AB-KV-Ch8

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335

Of Divers Destinies

211

1. Of Divers Destinies. 1

Controverted Point. — That there are six spheres of destiny.

From the Commentary. — There is an opinion among some schools — the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas— that the Asuras form a sixth plane of rebirth. The Theravadin contradicts this in virtue of the hair-raising illustration of the five divisions of destiny in the Sutta : ‘ There are these five destinies, Sariputta 2. . . It is true that a troop of Asuras — that of Vepacitti 3 — was freed from the fourfold plane of misery, but not to form a separate plane. They were taken up among the devas. The Kalakanjakas were taken up among the Petas.

[1] Th. — Did not the Exalted One name five destinies — purgatory, the animal kingdom, the Peta-realm, mankind, the devas ? [2] And did not the Kalakanjaka Asuras, who resembled the Petas in [ugly or frightful] shape, sex-life, diet, and length of life, intermarry with them? [3] And did not Vepacitti’s troop, who in the same respects re- sembled the devas, intermarry with devas ? [4] And had

not Vepacitti’s troop been formerly devas ?

[5] A. U. — But since there is an Asura-group, it is surely right to speak of it as a [possible] destiny? 4

1 Gati, literally, a going, or bourne, a career. On these, concisely stated, see Compendium, p. 137.

2 Majjhima-Nik., i. 73.

3 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 221 f. Cf. Dialogues, ii. 289 : Pss. of the Brethren, verse 749.

4 The Commentary includes between ‘in shape’ and ‘ sex-life,’ the [bracketed] term bfbhaccha — BIbhaeeha ti virupa dud- dasika. It also paraphrases samanabhoga (rendered as ‘re- sembling ... in sex-life’) by sadisa-methuna-samacara; and samanahara (‘ resembling ... in diet ’) by sadisa-khela- singhanika-pubba-lohitadi-ahara.

212

Of an Intermediate State

VIII. 2.

2. Of an Intermediate State.

Controverted '■ Point. — That there is an intermediate state of existence.

From the Commentary. — Some (as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas), by a careless acceptation of the Sutta-phrase — ‘ completed existence within the interval ’ 1 — held that there is an interim stage where a being awaits reconception for a week or longer. The counter-argument is based on the Exalted One’s dictum that there are three states of becoming only — the Kama-, the Kupa-, and the Arupa-worlds. 2 And it is because of that dictum that the opponent [in so far as he is orthodox] has to deny so many of the questions.

[1] Th.—li there be such a state, you must identify it with either the Kama-life, or Rupa-life, or Arupa-life, which you refuse to do. . ..

[2] You deny that there is an intermediate state between the first and second, or the second and third, of these. ..

[3] you affirm, indeed, that is no such thing ; how then can you maintain your proposition ?

[4] Is it a fifth matrix, a sixth destiny, an eighth station for reborn consciousness, 3 a tenth realm of beings ? Is it a mode of living, a destiny, a realm of beings, a renewal of life, a matrix, a station of consciousness, an acquiring of individuality? Is there karma leading to it? Are there beings who approach thither? Do beings get born in it, grow old, die in it, decease from it, and get reborn from it ? Do the five aggregates exist in it? Is it a five-mode existence ? All this you deny. How then can you main- tain your proposition ?

[5-7] You admit that every one of these [categories or notions] applies to each of the three planes of life named above, the only difference being that the first two — Kama- life and Rupa-life — are five-mode existences; the last —

1 I.e., died within the first half of the normal life-span in those heavens. See I. 4, § 9.

2 Sayyutta-Nih., ii. 3, etc. Cf. Compendium, 81, n. 2, 138 f.

3 The seven ‘stations’ (vinnanatthitiyo), or opportunities for the resultant rebirth-consciousness (the effect of a dying person’s consciousness) to happen — are described in Dialogues, ii. 66 f.

361.

Of an Intermediate State

218

Arupa-life — is a four-mode existence (that is, -without material qualities). If then there is an intermediate stage of life, you must be able to predicate some or all of these [notions or categories] of it. But you say you cannot. . ..

[8] But you deny also that there is an intermediate life for all beings. Hence your proposition is not universally valid.

[9-11] For whom then do you deny the intermediate state? For the person whose retribution is immediate? 1 If you assent, to that extent your proposition is for you not true. Or is it for the person whose retribution is not im- mediate that you affirm this state ? Yes, you say. Then you must deny it for his opposite.

