AB-KV-Ch17

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312

The Arahant as beyond Merit

XVII. 1.

BOOK XVII

1. Of an Arahant having Accumulating Merit.

Controverted Point. — That there is accumulation of merit in the case of an Arahant.

From the Commentary. — This is an opinion carelessly formed by such as the Andhakas : that because an Arahant may be seen dis- tributing gifts to the Order, saluting shrines, and so on, he is accumu- lating merit. Tor him who has put away both merit and demerit, if he were to work merit, he would be liable to work evil as well.

[1] Th.—Ii the Arahant have accumulation of merit, you must allow he may also have accumulation of demerit. . . . And [2] you must equally allow that he achieves meritorious karma, and karma leading to the imperturbable, 1 that he does actions conducing to this or that destiny, or plane of rebirth, actions conducing to authority, influence, riches,

adherents and retainers, celestial or human prosperity. . ..

[3] Yon must further admit that, in his karma, he is heaping up or unloading, putting away or grasping, scat- tering or binding, dispersing or collecting. 2 3 4 * * If he does none of these things, but having unloaded, put away, scattered, dispersed, so abides, your proposition is untenable.

[4] A. — But may not an Arahant give gifts — clothing,

alms, food, lodging, medicaments for sickness, food, drink ? Maj 7 he not salute shrines, hang garlands on them, and per- fumes and unguents? May he not make consummate

oblations before them ? You admit this. But these are all merit-accumulating acts. .,.

1 See p. 190, n. 2. 2 See I. 2, § 63.

542.

Karmic Energy Indestructible

313

2. Of Arahants and Untimely Death.

Controverted Pojnt. — That an Arahant cannot have an untimely death.

From the Commentary. — From carelessly grasping the Suita cited below, some — to wit, the Rajagirikas and Siddhatthikas— hold that since an Arahant is to experience the results of all his karma before he can complete existence, therefore he cannot die out of due time.

[1] Th. — Then are there no murderers of Arahants ? You admit there are. [2] Now when anyone takes the life of an Arahant, does he take away the remainder of life from a living man, or from one who is not living? If the former, then you cannot maintain your proposition. If the latter, there is no murder, and your admission is wrong.

[3] Again, you admit that poison, weapons, or fire may get access to the body of- an Arahant. It is therefore clear that an Arahant may suffer sudden death. [4] But if you deny, then there can be no murderer.

[5] R.S. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ / declare, bkikkhus, that there cannot be destruction [of karmic energy ] ere the outcome of deeds that have been deliberately wrought and conserved has been experienced, whether that destruction be under present conditions, or in the next or in a subsequent series of conditions ’ ? l

Hence there is no untimely dying for an Arahant.

1 Angihttara-NiTc., v. 292 f., and above, p. 266. The Commentary paraphrases this passage in detail. The following is an approximate rendering. The commentator follows the negative form of statement in the Pali of the Sutta, which is rendered above in positive form: 1 I do not declare (n a vadami) the annulment — that is, the complete cutting off of the recoil (parivatuma-pariechinnabhavap) — of deeds done by free will without their result having been ex- perienced — i.e., obtained, partaken of. Nor do I declare that such destruction may be realized under present conditions, but not here- after. Nor do I declare that such destruction may be effected in the very next rebirth, or the rebirth next to that ; nor that it may be effected in subsequent rebirths; nor that it may be effected in one rebirth where opportunity of maturing results arises, and not in another where no such opportunity arises. Thus in all manner of conditions.

314

Predeterminism

XVII. 3.

3. Of Everything as due to Karma,

Controverted Point. — That all this is from karma.

From the Commentary. — Because of the Sutta cited below, the Bajagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold that all this cycle of karma, corruptions and results is from karma.

'[1] Th. — Do you then include karma itself as due to karma? 1 And do you imply that all this is simply the result of bygone causes? 2 You are committed here to what you must deny.

