AB-KV-Ch11

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444.

Is Latent Bias Unmoral ?

253

BOOK XI

1. Of Three Facts about Latent Bias.

Controverted Points. — (i.) That latent bias 1 is unmoral (indeterminate).

From the Commentary. — That latent bias in its seven forms is (i.) unmoral, (ii.) without moral or immoral motive, (iii.) indepen- dent of mind, is an opinion held, for instance, by the Mahasanghikas and the Sammitiyas. They allege that it is not right to say that the average man, while moral, or unmoral consciousness is going on, has latent bias, since the motive or condition of such consciousness cannot cause latent bias [to manifest itself], nor is such consciousness con- joined with any form of bias.

[1] Th. — But are you prepared to identify latent bias with any of the morally indeterminate ultimates— -with resultant or with inoperative indeterminates, with matter or body, with Nibbana, or with the organs and objects of sense ? Of course you deny this. . ..

[2-8] Again, take each form of bias — unless you can prove that each form is something different in kind or degree from the corresponding kind of ‘ fetter,’ or ‘ outburst, 5 or ‘flood,’ or ‘yoke,’ or ‘hindrance,’ which are indisputably immoral states, you cannot call the corresponding form of bias unmoral, whether it be sensual desires, or enmity, or conceit, or mere opinion, or doubt, or lust of life, or nescience. 2

[9] M. S. — Well, but would you say that an average man, while thinking moral or immoral thoughts, had latent bias ?

Th. — Yes.

1 On. this term see III. 2 f. ; IX. 4.

2 The ‘ seven forms.’

254

XI. 1.

Of Three Facts about Latent Bias

M. S. — Do you tell me then that good and bad ideas can come together side by side in consciousness ?

Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . ..

M. S.~ — Then latent bias must be unmoral.

Th. — Then you must go further and admit that lust is unmoral, because you will agree that the average man, when thinking good or unmoral thoughts, has not got rid the while of the root-condition of lust or greed. . ..

(ii.) That latent bias is without moral motive (or root- condition). 1

[10] Th. — Since you cannot identify latent bias with any ultimate [cf. § 1], these being admittedly independent of the root-conditions or hetu’s, it only remains for you to show that each form of latent bias is something different in kind or degree from the corresponding kind of ‘fetter,’ or ‘ outburst,’ or ‘ flood,’ or ‘ yoke,’ or ‘ hindrance,’ which are indisputably motived by the root-conditions of lust, or enmity, or dulness. . ..

[11] M. S. — You urge that latent biases are not uncon- ditioned by these root-conditions, and you still maintain that an average person, while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts, is possessed the while by forms of latent bias. But you deny that these forms are conditioned by any of the root-conditions accompanying those thoughts. Surely then latent bias is unconditioned. 2

Th. — You admit that such an average person is still possessed of lust, even while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts. But you deny that that lust is conditioned by the ‘ hetu ’ accompanying those thoughts. According to you, therefore, lust is unconditioned — which is absurd.

1 On hetu, see Compendium, 279 f. ; ef. Duka-patthana (PTS), * xii., xiii.

2 The argument is complicated by r a g a being classed as both (i.) ‘ root-condition,’ or hetu (as such it is sometimes called 1 o b h a), and (ii.) the first in the list of seven forms of latent bias : kama-raga.

450. Of Insight as Potential 255

(iii.) That latent bias is independent of consciousness.

[12-19] Argued verbatim as in IX. 4, §§ 1-8, substituting ‘independent of’ or ‘ conjoined with ’ ‘ consciousness ’ for ‘ without ’ or ‘ with ’ ‘ mental object ’ respectively.

[20] M. S. — You affirm that an average person is still possessed of latent bias, even while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts. But you deny that the latent bias is conjoined with such thoughts. Surely then latent bias is independent of mind.

Th. — If, as you admit, such a person is still possessed of lust while thinking moral or immoral thoughts, your denial that lust is conjoined with those thoughts does not necessarily lead to the false conclusion that lust is inde- pendent of mind.

2. Of Insight.

Controverted Point. — That it is wrong to say ‘he has insight ’ of one who, though he has banished nescience, has thoughts not conjoined with insight.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that one who, having banished spiritual ignorance by Path-insight, is experiencing ordinary cognitions by way of sense, cannot at the time be said to ‘ have insight, 5 since Path-conscionsness is then not active. The criticism reveals their ineptitude in the notion of what an [Ariyan] person is, and also the propriety of ascribing insight to one who, having acquired insight [has it always potentially, if not actually ]. 1

[1] Th. — Then you must also admit it is not right to say that, when lust has departed, a man has ‘ done with lust.’ Similarly for hate, and for dulness, and for worldly corruptions generally. [2] If, on the contrary, you main- tain that it is right to affirm these latter propositions, then it is no less right to say, of one for whom nescience is departed, but for whom cognition not conjoined with insight is active, that he has insight.

