AB-KV-Ch2

Tipitaka >> Abhidhamma Pitaka >> Kathavatthu >> ‘’’Kathavatthu Ch2’’’

Pali Versions : Pali English Version and Pali Devanagri Version

=Kathavatthu Chapter 2=

1. Of Conveyance by Another.

Controverted Point. — That an Arahant has impure discharge.

From the Commentary. — This was asked concerning a notion

entertained by the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaselivas. These had noted

seminal discharge among those who professed Arahantship in the belief

that they had won that which was not won, or who professed Arahant-

ship, yet were overconfident and deceitful. And they wrongly

attributed to devas of the Mara group the conveyance, to such, of an

impure discharge. This leads to the second question, since even a

pure discharge is caused by passion.

[1] Th. — You contend that he may have. Yet you deny

that in the Arahant there remains any lust, sensuous

desires or assailing passion, any ‘fetter,’ ‘ flood,’ ‘ bond,’

or ‘ hindrance of sensuality.’ But this denial commits you

to negate your proposition.

[2] You admit that the average -worldling may have both

the one and the other, both the desires and the physical

result. But then you must also admit' both as true in the

case of the Arahant.

[3] What is the cause of that physical impurity which

you impute to the Arahant ?

P. A. — The devas of the Mara group convey it to the

Arahant.

Th. — Have then these devas themselves that physical

impurity ?

P. A. — No, in them it is non-existent.

Th. — Then you should not say that they convey it to

the Arahant. [4] From whom do they convey it ? Not,

1X2 Of Conveyance by Another II. 1.

yon affirm, from their own bodies, nor from the Arahant

himself, nor from other beings [which is absurd]. [5] You

deny also that they effect the conveyance through the pores

of the body. Then you should also deny that they convey

it at all. What [do you allege] is the reason of their con-

veying it ?

P. A. — Their idea is: ‘we shall cause doubt as to his

attainment to be laid hold of.’ 1

Th.— Is there doubt in an Arahant ? If you reply ‘ No,’

then your argument falls through. Or if you reply ‘ Yes,’

then must you herein admit that an Arahant may hold

doubts about the Teacher, the Doctrine, the Order, the

ethical training, the beginning and end of time— either or

both— and about things as happening through assignable

causes— which is absurd. [6] The average man holds

doubts about such things, but an Arahant does not [else is

he like the average man]. Or if both hold doubts not on

any of these eight points, but on other matters, 2 then

again the Arahant is no better than the average man.

[7] Granting your proposition, to what is the impurity

due ? You reply, to eating, drinking, chewing, tasting. But

you deny that the proposition is true of all who eat, drink,

chew, taste. Or, if you maintain the opposite conclusion,

you must admit that children, eunuchs, devas eat, drink,

etc., yet that the proposition is not true in their ease.

[8] Nor can you refer to any specific repository for that

impurity which you call a result of eating, drinking, etc.,

similar to that which is provided for the natural results of

eating, drinking, etc.

[9] If your proposition were true, then the Arahant

would pursue and produce things relating to sexual inter-

course, live a family life, use Kasi sandalwood preparations,

1 Vimatirj gahayissamati. A Singhalese v.Z. has g ah i s-

samati.

2 1 Such, as the name, family, etc., of a given woman or man, and

the like.’ — Corny. The ‘ eight points ’ constitute a stock formula even

up to the present. See ‘ Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine, 1 by Ledi

Sadaw, JPTS, 1913-14, p. 119. Bud. Psy. Ethics, § 1004.

169 Are all Amhants equally Immune ? 113

adorn himself with wreaths, perfumes, and cosmetics,

hoard gold and silver, like any average man, concerning

whom your proposition were true. [10] But how can it

he true of the Arahant who, as you admit, has put away

passion, has cut it off at the root, and made it as the

stump of a palm tree, made it incapable of rising up again

in future renewal? — of the Arahant who has treated in

like manner hate, ignorance, conceit, error, doubt, sloth,

distraction, impudence, and indiscretion ?

[11, 12] How, again, should it be true of one who, like

the Arahant, has cultivated the means for the putting away

of passion, etc., and all the other factors of enlightenment. 1

[13] How should it be true of one who, like the Arahant,

has [consummated as having] done with lust, done with

hate, done with nescience, by whom that which was to be

done is done, by whom the burden is laid down, by whom

the good supreme is won, and the fetter of becoming is

wholly broken away, who is emancipated through perfect

knowledge, who has lifted the bar, has filled up the

trenches, is a drawer-out, is without lock or bolt, an

Ariyan, of one for whom the banner is lowered, the burden

is fallen, who is detached, conqueror of a realm well-

conquered, who has comprehended 111, has put away the

cause thereof, has realized the cessation thereof, has culti-

vated the Path thereto, who has understood that which is

to be understood, comprehended that which is to be compre-

hended, put away that which is to be put away, developed that

which is to be developed, realized that which is to be realized? 3

[14-20] Do you still maintain your proposition?

P. A. — Yes, but only in the case of an Arahant who is

proficient in his own field, not of an Arahant who is

proficient in other things. 3

1 These are enumerated under heads in the text as above, I. 2, § 47.

2 See II., § 47 (p. 67).

3 This curious distinction is explained by the Corny, as that between

the Arahant who is ‘ freed by reason ’ (pannavimutto) and one

who is freed by the 1 eight attainments ’ (or stages in deliverance),

or who is ‘ freed both ways.’ See Dialogues, ii. 69, 70. The modified

position may be compared with a similar recourse above, p. 68.

IiS. V. 8

114 Of Conveyance by Another II. 1.

Th. — But how can you maintain it in the one case

without admitting it as true in the other? [15] The

former has the qualities and requisites of Arahantship

no less than the other ; both have equally put away

passion, and so on.

[21] How can you maintain your proposition when you

admit that there is a Suttanta in which the Exalted One

said : ‘ Bhikkhus ! those bhikkhus who are but average men, yet

are proficient in virtue and are mindful and reflective, can go-

to sleep without impure discharge. Those Rishis who are

outsiders, yet are devoid of passion in matters of sense, have

also no impure discharge. That an Arahant should have

impure discharge is anomalous and unnatural ’ ? 1

[22] P.A. — Is the proposition untrue ?

Th. — Yes.

P.A. — But if you admit that others may convey to the

Arahant clothing, alms, bedding, or medicine, surely my

proposition [as involving conveyance of something by

another] is tenable ?

[23] Th. — But is everything beyond those four requisites-

conveyable ? Could others convey to the Arahant the

fruition of Stream-Winning, of Once-Beturning, of Never-

Beturning, or of Arahanship ? No ? Then your argument

cannot hold.