[2] Again, you imply, by your proposition, that all this is [not so much from karma as] from the result of [still earlier] karma. If you deny, 3 you deny your first proposi- tion. If you assent, 4 you imply that one may commit murder through [not karma, but] the result of karma. You assent? 5 Then murder, [though a result], is itself

given renewed existence and eventuation of karmic result, there is no place on earth wherein a living being may be freed from the con- sequences of his own evil deeds. All this the Buddha implied in the Sutta quoted. Hence the opponents’ premises for establishing his view — that any act which has not obtained its turn of eventuation should invariably be experienced by an Arahant as result-have not been well established.’

For the opponents a k a 1 a (untimely) meant one thing, for the Theravadin another. To judge by the Theragatha Commentary ( Pss . of the Brethren, pp. 232, 266), the orthodox opinion was that no one, in his last span of life, could die before attaining Arahantship.

1 This is rejected as fusing karma with its result. — Corny.

2 That the present is merely a series of effects and without initiative. See on this erroneous opinion (stated in Anguttara-Nik., i. 173 ff. ; Vibhanga, 367) Ledi Sadaw, JFTS, 1913-14, p. 118.

3 If all is from karma, then that causal karma effected in a past life must have been the result of karma effected in a still earlier life. — Corny.

4 A shoot cannot produce a shoot, but in the continuity of life a seed is the product of another seed, and by this analogy karma is the result of previous karma. So at first rejecting, he then assents. — Corny. (freely rendered).

5 He assents, because the murderous intent is, by his theory, the result of previous karma. — Corny. The PTS edition ought here to have Am ant a instead of the negation.

542.

315

Is Karma the One Cause?

productive of [karmic] result ? You assent ? Then the result of karma is productive of result ? You deny ? Then it is barren of result, and murder must a fortiori be barren of [karmic] result. . ..

[3] This argument applies equally to other immoral acts —to theft, to wicked speech — lying, abuse, slander, and idle talk — to burglary, raiding, looting, highway robbery, adultery, destroying houses in village or town. It applies equally to moral acts : to giving gifts — e.g., giving the four necessaries [to the religious]. If any of these is done as the result of karma, and themselves produce karmic result, then [you are on the horns of this dilemma : that] either result-of-karma can itself produce effects [which is hetero- dox], or any good or bad deed has no karmic result [which is heterodox]. ...

[4] II. S. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :

c ’ Tis karma makes the world go round,

Karma rolls on the lives of men.

All beings are to karma bound As linch-pin is to chariot-ioheeV 1

£ By karma praise and fame are won.

By karma too, birth, death and bonds.

Who that this karma's divers modes discerns,

Can say “ there is no karma in the world ” ! ?' 2

Hence surely all this is due to karma ?

4. Of III ( Dukkha ) and Sentient Organisms.

Controverted Point. — That 111 is wholly bound up with sentience.

From the Commentary.' —‘Ill’ [dukkha] must be understood in two ways : as bound up with and as not bound up with life [indriya’s]. According to the former, 111 is referred to the seat of

1 Sutta-Nipatu, verse 654.

2 We cannot trace these four lines.

316

Two Meanings of 1 Dukkha’

XVII. 4.

suffering ; according to the latter, 111 covers liability to trouble through the law of impermanence with its ‘ coming to be and passing away.’ But the Hetuvadins, for instance, do not draw this distinction. They hold that painful sentience alone constitutes that dukkha, to under- stand which the holy life, according to the teachings of the Exalted One, is led.

[1] Th. — But you commit yourself to saying this: that only that which is bound up with sentience is impermanent, and conditioned, has arisen through a cause, is liable to perish, to pass away, to lose desire, to cease, to change. 1 But are not all these terms suitable to insentient things? 2 You assent ; but you refute your proposition in so doing.

