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834

Of getting rid of Corruption

XIX. 1.

BOOK XIX

1. Of getting rid of Corruption.

Controverted Point. — That we may extirpate corruptions past, future, and present. 1

From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as there is such a thing as putting away corruptions, and for one in whom this is completed both past and future, as well as present, corruptions are put away, there- fore some — certain of the Uttarapathakas, for instance— hold that we can now put away the corruptions of our past, etc.

[1] Th. — In other words, we may stop that which has ceased, dismiss that which has departed, destroy that which is destroyed, finish that which is finished, efface that which has vanished. For has not the past ceased? Is it not non-existent ? . ..

[2] And as to the future, you imply that we can produce the unborn, bring forth the non-naseent, bring to pass the unhappened, make patent that which is latent. . . . For is not the future unborn ? Is it not non-existent ? . ..

[8] And as to the present : does the lustful put away lust, the inimical put away hate, the confused put away dulness, the corrupt put away corruption ? Or can we put away lust by lust, and so on? You deny all this. But did you not affirm that we can put away present corrup- tions ? . ..

Is lust and is ‘ Path’ a factor in conscious experience? 2 You assent, of course. But can there be a parallel con-

1 For the ‘ ten corruptions,’ see above, pp. 65, n. 4, 66, n, 4. On [1] f. cf. p. 85, § 2 f.

2 Literally, ‘ conjoined with consciousness.’ We cannot at the same time give play to immoral thought and be developing the Ariyan mind.

57 8. Implications of 1 the Void ’ 385

scious procedure [of both] at the same time ? . . . If lust be immoral, and e Path ’ moral consciousness, can moral and immoral, faulty and innocent, base and noble, sinister and clear mental states co-exist side by side [at the same moment] ? You deny. Think again. Yes, you now reply. But was it not said by the Exalted One : 4 There are four things, hhikkhus, very far away one from the other : ichat are the four ? The sky and the earth, the hither and the yonder shore of the ocean, ivhence the sun rises and where he sets, the norm of the good and that of the wicked. Far is the sky, etc.

Hence those mental opposites cannot co-exist side by side.

[4] TJ. — But if it be wrong to say 4 we can put away past, future, and present corruptions,’ is there no such thing as the extirpation of corruptions ? You admit there is. Then my proposition stands. 2

2. Of the Void.

Controverted Point. — That ‘ the Void ’ is included in the aggregate of mental co-efficients (sankharakkhandha).

From the Commentary. — 4 The Void [or Emptiness] has two im- plications : (a) Absence of soul, which is the salient feature of the five aggregates [mind and body]; and (&) Nibbana itself. As to (a), some marks of ‘ no-soul ’ may be included under mental coefficients (the ourth aggregate) by a figure of speech. 3 Nibbana is not included there- under. But some, like the Andhakas, drawing no such distinction, hold the view stated above.

[1] Th.— Do you then imply that the 4 Signless,’ that the 4 Not-hankered-after ’ is also so included ? If not, 4 the

1 See VII. 5, § 3, for the full quotation.

2 The putting away of corruptions, past, future, or present, is not a work comparable to the exertions of a person clearing away rubbish- heaps. With the following of the Ariyan Path having Nibbana as its object, the corruptions are ‘put away’ simply because they don’t get born. In other words, the past has ceased ; the cure as to present and future is preventive. — Corny.

3 Ekena pariyayena. Marks of other aggregates cannot be so included, even by way of figurative speech.

836 Of Spiritual Fruition XIX. 3.

Void : cannot be, 1 [2] for you cannot predicate of the last that which you deny of the former two.

[3] Again, if the fourth aggregate be made to include ‘ the Void,’ it must be not impermanent, not arisen through a cause, not liable to perish, nor to lose lust, nor to cease, nor to change !

[4] Moreover, is the £ emptiness ’ of the material aggre-

gate included under the fourth aggregate ? Or the £ empti- ness 5 of the second, third, and fifth aggregates thereunder ? Or is the ‘ emptiness 5 of the fourth aggregate itself included under any of the other four ? [5] If the one inclusion is

wrong, so are all the other inclusions.