2. Of the Knowledge of the Arahant.

Controverted Point .— That the Arahant may lack know-

ledge. 2

1 Vrnaya, i. 295. Atthanam, anavakaso — this idiomatic

pair of words means literally [something] out of place, without

occasion.

2 A £ - n a n a. This is less often used as a technical term in religion

than a v i j j &, ignorance, and m o h a, but see Sayy.-Nik., ii. 4 ;

v. 127, 429 ; Dhammasangani, § 1061, etc. This and the two following

propositions are based on the vague, loose extension of three several

terms.

173-6.

Ignorance and Crimes

115

From the Commentary. — The Pubbaseliyas hold that, because he was

liable to be ignorant and to get perplexed about facts concerning every-

day life, and to be surpassed in such knowledge by others, an Axahant

might be considered as lacking knowledge or insight, as given to doubt,

and as inferior to some. These views are refuted in this and the next

two discourses.

[1] Th. — You maintain that he does. Then you must

also admit that the Arahant has ignorance — ignorance as

flood, bond, latent bias, attack, fetter, hindrance. 1 If you

deny this, you cannot say he lacks knowledge.

[2] You would certainly admit lack of knowledge, ignorance

as ‘ flood,’ etc., in the case of the average man. [3] How

can you assert the former and deny the latter in the case of

the Arahant ?

[4] You would deny that an Arahant from lack of know-

ledge would kill living things, take what is not given, speak

lies, utter slander, speak harshly, indulge in idle talk, com-

mit burglary, carry off plunder, be a highwayman, commit

adultery, 2 and destroy village or town; yet you would admit

an average man might from lack of knowledge do such

things. [5] In fact you assert that an Arahant from lack

of knowledge w r ould pursue the opposite course from what

an average man would do from lack of knowledge.

[6] You deny that an Arahant lacks knowledge in respect

of the Teacher, the Doctrine, the Order, of the ethical train-

ing, of the beginning of time, the end of time, both beginning

and end, and of things as happening by way of assignable

causes. You deny that herein he lacks knowledge. Yet

you maintain your proposition. . ..

[7] You admit that an average man who lacks knowledge

lacks it in those respects, but that an Arahant who lacks

knowledge does not lack it in those respects. Must you

not also admit that an average man, lacking in knowledge,

does not lack it in those respects ?

[8-10] Can you maintain that the Arahant— one who

1 Six metaphors constantly applied to spiritual ignorance and

other failings in the Suttas. Cf. I., 5, § 8.

2 Of. Dialogues, i. 69.

116 Of the Knowledge of the A rah ant II. 2.

has so put away passion, 1 hate, ignorance, conceit, error,

doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, and indiscretion, that

they are cut off at the root and made as the stump of a

palm tree, incapable of rising again in future renewal, who

has cultivated the means for putting away passions and

all the other factors of enlightenment to that end, who has

consummated as having done with lust, hate, and nescience,

and to whom all the terms for the Arahant may be applied

— that such an one lacks knowledge ?

[11-16] Or how can you maintain your proposition with

regard to one class of Arahant only— to those who are

proficient in their own field— and not to another class— to

those who are proficient in other things ?

[17] Did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta : ‘ In

him if ho knows, 0 bhikkhus, who sees do I declare the

intoxicants to be extinct, not in him who knows not neither

sees. And what, bhikkhus, in him who knows who sees,

is the extinction of intoxicants ? “ Such is body, such its

cause, so is its cessation ; such are the four mental factors,

such their cause, so is their cessation ” — even this, 0 bhikkhus,

is the extinguishing of intoxicants ’? 2

How then can the Arahant [who knows who sees] lack

knowledge ?

[18] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta:

4 In him ivho knows, 0 bhikkhus, ivho sees do I declare the

intoxicants to be extinct, not in him ivho knows not, neither

sees And what, bhikkhus, in him who knows ivho sees is the

extinguishing of intoxicants ? “ This is III !" herein, bhikkhus,

for him who knows who sees is that extinguishing. “ This is

the cause of III. . . this is the cessation of III .. . this is

the course leading to the cessation of III ”■ — herein, bhikkhus,

for him who knows who sees is the extinguishing of intoxi-

cants' ? 3

How then can the Arahant [who knows who sees] lack

knowledge ?

1 §§ 8-16 are given more fully in the preceding discourse, §§ 10-20.

2 Sanyutta-Nikayu, ii. 29.

3 Ibid., v. 434.

178-80. Appeals to Authority 117

[19] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta :

‘ The man, 0 bhikkhus , who does not understand and compre-

hend all, who has not emptied himself of all, and given up all,

is not capable of extinguishing III. And he, 0 bhikkhus, who

understands, comp rehends, empties himself of, ancl gives up all ,

he is capable of extinguishing III 7 1

How then can the Arahant [who knows who sees] lack

knowledge ?

[20] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta :

‘ For him e’en as insight doth come to pass,

Three things as bygones core renounced for aye :

Belief that in him dwells a soul,

And faith in rule and rite — if aught remain.

Both from the fourfold doom is he released,

And ne'er the six fell deeds are his to do 7 2

How then can the Arahant be said to lack knowledge ?

[21] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta r

‘ Whenever, 0 bhikkhus, for the Ariyan disciple there doth

arise the stainless, flawless eye of the Norm — that whatsoever

is liable to happen is also liable to cease — together with the

arising of that vision core these three fetters : belief in a soul,

doubt, and the contagion of .mere rule and ritual put away by

him 7 3

How then can the Arahant be said to lack knowledge ?

[22] P. — Is it wrong to say ‘the Arahant lacks know-

ledge ’? May he not be ignorant of the name and lineage

of a woman or a man, of a right or wrong road, or of how

grasses, twigs, and forest plants are called ? If this is so,

surely, good sir, it is right to say that he lacks knowledge.

[23] Th. — If you say that, in not knowing such things,

the Arahant lacks ‘ knowledge/ would you also say he lacks

knowledge as to the fruition of Stream-Winning, Once-

Returning, Never-Returning, Arahantship ? Of course not ;

hence it should not be said that he lacks knowledge.

1 Sayyutta-Nikdya, iv. 17. The Br. translator renders the second

line— avirajayag appaj aharj— by ‘is not free from “ dust,” has

not given up the corruptions.’

2 See above (I. 4), p. 80. 3 See ibid.

118

Of Doubt in the Arab ant

II. 3.

B. Of Doubt in the Arahant.

Controverted Point. — That an Arahant may have doubts.

