AB-KV-Ch9

Tipitaka >> Abhidhamma Pitaka >> Kathavatthu >> ‘’’Kathavatthu Ch9’’’

Pali Versions : Pali English Version and Pali Devanagri Version =Kathavatthu Chapter9=

230

Of Release through realizing Danger

IX. 1.

BOOK IX

I. Of Release through seeing the Good. 1

Controverted Point. — That the Fetters are put off for one who discerns a blessing (in store).

From- the Commentary. — In our doctrine we are convinced that when anyone discerns (a) the ‘ world ’ (literally, ‘ the conditioned ’) as full of peril, and (&) Nibbana as a blessing, the ‘ Fetters ’ are put off. But some — for instance, the Andhakas — take one of these two alterna- tive statements, and say it is only 2 by the latter discernment that the Fetters are put off. It is to rebuke this partial view that the Theravadin speaks.

[1] Th— But are not the Fetters also put off when the world 3 is considered as impermanent? You admit this, of course. But [then you should not confine yourself to the optimistic side].

[2] You admit, too, they are put off when the world is considered as full of 111, as disease, as a canker, a piercing dart, as woe, as unbearable, 4 as an enemy, 5 as crumbling away, as a calamity, as oppression, as peril, as trouble, as fluctuating, as dissolving, as transient, as shelterless, as no retreat, as no refuge, as without protection, as empty, bare and void, as without soul, as full of danger, and mutable. [But your statement hereby becomes one-sided.]

1 Anisapsa (literally, ‘praise,’ with two intensive prefixes; com- mendable, because good ; profit, advantage). The argument is that the realization of present actual evils is as strong a stimulus, as vis a tergo, to betterment, as the faith in the happiness of that betterment attained — the vis a f 'route.

2 In the PTS edition read va or eva for evat).

3 Sankhara.

4 Or 1 an affliction 5 (a b a d h a t o).

5 Literally, ‘ as other.’

401. Of Release through seeing the Good 231

[3] You admit then that (at the same moment) a man can both consider the impermanence and so on of the world, and see the blessings in Nibbana? No? But you have admitted that he loses the Fetters when he does both. You admit then that he can? But does this not involve us in two simultaneous mental reactions, two consciousnesses, and so on ?

[4] A. — You reject my proposition. But did not the Exalted One say : ‘ Take, bhikhhus, the ease of a bhikkhu who lives contemplating the happiness in Nibbana, perceiving and feeling that happiness continually, constantly, and un- diluted, convinced of it in his mind and permeated with it by insight. ..

Surely then it is for one who discerns the happy prospect that the Fetters are put off.

2. Of the Ambrosial 1 2 3 as an Object by which we are hound. *

Controverted Point. — That the Ambrosial as an object of thought is a ‘ fetter.’

From the Commentary. — This is an opinion held, for instance, by the Pubbaseliyas, and due to careless inference from such passages as ‘ He fancies things about Nibbana. 33

1 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 14. Cf. the Commentary (Manoratba- purani) on this passage. The K. V. Commentary concludes that whereas the work of insight into the actual, the perilous present, occupies the entrant at the threshold of the Ariyan Way, the Fetters get removed, as, during his progress, he discerns the blessings of Nibbana. The sense seems to require abbocchinnap, ‘without a break,’ or ‘ uninterruptedly, 5 for abb okinn ai), ‘undiluted.’ One is tempted to render cetasa adhimuccamano by ‘of his own freewill.’

2 A m a t a, or ‘ not-dead.’ As this term does not for Puddhists, as it might for Europeans, suggest immortal life, we have not rendered it by ‘ the Immortal,’ but by a term which, though it literally does mean that, has a vague suggestion of bliss.

3 See Majjhima-Nik. , i. 4. ,

232 Of the Ambrosial as a Fetter IX. 2.

[1] Th. — If you say that, are you prepared to admit that the Ambrosial is the object of consciousness accom- panied by ‘ Fetters,’ ‘ Ties,’ * Floods,’ ‘ Bonds,’ ‘ Hind- rances,’ ‘Infections,’ ‘ Graspings,’ ‘Corruptions’? 1 Is it not rather an object accompanied by the very oppo- site ?

[2-4] You affirm that, on account of the Ambrosial occu- pying the mind, lust, hate, ignorance may spring up. But are you prepared to admit that the Ambrosial itself con- duces to occasions for lusting, to lusting after, wishing for, being inebriated, and captivated by, languishing for ? That it conduces to occasions for hatred, anger, and resent- ment? That it conduces to occasions for delusion, for depriving of knowledge, for blinding vision, for suspend- ing insight, for siding with trouble, 2 for failing to win Nibbana ? Is it not rather the opposite ctf all these ? How then can you say that, on account of the Ambrosial occupying the mind, lust, hate, and ignorance spring up?

