AB-KV-Ch10

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421.

Consciousness and Life

248

BOOK X

1. Of Cessation.

Controverted Point. — That before five aggregates seeking rebirth have ceased, five operative 1 aggregates arise.

From the Commentary. — Some — for instance, the Andkakas — hold that if, before a unit of sub-consciousness lapses, another unit of con- sciousness, with its [operative] fourfold aggregate and the material aggregate sprung from it, has not arisen, the living continuum must be cut off. 2

[1J Th. — Is there then a congeries of ten aggregates? Do ten aggregates arrive at actuality ? If you deny, where is your proposition ? If you assent, you must answer for two copies of each aggregate [which is unorthodox].

[2] The same argument holds if you maintain that only four operative aggregates 3 may arise, substituting ‘nine" for ‘ ten ’ [i.e., five plus four].

[8] And the same argument holds if you maintain that only operative insight 4 arises, substituting ‘ six ’ for 4 nine ’ [i.e., five plus one].

[4] A. — When the five aggregates seeking rebirth cease, does the Path then arise ?

1 Kiriya, here meaning that which induces action, such as bodily movement, etc. It is not specialized, as in Compendium, pp. 19, 285 f. ; and may therefore be consciousness entailing merit or demerit. The aggregates (k h a n d h a ’ s) must be conceived as series of life- moments.

2 Cf. op. cit., 126.

3 Excluding the material aggregate.

4 I.e., insight understood as in IX. 5. — Corny.

244

The Path and the Believer

X. 2.

Th. — Yes.

A. — What! do the dead, does one who has ended his days, develop the Path? 1

2. Of the Path and Bodily Form.

Controverted Point. — That the physical frame of one who is practising the Eightfold Path is included in that Path.

From the Commentary. — Those who, like the Mahiijsasakas, Sam- mitiyas and Mahasanghikas, hold that the three factors of the Path : — supremely right speech, action, and livelihood — are material, are confronted with the contradiction that, since the factors of the Path are subjective, they imply mental attributes lacking in matter.

[1] Th. — You must then be prepared to affirm also that bodily form is [like the Path-factors] subjective, having the mental attributes of adverting, ideating, co-ordinated application, attending, volition, anticipating, aiming. You deny this and rightly, for surely the opposite is true.

[2, B] The three factors of the Path [in which you deem things corporeal to be included]— supremely right speech, action, livelihood — these, you affirm, are not subjective, not having the mental attributes above-named. [4-5] But the other five factors of the Path — supremely right views, aspiration, endeavour, mindfulness, concentration — these, you admit, are subjective, and have the mental attributes above-named.

[6, 7] If you affirm the absence of these mental charac- teristics from those three factors of the Path, you must also affirm their absence from all these five factors of the Path.

[8] M. S. M. — But you admit that supremely right

14 By sophistry’ (chalavada, Corny.), he has shifted from psychological to religious ground, then skips back again, drawing a false analogy between the final death of any one life and momentary death. The aggregates typify the life of worldly desires, which for the convert is superseded by the higher life of the Path. Psycho- logically and physically, the cessation of their continuity means death. Cf. below, X. 3. '. ,

424.

Intellect, not Sense, as Path- Instrument

245

speech, action, and livelihood are factors of the Path, [and these are manifestations of corporeality]. Surely then the practiser’s physical frame is included in the Path. 1

8. Of Path-Culture and the Senses.

Controverted Point. — That one may develop the Path while enjoying the fivefold cognitions of sense.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas, with reference to the Sutta : ‘ When he sees an object with the eye, he does not grasp at it in idea ,’ 3 hold to the view stated above. The Thera- vadin’s argument is that, if this be so, either the Path developed is of a worldly nature, or the developer’s sense-experience must be of the nature of the Path. But neither is possible, because sease-cognition is worldly, and has not Nibbana as its object. 2

[1] Th. — But you will admit — (i.) that the five kinds of sense-consciousness have a seat and an object that have already sprung up; (ii.) that their seat and object are antecedent; (iii.) that their seat is of the subject whi|e their object is external, that seat and object are not yet*' broken up while operative; (iv.) that seat and object are of different varieties ; (v.) that they do not enjoy mutually their respective ranges and fields ; (vi.) that they come to pass not without co-ordinated application or attention 3 ; (vii.) that they are not unmixed; (viii.) are not without order in time ; (ix.) are without order of contiguity ; and (x.) without any ideation? 4 Now if all this be true, your proposition cannot be true.