From the Commentary. — This discourse resembles the foregoing,

sentence for sentence— substituting ‘ doubt 5 (kankha) for lack of

knowledge and ‘perplexity’ (vieikiccha) for ignorance — but with

the following exceptions : (1) The expressions (from the religious

metaphors of the Suttas) ‘flood, 5 ‘bond,’ ‘latent bias,’ are not used in

the case of doubt (see above, §§ 1, 2). (2) The sections (§§ 4, 5) where

it is argued that, if an Arahant lacked knowledge, he might, like

any average man, offend against law and morality, are omitted-

(3) An additional passage is adduced from the Suttas (following the

•others as § 20) as follows :

[20] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta :

‘ Whene’er- in sooth ardently meditating

The brahmin sees [ the truth of] things 1 reveaUd,

All doubts are rolled away, for now he knoweth

That luhich befalls and likewise its conditions. 1

‘ Whene’er in sooth ardently meditating

The brahmin sees [the truth of] things reveaUd,

All doubts are rolled away, for he discerneth

That which doth make befall may be abolished.


 * Whene’er in sooth ardent and meditating

The brahmin sees the truth of things revealed,

He standeth victor o’er the hosts of evil,

E’en as the sun that lighteth up the heavens.’ 2

‘ Ail doubts soever as to here or yonder,

Felt by themselves, or doubts that torture others

Thinkers renounce in ardent meditation.

Choosing to follow after holy conduct.’ 8

1 Dhamma and s a-h etu-dh arum a n, meaning in the (plural)

form things given, or data, phenomena, mental objects. But the

Burmese translation paraphrases dhamma by either bodhi-

pakkhiya dhamma or saccadhamma. In the context the

Buddha has just evolved the formula of causation as expressing a

universal law.

2 Vin. Texts, i. 18. The tristhubh metre of the text has been

imitated.

3 TJddna, v. 7. -

187-94. The Arahant’s Self -Redemption 119

‘ They ivho ’ mong souls beset by doubts, past all doubt

Have ivon, and now ■unswayed, from bonds enfranchised

Abide, to them a great reward is given.’ 1

‘ How should disciple ever doubt

That by the kind who here abide

The truth may yet be realized ?

All hail to Buddha who hath crossed

The flood and severed every doubt,

Great Conqueror and. Lord of all ’ l 2

4. Of the Arahant being excelled by Others.

Controverted Point. — That the Arahant is excelled by

others.

From the Commentary. — Here again the argument resembles that

in] II. 2, section for section, substituting ‘ excelled by others ’ for


 * lack knowledge,’ and revealing the following exceptions :

(a) [1] Th. — You maintain that he is. Then you must

also admit that the Arahant is led by others, attains

through others, is conditioned by others, exists in de-

pendence upon others, and knows not sees not, being

baffled and without thoughtfulness. If you deny this,

you cannot affirm that he is excelled by others, etc. ...

( b ) The argument in 2, § § 4, 5, is omitted.

( c ) To the five quoted Sutta passages in 2, §§ 17-21, a

sixth is added :

[20] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Sut-

tanta :

‘ Nay, Dhotaka, to no one upon earth ivho doubts

Is’ t mine to go that I may set him free.

’ Tis in the learning of the noble Norm

That thou, thyself shalt journey o'er this Flood ’ % 3

1 We have not been able as yet to trace this stanza. The Uddnavarga

has the ‘ enfranchised 5 phrase in its last stanza of seven imitating

those above. Eockhill’s transl., xxxii. 91.

2 Digha-Nik., ii. 275 ( Dialogues, ii. 809). 3 Sutta-Nipdta, 1064.

120

Of Utterance c hiring Meditative Ecstasy II. 5.

5. Of Articulate Utterance [during Ecstasy ].

Controverted Point. — That there is articulate utterance 1

on the part of one who has entered into Jhana.

From, the Commentary. — It was held by the Pubbaseliyas and others

that anyone in First Jhana, at the moment of attaining the [first or]

Stream-Winner’s Path, uttered the truth : ‘ Sorrow!’ 2 This is refuted

by the Theravadin.

[1] You affirm this [in general]. Your statement should

hold good for such an one everywhere, always, for all such

persons, and for all such attainments in ecstatic meditation.

But you do not admit all such cases. Then you cannot

affirm it at all.

[2] Does such an one make utterance by bodily move-

ments ? You deny that he does so, but why not, if your

thesis is true? If he make no bodily expression, you

should not affirm that he makes vocal expression.

[B] If one during Jhana having [the power of] speech,

gives vocal expression, it follows that, having a body, he

may also make bodily expression.

[4] You affirm that, knowing the fact of 111, he utters the

word ‘ Sorrow/ yet you deny that, knowing the fact of Cause

[of 111], he utters the word ‘Cause.’ 3 But why? Why,

again, deny that he, knowing the facts of ‘ Cessation ’ [of

111], and ‘ Path ’ [leading to that Cessation] , 4 utters those

words ?

[5] Or, taken negatively, why deny that he utters any of

the last three terms, yet not deny that he utters the first ?

[6] You say that the object of such an one’s insight is

the [Ariyan] truth. But you deny that the object of

1 B h e d o is literally a breaking or dividing off or up. The Com-

mentary paraphrases by vinhatti, intimation. See Bud. Psy. Eth. ,

192 f. ; Compendium, 22, 264. We have also rendered it by ‘ ex-

pression.’

2 I.e., the first of the four Ariyan Truths : that everything in life is

liable to undergo suffering or ill in general (d u k k h a).

3 I.e. the second of the four Ariyan Truths.

i I.e., the third and fourth of these four.

121

197-200. Why Limit the Alleged Utterance ?

such an one’s ear 1 is truth. This, you say, is sound.

But you deny that the object of his insight is sound.

[7] No, you say, the truth is the object of his insight,

sound the object of his ear. But if his insight has the

truth as its object, and his ear has sound as its object,

then, good sir, you should not affirm that such an one

makes articulate utterance.

[7a] If you say, that while his insight is concerned with

the [first] truth and his ear with the sound, the attainer

makes articulate utterance, you must admit a combination

of two contacts, two feelings, two perceptions, two voli-

tions, two consciousnesses [at a given moment], (which is

absurd).

[8] You affirm your thesis, yet you deny that it applies

to one who has attained Jhana by any one of the eight

artifices, 2 to wit, earth, water, fire, or air; blue-green,

yellow, red, or white colour, or by [any of the four im-

material conceptual inductions, to wit,] infinity of space

or of consciousness, ‘nothingness,’ or ‘neither perception

nor non-perception.’ 3 How is this intelligible ? [9] If you

deny each of these possibilities, you cannot affirm your

proposition.

