AB-KV-Ch13

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272

Of Age-Long Penalty

XIII. 1.

BOOK XIII

1. Of Age-Long Penalty.

Controverted Point. — That one doomed to age-long retri- bution must endure it for a whole kappa.

From the Commentary. — This concerns those who, like the Raja- girikas, hold the notion that the phrase, ‘ one who breaks up the concord of the Order is tormented in purgatory for a kappa/ 1 means that a schismatic is so ‘tormented for an entire kappa. 52

[1] Th. — But this implies that the cycle may start when a Buddha is born into the world, or when the Order is dissolved, or when the condemned person is committing the act incurring the penalty, or when he is dying. . ..

[2] It also implies that if he live for a past kappa, he may live for a future one — nay, for two, three, or four. . ..

And if during his kappa there be a cosmic conflagra- tion, 3 whither will he go ?

JR. — To another plane of the universe. 4

Th. — Do the dead go thither ? Do they go to the sky ?

R. — The dead go.

Th. — Can the act involving the penalty take effect in a subsequent life ? You must deny. 5 . . . . Hence he must go to the sky. This implies that he has the gift of iddhi 3 —

1 Itivuttaka, § 18.

2 On the loose significance of the time-term kappa, see above, XI. 5. The orthodox view was that the purgatorial retribution lasted for the remainder of the cycle or cosmic era.

3 Literally, ‘should the kappa burn.’. ..


 * Loka-dhatu. 5 See above, p. 260.

477.

Hope for the Doomed

273

else he could not. Now can one doomed to age-long retribution practise the four steps to Iddhi — will, effort, thought, investigation ? . ..

[3] R. — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One :

‘ Doomed to the Waste, to purgatorial woe For age-long penalties, provoking schism,

Of discord fain, fixed in unrighteousness.

From the sure haven doth he fall away.

Breaking the concord of the Brotherhood,

Age-long in purgafry he waxeth ripe ’ F

Hence my proposition is true.

2. Of a Doomed Maids Morality.

Controverted Point. — That a person doomed for a kappa may not acquire moral consciousness.

From the Commentary. — So, for instance, the Uttarapathakas, making no distinction between that lower goodness of the world of sense-desire, which such a person may alone acquire, and the sub- limer,'or the highest goodness, by which he would be able to avert his ; doom.

[1] Th. — Yet you admit that he may make gifts [to the Order] — how then can your proposition hold ? And not only gifts — namely, of raiment, alms, food, lodging, medica- ments against illness, various kinds of food, drink — but also that he may render homage at a shrine of older faiths, 2 decorate it with a wreath, with incense, with ointment, salute it by marching round. 3 . ..

1 Itivuttalca, § 13. The Commentary adds that these stanzas ,£ were uttered by the Buddha with reference to the normal life-cycle (a yu kappa) in purgatory. This is one-eightieth part of a great kappa.’ As thus included it is also called an antarakappa.

2 C e t i y a, a pre-Buddhist term for anything worthy of being revered as a memorial. Buddhism has applied it to the four classes of recognized memorials — paribhoga-, dhatu-, Dhamma-, .and udissa-cetiya’s. The last includes images.

3 In Br. abhidakkhinaij, or consummate offering.

T.S. V.

18

274

Immediate Retribution

XIII. 8.

[2] U. — You contradict my proposition. Now you admit that he may acquire good consciousness arising out of that [purgatorial discipline]. Yet this implies that he may also acquire good consciousness belonging to the Kupa- and Arupa-spheres, 1 and belonging even to the supramundaue mind. . ..

B. Of Abettors of Cardinal Crimes.

Controverted Point. — That a person who, as abettor, is involved in 4 immediate retribution ’ may enter on the True Path of Assurance.

From the Commentary. — Such a person, who at death inherits the immediate effect of karma, may have abetted any of the cardinal crimes (matricide, etc.) in one of two ways — by a permanent or stand- ing injunction to commit the crime, or by an occasional injunction. An abettor of the former class is already assured of his doom along the Wrong Path, because of the will to accomplish such a course having arisen. He is incapable of entering the True Path. But the other class of abettor is not incapable. So do we conclude in our doctrine. But some, like the Uttarapathakas, judge of the latter class, as we do of the former only.