You deny it also for one who is to be reborn in purgatory,, in the sphere of unconscious beings, in the immaterial heavens. Therefore to that extent your proposition is not universally valid. Nevertheless, you maintain that there is an intermediate stage of life for one whose retribution is not immediate, for one who is not to be reborn in purga- tory, nor among the ‘ unconscious beings,’ nor in the im- material heavens. [Concerning these you have yet to state in what respect, as a plane of life, it resembles, or differs from, the three named by the Exalted One.]

[12] P.S. 2 — But are there not beings who ‘complete existence within the first half of the term ?’ If so, are we not right ?

[18] Th. — Granted that there are such beings, is there a separate interval-state [between any two recognized exist- ences] ? Yes, you say. But granted that there are beings who ‘complete existence within the second half of the term,’ is there a separate state of life corresponding thereto ? If you deny, you must also deny ypur proposition [since you rest it on this basis].

The same argument applies to such cognate terms as ‘ beings who complete existence without,’ and again, ‘ with difficulty and striving ’ (see above, I., 4, § 9, n. 1).

1 On this term, see Bud. Fsy. Eth., § 1028.

2 Pubbaseliya, Sammitiya. '

214 Of the Pleasures of Sense VIII. 3.

3. Of the Pleasures of Sense.

Controverted Point. — That the kama-sphere means only the fivefold pleasures of sense.

From the Commentary. — This discourse is intended to teach those who, like the Pubbaseliyas, contract the meaning of kama -dhatu (element or datum of desire) to that of k a m a - g u n a (pleasurable sensations), ignoring the difference in the meaning of the two terms. It is true that in the Sutta — ‘ There are these five hinds of pleasurable sensations, bhihhhus ’ 1 — the whole world of k a m a d h a t u is im- plied. But generally kamadhatu may stand for vatthukama, objects of sense - desire ; kilesakama, corrupt, worldly desires; and kamabhava, or the eleven lowest planes of existence (from purgatory to the six lowest heavens). In the first term kama means ‘to be desired 5 ; in the second, it means both ‘ to be desired’ and ‘ to desire.’ But in the last term kama means ‘ to be desired ’ or ‘desiring,’ or * place where objects of sense happen.’ Dhatu, as always, means self-existing ultimate, without entity, non-substantial. 2

[1] Th. — You admit, do you not, that desire, intention, zest, and joy, and the passion or lust 3 that is involved in •each, are all bound up with the fivefold pleasures of sense? 4 How then can you maintain that the kama-life is only those pleasures ?

[2] Do you mean that human organs of sense are not co- extensive with kama-life, the five organs of external sense and the co-ordinating sense, or mind? No, 5 you say (meaning only the pleasures of sense in your proposition) ; but think again as to mind. . . . Yes, you now say, mind is not kama-life. 6 But was it not said by the Exalted One:

1 Majjhmia-Nik., i. 85. See Vigha-Nih. , iii. 234, for other references.

2 The PTS edition of the Commentary, through either corrupt MSS., or printing errors, or defective punctuation, is here not always intelligible. A perusal of the Br. edition will make the meaning clearer.

3 Here kama dhatu means kilesakama. — Corny.

i As objects, kamagunar amnano. — Corny.

5 The opponent does not reject these as objects of desire (vatthu- kama.). — Corny.

6 He recollects the sublimer and also the supramundane or spiritual work of mind. — Corny. Read te-bhumaka-mano ( ib .).

366.

Is Kama-Life Sense-Pleasures only t

215

‘ Fivefold the world's sense-pleasures be,

And mind as sixth, our lore doth rede.

Whoso therein doth purge desire, 1 Is thus from ill and' sorrow freed’ l

Hence it cannot be said that the kama-life does not in- clude the mind.

[3] Again, can you say that the pleasures of sense amount to a sphere of life, 2 a destiny, a realm of beings, to renewed life, to a matrix, a station for consciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma leading to them ? Are there beings to be reborn in them ? Do beings get born, grow old, die, decease, get reborn ‘in’ sense- pleasures ? Are there the five aggregates in them ? Are they a five-mode existence? Are Buddhas Supreme, Silent Buddhas, Chief Pairs of disciples 3 reborn in them? [4] All these things you can predicate of the ‘ kama-element,’ but not one of them of the pleasures of sense.