[10] You deny, further, that one who practises Jhana

for merely mundane objects makes articulate expression,

whether he attain any of the four stages. Neither then

can you affirm your proposition. [11] If you deny the

former, you must deny the latter.

[12] You affirm your proposition only of one attaining

the first supramundane Jhana, not the second, third, or

fourth. But if you affirm it of the first stage, what is

there to make you deny it of the other three stages ?

[14] P. — Is it wrong to say that there is articulate utter-

ance on the part of one who has entered Jhana ?

Th.— Yes.

P. — But was it not said by the Exalted One that initial

1 Or, hearing (s o t a p).

2 Bud. Pay. Eth. , 43, n. 4 ; 58. 3 Ibid., p. 71 f.

122 Of Utterance during Meditative Ecstasy II. 5.

and sustained application of mind was vocal activity? 1

And does not such application belong to one in first

Jhana ? Surely then my proposition is true.

[15] Th. — Granting that you quote correctly, and that

one in first Jhana is engaged in such application, Isay, you

have just denied that anyone attaining Jhana by any of the

eight artifices does make articulate utterance. How then

can you also affirm your proposition ?

[16] P.— But was it not said by the Exalted One that

speech arises from initial application [or directing] of

thought ? And does not such movement of thought belong

to one in first Jhana ?

[17] Th. — That is no good reason. The Exalted One

also said that speech is caused by perception. 2 Now one

in second, third, or fourth Jhana has perception, but [we

know that] he no longer applies or sustains thought. So

also for the four more abstract Jhana states (see § 8).

[18] Moreover, is it not said in the Suttanta : : In one

who has entered first Jhana speech has ceased ’ ? 3

[19] If you maintain your proposition in the teeth of

this one, you must cease to hold [in accordance with the

next words] in the Suttanta : that ‘ in one who has entered

second Jhana, thought initial and sustained has ceased.’ 4

Similarly you must contradict the remaining words : ‘ in

one who has entered third Jhana, zest has ceased ; in one who

has induced fourth Jhana, respiration has ceased ; in one who

has induced ecstasy of infinite space, perception of bodily

qualities has ceased; in one who has induced ecstasy of in-

finite consciousness, perception of space infinity has ceased ;

1 Majjhi?na-Nih, i. 301 : ‘ vitakka-vicara vaci- sankharo

quoted in Yamaha, i. 229). The context in the Sutta (the Cula-Vedalla)

shows that Dhammadinna teaches, not identity between the two terms,

but causal sequence. Thinking leads to speaking. This is probably

the reference made in § 16, or it may be to Bh’amma-sangani ,

§§ 981, 982.

2 See again Dhamma-mngani, ibid. Perception (sauna) is

awareness without the more ratiocinative procedm-e implied in ‘ applied

and sustained thought.’

3 Sarjyutta-Nik., iv. 217. 4 Ibid.

202-03.

Appeals to Authority

123

in one who has induced ecstasy of nothingness, perception of

infinity, of consciousness, has ceased ; in one who has induced

ecstasy wherein is neither perception nor non-perception, per-

ception of nothingness has ceased ; in one who has induced

trance, 1 both perception and feeling have ceased. 52

[20] P. — But if my proposition is wrong, why did the

Exalted One say that ‘ for first Jhdnci sound is obnoxious ’ ? s

Does not this show that one who has attained Jhana can

emit speech ?

[21] Th. — You accept both the Suttanta dictum and your

proposition. But, by the same Sutta, that which is elimi-

nated successively, as each further stage of Jhana 4 is

reached, was pronounced to be obnoxious in its turn.

Does that therefore indicate that one who attained each

stage, practised each obstacle to that stage ?

[22] P. — But did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta:

0 Ananda, Abhibhu, disciple of Sikliin, the Exalted One,

Arahant Buddha Supreme, standing in the Brahma-world,

lifted up his voice over ten thousand worlds, saying 5 :

‘ Arise and strive ! go forth and give

Yourselves unto the Buddha’s Rule !

Sweep ye away the hosts of Death

As elephant a rush-built shed.

Who in this Norm and Discipline

Earnest and zealous shall abide,

Casting away the round of births,

He shall make litter end of III’ ? 6

Surely then an attainer does utter articulate sounds

during ecstasy.

1 Literally, the cessation of perception and sensation.

2 Op. cit., ibid.

3 Anguttara-Nik., v. 133 f.


 * Ibid. The stages are here given as those in § 19, but in the Sutta,

only the four Jhanas and trance are given.

6 Ibid. i. 227.

6 SayyuttaNik., i. 157.

124:

Of Inducing Insight by saying ‘ Sorroiv 5

II. 6.

6. Of inducing [ Insight ] by saying ‘ Sorrow !’

Controverted Point. — That induction [of insight] by the

word * sorrow !’ is a factor of an'd included in the Path.

From the Commentary. — An opinion of the Pubbaseliyas is that

repeating the word ‘dukkhal’ induced insight (nanaij), and was

thus a factor and part of the Path [of salvation]. 1 They admit it as

true for those only who are qualified to win insight (v i p a s s a k a).

Th. Then you must also affirm that all who utter that

word are practising 2 the Path, which is absurd.

Or if you do affirm this, notwithstanding, then you must

also affirm that the average fqolish person, in uttering that

word, is practising the Path, and, again, that matricides,

parricides, murderers of Arahants, those that shed blood

[of Buddhas], those that cause schism in the Order, in

uttering the word ‘ sorrow !’ are practising the Path, which

is absurd.

7. Of the Duration of Consciousness. 3

Controverted Point. — That a single [unit of] consciousness

lasts for a day.

From the Commentary. — TheTheravadin puts this question to correct

the belief of the Andhakas, whose secession is narrated above, that,

judging by the apparent continuity both of consciousness in Jhana

and of sub-consciousness, a single state of consciousness lasted for a

length of time,

[1] Th. — If your proposition is true, does one-half of the

day belong to the ‘nascent moment,’ and one-half to the

1 I.e., the Four-staged Path : Stream -Winning, etc., not the Ariyan

Eightfold Path. Of. Dhamma-sangani, §§ 283-92. (This is incor-

rectly stated to be the latter path in the translation, p. 84, n. 1.)

2 Bhaventi, making to become, developing.

3 In the appended title, p. 208, of PTS text, read cittatthiti-

k a t h a, as in the Commentary.

204-06.

Phases of a Conscious Unit

125

‘ cessant moment’? 1 You say no; but you have im-

plied it. A similar admission is involved in affirming

that a state of consciousness lasts two days, or four days

or eight, ten, or twenty days, or a month, or two, four,

eight, or ten months, or a year, or any number of years, or

any number of teons.