[5] All these things you may truly predicate as springing up because of the occupation of the mind with material qualities (rupa). But material qualities are not the Ambrosial.

[6] You would not say that, whereas -the Fetters spring up because of material qualities, the latter do not conduce to Fetters, Ties, Floods, and all such spiritual defects and dangers. How then can you affirm just the same of the Ambrosial : that, whereas the Fetters spring up because of it, it does not conduce to Fetters, and so forth ? Or that, whereas lust, hate, and ignorance spring up because of the Ambrosial, nevertheless the Ambrosial is not an occasion for lusting and all the rest ?

[7] P. — But was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘He perceives Nibbdna as such, and having perceived it he imagines things about Nibbdna, with respect to Nibbdna,

1 On these spiritual categories ef. p. 115, § 1 ; and see Bud. Psy. Eth., iii., chaps, v., x., xii., xiii.

2 Br, reads vighatapakkhiyaip

404. Of Matter as Subjective 238

things as Nibbana, that “ Nibbana is mine,” dallying with the idea 1 ? 1

Therefore the Ambrosial is an object of thought not yet freed from bondage.

3. Of Matter as Subjective.

Controverted Point. — Whether matter should be termed subjective or objective.

From the Commentary. — It is an opinion of some — for instance, the Uttarapathakas — that matter should be termed sarammana (i.e., eo-objeet), not because it is so in the sense of making a mental object [for itself], but inasmuch as it causes mental presentation. The argument seeks to point out the distinction beween the two meanings of arammana. 2

[1] Th. — If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or body, that it has the mental features of ‘ adverting,’ idea- ting, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, -willing, anticipating, aiming 3 — things which you would, on the contrary, deny of matter.

[2] All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, per- ception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit,

1 Majjhima-Nik., i. 4 : a Sutta, says the Commentary, which is here inconclusive, because the Nibbana spoken of is simply temporal well-being, so called. ‘ Falsely mistaken by the worldling for the real thing ; a matter connected with the satisfaction of natural desires only, 5 wrote Buddhaghosa in the Payanca Sudani ( Commentary on the Majjhima-Nitc.).

2 So Br. edition : arammana-dvayassa vibhaga-das- san’atthap. The PTS reading is not intelligible. Saram- mana, in the orthodox view, means ‘subjective,’ because mind has mental object. The opponent takes sarammana to mean ‘ objective,’ because matter is presented as object. This confusion of the terms applicable to mind arises from the fact that he substitutes aram- mana for p a c c a y a in the compound sappaccaya, and misreads sarammanatthena sarammana g. Thus the word aram- mana g has two meanings — ‘ object ’ and p a c c a y a. See § 4.

3 See VIII. 9, § 1.

234 Of Bias as without Mental Object IX. 4.

erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, im- modesty, indiscretion — all of which you admit as subjective. But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things may not be affirmed of it.

[3] You deny in the case of matter all those mental features — adverting, etc. — but claim for it the term * subjec- tive,’ which is really applicable to £ contact,’ sensation, etc. These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.

[4] U. — But is not matter correlated (as an object)? 1 Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right to apply the term f subjective ’ to matter, etc. [since ‘ object ’ is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations].

4. Of Bias as without Mental Object.

Controverted Point. — That latent (immoral) bias 2 is with- out mental object.

From the Commentary. — Some — for instance, the Andhakas and certain of the U ttarapathakas — hold that what are called the (seven) latent biases, being something distinct from mind, unconditioned, indeterminate, are thereby without concomitant mental object. The Tberavadin’s questions are to show what sort of phenomenon it is that ‘ has no mental object.’

[1] Th. — Then the forms of latent bias must be either material quality, or Nibbana, or one of the five organs or five objects of sense, 3 * which you deny.

1 Dliammasangani, § 595: rupaij sappaecayarj (translated as ‘ conditioned ’ in Bud. Psy. Eth.) ; Compendium, 194.

2 A nu say a. On this sevenfold ‘Category of Evil,’ see Com- pendium, p. 172, n. 2. In the Yamaha it bulks very large. The Commentary on that work attributes the metaphor to the relatively ineradicable nature of the seven modes lying latent throughout the life-term of the individual, and quotes the present argument as showing a rejection of all the qualities claimed for anus ay a ( JPTS, 1910-12, p. 86). This deep-rootedness is brought out in Pss. of the Brethren, verses 12, 768. Herbert Spencer’s use of ‘ bias ; first suggested to us the suitability for it. See JR AS, 1894, p. 324.