[5] P. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : Bhik- khus, there are these fivefold kdma-pleasures — which are they ? Objects desirable, sweet, agreeable, dear, connected with ‘kamaf and seductive, are cognizable by sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch — these are the five kinds of kdma- pleasures ’ ? 4

Hence surely the kama-element is only those five.

4. Of Sense-Desires.

Controverted Point, — Whether the subjective sense-desires or the objective five fields of sense constitute kama’s.

From the Commentary. — Going merely by the Sutta last quoted above, some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold the latter view. The

1 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 16.

2 Here k amadhatu = kama - bha va or -loka.

3 See above, I. 3, §§ 9, 10.

4 Ang uttara-Nik., iii. 411, etc.

216 Of Sense-Desires YIII. 4.

Theravadin shows that ‘ corruptions 3 alone truly constitute sen- suality. 1

[1] is verbatim = § 1 in YIII. 3, and [2] is verbatim— § 6, save for the substitution of ‘ Hence sensuality consists in only the five fields of sense-object.’

[3] Th. — But was it not also said by the Exalted One : ‘ There are these fivefold pleasures of sense, bhikkJius: which are the five? Objects desirable,. . . adapted to sense-desires (kama), and seductive are cognisable by sight, hearing, etc. .. . five kinds of [ objects associated tvith ] sense-pleasure. Never- theless, bhikkhus, these are not sense-desires ; they are called in the Ariyan discipline [ objects of] sense-pleasures [kama- guna]. For kama is a mail’s lustful intention ’ ; 2

‘ The manifold of objects 5 in the world —

This in itself is not ‘desires of sense.'

Lustful intention 4 is man’s sense-desires.

That manifold of objects doth endure ;

The will thereto the wise exterminate ’ ? 5

Hence it is wrong to say that just the five kinds of sense- objects constitute sense-desires.

1 Read kamabhavag, ‘ state of having kanaa’s.’ The translators’ difficulties increase in this discourse. But the Indian conception of all the universe, save the higher and highest heavens, in terms of ‘ desire,’ is of great interest. See Ency. Religion and Ethics, ‘ Desire, Buddhist/ by Mrs. Rhys Davids.

2 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 411. Br. does not support the reading of the PTS text — Te ariyassa. . .—as verse, but agrees with Edmund Hardy’s reading in the PTS edition of the Nikdya, which we have mainly followed. Cf. ibid., the many differences of reading in the MSS. consulted. The gathas occur, as above, in Sayyutta, i. 22. In the Anguttara line 3 is prefixed to the verses, and repeated as line 4 (in translation above, line 8 in text).

3 The Pali for this phrase, yani c it rani — ‘the varied things which ’ — is paraphrased in the Anguttara, Commentary with 1 objects ’ : citra-citrarammanani.

4 26., paraphrased as sail kappa vasena uppannarage.

6 Or ‘ discipline 5 (v i n a y a n t i).

370.

Ambiguity of Rupa

217

5. Of the Rupa-element.

Controverted Point. — That the ultimate ‘ datum or ele- ment of rap a ’ is things [cognized as] material.

From the Commentary.— The Theravadin criticizes this view — held, for instance, by the Andhakas — on the ground that the ‘ Rupa- element ’ includes all the spheres of life known as Eripa - bhava, and is therefore more extensive than just material qualities of things. 1

[1] Th. — Is then rupa a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-con- sciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma leading to it, beings to be reborn in it ? Do they get born, grow old, die, decease, get rebirth there? Are the five aggregates ‘in’ rupa? Is it a five-mode existence? [2] Now all these you can predicate of the Bupa-datum, but not of rupa, or material quality. Hence the latter has not all that is implicated in the former.

Again, if the EiTpa-datum consists only of material quali- ties — and, as you will admit, there is material quality in the ATimu-datum — is this latter datum the same as iftTpa-datum? You say ‘ no.’ But think. You must admit it is. 2 Then we get a man in two life-spheres at the same time. . ..

6. Of the Arupa-Element.

Controverted Point. — That the ultimate ‘ datum, or element ‘ of ariupa is things [cognized as] immaterial.

From the Commentary. — Here the same method is followed. Instruction is given by taking a certain immaterial notion — 1 feeling ’ — and asking if that is a sphere of life, etc. ; thus it is showed that in no ease are the two identical.