[2] Are there other phenomena beside mind which arise

and cease many times during one day? Yes, you say?

Then do you contend that they come and go as quickly as

mind? If you say no, then your proposition falls. If

you say they do, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ I

consider, bhikkhus, that there is no phenomenon that comes

and goes so quickly as mind. It is not easy to find a simile

to shoio ho w quickly mind comes and- goes ’ ? 2

Again : ‘J-ust as a monkey faring through the dense forest

catches one bough, and, letting it go, catches another, and then

another, even so, bhikkhus, until what is called thought, or

mind, or consciousness, by day as by night, one arises iciien

another perishes ’ ? 3

[4] [Take the content of a state of consciousness :]

does any visual consciousness or other sense-consciousness

last a whole day, or any bad thought, such as conscious-

ness accompanied by passion, hate, ignorance, conceit,

error, doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, or indiscretion ?

If not, then neither can consciousness be said to last a

day.

[5] Does one hear, smell, taste, touch, apprehend men-

tally by means of the same [unit of] consciousness as one

sees? Or see, hear, etc., or touch by means of the same

[unit of] consciousness as one apprehends mentally ? You

1 Any citta (unit of consciousness) came to be orthodoxly con-

sidered as consisting of three ‘ moments ’ : nascent, static, cess ant.

This grew apparently out of the older twofold division of nascent

(uppada) and cessant (vaya, bhanga), such as is here alone

adduced.

2 Anguttara-Nilc., i. 10.

3 Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 95. Cf. Hume : perceptions ‘ succeed each

other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and

movement. . . (p. 584, Green and Grose ed.).

126 Of the Duration of Consciousness II. 7.

say ‘no.’ Then you cannot affirm that one [and the same

unit of] consciousness lasts a whole day.

[6] Similarly, if you deny that one moves backward with

the same [unit of] consciousness as one moves forward,

and vice versa, you cannot affirm your proposition. A

similar argument applies to looking backward, looking

forward, and to bending, extending by means of the same

unit of consciousness. 1

[7] In the case of the devas who have reached the realm

of space-infinity, does any unit of consciousness last their

whole lifetime ? You affirm it does, yet you deny a similar

duration in the case of humanity. You deny it also in the

case of all devas of the plane of sense-desires, and of all

devas of the higher or Efipa plane, 2 why not of those of

the first-named non-Eupa plane?

[8] You affirm, I say, this duration of a unit of conscious-

ness during the 20,000 seons of the Anipa-deva's life, yet

you deny an analogous duration in a unit of human con-

sciousness, lasting, say, for 100 years, and you deny it in

the case of all those devas of the Kamaloka and Rupaloka,

whose lifetime varies from 500 years in the Four Great

Kings to 16,000 seons of years in the senior 3 devas.

[9] A. — Does then the mind of the devas who have

reached the plane of space-infinity arise and cease moment

by moment ?

Th. — It does.

1 Cf. again Hume’s unconscious plagiarism : ‘ Our eyes cannot turn

in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still

more variable than our sight ;. . . nor is there any single power of

the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one

moment. . . several perceptions successively make their appearance ;

pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures

and situations 5 (p. 534, Green and Grose ed.).

2 The groups of devas are all enumerated in the text : of the heavens

of the Four Kings, of the Thirty-Three, of the Yama’s, of Delight, etc.,

of the Brahmas, etc., as enumerated in the accurately preserved

tradition recorded in the Compendium, pp. 138, 142.

3 Literally, the non-younger devas. Cf. Compendium, pp. 140, 142.

208.

127

The Fact of Manifold Happiness

A. — But do these devas themselves decease, and are they

reborn moment by moment ?

Th. — Nay, that .cannot truly be said.

A. — Surely this momentary living and dying is involved

in the momentary happening of consciousness ?

[10] Th. — But if you affirm that in the case of these

devas a unit of consciousness lasts as long as they live,

then you must also admit that they die with the same unit

of consciousness as that wherewith they are reborn ; but

you are not prepared to admit this. ...

8. Of [the World as only a ] Cinderheap.

Controverted Point. — That all conditioned things are

absolutely 1 cinderheaps.

From the Commentary. — The opinion of the Gokulikas, from grasping

thoughtlessly the teaching of sueh Suttas as ‘ All is on fire, bhikkhus !’ 2

‘All conditioned things [involve] ill, 53 is that all conditioned things

are without qualification no better than a welter of embers whence the

flames have died out, like an inferno of ashes. To correct this by

indicating various forms of happiness, the Theravadin puts the question.

[1] Th. — You affirm this ; but is there not such a thing

as pleasurable feeling, bodily pleasure, mental pleasure,

celestial happiness, human happiness, the pleasures of

gain, of being honoured, of riding-and-driving, 4 of resting,

the pleasures of ruling, of administrating, of domestie-and-

secular life, of the religious life, pleasures involved in the

intoxicants 5 and pleasures that are not, the happiness [of

Nibbana], both while stuff of life remains and when none

remains, 6 worldly and spiritual pleasures, happiness with

1 Anodhikatva, ‘not having made a limit, without distinction.

— Corny.

2 Vin. Texts, i. 134.

3 Dialogues, ii. 175.

4 Yana-sukhaq, literally, vehicle-pleasure.

5 Asava’s: sensuality, desire for rebirth, erroneous opinions;

ignorance was added as a fourth.

8 Upadhisukhaq nirupadhisukhaq.

128

II. 8.

Of the World as a ‘ Cinclerheap ’

zest and without zest, Jhana- happiness, the bliss of

liberty, pleasures of sense-desire, and the happiness of

renunciation, the bliss of solitude, of peace, of enlighten-

ment? 1 Of course. How then can you maintain your

general affirmation ?

[2] G. — My proposition then is wrong ? But was it not

said by the Exalted One: ‘All is on fire, 0 bhikkhus !

How is everything on fire ? The eye is on fire ; visible

objects, visual consciousness, visual contact and the pleasure,

the pain, the neutral feeling therefrom— all is on fire. On

fire ichereivithal ? I tell you, on fire xvith the fires of passion,

hate, and ignorance; with the. fires of birth, decay, and

death ; with the fires of sorrow, lamentation, ill, grief, and

despair. All the field of sense, all the field of mind, all the

feeling therefrom is on fire with those fires ’ ? 2 Surely then

all conditioned things are mere einderheaps absolutely.

