affirm here instead of denying ? If the desires are to be denied here, neither can you affirm them in the case of the heavens. 2

[3-4] The same arguments apply to the desire for the things of the Arupa heavens.

[5] A.8. — But if you admit that we may speak of sensuous lusts as inherent and included in the world of sense-experience, it is surely right to affirm analogous desires in the case of the Rupa and Arupa heavens. 3

1 According to the Commentary these three terms refer respectively to moral (k u s a 1 a) consciousness, resultant (v i p a k a) consciousness, and inoperative (kriya) consciousness — five modes in each of the three — on the Rupa plane. Cf. Compendium, Part I., 2, §§ 8, 9.

2 For the point in this argument see XVI- 10, § 2.

3 The orthodox position is that such desires are inherent in and confined to the world (earth, purgatory, lower heavens) of sense- experience (K a m a 1 o k a).

TS. V.

19

290

Things ‘ Undeclared ’

XIV. 8.

S. Of the Unmoral and the Unrevealed.

Controverted Point. — That error is unmoral.

From the Commentary. — As to the term a-vy-a-kata, literally ‘ undeclared,’ applied to the four categories : result-in-conscious- ness 1 (vipaka), inoperative consciousness 1 (kiriya), matter and Nibbana, it means ‘ cannot be declared to be either moral or unmoral, because of the absence of moral [or karmic] result-in-consciousness ’ (a v i p a k a 1 1 a ). Applied to speculative opinion on unproveahle matters, it means undeclared (a k a t h i t a 1 1 a). 2 Now some, like the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas, making no such distinction, speak of erroneous views as unmoral in their result [itself a very erroneous view],

[1] Th. — Then you must he prepared to class it as one of the unmoral categories — result, inoperative conscious- ness, matter, Nibbana, organ and object of sense 3 — which you may not do. You must also be prepared to admit that other mental factors, the conscious processes or acts accompanying erroneous opinion, are unmoral. Else you have this anomaly : that all these together constitute a state of immoral consciousness, while the erroneous opinion alone is unmoral. 4

[2] Again, the unmoral has no moral fruit or result, while erroneous opinion is of the opposite nature. Nay, were not evil views ranked as paramount offences by the Exalted One? 5 [8] Did he not say: ‘ Wrong views, Vaccha, are immoral, right views are moral ’ 6 And did he not say also: ‘For the holder of wrong views, Puma, I declare one of tivo destinies, either purgatory or the animal world ’? 7

1 See above, XII. 2,3. 2 A Christian, would say ‘unrevealed.’

3 See above, XI. 1, XIII. 9.

4 I) it thi - g a t a, or wrong views, is a factor in akusala- cittarj, bad consciousness (Bud. Psy. Bth., pp. 98-101). The idea here seems to be : How can a part be immoral, while the whole is immoral ?

5 We cannot trace this phrase verbatim. The Br. translator reads, for paramani (paramount), pamanani, ‘as their measure.’

e Majjlmna-Nik. , i. 490.

7 Cf. ibid., i. 388 ; Sayyutta-Nih., iv. 307.

504.

Things ‘ Undeclared ’

291

[4] A.U. — But did not the Exalted One say: ‘This, Vaccha, is unsolved (a v y ah at a) : — that the world is eternal, or that it is not eternal. This, too, is unsolved {av yak at a ) — that the world is finite, or that it is infinite. And so, too, are these : that the sold and the body are the same, or are different things ; that a Tathagata comes to be after death, or not, or both comes to be and does not come to be, or that neither happens '? 1

Surely then erroneous opinions are unmoral.

[5] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ Of a person holding wrong views, bhikhhus, whatever karma of deed, word and thought he completes and carries out in accordance with those views, be it volition, aspiration, adjust- ment of mind, or other activities, all those things conduce to the undesirable, to the unpleasant, to the disagreeable, to trouble, to ill ’ ? 2

Hence it is surely wrong to say that * erroneous opinions are unmoral.’

9. Of the Unincluded.

Controverted Point. — That erroneous opinions [may enter into] ‘ the Unincluded.’ 3

From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as when a man of the world has attained to Jhana, he may he called passionless as to sense- desires, but not free from erroneous opinions, some, like the Pubba- seliyas, hold that erroneous views beset also that other consciousness which is ‘ Unincluded.’

1 Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 393, 401 (neither is quite verbatim as the text).

2 Anguttara-Nilb. , v. 212.

3 The opponent would break down the exclusive content of the term a-pariy apanna — the Umncluded— which, according to the M>hidhamma-Pitaka, is reserved for the consciousness and conscious experiences of those qualifying in the Path, and for Nibfcana (Dhamma-sangani [Bud. Psy. Eth.\ §§ 992, 1287). Such conscious- ness would not be shared by a ‘ man of the world ’ or ‘ average person ’ (puthujjana, literally, one of the many-folk, or hoi polloi). It is ‘not included’ in the ‘mental range of one whose interests are confined to any sphere of life in earth or in heaven,

292

Of the Uninclvdecl

XIV. 9.

[1] Th. — Then you must be prepared to class them among the category of the ‘ Unincluded,’ to wit, as Path, Fruit, Nibbana, as one of the Four Paths, or Four Fruits, as one of the Factors of Enlightenment— which you may not do.

[2] P. — But if I am wrong, why do you admit that a worldly person [in Jhana] may be called passionless as to sense-desires, but depy: that he has lost all erroneous opinion ?

Surely then it is right to say that erroneous opinion may enter into * the Unincluded.’