[1] Th. — Is then feeling a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth- consciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Is there

1 Here there is the corresponding difficulty of the ambiguity of rupa. See Compendium, 271 f. ; Bud. Psy. Eth., 43 f.

2 He denies, so as not to contradict the accepted triad of life-spheres. When pushed, he assents, because of his thesis. — Corny:

218 Senses in the Bupa-Heavens YIII. 7.

karma leading to it? Are beings to be reborn in it? Do they get old, die, decease from, get reborn in it ? Are the five aggregates * in 5 feeling ? Is it a five-mode existence ? [2] Now all these you can predicate of the Arupa-datum or element, but not of feeling only.

Again, if the Arupa-element mean only immaterial things — and you will admit there is feeling and other mental aggregates in the Kama-element — are these two elements or data identical ? Either you must deny (which were unorthodox) or assent. In the latter case we get a person in two spheres of life at the same time. The same argu- ment holds good for Arupa and Rupa data. And if all three be mutually identical, we get a person in three spheres of life at the same time. . ..

7. Of the Senses in the Rwpa-Sphere.

Controverted Point.— That in the Rupa-sphere 1 the in- dividual has all the six senses.

From the Commentary. — Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas and Sammitiyas), judging by the Sutta-passage — ‘ having form, made of mind, with all its main and lesser parts complete , not deficient in any organ ’ 2 — imagine that the Brahma-group and the rest had sensations of smell, taste, and touch.

[1] Th. — If that be so, and one in that sphere have, say, the sense of smell, you must admit odorous objects for him to smell ; and so too for the senses of taste and touch. [2] But you deny the existence, in that sphere, of such objects. [8-6] Yet it seems only rational that, admitting, as you do, the existence in that sphere of both organ and object in the case of sight, hearing, and [sense-co-ordination or] mind, you should admit no less as to the other fields of

1 This includes sixteen grades of devas, the Brahma-heavens being the lowest ( Compendium, p. 138).

2 Dialogues, i. 47. In the Rupa heavens, where ‘a subtle residuum of matter is still met with ’ (Compendium, p. 12), only sight, hearing, and intellectual co-ordination of these survives.

374.

Can Rujm-devas smell, taste, touch ?

219

sense, once von affirm the existence, in that sphere, of any of the other sense-organs. [7-8] ‘ No,' you say. You are pre- pared to admit organs of sight, hearing, and co-ordination, and corresponding objects seen, heard, and cognized by those organs; yet while you admit the other sense-organs, you deny the existence of their objects. [9-10] In fact, even if you were to concede the existence, in that sphere, of objects odorous, sapid, and tangible, you would, you say, deny they were apprehended by the corresponding organs, though you admit the corresponding apprehension in the case of sight, etc.

[11-13] But there are among you some 1 who would admit this apprehension of odours, tastes, and touches by the re- spective organs, the existence of which you affirm. I would ask them whether there exists in that sphere the odour of roots, pith, bark, leaves, flowers, fruit, raw flesh, poisonous, pleasant, or evil odours; whether there exists there also the taste of roots, pith, bark, leaves, flowers, fruit, or sour, sweet, bitter, pungent, saline, alkaline, acrid, astringent, nice, or nauseous tastes ; whether there exist there also hard and soft, smooth and rough, pleasant and painful contacts, heavy and light tangibles? 2 You deny that any of these does exist in that sphere. . ..

[14] A. S.~ -But is there not in that sphere the wdiere- withal 3 for smelling, tasting, touching?

Th.— Yes.

A. S. — Surely then it is right to say that in the Bupa- element the individual has all six senses ?

1 Certain teachers who will have it that the fields of sense are there complete, each organ having its function. — Corny.

2 These are standard formulas of enumeration. See Bud. Psy. EtTi., pp. 187-89, 198.

3 Ghana-nimittarj, etc. But this is only a matter of external appearance, not of organ and mental object, and is therefore a futile reference. — Corny.

220

Is there a sublimated Matter ?

VIII. 8.

8. Of Matter in ArTqm-Sphere.

Controverted '■ Point,. — That there is matter among the Immaterials.

From the Commentary. — Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas), judging by the Word — ‘ Because of consciotosness there comes mind and body’ 1 — imagined that, even in the Arupa-sphere of exist- ence, there was a subtle, refined matter segregated from grosser matter.

[1] Th. — Is then ‘matter’ (rwpa) a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm of beings, renewed life, a matrix, an acquiring of individuality ? This you deny ; but ail this you can predicate truly of Arupa. Hence you cannot maintain your proposition.