1 Cf, this borrowing of a modern turn (anticipated by Aristotle) in X. 12, p. 243.

256 Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness XL 3.

[3] M. — But if it be right to say thus of that person, is it in virtue of past insight? Can he be said ‘to have in- sight ’ by an insight that has ceased, that is past, that has subsided ? You deny this. ..

3. Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness.

Controverted Point. — That insight (ii a n a) is not con- joined with consciousness.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that, inasmuch as an Arahant, who is said to have insight on account of that which he has won by the Path, may experience sense- cognitions which are not conjoined with that insight, therefore insight is inde- pendent of ordinary consciousness. The criticism shows that, if insight be detached from consciousness, it must be identifiable with one of the categories of things that are other than consciousness.

[1] Th. — But are you prepared to identify insight with all that is admittedly detached from consciousness : — with matter, Nibbana, or the organs and objects of sense ? Scarcely ! . ..

Or are you prepared to declare ‘insight’ as having nothing in common with understanding? 1 For you will admit that understanding, as controlling power or force, as supremely right view, as intuitive search for truth, 2 is not detached from, but is bound up with, consciousness ?

[2] Insight, again, as* we agree, includes, involves the activity of the aggregate of the coefficients of conscious- ness, [3] as also does understanding. Both of these are conjoined with consciousness. How then can insight be detached from it ? [4] Hence, if you maintain that insight and understanding, both involving conscious coefficients, are respectively detached from and conjoined with con-

1 Panna, It is possible to translate both terms by the same English term, none fitting exactly. Both are aspects of ‘ knowledge/ Cf. Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 142 ; Mrs. Rh. D. : Buddhism, 1914, pp. 94, 130, 201 ; also on the Patisambhiddmagga, JBAS, 1906, 239 f.

2 Cf. Dhamma-sangmi, § 292.

453.

257

Does Speech betray Insight t

seiousness, you are committed to this : that the aggregate of coefficients is in part conjoined with, in part detached from, consciousness — which you of course deny. . ..

[5] P. — You contend then that an Arahant who is enjoying cognitions by way of sight, etc., may be said to
 * have insight ’?

Th. — Yes.

P- — But is his insight conjoined with that consciousness (sight, etc.)?

Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. . ..

P. — Then my proposition holds.

Th. — But such an argument holds equally for ‘under- standing,’ if you substitute that for ‘insight.’ And you have admitted the connection between understanding and consciousness.

4. Of the Utterance, ‘ This is Pain and Sorrow /’

Controverted Point. — That from utterance of the word, ‘ This is 111 !’ insight into the nature of 111 is set working.

From, the Commentary.— -Some, like, the Andhakas, hold that this befalls the devotee at the moment when he enters on the Path. 1 The opponent’s reply admits both utterance and insight. In the last ■question, to which the opponent replies in the negative, he is asked whether, by the procedure he upholds, he is not committed to allow an insight issuing from each syllable : I-dag du-kkhap?

[1] Th. — But you deny that a similar result ensues on the utterance of the other three Truths : This is the Cause, this the Cessation, this the Path leading to the Cessation of 111. Why is this? [2] Why deny for these what you affirm for the first Truth ?

[3] Or why deny, as you do, that insight into the im- permanence of each of the five aggregates (body- mind) follows from statement of the fact ? [4] Or, once more,

1 When he is fleeing from 111 rather than envisaging positive happiness. See above, IX. 1 ; cf. II. 5, 6.

t.s. v.

17

258

The Magic Gift

XI. 5.

that insight into the soullessness of each aggregate follows from a statement of the fact ? [5-6] On what grounds can you defend the sequence in one case only out of the three sets of five propositions ?

[7] Now do you mean to tell me that insight issues from every syllable of this formula : — This — is — pain — and — sor — row? 1

A. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. 2 . ..

5. Of the Force of the Magic Gift (I cl cl hi).

Controverted Point. — That one who has the gift of magie potency might live on for a kappa [on earth].