1 I.e., in part of it. The opponents regard those three factors as physical, the Theravadin as psychical. For instance, according to the latter’s doctrine, sammavaca is not so much the right utterance itself as that factor in the religious character by which right speech is engendered.

2 The Path is a concern of inano, not of the five senses ; again, i. — x. are not predictable of the Path. — Corny.

3 By the mind adverting to external object. — Corny.

4 Quoted from Vibhanga, 307. ‘ Leaving aside the automatic fall

(incidence in a presented object), there is not even the semblance of minding about it [in sense].’ — Corny.

246 Path-Development and Seme- Cognition X. 3.

[2] Consider visual consciousness and one of the Path- subjects — Emptiness 1 — does the former come to pass ■concerning the latter? If you deny, 2 you are opposing your thesis. If you assent, I ask whether it is right doc- trine to say not only :

sciousness arises ,’
 * Because of the eye and the visible object visual con-

but also :

Because of the eye and Emptiness visual consciousness arises ?

Is the Suttanta thus ? [Of course not.]

[8] Again, if your proposition be true, you must also affirm that visual consciousness arises concerning the past and the future. Also that it arises [not solely because of visible object, but also] concerning mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, thought, the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and the objects of hearing, smell, taste, touch — impossible affirmations.

Now you can admit that representative (ideational) consciousness does arise concerning Emptiness, concerning the past and the future, concerning phases of mind, factors of experience, as stated just now.

And one may develop a Path while enjoying representa- tive cognition concerning any one of those matters, but not during the enjoyment of sense-consciousness, which as such is not concerned with them.

[4] M. — Well, but was it not said by the Exalted One .• ‘ Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye, he does not grasp at the general characters nor at the details of it,. . . or hears a sound,. . . or smells,. . . tastes,. . . touches a tangible. . . ’ P

Surely here there is Path-practice by one who is enjoying the five sorts of sense-consciousness ? . ..

1 Compendium, 67, 216, and above, iii. 2.

2 Because of the orthodox formula below. See Majjlmna-Nik., i. 259 ; Sayyutta-NiJc., iv. 87.

3 Anguttara-NiTc., i. 113 ; cf. Dialogues i. 80, n. on the terms rendered by £ characters,’ ‘ details,’ and their being generally taken to refer to sex-attraction. See also Appendix : N i m i 1 1 a.

427.

Are Sensations Ethically Positive 1

247

4. Of Sensations as Moral and Immoral.

Controverted Point. — That the five kinds of sense-con- sciousness are good and bad (have positive moral quality).

The Commentary contributes no discussion.

[1-3] 1 2 Th. — ( Verbatim similar to X, 3, §§ 1-3.) The argument being here, too , that the senses are limited to sense- objects, ethical and intellectual matters being the concerns of intellect, will, etc.

[4] M. — Well, but was it not said by the Exalted One : he grasps, ... or again, does not grasp, at the general characters, or the details of it,. . . or hears a sound, etc. .. .’ ?
 * Here, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu sees an object with the eye,

Surely then the five sorts of sense-consciousness are good and bad.

5. Of Sensations and Ideation.

Controverted Point. — That the five kinds of sense-con- sciousness as such are co-ideational. ?

From the Commentary. — Here again the Mahftsanghikas, for instance, carelessly interpret the Teacher’s words, quoted in the fore- going. They hold them to mean that the five kinds of sensations as such are accompanied by ideation, because sexual ideas are generated by immoral thoughts.

( The argument is verbatim similar to the preceding, the authority appealed to being that in X. 2.)