[5] A. — But was it not said by the Exalted One: £ Empty is this, 2 hkikkhus — the s a n h h d r a ’ s — either of soul or of what belongs to soul 7

8. Of the Fruits of Life in Religion.

Controverted Point. — That the fruit of recluseship is unconditioned.

From the Commentary. — Our doctrine has judged that the term ' fruits of life in religion ’ means the mind in general which results from the processes of thought in the Ariyan Path, and occurs in the mental process attending the attainment of its Fruits. But there are some, like the Pubbaseliyas, who, taking it otherwise, mean by it just the putting away of corruptions and success therein. 3 *

1 All three being names for Nibbana, they are adduced to expose the daw in a theory which does not discriminate. — Corny. Cf. Com- pendinm, p. 216.

2 See I. 1, §§ 241, 242. The nearest verbatim reference that we can trace is Sayyutta-Nik. , iv. 296 ; but even there the word sankhara, which here seems dragged in by the opponent, is omitted. ‘ The Theravddin suffers it to stand, because it is not inconsistent with the orthodox “sabbe sankhara anicca,” where sankhara stands for all five aggregates [exhausting all conditioned things].’— -Corny.

3 Hence unconditioned, i.e., unprepared, uncaused, unproduced by

the our conditions — karma, mind, food, or physical environment

(utu). Cf. Compendium, p. 161.

579. Of Spiritual Fruition 337

[1] Th. — Do you then identify that e fruit ’ with Nibbana: — the Shelter, the Cave, the Refuge, the G-oal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial? 1 Or are there two ‘uncon- ditioned’s ’? You deny both alternatives [but you must assent to one or the other]. If to the latter, I ask are they both. . . Nibbanas, and is there one higher than the other, ... or is there a boundary ... an interstice between them? 2

[2] Again, do you imply that recluseship itself is uncon- ditioned ? ' No, conditioned,’ you say. Then is its fruit or reward conditioned ? . ..

[3, 4] You admit, again, that the four stages in the recluse’s Ariyan Path — the Four Paths — are conditioned. Yet you would deny that the Four Fruits are conditioned !

.[5] In fact, you would have in these four and Nibbana five ‘unconditioned’s.’ Or if you identify the four with Nibbana, you then get five sorts of Nibbana, five Shelters, and so on. . ..

4. Of Attainment (patti).

Controverted Point. — That attainment is unconditioned.

From the Commentary.— Some, like the Pubbaseliyas again, hold that the winning of any acquisition is itself unconditioned.

[1] Is similar to § 1 in the foregoing.

[2-4] Th. — Again, do you imply that the winning [through gifts] of raiment, almsfood, lodging, medicine, is unconditioned ? But if so, the same difficulty arises as in the case of attainment in general (§ 1). In fact, you would have in these four and Nibbana five ‘ unconditioned’s.’

[5, 6] A similar argument is used for the winning of any of the Rupa Jhanas (4), or of the Arupa Jhanas (4), or of the Four Paths and Four Fruits, concluding with : — In fact, you would have in these eight and Nibbana nine ‘unconditioned’s,’ etc.

1 Cf. YI. l, § 1.

2 Ibid. The text abbreviates even more than we do.

22

T.S. V.

338

Of ‘ Thusness ’

XIX. 5.

[7] P. — But if I am wrong, can you identify winning with any one of the five aggregates, bodily or mental ?

If not, then it is unconditioned.

5. Of ‘ Thusness.’

Controverted Point. — That the fundamental character- istics of all things ( sabba-dhamma ) are unconditioned.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Uttarapathakas, hold that there is an immutable something called thusness (or suchness) 1 in the very nature of all things, material or otherwise [taken as a whole]. And because this ‘ thusness ’ is not included in the [particular] con- ditioned matter, etc., itself, therefore it is unconditioned.

[1] Tit. — Do you then identify those fundamental charac- teristics or ‘thusness’ with Nibbana, the Shelter. . . the Goal, the Past-deceased, the Ambrosial ? Or are there two ‘unconditioned’s’? You deny both alternatives [but you must assent to one or the other]. If to the latter, I ask, are there two kinds of Shelters and so on ? And is there a boundary or. . . interstice between them ?