[2] You cannot predicate them truly of a five-mode existence, one mode of which is material qualities. But you can do so respecting a four-mode existence, that is, with the material qualities omitted, as is the case with Arupa. . ..

[8] You can predicate them truly of the Bupa-sphere, where there yet is matter. But this sphere is not iden- tical with the Arupa-sphere. [4] And if you predicate matter of the Arupa-sphere, you must show that matter agrees with the description you can truly give of the Arupa- sphere as a state of existence, a destiny, etc.

[5] Again, did not the Exalted One say that the Arupa was a way of escape from visible or material things ? If that is true, do you still maintain your proposition ? Yes ? Well, then, the Exalted One said that renunciation was a way of escape from sense-desires. 2 Now, according to your reasoning (if there is matter in the Immaterial), there are sense-desires in renunciation, and there are intoxicants in

1 Dialogues, ii. 52 f. ; Sayyutta-Nik ii. 1, passim; Compendium,. p. 188 ; Buddhism (Mrs. Rhys Davids), p. 91.

2 Nekkhamma...kama, a (very poor) word-play of exegetical derivation. The former term = going out or down from. Of. Dlglia- Nik„ iii. 289 f., 275; Anguttara-Nik. , iii. 245.

380.

Is Matter Moral ?

221

those who are freed from them, there are things ‘ included ’ (in intoxicant-infested states of the three spheres) among the £ unincluded ’ 1 which is absurd.

9. Of Matter as ethically Good or Bad.

Controverted Point.— That physical actions [involved in bodily and vocal intimations] proceeding from good or bad thoughts amount to a moral act of karma.

From the Commentary. — Some (as, for instance, the Mahiijsasakas and the Sammitiyas) hold that acts of body and voice being, as they are, just material qualities, reckoned as bodily and vocal intimation 2 are morally good if proceeding from what is good, and morally bad if proceeding from what is bad. But if, runs the counter-argument, they are to be considered as positively moral, and not unmoral— as we are taught 3 — then all the characteristics of the morally good or bad must apply to them, as well as material characteristics.

[1] Th. — If that be so — if rCtpa involved in bodily action be of morally good import — then it must have a mental object, and the mental attributes of f adverting,’ ideating, 4 co-ordinated application, attending, willing, anticipating,

1 I.e., the Ariyan "Way or Order (niyama), with its Paths and Fruits {Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 254, 335).

2 See Compendium, p. 264; Bud. Psy. Eth., 192 f. ; and below, X. 10, 11.

3 Bud. Psy. Eth., p 169, especially n. 5.

4 Abhogo, from bhuj, to bend, turn (cf. our ‘bow,’ ‘bough,’ from the common Aryan root bhugh), is synonymous with avaj- j ana (or a vat tana), the preceding term. Popularly equivalent to manakkara (mind-doing, mentation), it is technically defined, with the former term, as the adverting of consciousness, when attention is arrested or roused. It is tantamount to ‘ what is in the mind ’ ; hence the rendering ‘ ideating.’ Cf. Milinda (translation), i, 147 : ‘ Would a wind that had died away acquiesce in being produced again ? No, it can have no idea (abhogag), or will (cetanaq) to be reproduced ... it is an unconscious thing.’

222 The Physical and the Moral VIII. 9.

aiming, 1 -which you deny. But otherwise it is not good.

[2] All these things you can predicate about the good contact proceeding from good consciousness, as well as about the good feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, that proceed from good consciousness, and have an object of thought, but you cannot do so about rupa involved in bodily action.

[3] Or again, you would admit that, if rupa of the kind you name has no mental object, it will have no mental adverting, ideating, and so on ; but you would deny that contact, feeling, perception, and the rest, similarly pro- ceeding from good thought — good, but without mental object — lacked mental adverting, ideating, and so on.

[4] Now take the matter involved in the bodily action, resulting from good thought: Is all of it morally good? You deny. But then you cannot maintain your pro- position as generally true. For instance, would you call visible object which was the consequence of good thought,

‘ good ’ matter ? Are audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible object, or the four elements : extended, cohesive, hot, and mobile, [if they ‘ happened 1 as] the result of good thought,

£ good ’ matter ? You deny. [5] Then would you call any of them, under the circumstances, indeterminate matter (neither good nor bad) ? ‘ Yes 5 you say ; yet you deny that

the matter or material quality appearing, under the circum- stances, as bodily action is indeterminate. That, you say, would be ‘ good.’. ..