[3] Th. — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :


 * There are these five pleasures of sense, bhikkhus — namely,

visible objects seen through the eye as desirable, pleasing, de-

lightful, lovely, adapted to sense-desire, seductive; audible

objects, odorous, sapid, tangible objects, desirable, pleasing,

delightful, lovely, opposite to sense-desire, seductive ’. . . ? 3

[4] G. — But was it not also said by the Exalted One : —

‘ A gain is yours, 0 bhikkhus ! well have ye won, for ye have

discerned the hour 4 for living the religions life. Hells have

I seen, bhikkhus, belonging to the six fields of contact. Hereof

whatsoever object is seen by the eye is unclesired only, not

desired; whatsoever object is sensed by ear, smell, taste,

touch, mind, is undesired only, not desired ; is unpleasant only,

not pleasant ; is unlovely only, not lovely ’ ? 5

1 The invariable generic term in each of the Pali compounds is

snkhai). On its pregnant import see Compendium, 277; cf. JPTS

1914, 134.

2 Vin. Texts, i. 134.

3 Majjhima-Nik., i. 85, 92 passim. 4 Literally, moment.

5 Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 126. The ‘ hour ’ is the crucial time when a

Buddha is living on earth. Cf. the passage with frequent allusions in

the Psalms of the Early Buddhists, 1. 13, 167 ; II. 162, 213, 280, 347

also Anguttara-Nik., iv. 225 f.

210 - 12.

129

Appeals to Authority

[5] Th. — But was it not also said by the Exalted One :


 * A gain is yours, bhikkhm / well have ye won, for ye have

discerned the hour for living the religious life. Heavens

have I seen, bhikkhm, belonging to the six fields of contact.

Hereof whatsoever object is seen by the eye, or otherwise

sensed, is desired only, not undesired / is pleasing only, not

unpleasing ; is lovely only, not unlovely ’ l 1

[6] G. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : * The

impermanent involves III ; all conditioned things are im-

permanent’ ? 2

[7] Th. — But take giving : — does that bring forth fruit

that is undesired, unpleasant, disagreeable, adulterated?

Does it bear, and result in, sorrow ? Or take virtue, the

keeping of feastdays, religious training, and religious life: —

do they bring forth such fruit, etc. ? Do they not rather

have the opposite result ? How then can you affirm your

general proposition ?

[8] Finally, was it not said by the Exalted One :

£ Happy his solitude who, glad at heart,

Hath learnt the Norm and doth the vision see !

Happy is that benignity towards

The world which on no creature worketh harm.

Happy the freedom from all lust, th’ ascent

Past and beyond the needs of sense-desires.

He tvho doth crush the great “I am ” -conceit :

This, even this, is happiness supreme.

This happiness by happiness is won,

Unending happiness is this alone.

The Threefold Wisdom hath he made his own.

This, even this, is happiness supreme 1

You admit the Suttanta says this ? How then can you

•maintain your proposition ?

1 Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 126.

2 Anguttara-Nik., i., 286 ; Dialogues, li. 232 ; Sayyutta-NIk.,

passim.

3 Udcma, II. 1. Line 9 (slightly different) also occurs in Psabns of

the Brethren, ver. 220; cf. ver. 63; and line 11 occurs often in the

.Psalms, Parts I. and II. See Ibid., II., pp. 29, 57.

T.S. V.

9

1B0

Of a Specified Progress in Penetration

II. 9.

9. Of a specified Progress in Penetration.

Controverted Point. — That penetration is acquired in

segmentary order.

From the Commentary.. — By thoughtlessly considering such Suttas

as —

‘ Little by little, one by one, as pass

The moments, gradually let the wise,’ etc., 1

the Andhakas, Sabbatthivadins, Sammitiyas, and Bhadrayanikas have

acquired the opinion that, in realizing the Four Paths, the corruptions

were put away by so many slices as each of the Four Truths was

intuited (cf. I. 4).

[1] Th.—li you affirm that there is a definite graduation

in penetration, you must also affirm that the first Path

(Stream- Winning) is gradually developed. 2 If you refuse,

your first proposition falls. If you consent, you must also

admit gradual realization of the fruition of that Path.

But you cannot. [2-4] Similarly for the realization of

the second, third, and fourth Fruits.

[5] [But tell me more of this gradual piecemeal ac-

quiring:] when a person is working to be able to realize

the fruition of Stream- Winning, and wins insight into

[the first Truth, namely] the fact of 111, what does he

give up ?

A. S. S. Bh. — He gives up the theory of soul, doubt,,

the infection of mere rule and ritual, 3 and a fourth part in

the corruptions that are bound up with them.

Th. — This fourth part: — do you maintain that 'he-

[thereby] becomes one quarter Stream-Winner, one quarter

not? Has one quarter of him won, attained to, arrived

at, realized the Fruit? Does a quarter of him abide in

personal contact with it, and a quarter not ? Does a

1 Sutta-Nipdta, verse 962; Dhammapada, verse 289; quoted

already, I. 4, § 17 ; and below, § 18.

2 Development in Path-attainments is considered as essentially a

momentary flash of insight. Each phala-citta {unit of fruitional con-

sciousness) is, for instance, momentary, albeit the flow of such units

may persist awhile. Cf. Compendium, pp. 25, 161, n. 5, 215.

3 The first three 1 Fetters.’ See above, p. 66, n. 2.

218-17.

Saintship in Segments

131

quarter of him get seven more rebirths only, rebirths only

among gods and men, or one more rebirth only? 1 Is one

quarter of him endowed with implicit faith in the Buddha,

the Norm, the Order ? Is a quarter of him endowed with

virtues dear to Ariyans, and a quarter of him not ? You

deny this, yet it follows from your proposition.

[6] Again, when he wins insight into [the second, third,

and fourth Truths, namely] the cause of 111, its cessation,

and the Path leading to that, what does he give up ? The

same things, say you? Then the same objection applies.

[7-9] Or what does a person who is working to be able to

realize the fruition of the other three Paths give up ?

A. S. S. Bh. -He gives up respectively (3) the bulk of

sense-desires, intense ill-will, and a quarter of the corrup-

tions bound up with them ; (2) the residuum of sense-

desires and of ill-will, and one quarter of the corrup-

tions bound up with them ; (3) lusting after life in any of

the higher heavens, conceit, distraction, ignorance, and

one quarter of the corruptions bound up with them.

Th. — Then the same objection applies, namely, you must

say whether, for example, he is one quarter Arahant, 2 one

quarter not, and so on.

[10] When a person who is practising to be able to

realize the fruition of Stream-Winning is beginning to see

the fact of 111, would you call him * a practiser ’ ?

A. 8. 8. Bh. — Yes.

Th.- — Would you, when he has seen it, call him ‘ estab-

lished in the fruit’? No, you reply, but why not? So

again, in the case of the three other Truths — why not ?