[2] Again, assuming a materiality (rupata) of matter or body, is not materiality unconditioned ? You assent. Then I raise the same difficulties as before.

[3] I raise them, too, if you admit a ‘hedonality ’ of feel- ing, 2 a ‘pereeivability’ of perception, 2 a sankharata or

1 Tathata. The Er. translation renders this by ' immutable reality.’ Cf. VI. 3, above. Br. reads here, differently from PTS edition: sabbadhammanaij rupadibha vasankhata tathata namaatthi. On the metaphysical expansion of the notion, rendered by those who have translated Ai-svaghoia from the Chinese as t a t h a t a see T. Suzuki’s Awakening of Faith, p. 53, etc. Tathata does not occur again throughout the Pitakas. The Commentary attaches no increased interest or importance to the term, and the argument in the text is exactly like that in the foregoing discourse. But because of the importance ascribed to 4 thusness ’ or 4 suchness ’ by certain of the Mahayanists, and because of the unique abstract forms coined for the argument, we do not condense this exposition.

2 Vedanata, sahnata.

584.

Nibbdna as Unmoral

889

co-efficiency of mental co-efficients, a consciousness of being conscious. 1 If all these be unconditioned, are there then six categories of 'unconditioned’s’?

[4] U. — But if I am wrong, is the * thusness ’ of all things the five aggregates [taken together] ?

Th. — Yes.

U. — Then that ‘ thusness ’ of all things is unconditioned.

6. Of Nibbdna as Morally Good.

Controverted Point. — That the element (or sphere) 2 3 of Nibbana is good.

From the Commentary. — All ‘good’ mental states are so called, either because they can, as faultless, insure a desirable result-in- sentience (v ip aka), or because they as faultless are free from the corruptions. The idea of faultlessness is applied to all except immoral states. The desirable result takes effect in a future rebirth, either at conception or later. The first term in the triad : — good, bad, indifferent — applies to the moral cause producing such a result. But the Andhakas makes no such distinction, and call Nibbana ‘good’ just because it is a faultless state.

[1] Th. — Do you imply that it has a mental object, involving a mental process of adverting, reflecting, co- ordinating, attending, willing, desiring, aiming? Is not rather the opposite true ?

[2] These things we can predicate of all morally good mental states — of disinterestedness, love, intelligence, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding. But if we cannot predicate them of Nibbana, then is the element of Nibbana not rightly called morally good.

[3] A. — But is not the element of Nibbana faultless? If so— and you do assent — then it, not being immoral, is moral.

1 Yinnauassa vinnanata.

2 Nibbana- d h a t u, Nibbana considered in itself, independently coming to pass, ultimate, irreducible.

340

Eternal Doom and Final Salvation XIX. 7.

7. Of Assurance which is not Final.

Controverted Point. — That the average man may possess final assurance. 1

From the Commentary. — Certain of the Uttarapathakas, judging by the Sutta — ‘ once immersed is so once for all * etc. 2 — hold the view above stated.

[1] Th. — Do you mean that he has that assurance even if he commit the worst crimes — matricide, parricide, Arahanticide, wounding a Buddha, breaking up the Order ? ‘Nay/ you say. 8

Again, could an average man holding that assurance feel doubt aboutit? ‘Yes, 5 you say. Then he cannot feel assured.

[2] Surely you agree that, if he feel assured, he cannot feel doubt. 4 Now has he put away doubt ? ‘ No,’ you say. 5 But think! You now assent. 6 Then has he put away doubt by the First Path ? or the Second, Third, or Fourth Path ? How, then ?

U. — By a bad path.

Th. — [Do you tell me that] a bad path leads aright, goes to the destruction [of lust, hate, etc.], goes to en- lightenment, is immune from intoxicants, is undefiled ? Is it not the opposite of all this ? . ..

[3] Could the Annihilationist view be adopted by a person assured and convinced of the truth of the Eternalist

1 Accanta, i.e., ati+anta, very final. The Br. translator renders this by ‘ true,’ because all assurance for a finite period is not a true assurance. Thus our conviction that the sun will rise to-morrow, though it is exceedingly likely to he justified, is based only on a belief that no cosmic dislocation will intervene, and is therefore no ‘ true ’ assurance either.