[1] U. — Do you mean that such a culpable abettor can enter on both the False and the True Path of Assurance ? If you deny, neither can you affirm your proposition.

Again, if he become worried and uneasy after his con- nection with the deed, how can he ever enter on the True Path of Assurance ? 2

[2] Th. — You say he is incapable of entering on that. Path. But are you assuming that one or other of the five cardinal crimes has actually been committed [through his abetment] ? Your proposition implies this. 2

1 In Jhana-ecstasy.

2 Stress is laid by the opponent on the evil character of worry (kukkucca-pattimattai) gahetva). — Corny. It is one of th& Five Hindrances, taken together with uddhacea (distraction, or flurry). See Dialogues, i., p. 82, § 68.

3 ‘Actual commission of any one of the five is to be proved in- capable of entering on the True Path of Assurance.’ — Corny. This,, we judge, refers to the principal offender. If there be no actual commission, the abettor is a fortiori not liable to severe retribution.

480.

Assurance

275

Again, you affirm that an abettor of such crimes, when he has withdrawn his instigation, and has dispelled his worry and remorse, is still incapable of entering upon the True Path of Assurance. Hereby you imply that some one of the grave misdeeds just named has been actually com- mitted [at his instigation]. But can you maintain your position in the face of his reforming before the commis- sion of the act ?

[3] U. — But has he not previously instigated someone to commit it? How then can you judge him capable of entering on the True Path of Assurance ?

4. Of One whose Salvation is Morally Certain (n i y a t a).

Controverted Point. — That one who is morally certain of salvation has entered the Path of Assurance. 1

From the Commentary. — Niyarna (Assurance) is of two kinds, according as it is in the wrong or the right direction. The former is conduct that finds retribution without delay, 2 the latter is the Ariyan Path. And there is no other. All other mental phenomena happen- ing in the three planes of being are not of the invariably fixed order, and one who enjoys them is himself ‘ not assured? Buddhas, by the force of their foresight, used to prophesy : ‘ Such an one will in future attain to B 6 d h i ’ (Buddhahood). This person is a Bodhisat, who may be called Assured (Niy at a), by reason of the cumulative growth of merit. 3 * Now the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, taking the term 1 Assured 5 without distinction as to direction, assumed that a Bodhisat was becoming fitted to penetrate the Truths in his last birth, and therefore held that he was already 1 Assured.’

1 Here the text (both PTS and Br.) has niyarna, while the Com- mentary has niyarna. The former is technically more correct. Bee Y. 4, and Appendix : Assurance.

2 Anantariy akamma. See above, YIII. 9-11.

3 Bead for punnassa datva, puhn 5 ussadatta. The title

of Niyata is extended to a Bodhisat by courtesy, so to speak,

because his final salvation, through accumulating merit, amounts almost to a certainty, is highly probable. Cf. IY. 8.

276 Hindrances and the Hindered XIII. 5.

[1] Th. — Do you imply that the so-called ‘Assured’

enters upon the True Path of Assurance when assured of immediate retribution, and upon the False Path of Assur- ance when assured of final salvation ? That having first practised the Path, he afterwards enters upon the Assur- ance ; that having first practised the Stream -Winner’s Path, he afterwards enters upon the Assurance of the, Stream- Winner, and so on ... That finally, entrant^ upon Assurance comes after practise of the applications in mindfulness and the rest of the Factors of Enlighten- ment ? /

[2] P.A. — But in contradicting us, you imply that the

Bodhisat was not fitted by that last birth to penetrate the ( Truths., ■

Th. — Nay, I say not so.

P.A. — Then he was [already] assured of entering upon the Path of Assurance.

5. Of One in the Toils.

Controverted Point. — That a Hindrance is cast off by one who is entangled in it.

From the Commentary. — The Uttarapathakas are among those who hold that, just as there is no purifying work left for the purified, so it must be one entangled, obstructed, cloaked by the Hindrances, who abandons them.

