AB-KV-Ch21

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Pali Versions : Pali English Version and Pali Devanagri Version =Kathavatthu Chapter21=

604.

The. Sasanas Capacity for being Recant

35]

BOOK XXI.

1. Of oar Religion.

Controverted Point. — That our religion is (has been an d may again be) reformed. 1 2 3

From the Commentary.— Because after the three Councils at which the differences in our Religion were settled, some— for instance, certain of the Uttarapathakas— hold that it has been reformed, that there was such a person as a Reformer of the Religion, and that it is possible yet to reform it.

[1] Th. — What, then, has been reformed — the Applica- tions in Mindfulness? the Supreme Efforts? the Steps to Iddhi ? the Moral Controls ? the Moral Forces ? the Seven Branches of Enlightenment? Or was that made good which had been bad ? Or was that which was allied with vicious things — Intoxicants, Fetters, Ties, Floods, Yokes, Hindrances, Infections, Graspings, Corruptions— made free herefrom ? You deny all this, but your proposition [a s .stated] implies one or the other.

[2] Or do you mean that anyone has reformed the religion founded by the Tathagata? If so, in which of the doctrines enumerated has he effected a reform ? Again you deny. . ..

[3] Or if you hold that the religion may again be re- formed, what in it is there that admits of reformation ?

1 Literally, ‘made new.’

852 Consciousness and Individuality Inseparable. XXL 2.

2. Of Experience as Inseparable from Personality.

Controverted Point. — That an ordinary person is not exempt 1 from experiencing the phenomena 2 of all the three spheres of life.

From ■ the Commentary. — That is to say, at one and the same moment, since his understanding -does not suffice to distinguish the three kinds. Our doctrine only entitles us to say that the individual is inseparable from such [mental] phenomena as arise at present in him.

[1] Th. — You imply that an ordinary person is insepar- able from the contacts, the feelings, perceptions, volitions, cognitions, faiths, efforts, mindfulnesses, concentrations, understandings, belonging to all three spheres? You deny; but what else can you mean?

[2] Again, you imply that ■when he makes a gift, say, of raiment, etc, at that moment he is enjoying not only the giver’s consciousness, but also the Rupa-consciousness of the Four Jhanas, the Arupa-consciousness of the four Arupa-Jhanas.

[3] Opponent. — But is an ordinary person capable of distinguishing whether his actions leading to a Rupa-world or Arupa-worid ? If not, then surely he cannot be separated from actions leading to all three spheres.

3. Of Certain Fetters.

Controverted Point.— That Arahantship is won without a certain ‘ Fetter ’-quantity being cast off.

From the Commentary.— Some — for instance, the Mahasanghikas — hold this view with respect to the Tetters of ignorance and doubt, for the reason that even an Arahant does not know the whole range of Buddha-knowledge.


 * Avivitto, rendered below ‘ inseparable?

2 D h a m m e h i. The Br. translator of the text (unlike the Br. translator of the Commentary) reads here ka mm eh i (actions), as in the final sentence of this discourse.

606.

Lid hi

353

[1] Tk. — Do you imply that Arahantship is won without the extirpation of theory of soul, or doubt, or contagion of mere rule and ritual, or lust, or hate, or dulness, or indis- cretion? 1 You deny that you do, but your proposition cannot then be maintained.

[2] Or do you imply that the Arahant is prone to lust, hate, dulness, conceit, pride, despair, corruption? Is not the opposite true of him ? How then can you say there are certain Fetters he has not cast off?

[3] M. — [If I am wrong, tell me] : does an Arahant know with the complete purview of a Buddha? You agree he does not. Hence I am right.

4. Of Supernormal Potency ( iddhi ).

Controverted Point. — That either a Buddha or his dis- ciples have the power of supernormally performing what they intend.

From the Commentary. — 1 Iddhi’ is only possible in certain direc- tions. It is absolutely impossible by it to contravene such laws as that of Impermanence, etc. 2 But it is possible by iddhi to effect the transformation of one character into another in the continuity of anything, 3 or to prolong it in its own character. This may be accom- plished through merit or other causes, as when, to feed bhikkhus, water was turned into butter, milk, etc., and as when illuminations were prolonged at the depositing of sacred relics. This is our orthodox doctrine. But some, like the Andhakas, hold that iddhi may always be wrought by will, judging by the venerable Pilindavaeeha willing that the palace of the king be all of gold. 4

[1] Th. — Do you imply that the one or the other could effect such wishes as ‘ Let trees be ever green ! ever blos-

1 It is curious that the Theravadin does not confine himself to one or other of the Better-categories. However, there was more than one category, and the ' list given may have formed another of them. Cf. Bud. Psy. Bth ., p. 803.

2 I.e., of 111 (as inseparable from life), and of No-soul, and other natural laws, as in the text.

3 Santati. See Compendium, p. 252

4 Vinaya Texts, ii. 65.

ts. v.

23

354

Mutual Resemblance in Buddhas

XXL 5.

soming ! ever in fruit ! Let there be perpetual moonlight! 1 Let there be constant safety ! Let there be constant abundance of alms ! Let there be always abundance of grain ’ ? [2] Or such wishes as ‘ Let this factor of con-

sciousness that has arisen [contact, feeling], etc., not cease!’ [3] Or such wishes as 1 Let this body, this mind, become permanent !’ [4] Or such wishes as ‘ Let beings subject to

birth, old age, disaster, death, not be born, grow old, be unfortunate, die !’ All this you deny. Where then is your proposition ?