[2] You mean, do you not, that what is not bound up with sentience is impermanent, etc., and yet is not 111. 3 But if you call ‘ what is bound up with sentience ’ equally impermanent, etc., must you not also say that ‘ this is not ill.’? If you deny, [and by your proposition you must deny], then must you not contrariwise include ‘ that which is not bound up with sentient life ’ under the notion of what ‘ is ill ’ ?

[3] Did not the Exalted One call whatever is imperma- nent 111 ? And is not the insentient also impermanent ?

[4] H. — You deny the accuracy of my proposition. 4

1 These all making up the content of the idea of 111 or sorrow or suffering. Cf. Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, p. 133.

2 E.g., the earth, a hill, a rock, are insentient, and also impermanent. — Corny.

3 Br., omits ‘ not. 5

i ‘Insentient objects cause both physical pain (dukkha) and

grief (domanassa) to a sentient subject; for instance, fire in hot weather, or air in cold weather. Again, the destruction of property, etc., is always a source of mental pain. Hence the insentient may be called “ 111 ” even without a reference to the idea of impermanence ; but as they are not produced by karma and corruption, they cannot be said to constitute the Ariyan fact of “ 111.” Moreover, the destruction of grass, wood, etc., and of such physical things as seed, etc., does not constitute the Ariyan fact of the “ cessation of 111.” It is the sentient that is both 111 and also an Ariyan fact. But the insentient is the former only, and not the latter. The Theravadin in denying the Hetuvadin’s proposition shows this difference.’-— Corny. \

548. Of III and the Truths 317

But you are thereby committed to this: that just as the higher life is lived under the Exalted One for understand- ing III as bound up with sentient life, it is also lived for the purpose of understanding 111 that is not bound up with sentient life.

Tli. — Nay, that cannot truly be said.

. H. — And you are further committed to this : that just as 111 that is bound up with sentient life, once it is thoroughly understood, does not again arise, neither does it again arise when it is not bound up with sentient life and is thoroughly understood.

You deny 1. . . but I hold my proposition stands.

5. Of ‘ save only the Ariyan Path!

Controverted, Point. — That save only the Ariyan Path, all other conditioned things may be called £ 111.’

From the Commentary. — This is held by such as the Hetuvadins, because the Ariyan Path was stated by the Exalted One in the Four Truths as ‘ a course going to the cessation of III/ 2

[1] Tli. — Then you call the Cause of 111 3 also 111? If you deny, you cannot maintain your proposition. If you assent, do you mean that there are but three Truths ? 4 If you deny, your proposition falls. If you assent, do you not contradict the words of the Exalted One, that the Truths are four — 111, Cause of 111, Cessation of 111, Way going to the Cessation of 111 ?

[2] If now you admit that the Cause of 111 is also 111, in what sense do you judge it to be so ?

1 Albeit the Theravadin makes these two denials, it is nevertheless orthodox to include impermanent insentient things in the category of 111. Hence his denials must not be taken as proving the opponent’s proposition. — Corny.

2 In his first sermon, Buddhist Suttas (SBE, XI.), 148 f. ; Vinaya Texts, i. 95 ; also in the Nikayas, passim.

3 The Second Truth.

i I.e., are the First and Second equal to each other?

318

Is the Order an Abstract Idea? XVII. 6.

H. — In the sense of impermanence.

Th, — But the Arijan Path, is that impermanent ?

H. — Yes.

Th. — Then is not that also III? . ..

You say then that the Path is impermanent but not 111, while the Cause of 111 is both impermanent and III. [It is impossible for you to maintain such a position]. . ..

[3] H. — But if the Path be * a way going to the cessation of 111,’ I maintain that, when we speak of all other con- ditioned things as 111, this Ariyan Path is excepted.

6. Of the Order and the Accepting of Gifts.

Controverted Point. — That it ought not to be said * The Order accepts gifts.’

From the Commentary. — This view is now held by those of the Vetulya[ka]s, who are known as the Mahasunnai avadins. 2 They believe that the Order, in the metaphysical sense [paramatthato] of the word, is the Paths and the Fruits. These cannot be said to accept anything.