[1] Th. — Equally then he who is infatuated abandons lust; he who is malign, stupid, corrupt, abandons hate, dulness, corruptions, respectively. Now, does he cast off lust by lust, hate by hate, and so on ?

U. — [If this is not so, you are suggesting that the Hindrances are cast out by the Path.] Now you allow that lust, for instance, and the Path are both conscious experiences. But do you not hereby imply a combination of two rival mental procedures ? Lust is immoral, the Path is moral — does not your position imply that good and bad, moral and immoral, radiant and sinister mental states

480.

Obstacles and the Obstructed

277

confront each other in the mind ? And was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ These four things are very far apart ; the sky and the earth, the hither and the yonder shore of the ocean, whence the sun rises and ivhere he sinks. . . . Hence far is norm of good: from that of evil ?

Hence it is also wrong to say good and bad states con- front each other in the mind at the same moment.

[2] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : lucent, cleared, void of defilement, made supple, wieldy, firm, imperturbable, he applies and bends over the mind to insight into the destruction of Intoxicants ' P
 * With consciousness thus concentrated, made pure, trans-

[3] LL — But was it not also said by the Exalted One : ‘ He thus knowing, thus seeing, his heart is set free from the Intoxicants — sense -desires, lust of becoming, error and nescience ’ P

Hence surely it is one who is entangled by the Hindrances who casts them off.

6. Of Captivity and Release.

Controverted Point. — That a Fetter is cast off by one who is in thrall to it. 4

Fro?n the Commentary. — This follows the preceding argument. To be ‘ in thrall to ’ means |o be up against the Fetters, to have reached the state of being possessed of them.

The discourse is similar to XIII. 5.

7. Of Jhana as Enjoyment.

Controverted Point. — That the expert enjoys Jhana, and the desire for Jhana has Jhana as its object. 5

1 Quoted in full on p. 201 f. 2 Dialogues, i. 92.

3 Ibid., 93. * This is inconclusive, not being spoken concerning one still in the toils. 5 — Corny. With this discourse cf. III. 3.

4 Literally, is face to face with it.

5 Jh ana-exercises, rightly valued, are solely a means, not an end, the. end, for the Ariyan, being adhicitta, or the consciousness called,

278 Pleasure in Jhana Retrospective XIII. 7.

From the Commentary. — This opinion, held, for instance, by the Andhakas, is based upon the Word : ‘ He attaining to and abiding in First Jlicina finds enjoyment in it .’

[1] Th. — Do you mean that a given Jhana is the mental object to that same Jhana ? If you deny, 1 your proposi- tion falls. If you assent, you must equally admit that he touches a given mental contact with the same contact, feels a given feeling with that feeling, and so on for per- ception, volition, thought, applied and sustained intellec- tion, zest, mindfulness, understanding. . ..

[2] You admit that desire for Jhana and Jhana itself are forms of conscious experience? But are you prepared to admit further that they constitute two conscious pro- cesses going on at once ? You deny ; then your former admission is invalid. And if you admit further that desire for Jhana is wrong while Jhana itself is good, you bring the good and the bad up against each other in the same consciousness — things as ‘ far apart as earth and sky/ etc. 2

[8] A. — But, if I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One : * Take the case, hhikkhus, of a bhikkhu who, aloof from sensuous ideas, aloof from evil ideas, entering into, abides in First Jhana : he enjoys it, lie yearns over it, and by it he is delighted ’ P

Hence surely the expert enjoys Jhana, and the desire for Jhana has Jhana as a mental object. ,

especially in later books, supramundane. For the more worldly aspirant the end was rebirth in the Rupa, or Arupa heavens.

1 For fear of not conforming to the Sutras. — Corny.

2 See YII. 5 ; XIII. 5.

3 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 126. Here such an expert is aspiring to the Brahma-heavens (Rupa-loka) only, and is contrasted with the ‘ disciple of the Exalted One.’ ‘ The passage is inconclusive, inasmuch as it refers to pleasure in and desire for Jhana after, and not during the exercise of it.’ — Corny.

485.