2 See next page.

3 ‘ The heretic, incorrigible as a tree-stump, is more or less assured of cherishing his fixed opinions in other future existences. But the matricide, etc., is assured of retribution in the next existence only. Hence he must reject.’ — Corny.

4 ‘ He assents, because a man cannot doubt his own opinion if it be repeatedly cherished.’ — Corny,

6 ‘ Because it has not been put away by the Ariyan Path.’— Corny.

8 Doubt not overriding the cherished opinion. — Corny.

586. Eternal Doom and Final Salvation 341

view? 1 ‘ Yes,’ you say. Surely then the assurance ot the average man in his Annihilationist convictions is no ‘in- finite assurance.’

[4] If you now deny in reply to my question, I ask again, has he put away [the Annihilationist view]? If so, by whieh of the Four Paths ? You reply, as before, * By a bad path.’ That is to say, by a bad path he puts away a bad view. . ..

[5, 6] A similar argument may be put forward for an Annhilationist who adopts the Eternalist view.

[7] ZJ.—It I am wrong, 2 was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Take the case, bhikkhus, of a person whose mental states are entirely black-hearted 3 and immoral — he it is who, once immersed, is so once for all’? 4

Surely then any average man can attain infinite assurance.

[8] Th. — Is that which you have quoted your reason for maintaining your proposition ? You admit it is. Now the Exalted One said further : ‘ Take the case, bhikkhus, of a person ivho, having come to the surface, is immersed.’ Now is this [supposed to be] happening all the time ? 5 Of course not. ... [9] But again he said : ‘ Take the case, bhikkhus, of a person who, having emerged, so [remains]; of one ivho, having emerged, discerns, glances around; of one who, having emerged, swims across ; of one who, having emerged, wins a footing on the shore.’

Now is each of these persons doing so all the time ?

And does any of these cases furnish you with a reason for saying that any average person can have final assurance [in his convictions] ?

1 In the eternal duration of soul and universe. The former view holds that the soul ends at death. Dialogues, i. 50, § 32.

2 In the Commentary, PTS edition, p. 181, line 14, read puceha paravadissa. Suttassa. . ..

3 Ekanta-kalaka. . . dhamma.

4 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 11, the ‘water-parable 3 of seven classes of persons. Discussed in Puggala-Pannatti, 71.

6 The Theravadin asks this question in order to show the necessity of a critical study, by research, of the spirit of Texts, without relying too much on the letter. — Corny.

342

Moral Controls

XIX. 8.

8. Of the Moral Controlling Powers. 1

Controverted Point. — That the five moral controlling powers— -faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, under- standing — are not valid as £ controlling powers ’ in worldly matters.

From the Commentary. — This is an opinion held by some, like the Hetuvadins and Mahirjsasakas.

[1] Th. Do you imply that there can be no faith, or effort, or mindfulness, or concentration, or understanding in worldly concerns ? You deny. [2] On the other hand, you maintain that there is faith, etc., in such a connection, but that none of them avail for moral control.

[3] You admit that both mind and mind as a controlling power are valid in worldly matters. And you admit a similar validity in both joy and joy as a controlling power, in both psychic life and psychic life as a controlling power.

[4] Why then exempt those five ?

[5] Again, you admit that there is both a spiritual 2 faith and a controlling power of that faith — why not both a worldly faith and a worldly controlling power of faith ? And so for the rest. [6] Why accept in the one case, deny in the other ?

[7] Moreover, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ And I, bhikkhus, ivith the eyes of a Buddha surveying the world, saw beings living whose vision was dim with dust, in some but slightly, greatly in others, beings whose faculties were here keen, there blunt, of good disposition. . . apt to learn. . . some among them discerning the danger and defect of [rebirth iri\ other worlds ’? 3

Surely then the five moral controlling powers are valid in worldly matters.

1 Or five faculties or factors of £ moral sense ’ (i n d r i y a). See above, pp. 16 ; 65 f. ; 194, n. 1. These five are pre-eminent in* doctrine as ranking among the ‘ thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment.’

2 Or supra-mundane and mundane.

3 Dialogues, ii. 31 f. The two lacunae (of one word each) occur in both Br. and PTS editions.