[1] Th. — But is not the Order worthy of offerings of hospitality, of gifts, of salutations, as the world’s supreme field of merit ? How then can it be wrong to say it accepts gifts? [2] Were not its four pairs of men, its eight classes of individuals 3 declared by the Exalted One to be worthy of gifts ? [3] And are there not they who give to it ?

[4] Finally, was it not said by the Exalted One : —

1 A s doth the holy flame its offering,

As doth the bounteous earth the summer rain,

So dk>th the Order, in rapt thought expert,

The Gift accept ' ? 4

Hence surely the Order accepts gifts.

[5] M. — But can a Path accept ? Can Fruition ac- cept? . ..

1 See XXIII. 1.

2 So PTS ed. Br. has ‘ Mahapunna-\adins. !

3 Digha-Nik., iii. 255. 4 We cannot trace this passage.

551.

Is the Order an Abstract Idea 7 :

319

7. Of the Order and the Purifying of Gifts.

Controverted Point. — That it ought not to be said that
 * The Order purifies 1 gifts.’

From the Commentary. — Those who hold the view just discussed, hold as a corollary that Paths and Fruits are not able to purify gifts.

[1, 2] Similar to XVII., 6, §§ i, 2.

[3] And are there not those who, having made a gift to the Order, make their offering effective? 2

[4] M. — But does a Path, does Fruition ‘purify’? . ..

8. Of the Order and Daily Life.

Controverted Point. — That it should not be said that ‘ The Order “ enjoys,” “ eats,” “ drinks.” ’

The reason and the adherents as above.

[1] Th. — But you must admit that there are those who partake of the meals of the Order, both daily and on special occasions, both of rice-gruel and of drink.

[2] Moreover, did not the Exalted One speak of * meals taken in company/ ‘in turn,’ ‘of food left over,’ and ‘not left over ’ ? 3 [3] And did He not speak of eight kinds of drinks: — ‘mango-syrup, jambu-syrup, plantain- syrup, m6cha-syrup, honey-syrup, grape- juice, lily root- syrup, and pharusaka-syrup’? 4 How then can you maintain your view?

[4] M. — But does a Path, does Fruition ' enjoy/ ‘eat,’

‘ drink ’ ? . ..

1 Visodheti — i.e., causes to fructify, makes more fruitful (in merit). — Corny.

2 Dakkhinar) aradheti, a less obvious phrasing than the instrumental phrase of the Sutta-Nipata, verse 488, aradhaye dakkhineyyehi. ‘They gain, they win great fruit even by a trifling offering. . . . Little (when so offered) becomes much, much becomes more.’ — Corny. In the text the usual gifts to the Order are then detailed. See above, p. 199, § 3.

3 Vinaya, Texts, i. 38 f.

4 Hid., ii. 132. The Commentary does not enrich our scanty know- ledge about the less obvious kinds.

820

Wise Givers are blessed

XVII. 9.

9. Of the Order and the Fruit of Giving.

Controverted Point. — That it should not be said that ‘ a thing given to the Order brings great reward.’

The reason and the adherents as above.'

[1, 2] Similar to XVII. 6, §§ 1, 2.

[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Give, lady of the Gotamas, to the Order. In that giving thou shall also render honour to me and to the Order’ ? l

[4] Again, was it not said to the Exalted One by Sakha, ruler of the gods :

c Of men who bring their offerings,

Of creatures who for merit seek,

Makers of merit for fair doom : —

Where must they give to reap reward !-

The four ivho practise in the Paths,

The four established in the. Fruits : —

Such is the Order upright, true,

By wisdom and by virtue stayed.

Of men who bring their offerings,

Of creatures who for merit seek.

Makers of merit for fair doom,

Who to the Order make their gift : —

Theirs is’t to reap a rich reward .’ 2

‘ This Order sooth abounds ancl is grown great,

In measure as the waters of the sea,

These be the valiant students, best of men, Light-bringers they ivho do the Norm proclaim.