3 Only sense - co-ordinating and sensations as co-ordinated have

‘ mental objects 5 ( Vibhanga, 428).

407.

Is Latent Bias Mental ?

235

But let us take the first form, the bias of sense-desire. If this is without mental object, must you not also affirm the same of all manifestations and notions of sense-desire — to wit, sense-desire as lust, as an outburst of lustful desire, as a Better, as a Flood, as a Bond, as an Obstacle ? "Would you not rather affirm just the opposite of these, that they are concomitant with mental object ?

[2] Or again, in what aggregate is latent bias included ? The aggregate of mental coefficients, 1 you say. But these are concomitant with object not less than the other mental aggregates : this you of course admit. How then can you maintain your proposition ? [3] If you affirm that (a) the

bias of sense-lust has the aggregate of mental coefficients involved with it, and yet is without mental object, you must say no less of (&) sense-lust in general. But you refuse (making of sense- lust as bias a thing apart). [4] Thus you get : ( a ) aggregate of mental coefficients without mental object; (6) aggregate of mental coefficients with mental object.

Then is that aggregate partly with, partly without, mental object ? Then must you affirm the same of all the mental aggregates 2. . . which you may not. . ..

[5] Or, passing over the next five latent biases — resent- ment, conceit, mere opinion, doubt, lust of rebirth — as disposed of by this same argument, take similarly the seventh — nescience — if this as latent bias is without object, it must be no less without mental object when figured as Flood, Bond, Outburst, Fetter, Obstacle — which you deny [keeping the latent bias a thing apart].

[6, 8] The argument about the aggregates applies no less to this form of bias.

[9] A. U. — But is it not right to say that, when an average man of the world is thinking of something that is morally good or indeterminate, he may be described as

1 Sankhara's. Cf. p. 229, n. 2.

2 These were taught as being all ‘with mental object.’ See Vib- hanga, p. 428.

236 Of Insight ancl its Object- IX. 5.

forms of bias [latent in him] without mental object ?
 * having latent bias ’ ? And are not [at that moment] those

[10] Th. — But you could equally well say of him at such a moment that he had lust in his heart, 1 and you deny that lust is without mental object. 2 . ..

5. Of Insight as ivithout Mental Object.

Controverted Point. — That insight 3 is without mental object.

From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as an Arahant cannot be said to lack insight, that insight must, at least at times, be practically without object, namely, when his visual consciousness is active, for then he is occupied with the visible object engaging his sense of sight. So think some, for instance, the Andhakas.

[1] Th. — Then insight must be either material quality, or Nibbana, or one of the five organs of sense, or their five external objects (since these are the things that are without mental object). But this you deny. . ..

You deny also that understanding, as controlling power or force, as right views, as the search for truth by intui- tion, 4 is without mental object, affirming the contrary. Then why exclude insight ?

[2-4] Here, too, you judge that the aggregate of mental coefficients is involved. But as in the preceding discourse, so here : you cannot say, a mental aggregate is without object, or partly so. And you cannot affirm that under- standing, which is involved in that aggregate, is with mental object, while insight, also involved in it, is without.

1 I.e., potentially, as something not extirpated.

2 ‘ Hence the objectlessness of ‘ latent bias ’ is not properly sub- stantiated. 5 — Corny.

3 Nana p — i.e., Arahatta-magga-hana r) — insight belonging to the highest Path, that of Arahantship.

4 Dhammavicayo. Cf. Bud. Pay. Fth., p. 18, n. 1 (reading E.g. for I.e.), with Compendium, p. 180, n. 3.

410.

Can ice be Conscious of what is Past ?

287

[5] A. — You deny that insight is objectless. Is it right to say that the Arahant is ‘full of insight,’ 1 while he is visually cognitive?

Th. — Yes.

A. — Has his insight at that moment an object?

Th. — Nay, that cannot truly be said. ... [6] But if you

substitute ‘ full of understanding’ for ‘full of insight,’ you yourself admit that he is full of understanding while visu- ally cognitive, and at the same time you deny that his understanding, during that process, has an object. 2

6. Of Past Ideas.

Controverted Point .. — That consciousness of a past object is without object.

From the Commentary. — Some— for instance, the Uttarapathakas — hold that, since past and future mental objects are not actually existing, therefore mind recalling a past object is mind without object.

[1] Th. — But you admit that there is such a thing as a mental object that is past ? Then how can you make such a self-contradictory statement? [2] Again, is there not adverting of mind, ideation, co-ordinated application, atten- tion, volition, anticipation, aim, concerning that which is past? ...