1 The Commentary refers also to the preceding discourse.

2 SabhogS. See VIII. 9, § 1, note.

248

Morals and the tligher Life

X. 6.

6. Of Two Codes of Morals.

Controverted Point. — That one who is engaged in the Path is practising a double morality.

From, the Commentary. — From such passages in the Word as ‘ When a man is established in virtue he is gifted with wisdom ’ 1 some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that, inasmuch as the virtuous person is developing the Path which is not of the world, with a morality that is of the world, he must, at the moment of realization, be possessed simultaneously of both a worldly and an unworldly morality. The argument begins by showing that each morality would involve two separate sets of mental processes.

[1] Th. — You must then be prepared to affirm that he is possessed qf his dual morality with a dual mental con- tact, dual feeling, dual perception, dual volition, dual thought, dual faith, dual energy, dual mindfulness, dual concentration, dual understanding. . . . [2] If his moral

code be worldly, those processes will be worldly. [8] If his moral code be both, they will be double. The mental contact, the feeling, etc., that he experiences, will be both worldly as well as unworldly [or supramundane] — which you of course deny. ...

And if you say that one actually engaged on the Path is possessed of a worldly code of morals, you are calling such an one in effect an average person or worldling — which you of course refuse to do. . ..

[4-6] Your position, you say, is this: (1) one actually engaged on the Path practises a worldly morality in the three factors relating to conduct — right speech, right action, right livelihood — but not in the five factors relating to mental life. 2 (2) In those three factors his morals are both worldly and supramundane, but they are only the latter in the other five factors. My position is that you must affirm one and the same higher morality for all the eight. 8

1 Sayyutta-Nik., i. 13, 165; quoted in Milindapahha, 34.

2 See X. 2.

3 Implied, not stated in so many words.

Is Virtue not Mental ?

483.

249

\ [7] M.—I Well, but does the Path come to be 1 when worldly morality has ceased ?

Th. — Yes.

M. — What ! can anyone without morals — his virtue defective, imperfect, cut off — develop the Path ?

Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . ..

7. Of Virtue or Morality as Automatic. 2

Controverted Point. — That virtuous conduct is automatic (and not a property of consciousness).

F rom the Commentary. — It is held by some, like the Mabasangh- ikas, that when there has been moral conduct, even though it has ceased, there is an accretion of virtue, and hence the doer becomes virtuous. The argument is analogous to that on giving as not mental (VII. 4). '

[1] Th. — But is virtue either material qualities, or Nibbana, or an organ or object of sense [since these are the opposites of properties of mind] ? . . . [2] You would

not call mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, un- mental. But if virtue cannot be identified with anything that is not mental, it must be a property of mind. ...

[8-5] If virtue be no property of consciousness, you must affirm that it has not a result consciously., sought after. Is not the opposite true? But if it has a\result to be desired, it is also something mental. . . . The mental properties just enumerated — they have both bonseiously desired results and are mental. In admitting this, you must also admit that virtue is of the same dual character. But you contend that virtue, on the contrary, is so anomalous as to have a consciously desired result, yet to be not mental. . ..

[6-8] Again, if virtue be not a thing of the mind, you must admit that it has not a result, not an effect [in 1 Literally, * arise.’ 2 A-cetasikat).

250

Virtue as Mechanical

X. 8, 9.

future consciousness] 1 ; yet is it not precisely something having such a result and effect? You would surely not say that it is non-mental and not productive of effect, as you would admit in the case of an organ or object of sense ? Again, you would not consider that these non- mentals have such a result; yet this is what you say of virtue : — that it is both non-mental and yet fruitful of results in consciousness.

[9-10] With reference to the Path-factors, you would call the three factors relating to virtuous conduct non- mental, while calling the other five mental [which you are not justified in doing].

[11] M. — But if I am wrong, you must then admit that when virtuous acts have ceased, the doer becomes immoral. You deny this? Then I am right to say that virtue is [i.e., goes on] without mind, mechanically.