[6] Let us then take your £ good ’ bodily action which, as matter, has no mental object : must you not equally allow that visible or other sense-object, or those four elements which, as matter, have no mental object, are also, under the circumstances, £ good ’ ? But you deny. . . . [7] Similarly you refuse to see that, if you allow

1 The last two are equivalents of cetana, volition. The former is volition under the aspect of preparation, or exertion ; the latter is the same, regarded as persistent.— Corny. The f ormer— p a 1 1 h a n a— in its popular meaning, is ‘ praying,’ and is used as equivalent to a sirj s a, :hope.

384.

Is Matter Moral ?

223

an 3 r sense-object, or any element brought about by good thought, and having no mental object, to be indeterminate, you must equally allow the ‘ matter ’ of bodily intimation resulting from good thought and with no mental objeet, to be indeterminate. . ..

[8] You call this bodily intimation, which is consequent on good thought, ‘ good ’ matter [even though it is so un- mental as] not to be conjoined with any [mental reaction or] £ contact.’ Yet you would deny the possibility of this if, for ‘ bodily intimation,’ you substitute any sense- object, or one of the elements.

[9] Taken conversely, you allow that any object of sense or an element consequent on good thought, but not con- joined with any mental reaction, is indeterminate (neither good nor bad). Yet you would deny the indeterminateness if, for sense-object or element, you substitute matter of bodily action born of good thought.

[10, 11] And if to ‘ not conjoined with mental reaction or contact’ I add ‘not having a mental object,’ your attitude is the same, in both alternatives [8, 9].

[12-15] The whole argument to he repeated for 1 vocal ’ instead of ‘ bodily intimation.’

[16] Next with respect to bodily intimation proceeding from bad thought. You affirm similarly that this is ‘ morally bad ’ matter. Then it too must have a mental object, and those mental attributes named above, 1 which you deny. But otherwise it is not morally bad. [17] All these things you can predicate about the bad reaction, or ‘ contact,’ pro- ceeding from bad consciousness, as well as about the bad feeling, perception, volition, lust, hate and dulness, pride, erroneous opinion, doubt, sloth, distraction, immodesty, and indiscretion, that proceed from bad consciousness, having a mental object, but you cannot do so about that bodily intimation, which is r u p a, or of material quality

[18] 2 Or again, you will admit that, if bad rupa of the kind you name has no mental object, it will have no mental adverting and other mental attributes named above ; bht 1 See § [l]. ^ Cl §§ 3i 4.

224 The Physical and the Moral ‘VIII. 9.

you will deny that contact, feeling, perception, volition, lust, hate, and so on, proceeding from bad thought, bad and having no mental object, lack mental adverting and those other attributes. . ..

[19] Now this that you call ‘ morally bad ’ matter pro- ceeding from bad consciousness : — is all of it bad ? Yes ? Whether it be ‘ bodily intimation/ or other material quality ? This you deny, so your proposition amounts to this : that some material qualities resulting from bad consciousness are bad, some not.

[20-28] And all that we have argued as to ‘ bodily intimation ’ as £ bad ’ matter applies to 'vocal intimation.’

[24] 1 For instance, would you call visible object which was the consequence of bad consciousness ‘ bad ’ matter ? Or audible, odorous, sapid, or tangible matter ? Or any of the four elements ? Or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat (if any of them happened as the result of bad consciousness) — would you call them £ bad ’ matter ? You deny. [25] Then would you call any of them, under the circumstances, indeterminate matter ? * Yes,’ you say. Yet you deny that the matter or material quality appearing, under the cir- cumstances, as bodily or vocal action, is indeterminate. That, you say, would be ‘ bad.’. ..

[26] 2 Let us then take your ‘ bad' vocal action, which, as material, has no mental object : must you not equally allow that any sense-object, or any of the four elements, or impure matter, tears, blood, sweat, which have no mental object, are also, under the circumstances, ‘ bad ’? But you deny. . . . [27] Similarly you refuse to

see that, if you allow any of these things, when brought about by thought, and having no mental object, to be indeterminate, you must equally allow the ‘ matter/ bodily or vocal, of action resulting from bad thought, and with no mental object, to be indeterminate.

[28-31] are simply repetitions of [8-11], substituting ‘ bad ’ for * good,' * vocal ’for ‘ bodily,’ and adding ‘ impure matter, tears, blood, sweat’ to the sense-objects and four dements.

1 Cl [4], [5], 2 Of- [6], [7].

392.