7. Of Future Ideas.

ControveHed Point. — That a consciousness, having an idea that is future, is without object.

The Commentary makes no separate comment.

[1, 2] are verbatim as in 6, ‘ future ’ substituted for ‘ past.

1 Nani. It is used as a synonym of pannava in § 6. Cf. Anguttara-NIk iv. 340.

2 The insight is potential, not always actualized, i.e., exercised about an object. There cannot be two mental objects at the same instant of time.

238 Of Initial Application of Mind IX. 8.

[3] Th. continues. — You admit of course concerning what is present, that there can be adverting of mind, ideation, and so on (6, § 2), so that consciousness of a present idea has its mental object. And you admit that there can be adverting of mind and the rest about the past and also about the future. Yet in both these cases mind, you say, is without mental object. [4] Why not also say then that, while there can be adverting of mind, etc., about the present, mind occupied about a present object is mind without object ?

[5] A. — But you admit that a ‘past object’ does not exist [at the present moment] ? Surely then a mind occu- pied with past object is occupied with no (that is, with a non-existent) object. . ..

8. Of Initial Application of Mind and its Field of Operation. 1 2

Controverted Point. — That initial mental application ‘ falls ’ on all consciousness.

From the Commentary. — This may happen in two ways : by way of falling on consciousness as object, and by way of association, -2 as a concomitant of the consciousness in which it operates. In the absence of any rule 3 by which we can say, that such and such a consciousness

1 Vitakka is the distinguishable sense, or nuance, in a given state of mental activity, of a 1 directing-on-to an object.’ In Buddhist psychology it is an occasional or particular, not a constant, factor of consciousness. See Compendium, 94 f., 238 f., 282. On the rather unusual term anupatita, cf. Fhammapada, verse 302. Burmese translators adopt two alternative renderings of vitakkanupatita: (a) Those things which constantly accompany *' the initial application or direction of the mind ; (b) those things on whieh this vitakka constantly falls. The first alternative suggests the question : Does vitakka operate in all consciousness ? The second suggests: Does it operate on all consciousness ? While it may operate on all con- sciousness as its object, it does not operate in all consciousness, since it is absent in some, asinavitakka-citta.

2 Sampayogato.

3 Niyama.

413.

Mental Incidence

239

cannot become an object of initial application, we might say that the thesis is true. But since some consciousness is brought to pass inde- pendently of any initial application, this does not fall on (i.e., operate in) all consciousness. [Hence the contradictory of the thesis is true.] Those who maintain the thesis— for instance, the U fctarapathakas — fail to draw this distinction.

[1] Th. — If that is true, you must also be prepared to admit in detail that [other mental properties 1 ] sustained application, zest, pleasure, pain, gladness, melancholy, indifference, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, lust, hate. . . indiscretion fall on (or operate in) all consciousness. ■ But you are not so pre- pared. . ..

[2-4] Contrariwise, is there not concentration with sus- tained application only, not initial application ; also con- centration wherein there is neither kind of application? Were not, in fact, three kinds of concentrative exercise distinguished by the Exalted One: (1) With both modes of .application ; (2) with the sustained mode only ; (3) with neither ? 2

Hence your proposition is wrong.

9. Of Sound as purely Mental.

Controverted Point. — That sound is nothing more than a diffusion of initial and sustained mental application. 3 4

From the Commentary. — Because it was said, ‘ Applied and dis- cursive thinking is productive of speech,’ 4 therefore some — for instance, the Puhbaseliyas— hold that sounds may occur even when cognition is proceeding without work of sense, because they consist merely in ‘ thrillings ’ #or irradiation] of initial and sustained applica-

1 C e t a s i k a. Cf. vii. 3.

2 Digha-Nik., iii. 219 ; Majjhima-Nik., iii. 162 ; Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 363 ; Anguttara-Nik., iv. 300.

3 In other words, that sounds are psychical ‘ thrillings ’ (v i p p h a. r a, or reverberations, or vibrations).

4 Majjhima-Nik., i. 301, where it is said that speech is an activity or co-efficient of mind, because there is first thought, then speech.

240 Of Speech conforming to Thought IX. 10.

tion of mind. 1 The Theravadin submits that if sound can be so specialized, each mental property would send forth its own peculiar sounds. If not, then we cannot speak of auditory cognition of a sound that is merely a matter of intellect, and not an object of sense. But the Word : ‘ Hearing a sound, an irradiation of initial application of mind, he reveals ' 2. . . shows there is auditory consciousness also.