8. Of Virtue as conforming to Thought.

Controverted Point .— That virtue does not proceed in adaptation to 2 thought.

From the Commentary. — This is merely a pendant to the previous discourse.

[1-5] The argument is exactly similar ^,o X. 7, ‘does not proceed in adaptation to thought ’ being substituted for ‘ is automatic (or a property of consciousness), ’tmd the middle sections [3-8] on ‘ result ’ and ‘ effect ’ being omitted.

9. Of Growth through Observance.

Controverted Point. — That virtue grows through [the mere fact of] being undertaken.

From the Commentary.— Here, from a careless interpretation of the verse in the Word, beginning —

‘ By planting pleasant parks and woods,'

1 See pp. 205, n. 8, 207, n. 2.

2 Literally, roll along after, in accordance with (ann-parivat- tati). Cf. Bud. Psy. Eth., §§ 671, 772.

440. Are Acts of Intimation Moral ? 251

wherein it is said —

‘ Merit doth grow continually /

some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that virtue grows naturally when once the virtuous life has been undertaken, accumulating indepen- dently of the mind’s action. The argument is similar to a previous discourse.

[1-4] The argument is exactly similar to VII. 5 (p. 200), ‘ virtue grows through being undertaken ’ replacing ‘ merit derived from a £pft. . . enjoyed keeps growing,’ § 2 being omidtecl, and in § 3, ' the giver of a gift ’ being replaced by ‘ one who has undertaken a life of virtue.’

10. Are Acts of Intimation Virtue ?

Controverted Point. — That acts of intimation are moral acts.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas and Sammitiyas, thinking that ‘ bodily intimation is karma of deed, vocal intimation is karma of speech/ believe that such acts have a moral quality. But intimation (as gesture or speech) is a material matter, while morality or virtuous conduct is not so, but is a deliberate (i.e., mental) act of abstinence.

[1] Th. — But the conduct called moral — abstaining from taking life, from stealing, from fornication, lying, and strong drink — do you affirm that these are so many modes of intimation ? You do not. . ..

[Acts intimating minor courtesies such as] salutation, rising to welcome, presenting clasped hands, acts of pro- priety, offering a seat, a couch, water for the feet, a towel 1 for the feet, rubbing the back in the bath 2 — are these morality ? Yes, you say. But you would not affirm they

1 Padakathaliya. See Vin. Texts, i. 92 n. Of Buddhagho- sa’s alternative renderings, there given, the Burmese translator of the Kathd Vatthu uses the latter. The 4 footstool (padapltha) for the washed feet ’ included in the Yinaya is here omitted.

2 The. same translator renders this word, n h a n e, by 4 with powder.’

252 Of Non-Intimation as Immoral X. 11.

are the five abstinences just named. Those are moral — are these ?

[2] M. S. — But if acts of intimation are not moral, are they immoral ? If not, then they are moral.

11. Of Non -Intimation as Immoral.



Controverted Point. — That acts not intimating [a moral purpose] are immoral.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Makasanghikas, hold this view, based on the idea of a possible accumulation of demerit [in the past], and on the fact that moral precepts may be broken at the dictates of another.

[1] Th. — But the conduct that is immoral — taking life, theft, fornication, lying, intemperance — do you affirm that these are so many modes of won- intimation ? You deny. (Then they are intimative, and some immoral acts are therefore intimative [of moral purpose].)

[2] Jf anyone giving in charity has resolved on some evil deed, do his merit and his demerit both grow thereby ? If you assent, you are involved in two sets of mental pro- cedure. 1 And if you assent to this anomaly, you have good and bad, low and excellent, sinister and radiant states of mind simultaneously present, when, in fact, as the Exalted One said, they are as far apart as earth and sky, etc. 2 [3] Similarly for all courtesies shown by one who has resolved on some evil deed.

[4] M. — But an evil deed, you admit, had been resolved upon, hence it is right to say that acts non-intimative of a moral thought behind them are immoral.

i As in X. 1.

2 As in VII. 5.