[11] Again, you allow that such a person, when he is

coming to see the [first] Path, may be called a practiser,

and you allow that when he has seen that Path, he is to

be called ‘established in fruition.’ Yet you do not allow

that such a person who, when he is coming to see the fact

1 On these terms, see above, p. 77, n. 8.

2 The detailed replies to (1), (2), and (3) enumerate the respective

rewards of the Second, Third, and Fourth Paths stated fully in I. 4,

§§ 5, 9, and 13.

132

Reality as Indivisible

II. 9.

of 111, may be called practiser, may, when he has seen the

fact of III, be called ‘ established in fruition ’ — why not ?

Again, you allow that such a person, when he is coming to

see the [first] Path, may be called practiser, and when he

has seen the fact of 111, may be called established in

fruition. Yet you do not allow that such a person who,

when he is coming to see the cause, or the cessation of 111,

may be called practiser, may, when he has seen either

of these Truths, be called established in fruition — why

not ?

[12] Once more, you allow that such a person, when he

is coming to see the fact of 111, may be called practiser,

while you refuse, when he has seen that fact, to call him

established in fruition (as in § 10). Then you must allow,

and refuse similarly, if we substitute any other of the

Four Truths — but to this you did not agree [§ 11].

[13] With reference to your position (in § 12) : you

compel yourself to admit, that insight into the fact, or the

cause, or the cessation, of 111 is really of no value. 1

[14] A. S. S. Eh. — You affirm then that, when once [the

first Truth, viz., the fact and nature of] 111 is seen, the

Four Truths are seen ?

Th. — Yes.

A. S. 8. Bh. — Then you must admit also that the First

Truth amounts to the Four Truths.

Th, — [Ah, no ! for you as for us] if the material aggre-

gate (khandha) is seen to be impermanent, all five are

seen to be so. 2 Yet you would not therefore say that the

material aggregate amounts to all the others. [15] A

similar argument may be applied to the twelvefold field of

sense and the twenty-two £ controllers ’ or faculties.

[16] If you believe that the fruition of the First Path

is realized by [insight considered as divided into so many

integral portions, for example,] the Four Insights, the

1 Since the discerner may not be called. ‘ established in fruition.’

2 ‘ Just as the presence of the sea may be known by the taste of one

drop of sea-water.’ — Corny. See Appendix: Paramattha.

Appeals to Authority

13a

Eight, Twelve, Forty-four, Seventy-seven Insights, 1 then

you must admit a corresponding number of Fruits of the

First Path — which of course you do not.

[17] A. S. S. Bh. — You say our proposition that there is a

gradual sequence in penetration is wrong. But was it not

said by the Exalted One : ' Even, 0 bhikkhus, as the ocean

slopes gradually, inclines gradually, has gradual holloivs,

without abrupt precipices, so, in this Norm and Discipline ,

is there gradual training, gradual achievement, gradual prac-

tice, but no sudden discernment of gnosis' ! 2 3

[18] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ Little by little, one by one, as pass

The moments, gradually let the wise

Like smith the blemishes of silver, blow

The specks away that mar his purity ' P

[19] Th. — That is so. But did not the venerable G-avam-

pati address the brethren thus : e Brothers, I have heard

this from the Exalted One, and learnt it from his Ups : —

0 bhikkhus ! whoso sees the fact of III, sees also its cause, its

cessation, and the course of practice leading thereto. Whoso

sees the cause of III, sees also III itself, its cessation, and the

course of practice leading thereto. Whoso sees the cessation pf

III, sees also III itself, its cause, and the course of practice

leading to its cessation. Whoso sees the way, sees also III ,

sees its cause, sees its cessation ’ ? 4

[20] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ For him e'en as insight doth come to pass,

Three things as bygones are renounced for aye :

1 These are explained as insight into ( a ) the Truths, (b) the Truths

plus the four Sections of analytic knowledge (patisambhida’s),

(c) the Causal formula (patieca-samuppada), (d) the Truths

each applied to items 2 to 12 of that formula (as in Sayyutta-Nik.,

ii. 56 f. ; nanassa vatthuni), and, similarly applied, these seven

terms: ‘ impermanent, conditioned, causally arisen, subject to perish,

to pass away, to lose passion, to cease ’ ( Sayyutta-Nik ii. 26).

2 Vinaya Texts, iii. 303.

3 See above (I. 4, § 17), from the Corny.. 4

Sayyutta-Nik., v. 436.

134 Of the Buddha's Everyday Talk II. 10.

Belief that in him dwells a soul, and doubt,

And faith in rule and rite — if aught remain.

Both f rom the fourfold doom is he released

And ner the six fell deeds are his to do ’ ? 1

Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Whenever,

O bhikkhus, for the Ariyan disciple there doth arise the stain-

less, flaivless Eye of the Norm — that whatsoever by its nature

may happen, may all by its nature cease — then with the

■coming of that vision doth he put aivay these three fetters :

belief in a soul, doubt, and the contagion of mere rule and

■ritical ’ t 2

10. Of a Buddha's Everyday Usage.

Controverted Point. — That the Exalted Buddha’s ordinary

speech 3 was supramundane. 4

From the Commentary. — The Andhakas hold that his daily usages

were supramundane usages.

[1] Does this not involve the further statement that his

speech impinged only on the spiritual, but not on the

mundane ear ; and that the spiritual, not the mundane,

intelligence responded to it, and thus that disciples alone

were aware of it, not average persons? You do not admit

this. . . . Nay, you know that the Exalted Buddha’s

speech struck on the mundane hearing of men, was re-

sponded to by mundane intelligence, and that average

persons were awaj;e of it.

[2] [The terms he used, are they supramundane — ]

Path, Fruit, Nibbana, Path and Fruit of Stream-Winning,

Once - Beturning, Never -Beturning, Arahantship, earnest

1 Quoted above, I. 4, § 18. Sutta-Nipdta-, verse 231.

2 Quoted above, I. 5, § 19 ; see references.

3 Vobaro refers to common, worldly matters in general, but

reference is confined throughout to speech.

4 Lok-uttara, a wide term meaning all unworldly thought and

ideals, and including supernormal powers of mind, when occupied with

such ideals only. Jhana, e.g., may be lokiya, mundane. The

Opponent over-emphasizes the supernormal side of it.

221-4. Words inadequate to express the Real 135

application in mindfulness, supreme endeavour, steps to

magic potency, controlling power or faculty, force, factor

of enlightenment ?

[3] Were there any who heard his everyday speech ?

But you deny that a supramundane object is known

by way of the ear, impinges on the ear, comes into the

avenue of hearing. Therefore you cannot affirm that men

‘ heard ’ his everyday speech.