They who because of them do give their gifts,

Oblations fair, and seemly sacrifice,

They to the Order loyal, firm in faith,

Commended by the wise, win great reward.

And mindful thenceforth of the off e rings made,

Joy is their heritage 3 while in this ivorld.

1 Majjhima-Nik. , iii. 253. 2 Sayyutta-NiJc., i. 233.

3 The V. V. Commentary explains vedajata by jatasoma- nassa.

555.

I) ise Givers are blessed

321

Thereafter, conquerors of selfishness 1 And of the root thereof, free front all blame,

Lo ! to a brighter world they win their wan ' ' 2

Hence surely a thing given to the Order brings great reward.

10. Of the Buddha and the Fruit of Giving.

Controverted Point. — That it should not be said that ‘ Anything given to the Buddha brings great reward. 5

From the Commentary. — From the same source comes the theory that because the Exalted Buddha did not really enjoy anything, but only seemed to be doing so out of conformity to life here below, nothing given him was really helpful to him,

[1] Th. — Now was not the Exalted One of all two-footed creatures the highest and best and foremost and uttermost, supreme, unequalled, unrivalled, peerless, incomparable, unique ? How then could a gift to Him fail to bring great reward? [2] Are there any equal to Him in virtue, in will, in intellect ?

[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘Neither in this world nor in any other is any to be found better than, or equal to the Buddha who has reached the summit of them who are worthy of offerings, who are desirous of merit, who seek abundant fruit 5 f 3 *

Hence surely anything given to the Buddha brings great reward.

IX. Of the Sanctification of the Gift.

Controverted Point. — That a gift is sanctified by the giver only, not by the recipient.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the U ttai apathakas, hold this view for this reason : If a gift were sanctified by the recipient, it would become a great blessing. Now if the donor gives and the donee

1 In the PTS edition read m a c oh era m ala ij samulag.

2 Vimdna- Vatthu, 84, 25-27.

? Not traced.

T.S. V. 21

322

Who Sanctifies the Gift ?

XVII. 11.

produces the result, this would mean that the former causing the latter to act for him, his own happiness or misery would be wrought by another. In other words, one would sowq another reap. [This is heresy.] 1

[1] Th. — Now are not some who receive gifts ‘ worthy of offerings, attentions, gifts, salutations, the world’s supreme field of merit ’ ? [2] And did not the Exalted One pronounce

the four pairs of men, the eight kinds of individuals to be worthy of gifts 2 [3] And are there not those who, having

offered a gift to a Stream-Winner, Once-Returner, Never- Returner or Arahant, make the gift effective ? How then can you maintain your proposition?

[4] U. — But if a gift may be sanctified by the recipient, does not he become the agent for quite a different person ? 2 Does not one person work the happiness or the misery of another? Does not one sow, another reap ?

Th. — Now was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ There are four ways, Ananda, of sanctifying a, gift. Which are the four ? A gift may he sanctified by the giver, not by the re- cipient; a gift mag be sanctified by the recipient, not by the giver ; or it rhay be sanctified by both;, or, again, by neither’ ? 3

Hence it is surely wrong to say: ‘A gift is sanctified only by the giver, not by the recipient.’

3 See above, I. 1 (p. 43 f.) ; XYI. 1-5 ; a perverse application of the doctrine of individual becoming and individual karma to two distinct contemporaneous individuals. Gf. Buddhism, London, 1912, p. 184.

2 Anno a n n a s s a k a r a k o. This question would be reasonable if the opponent had meant that the donor’s will is moved to act (literally, be done) by the donee. But he meant that the donor’s will is sanctified, purified, in the sense of great fructification depending upon the person of the donee. Hence the question is to no purpose. — Corny.

2 Majjhima-Nik. , iii.258; cf. Dlgha-Nik., iii. 231 ; Anguttara-Nik., ii. 80 f. (order of third and fourth alternatives reversed in all three).