From the Commentary. — The interval, kappa, here means a ‘ great ” cycle (m a h a k a p p a 3 ), not its fourth part, the ‘ incalculable cycle ’ (asankheyyakappa 4 ), nor the mere ‘life-term’ (a yu kappa). Now some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold this view, because they have not thoroughly grasped the real advantage lying in the development of the steps to magic potency. The opponent, knowing that his vital principle or functioning is but the result of karma, has to deny that, his vital functions are determined by i d d h i. All that magic potency can effect is to avert things that would bring about an untimely death.

[1] Th. — But is his life-span, is his destiny, is his. acquisition of individuality a thing of magic potency [that he should be able to prolong one interval of it] ? For this is what you are herein affirming.

An d do you reckon the kappa as past or as future ?

[ An d why restrict yourself to one kappa ?] Why not say ‘ might live on for two, three, four kappas ’ ?

[2] Again, do you mean that, given life, he could live on for the remainder of his life, or that he could live on

1 Dukkha includes both. In PTS text read du ti for ruci.

2 Ibid., read, for Am ant a, Na h’evai) vattabbe — pe—.

3 See Co?wpendium, 142, n. 1 (in which page, for [n.] 8 read 1, and 2nd fn. as 2). Cf, Anguttara-Nih., ii. 126, 142. On iddhi see Bud. Psychology, 127, 161.

4 Cf. Childers’ Pali Dictionary, sub voce kappa.

259

456. Can it prolong Life ?

for the remainder of his life if there were no [organic] life left?

M. — He could live on for the remainder of his life, given life.

Th. — Then he could certainly not live on for a kappa. 1

M. — [Well then] if there were no [organic] life left.

Th. — What ! he could live on though dead, though deceased ? . ..

[3] [Again, what could he effect by the magic gift in the duration of consciousness?] Could he by it succeed in preventing any phase of consciousness that had arisen from ceasing, contact, for instance, or feeling, or perception, or volition, and so on ?

[4] Or could he by it make any one of the five aggre- gates (body-mind) permanent ?

[5] Or could he by it prevent (a) beings liable to re-birth 2 from being born ? Or ( b ) beings liable to grow old, from old age? 3 Or ( c ) beings liable to disease, from disease, 4 or (d) liable to die, from death ? . ..

[6] M. — But was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘ Ananda, ivhosoever has cultivated, developed, established, built up, and persistently practised the four Steps to Iddhi, so as to be able to use them as a vehicle and as a basis, he, should he desire it, coidd remain in the same birth for a kappa, or for that portion of the kappa which had yet to run ’ ? 5

Does not this support my proposition ?

1 The normal duration of human life being at the most 100 years ( Sayyutta-Nik ., ii. 94 f.). — Corny.

2 Literally, having the quality or nature of birth.

3 In the Netti (p. 23) it is said that by iddhi old age may be deferred, and youthfulness prolonged till death.

4 From this it may be inferred that Buddhists did not attach much importance to the therapeutic value of magic potency, or iddhi.

6 Dialogues, ii. 110 f. The four Steps are will, effort, thought, in- vestigation, each united to earnest thought and the struggle against evil. 4 Iddhi ’ means accomplishment. Of. Milinda, i. 198 f. (trans- lation), where the question is again argued without reference to the Kathavattlm. Whether kappa here meant ayukappa only or not, the Mahasanghika takes it to mean mahdkappa.

260

Of Concentration

XL 6.

[7] Th. — But was it not also said by the Exalted One : ‘ 0 bhikkhus' l against four things there is none that can be surety, be he recluse or brahmin, be he deva, or Mara, or Brahma, or anyone whatever in the world. Against which four ? Against the old age of those subject to decay. Against the infirmities of those liable to infirmities. Against the dying of those whose nature it is to die. Against the coming to pass of the consequences of the evil deeds done in the past — deeds that were corrupt, tending to re-becoming, vain, of evil effect, making for birth, decay, and death ’ ? 1

Is the Suttanta thus ?

Hence it is not right to say that one who has the gift of magic potency might live on for an aeon.

6. Of Concentration.

Controverted Point. — That the continuity of conscious- ness 2 is concentration of mind (samadhi). 3

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Sabbatthivadins and TJttarapathakas, hold that, because of the Word — ‘ to spend seven days and nights motionless, speechless, in the experience of absolute bUss’ — the flow of consciousness itself may constitute concentration. They do not take the latter term as meaning collectedness of thought, even when the coefficient of individualizing intentness (ekaggata) has arisen in a momentary unit of consciousness.

[1] Th. — Your statement must include of course past and future states of consciousness in the series. You forgot that, and you must agree that the past having ceased and the future being unborn, it is not right to say that they form a [present] concentrated state of mind. 4

'■ Anguttara-Nik., ii. 172.