[4] Were there any who were ravished by his everyday

speech ? [We know that there were such. 1 ] But is a

supramundane thing an occasion of sensuous desire, ravish-

ing, entrancing, intoxicating, captivating, enervating? Is

it not rather the opposite ? . ..

[5] Further, there were some who were offended by his

habitual speech 2 But is a supramundane thing an occa-

sion of hate, of anger, of resentment ? Is it not rather the

opposite ? . ..

[6] Further, there were some who were baffled by his

habitual speech. 3 But is a supramundane thing an

occasion of obfuscation, causing want of insight and

blindness, extinguishing understanding, provoking vexa-

tion, not conducing to Nibbana? Is it not rather the

opposite ? . ..

[7] Now those who heard the Exalted Buddha’s habitual

speech, did they all develop the paths? Yes, you say?

But foolish average people heard him — matricides, too,

and parricides, slayers of Arahants, shedders of holy

blood, schismatics — therefore you are affirming that these

developed the paths ! . ..

[8] A. — But you may with one golden wand point out

both a heap of paddy and a heap of gold. So the Exalted

One, with his supramundane habitual speech, habitually

spoke about both mundane and supramundane doctrine.

Th. — It is no less possible to point out both paddy and

1 Of. Psalms of the Brethren, verse, 1270 ; Dialogues, ii. 16.

2 Of. Sayyutta-Nik., i. 160 ; Dighco-Nihaya, P&thika-Suttanta, etc.

3 E.g., disciples were asked to explain concise pronouncements by

the Master ( Sayyatta-Nih iv. 93 f., etc.).

136 Words not Coincident with Ideas II. 10.

gold with a wand of castoi'-oil wood. So the Exalted One,

with his mundane habitual speech, habitually spoke about

both mundane and supramundane matter.

[9] Now some o! you 1 say that the habitual speech of

the Exalted One the Buddha was mundane when speaking

to one so conversing, supramundane when speaking to one

so conversing. But this implies that his words impinged

on mundane hearing when he spoke of worldly things, and

on the supramundane hearing when he spoke of supra-

mundane things ; also that his hearers understood with

their mundane intelligence in the former case, and with

their supramundane intelligence in the latter ; also that

average persons understood in the former case, disciples in

the latter. To which you do not agree.

[10] A .— It is wrong then, according to you, to say that

the Exalted Buddha’s customary speech was mundane

when he spoke of mundane matters, supramundane when

he spoke of supramundane matters. But did he not use

both kinds of speech ? You ^assent. Then surely what

you maintain is untenable.

[11] Again, your proposition involves this further ad-

mission : that the speech of anyone becomes that of which

he is speaking — that if you speak of Path, your word

becomes Path ; similarly of what is not Path, of Eruit, of

Nibbana, of the Conditioned, of matter, of mind and their

opposites.

11. Of Cessation.

Controverted Point. — That there are two cessations [of

sorrow].

From the Commentary.~It is a belief of the Mahiijsfisakas and

the Andhakas that the Third Truth (as to the Cessation of 111),

though constructed as one, relates to two cessations, according as

sorrow ceases through reasoned or unreasoned reflections about

things.

1 So the Corny.

137

One Goal, Tiuo Modes of Access

[1] If you assert that there are two kinds of cessation, 1

you must also assert this duality with respect to the cessa-

tion of 111, the Truth about the cessation of 111, the Truth

about the nature of 111, its cause, and the path leading to

the cessation of 111 — to none of which you consent.

Further, you must assert that there are two shelters,

two retreats, two refuges, two supports, two deathless-

nesses, two ambrosias, two Nibbanas 2 — which you deny.

Or if you admit that there are, say, two Nibbanas, you

must admit some specific difference, say, of high, low, base,

sublime, superior, inferior— some boundary, division, line

or cleavage 3 in these two Nibbanas — which you deny. 4

[2] Further, you admit, do you not, that things 5 which

have ceased without deep reflection, 6 may also be made

1 N i r 5 d h a. In religions import, the term is a synonym of

Nibbana, whether it refers to cessation of 111 (dukkha), or to the

conditions of rebirth which inevitably result in 111. In the medically

inspired formula of the four Truths, nirddha is tantamount to

‘ health,’ i.e., to the ‘ cessation ’ of disease. Hence it suggests happiness,

rather than the reverse. Hence the English word ‘ riddance ’ might

often be a better rendering.

2 These terms are all similes for Nibbana, from the Suttas.

3 To the different readings of this word (see text, 226, n. 8), we would

add antarika, ‘interstice in threads,’ from Vinaya Texts, III. 94.

4 The somewhat scholastic insistence on the oneness of Nibbana

in the medieval Compendium (p. 168) is here shown to have early

authority, but we cannot quote any Suttanta support for it.

6 Sankhara. On the meaning in this context, cf. Compendium,

211, n. 3. It should not be .concluded that on any idealistic view

‘ things ’ are made no longer to exist now for the individual thinker

through his thought. According to the Commentarial tradition,

‘to cease’ means here prospective cessation; ‘to make to cease =

to cause to go into a state of not re- arising (anuppattibhavap)’ —

the negative of the term used to express future rebirth.

6 Patisankha, literally, re-reckoning. On this term, large, if

vague in import, yet rarely used in the Nikayas, see Bud. Psy. JEth.,

p. 354, n. 2. In popular diction its use in negative form is well

shown in the simile of the thirsty, exhausted man drinking ‘ rashly,

unreflectingly,’ from a cup against the contents of which he had been

warned. Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 110. See Compendium, loc. cit. Deep

reflection of spiritual insight, through its purity and the absence of state-

ments and questionings, is said to make worldly things cease. — Corny.

II. 11.

138 Of Cessation

to cease by deep reflection ? But this does not involve two

(final) cessations.

[3] M. A. — Surely it does, if you admit, as do you not,

that things which have ceased without, and those that

have ceased by, deep reflection are both annihilated for

ever 9 1

[4] Th. — You admit that the latter class of things ceases

because the Ariyan [eightfold] Path has been attained ?

Then must you also admit that the former class of things

ceases for the same reason — but you do not.

[5] Again, the latter class (i.e., things which have ceased

by deep reflection) does not, according to . you, ever arise

again. Then you must also admit this of the former

class — but you do not. 2 . . . Hence cessation is really

one, not two.

1 Corny. PTS edition, p. 61, line 1: for sakavadissa read

paravadissa. The Theravadin assents to the asserted annihilation,

partly because there is no need to destroy what has been destroyed,

partly because the things that have ceased without patisankha

continue as non-existent when the Path is developed. — Corny.

2 Contra the Theravadin’ s view, § 8.

228.

Graduation in Master and Disciples