[1] Th. — -If this be true, you must affirm no less that sounds from mental contact are solely an irradiation of mental contact; that such as are from feeling are solely an irradiation of feeling. So also for such as are from perception, volition, thought in general, mindfulness, un- derstanding. This you will not do.

[2] Must you not also affirm of a sound that is an irra- diation of mental application, that it is [none the less] to be cognized by hearing, impinges on the ear, comes into the auditory avenue? This you deny; you affirm that such a sound is not cognizable by hearing, etc. How then can you speak of it as sound ?

10. Of Speech conforming to Thought.

Controverted Point. — That speech does not accord with thought.

From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as anyone can decide [to think about one thing and] talk about another, therefore there is no accord, no sequence, no conformity between thought and speech. Speech can proceed even without thought. Such is the view of some — for instance, the Pubbaseliyas.

[1J Th. — If this be so, then a fortiori neither does speech accord with mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, nor with any property of consciousness. But surely, as you agree, the opposite is the case. 3

1 A phrase from Digha-Nik., iii. 104, and Anguttara-Nik., i. 170. Digha-Nik., i. 213, in the same context, omits -vippharasaddar) s u t v a, and uses slightly different inflexions.

2 See preceding references.

3 I.e., speech occurs to, or proceeds from, one who has ‘ mental contact,’ etc.

241

416, 417- Of Action conforming to Thought

[2] You must, again, deny that speech accords with .adverting, ideating, eo-ordinated application, willing, in- tending, aiming — which you will not, the opposite being true.

[8] You admit that speech which is provoked by thought is co-existent, and one in its origin, with the thought. Yet this is in contradiction to your proposition.

[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one speaks •of what one does not wish to speak, discourses, addresses [others], converses about what one does not wish. Surely the opposite is the case.

[5] P. — You say I am wrong, but you must admit that people can speak, discourse, address [others], converse about something different [from that which is occupying their minds]. 1 Hence my proposition is tenable.

11. Of Action conforming to Thought.

Controverted Point. — That action does not accord with thought.

From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as anyone, when proposing to go in one direction, can go elsewhere, some — for instance, the Pubbase- liyas — hold that action is not in accord or conformity with, or consequent upon, thought.

[1-3] Th. — (The argument is exactly similar to that in

IX. 10, §§ 1-3.)

[4] Again, you commit yourself to this, that one moves forward and backward, or looks ahead and back, or bends or extends, when not wishing to perform these respective acts. Surely the opposite is the case.

[5] P. — You srfy, I am wrong, hut does it not happen that some one, thinking ‘ I shall go in one direction,’ goes in another, or. . . thinking ‘I shall hold forth something,’ holds forth another ? Hence my proposition is tenable.

1 The illustration given in the Corny, is that of one intending to say civarag (robe) and saying drag (fibre), as if 'we were to say 14 coming’ for ‘ comforting.’ Speech not conforming to mental action, ■* no blame attaches to the speaker.’

T.S. V.

16

242

Of Past, Future, and Present

IX. 12.

12. Of Past, Future, and Present.

Controverted Point. — That a past or future experience is actually possessed.

From the Commentary. — In this connection we must distinguish between actual and potential possession. 1 The former is of the present moment. But for a man who has acquired the Eight Attainments in Jhana, the possession of them is potentially persistent, though not of all at once. But some, not discerning this distinction — for instance,, the Andhakas — speak of past and future Jhanas as something actually and presently possessed.

come to an end, finished? [2] And is not the future- unborn, not yet become, not come into being, not produced, not brought to pass, not manifested? How then can you call either something that is actually possessed ?
 * [lj Th. — But is not the past extinct, departed, changed,

[3] Is one who possesses a present material or bodily aggregate also in possession of a past and a future bodily aggregate ? Then must you admit three bodily aggregates. Similarly, if he is actually in possession of five past and five future, as well as five present [bodily and mental] aggregates, you must admit fifteen aggregates. . ..

[4-6] A similar argument applies to the organs and objects of sense, to the eighteen elements, to the twenty- two controlling powers.

[7] A. — But are there not those who, meditating on the- eight stages of emancipation, can induce the four Jhanas at their pleasure, can acquire the four serial grades? 21 Surely then it is right to say that one can have actual present possession of past and future things?

1 More literally, ‘the notion of being in possession of (saman- n a g a t a), and that of having acquired (p a t i 1 a b h a).’ — Corny.

- Anguttara-NiJc., iv. 410, 448. Buddhist Suttas (SEE XI.), 212,. §§ 9, 10 ; Pss. of the Brethren, ver. 916, 917, 1172.