2 Citta-santati. See Compendium, 6, 153, n. 1; 157, n. 4; 2521

3 Samadhi means the placing, establishing of consciousness ex- clusively and voluntarily on any single object. Ekaggata is the essential factor in consciousness, the cultivation of which may bring about the state called Samadhi.

4 There is no use in speaking of a ‘ state ’ without a ‘ function ’ of mind. And only the present state can be functioning (paccup- pannam eva eittar) kiccakararj hoti). — Corny.

458. Consciousness and Rapt Absorption 261

[2] S. U. — Then is concentration confined to a momen- tary conscious unit ?

Th. — Yes.

S. U.~ But if you could affirm that concentration is involved in each momentary unit of consciousness, you should say no less that one had won the ecstasy 1 of Jhana on the actual occasion of any sense-cognition, or at the very moment of thinking immoral thoughts, accompanied by lust, hate, dulness, or any of the ten corruptions. 2 3 . . ..

[8] Th. — If your proposition is true, it must also be true [a fortiori ] that a series of bad conscious units is concentration, whether it is accompanied by lust, hate, or any of the ten corruptions. This you deny. . ..

[4] S. TJ. — But if we are wrong, did not the Exalted One say: ‘ I, friend Jainas, s am able, ivithout moving the body or using the voice, to spend seven nights and days in the experience of absolute bliss ’ t 4

Surely then the flow of consciousness constitutes con- centration of mind.

7. Of the Causality of Things. 5

Controverted Point. — That a cause of things is predeter- mined. 6

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas, hold that, because of the Word — ‘ There is a cause, and that is elemental ’ 7 —

1 Here appana-samadhi is meant ( Compendium, p. 56).

2 See above, pp. 65, 66, nn. 4 ; Compendium, p. 17S.

3 Nigantha Jains. 4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 94.

5 Dhamma tthitata — i.e., the state of being a cause by which

resulting things are established. See above, VI. 2, and Appendix.

G Parinipphanna. On nipphanna (here intensified by the prefix) see Compendium, pp. 156 (c), 157, n. 6.

7 tSayyuMa-Nik., ii. 25 ; Anguttara-Nik., i. 286. In these passages it is stated that, whether Tathagatas arise to point it out or not, always the natural order holds good that (1) causation in the physical and psychical world goes on ; (2) all things are impermanent, pregnant with ill, soulless.

262

Of the Causality of Things XI. \7.

each term in the chain of Causal Origination is, as a cause, elemental, and is therefore predetermined. The Thera vadin shows that, if it were predetermined by another cause, this cause would in turn be pre- determined by yet another, and so on ad infinitum-.

[1] Th. — Is then the cause of causes predetermined [by something else] ? You deny. For if you assent, 1 you commit yourself to this : that, because of the continued eventuating due to endless causation, there can never be an end made to 111, nor any cutting off the round of rebirth, nor any Nibbana free from the residual stuff of rebirth.

[2] Again, is the cause of any one of the five aggregates (body, mind) predetermined? If you assent, you commit .yourself to the admission that the cause itself is predeter- mined by something else. And if you deny — and I insist, and take no denial — you, assenting, commit yourself to this — that there is, for this endless causation, 2 no making an end of 111, no cutting off of the round of rebirth, no (Nibbana without stuff of rebirth. . ..

8. Of Impermanence.

Controverted Point. — That impermanence is predeter- mined.

From the Commentary.— Some, like the Andhakas, hold that im- permanence itself is no less predetermined than impermanent things, such as the body, etc. By this they are involved either in a plural order of impermanence, or in an interminable series of temporal features, each predetermined in its own way, with no prospect of coming to the end of predetermination. 3

[1-3] Th. — Then is impermanence predetermined by im- permanence already predetermined. And if you admit this,

1 He judges that the correlation may hold by way of contiguity and reciprocity (two of the twenty-fonr Paccayas or conditioning relations). —Corny.

2 Literally, predetermination of one by the other.

3 The idea is that things possess impermanence as a characteristic feature. If this characteristic were predetermined, it should possess another feature of impermanence equally predetermined.

461.

Is Impermanence Predetermined ?

263

you imply that there is no making an end of ill, no cutting off the round of rebirth, no Nibbana without residual stuff of rebirth. This holds good for both decay and death, the two manifestations of impermanence.

[4-5] [Take now these manifestations of impermanence in the five aggregates, body-mind :] body is undoubtedly predetermined and characterized by impermanence in the form of decay, dissolution, disappearance. But you cannot equally affirm all this of impermanence, decay, or death itself. So for the mental aggregates. . ..