Appeals to Authority

225

[32] M. S. — But il we may not say that matter is good or bad, is not deed or word as an act good or bad ? [This being quite orthodox,] our proposition must be right.

[33] Th. — But if you maintain that matter is good or bad, you must not hesitate to say that all five organs and objects of sense, the four elements and impure matter, etc., are (intrinsically) good or bad — which you deny. [34] If body and bodily action be material, would you affirm that mind and mental action are so ? If these, on the contrary, are both immaterial, would you affirm that both body and bodily action are immaterial ? Or if body is material and bodily action immaterial, would you speak similarly of mind and mental action? 1 [35] To say that bodily action as well as body is material, involves such statements as 1 sense-consciousness is material because the sense-organs are material.’

[36] You must not say that rupa, or matter, is action (or karma). For was it not said by the Exalted One : ( X say, bhikkhus, that volition is karma; when we have willed, then toe make action (or karma ) by deed, word, and thought?' 2

[37] And again : * When, Ananda, there is action, subjec- tive pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by the deed. So also when there is speech or thought, subjective pleasure or pain arises because it is well determined by the action of speech or of thought .’ 3

[38] And again : ‘ There are, bhikkhus, three modes of volitional acts of body, four modes of volitional acts of speech, mid three modes of volitional acts of mind, all of which amount to immoral deeds, bringing forth 4 ill and entailing it as result. And there are a like number of modes of volitional acts of body,

1 The PTS adds a repetition of the first question in this section. Br. omits both the repetition and also the third question. They are all only so many parallel instances to show the unreasonableness of implicating the whole of matter in statements about bodily and vocal action.

2 Anguttara-Nik., iii. 415.

3 lb., ii. 157 f. ; Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 39 f.


 * Bead dukkhudrayaij. So the Br. translation.

T.S. v.

15

226 Of Vital Power VIII. 10.

speech, and mind amounting to moral [karma], bringing forth and entailing happiness as result.' 1

[39] Once more: ‘If, Ananda, this foolish man, Samiddhi, when asked by the Wanderer Pdtaliputta, were to answer : “ Brother Pdtaliputta, it is when anyone has acted intentionally in deed, word, and thought that he comes to feel pleasant, or painful, or neutral feeling, felt as pleasure, as pain, or as neither:” so answering he 'would make right answer ’ ? 2

Is the Suttanta thus ? Then it is not right to say Matter, or material quality, is karma (action).

10. Of Vital Power.

Controverted Point. — That there is no such thing as a material vital power.

From the Commentary. — Some, as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas, hold that, because vital power is an immaterial fact, distinct from consciousness, therefore there is nothing material in it.

[1] Th. — If there is not, you imply also that, in material (organic) phenomena, there is no such thing as 1 a term of life, or a subsisting, no going on, being kept going on, no progress, procedure or preservation of them’ 3 — but you

1 "VVe cannot trace this passage (cf. Compendium, pp. 145, 146)., The Burmese translator adds a note : ‘ The Thera vadin takes k a y a,, v a c I, m a n o, when compounded with k a m m a, to denote merely a means (nimitta), and kamma by itself to denote volition (e e t an a). But the opponent takes each compound to mean a moral act (of deed, word, or thought).’ Hereby we see how certain purely immoral actions involved in gestures and speech, proceeding from moral thoughts, came to be regarded as also moral.

2 Majjhima-Nik., iii. 209. All four passages are quoted in Buddha- ghosa’s Atthasfilim (PTS), p, 88.

3 This is the canonical formula for jlvitindriya, or vital power (see Bud. Esy. Eth., § 9). The Burmese translator also reads thiti as a separate synonym of a y u and the rest, and understanding each in the instrumental sense, he renders the passage thus : ‘ Is there no such thing as a means of living, subsisting, maintaining, moving,, or preserving ?’

395. Is it only Psychical? 227

deny that; in fact, you maintain the opposite. Hence your proposition falls through.

[2] With regard to the immaterial, you affirm both the existence of immaterial vital power and also its continuity, going on, etc. Why do you affirm the latter only, and deny the former ?

[3] You admit that the life-term of immaterial organic phenomena is immaterial vital power : why not admit the corresponding counterpart in the case of material organic power? Why is it wrong to deny the latter when you admit the former ?

[4] You say that, for you, the life-term of material organic phenomena is an immaterial vital power ? Would you then maintain the contrary? No? Why not? [5] Both vital powers, you say, are immaterial. It seems to me you could with equal plausibility say that both were material.