The Relativity of Taste

279

8. Of Lust for the Unpleasant.

Controverted Point. — That there is such a thing as lust- ing for what is disagreeable.

From the Commentary. — In the Sutta-passage :• — 1 Whatsoever feeling Tie feels, pleasant, painful, or neutral, he delights in and commends that feeling ’ — the reference is to erroneous enjoyment. 1 But some, like the Uttarapathakas, emphasizing the ‘ delights in,’ hold that one can delight in painful feeling as enjoyment of passion- lessness.

[1] Th. — Do you go so far as to maintain that of the beings who delight in the painful, some wish for it, long for it, seek, seareh, hunt for it, and persist in cleaving to it? Is not rather the opposite your genuine belief’? You assent. Then how do you maintain your proposi- tion?

[2] Can anyone have at once a latent bias of lust for painful feeling and' a latent bias of aversion from pleasant feeling? 1 Will not these two forms of bias be [really] directed inversely, the former craving pleasure, the latter hating pain ?

[8] U. — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One : £ He, thus, expert in complacency and anti- pathy, delights in and commends whatsoever feeling lie feels, pleasant, painful, or neutral, and persists in cleaving to it’? 2

Hence surely there is such a thing as lusting for the unpleasant ?

9. Of the Unmorality of a Natural Desire for Objects of the Mind.

Controverted Point. — That to crave for objects of the mind is unmoral.

1 I.e. to being subjugated to feeling.

' J Majjhima-Nik., i, 266. ‘ Delight,’ the Sutta goes on, ‘is grasping after the things of sense, which cause the feelings.’

280

XIII. 9.

Is Every Desire Immoral ?

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that the sixth kind of objects of sense-experience, 1 coming after any of the five forma of sensations, is neither moral nor immoral.

[1] Th. — If that be so, this craving must belong to one of the moral indeterminates — to wit, resultant or inopera- tive indeterminates — matter, Nibbana, or the organs and objects of the five senses. But you must deny this [as not doctrinal].

Or what reason have you for dissociating this sixth form of t a n h a [natural desire or craving] from the rest ? If you admit that a craving for objects of sight, sound, and so on is immoral, you must admit as much concerning the co-ordination of these.

, [2] Did not the Exalted One call craving immoral ? Does not this condemn your proposition ? Did he not call appetite (or greed) immoral? and is not craving for objects of the mind a kind of greed ?

[3] Your contention is that a craving for objects of the mind is an unmoral appetite, but you are not justified in using 1 6 b h a with this qualification, when in the other five modes of sense it is called immoral.

[4] Again, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ This natural desire is concerned with rebirth, is accompanied by delight and lust, dallying here and there — to wit, desires of sense, desire for rebirth, desire not to live again ’ ? 2 . ..

[5] P. — But if I am wrong, is not this [threefold] craving a craving for certain ideas or mental objects? 3

Hence surely such a craving is as such immoral.

1 The co-ordination of different successive sensations as a concrete single percept and image — e.g., of orange colour, smell, roundness, and certain other touches into an orange — was conceived by Buddhists as a sort of sixth sense.

2 Sarjyutta-Nik., iii. 26 ; Vin. Texts, i. 95, reading ‘ non-existence ’ for * prosperity.’ (V i b h a v a may conceivably mean either ; but the traditional reading is, as the Commentary to the Kathdvatthu says, the goal of the Annihilationists.)

3 ‘This is inconclusive, because the citation shows nothing as to a non-ethical nature, but refers to the process of natural desire concerning a mental object.’ — Corny.

488.

Is Every Desire a Cause of III ?

2S1

10. Of Desire for Ideas and the Cause of III.

Controverted Point. — That the natural desire for objects of mind is not the Cause of 111.

From the Commentary. — This, too, is an opinion of the Pubba- seliyas and others. The argument follows the preceding.

[1] Th. — What reason have you for dissociating this form of craving from the other five ? If you admit that a craving for objects of sight, sound, and so on, is im- moral, you must admit as much concerning the co-ordina- tion of these as ideas (percepts or images).

[2-5] Continue to imitate the preceding argument, XIII. 9.