[5] A. — But if I am wrong, how was it that when the venerable Pilindavaccha resolved : ‘ Let the palace of Seniya Bimbisara, King of Magadha, be only of gold !’ it was even so ? . ..

5. Of Buddhas.

Controverted Point. .— That Buddhas differ one from another in grades.

From, the Commentary. — We hold that, with the exception of differences in body, age, and radiance, 2 at any given time, Buddhas differ mutually in no other respect. Some, however, like the Andhakas, hold that they differ in other qualities in general.

[1] Th. — Wherein then do they differ — in any of the matters pertaining to Enlightenment? 3 in self-mastery? 4 in omniscient insight and vision ? . ..

1 . 6- Of All- Pervading Power.

Controverted Point. — That the Buddhas persist in all directions*

1 J u n h a p. The Br. translator renders this by ‘ growth.’

1 Some manuscripts read pabhava-mattap, measure of power, which is scarcely plausible for a Buddhist. Pacceka Buddhas are presumably not taken into account.

3 See p. 65.

4 Vasibhava, literally, the state of one who has practice.

608.

Buddha- Pervasion

355

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that a Buddha 1 exists in the four quarters of the firmament, above, below, and around, causing his change of habitat to come to pass in any sphere of being.

[1] Th. — Do you.. mean that they persist 2 in the eastern quarter ? You deny. Then you contradict yourself. You assent. 3 Then lash, How is [this Eastern] Buddha named? What is his family? his clan? what the names of his parents ? or of his pair of elect disciples ? or of his body- servant ? What sort of raiment or bowl does he* bear ? and in what village, town, city, kingdom, or country ?

[2] Or does a Buddha persist in the southern. . . western. . . northern quarter ? or in the nadir ? or in the zenith ? Of any such an one I ask you the same ques- tions. ... Or does he persist in the realm of the four ' great Kings? 4 or in the heaven of the Three-and-Thirty ? or in that of the Yama or the Tusita devas ? or in that of the devas who rejoice in creating,. or of those who exploit the creations of others ? 5 or in the Brahma-world ? If you assent, I ask you further as before. ...

7. Of Phenomena.

Controverted Point. — That all things are by nature im- mutable. 6

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Andhakas and certain of the Uttarapathakas, hold this, judging from the fact that nothing

1 In the PTS edition for bud dh a read buddho atthiti.

2 Titt.hanti, lit, 4 stand the word used in XIII. 1 for ‘endure. 1

3 He denies with respect to [the locus of] the historical Sakya- muni [ sic\ ; he assents, since by his view the persisting is in different places. — Corny.

4 On the possible birthplace of these deities, see Moulton, Zoro- astrianism, 22-27, 242.

5 Cf. Compendium, p. 140 f.

6 Niyata. On this term, see above, V. 4; YI. 1. 4 Not fixed’

below is a-niyato. On the three alternatives in § 1, see Childers’s Dictionary, s.v. rasi. The three are affirmed in Dlgha-Nih., iii. 217.

356 Things as Immutable XXI. 7.

[however it may change] gives up its fundamental nature, matter, e.g., being fixed as matter, and so on.

[1] Th. — Do you mean that they all belong to that Order of things, by which the wrong-doer is assured of immediate retribution on rebirth, or to that other Order by which the Path-winner is assured of final salvation ? Is there not a third congeries that is not fixed as one or the other ? You deny. But think. Surely there is ? You assent. Then you contradict your proposition. And you must do so, for did not the Exalted One speak of three congeries ?

[3] You affirm [as your reason] that matter is fixed as matter, and that mind (or each mental aggregate) is fixed as mind. Well, then, under which of those three congeries do you find them fixed? 1

[4] A. U. — But if I may not say that matter, or mind is fixed as matter, or mind respectively, tell me, can body become mind, can become one of the four mental aggre- gates, or conversely? Of course not. Surely then I am right.

8. Of Karma.

Controverted Point. — That all karmas are inflexible. 2

From the Commentary. — The same parties hold also this opinion, judging by the fact that karmas which work out their own effects under present conditions in this or the next life, or in a posterior series of lives, are fixed with respect one to the other.

[1, 2] Similar to §§1,2 in the foregoing.

[3] Th. — Bo you mean that karma which eventuates in

1 They are not immutable in badness, nor in goodness, wrongness, nor rightness. Therefore, since these are the only two categories admitted as immutable, they must come under the third or mutable ‘non-fixed’ category or congeries (r a si).

2 There are two uniformities in Nature, by one of which the worst offenders are assured of immediate retribution after death, and by the other of which the Path-winner is assured of final salvation. And there is a third alternative group which is neither.

611.

Karma as Rigid

357

this life is a fixed fact as such ? You assent. 1 Then does it belong to either of the fixed orders ? You deny. [Then it belongs to no fixed order.] The same holds good with respect to karma, results of which will be experienced at the next rebirth, or in a succession of rebirths.

[4] A. U. — But you admit, do you not, that none of these three kinds of karma is mutually convertible with the other two ? How then am I wrong ?

1 This kind of karma, if capable of eventuating at all, [invariably] works out its effects in this very life; if not, it becomes inoperative [ahosi-kamma]. So the Thera vadin assents.— Corny. That is, each of these three kinds of karma retains its own characteristics.