[6, 7] You will admit that vital power is still present in one who has fallen into a cataleptic trance. 1 Yet you could not call his vital power (he being unconscious) immaterial. In which aggregates is the vital power included ? In that of mental coefficients, 2 you say? But is that aggregate existent in one who has attained trance? c No,’ you say? I repeat my question. ‘Yes,’ you now say. But if anyone in trance has mental coefficients, he will also have the other mental aggregates — feeling, perception, cognitive consciousness. ‘No,’ you say? I repeat my question. ‘ Yes,’ you now say. 3 Then that person cannot be in a cataleptic trance.

1 Nirddha, literally cessation (viz., of consciousness) : the utmost result of Jhana abstraction. Everything mental (immaterial) is suspended for a time.

2 Sankhara. These, in the Suttas, are defined as activity in deed, word, and thought; in Abhidhamma as fifty phases, more or less of them present in states of consciousness. ‘ The opponent thinks of the fifty, and denies ; then of the three activities, and assents.’ — Corny. Cf. XIX. 2.

3 He denies with respect to mid-trance, but assents with respect to entrance into and emergence from trance. — Corny.

228

Of Vital Power

VIII. 10.

[8, 9] If there be no material vital power, no vital power can exist for the inmates of the unconscious sphere, 1 for how can they have an immaterial (or mental) vital power? The argument above as to mental coefficients, which you say they have, applies to them also. They cannot be as they are and yet possess all five aggregates, as in a five- mode existence.

[10] [If vital power be wholly psychical, it must be affected by mental conditions ; for instance,] you will admit that vital power, springing from a consciousness that seeks rebirth, must, when that consciousness breaks off, be itself broken off in part. Now, would you say the same of a purely mental phase such as * contact ’ (or mental reaction to stimulus) ? Why not ? You mean that contact would be broken off, not in part, but entirely ? Now, would you say the same of vital power [it being, as you say, not material] ? You deny. . ..

[11] P. S. — Are there then two vital powers (material and immaterial) ?

Th. — Yes.

P. S. — Then you are committed to this — that we live with two lives, die with two deaths ? 2

Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . ..

11. Of a Result of Karma,

Controverted Point. — That because of karma an Arahant may fall away from Arahantship.

1 See above, I. 3 ; III. 11.

2 ‘At the moment of decease the two break off together.’ — Corny. The Compendium, when treating of mind, takes note only of the psychic vital power. Of. Introduction, p. 17 : ‘ The activities of will and the other concomitant properties [or coefficients] are due to the psychic life (jlvitindriya), which infuses mental life into one and all, constituting the whole a psychosis or psychical state? But when treating of matter, the author notices physical vital power (Com- pendium, p. 156). The doctrine as to the two is clearly stated in Vibhcmga, 123 : £ Vital power is twofold : material and immaterial.’

398. Karma and Arahantship 229

From the Commentary. — Such is an opinion held, for instance, by the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas, the Arahant so falling being one who, in a former birth, calumniated one who was then Arahant. For any other comment, see the argument on the falling away from Arahantship (I. 2, p. 64 f.).

[1, 2] Th. — How can you affirm this without also affirm- ing — which you will not — that those in the three lower stages of fruition may fall away from their fruit ?

[3] And your claim is that he may fall away, not because of such karma., or prior action, as murder, theft, fornica- tion, evil speech, matricide, parricide, Arahantieide, wound- ing a Buddha, or schism-making, but because of having calumniated Arahants. You affirm he may fall away be- cause of having calumniated Arahants, but you deny that everyone who calumniates Arahants realizes Arahantship. 1 Therefore your proposition that falling is due to calumnia- tion is absurd.

1 ‘The opponent, not discerning the constancy (niyama) in the attaining {leg. sampapunane) of Arahantship with such a karma, denies.’ — Corny. The denial amounts to the admission that some who calumniated Arahants realize Arahantship. The converse of this is that all Arahants are not those who so calumniated. If those who did not so calumniate fall at all, their fall cannot possibly be due to calumniation, because they had not calumniated. Therefore the opponent’s proposition is not universally valid on his own showing. The orthodox view, however, is that there can never be a true falling, because, among other reasons, all the previous karmas had been exhausted. It is not necessary here to work out this obvious argu- ment, all that is necessary being to disprove the opponent’s statement by refuting him on his own grounds.