AB-KV-Ch12

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264 Self-Restraint and Sense-Control XII. 1.

BOOK XII

1. Of Self-Restraint. 1

Controverted Point. — That self-restraint is [positive] action (karma).

From the Commentary. — This is a view held, for instance, by the Mahasanghikas, and based on the Sutta : * When he sees an object, hears a sound, etc., he grasps, etc., at the general characters thereof,’ 2 etc. They hold that both self-restraint and want of self-restraint amount to overt action, or karma. In our doctrine it is volition that con- stitutes karma. And it is argued that just as volition, proceeding by way of deed, word, and thought, gets the name of action of body, speech, and mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint, proceeding by way of sense-control, would get the name of visual karmas, auditory karmas, etc. This, as not warranted by the Suttanta, the opponent rejects till the fifth sense is mentioned. Here he stumbles at the ambiguity of k a y a : ‘sentient skin-surface ’ and ‘ intimating body.’

The Sutta quoted is concerned with the presence and absence of self-restraint, not of karma, hence it is inconclusive.

[lj Th. — If this be so, you imply that ocular self- restraint is moral action of the eye ; so for the other senses — you cannot admit this. . . . But as to self- restraint, involved in sense- control of body and in control of mind, you at first deny it 3 to be moral action, and then

1 Cf. above, III. 10.

, 2 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 16 ; also Dialogues, i. 80, and elsewhere. The ‘general characters’ (nimitta), according to the Commentators, are usually taken, in this connection, as referring to sex-features and sex- attraction. Self-restraint is the carrying out of the volition (cetana), whieh alone ranks as morally effective action— i.e., karma.

3 He rejects for kaya as organ of touch; accepts for it as the vehicle of intimation. As to ‘ mind,’ he rejects it as organ of sense, accepts it as an avenue of karma.

463. Are Acts or Omissions Moral ? 265

assent to the proposition that it is moral action. Why then do you not concede this for the remaining four senses ? That which you admit as true for mind, the co-ordinator of sense, you must admit as true no less for the five senses.

[2] Want of self-restraint you admit of course is [immoral] action (karma) : is it eye-karma when self- restraint is not practised by the controlling power of sight ? . . . ( proceed as in § 1).

[3] M. — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, when he sees an object with the eye, grasps at the general characters thereof,’ . . . [again] { does not grasp at the external appearance,. . . when he hears a sound,. . . cognizes a thing with the mind,

, . . does not grasp, etc’? 1

Surely both self-restraint and want of it are herein shown to be morally effective action ?

2. Of Action.

Controverted Point. — That all action (karma) entails moral result (vipaka).

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Mahasanghikas again, hold this view, basing their opinion on the Sutta quoted below. Now whereas the Master, without any qualification, spoke of volition as moral action (karma), the argument here shows that only good or bad volition as entailing moral result was meant, and that volition which is morally indeterminate is without moral result. The Sutta quoted is inconclusive, since it refers to the experience of results in actual life or lives, given the necessary conditions.

[1] Th. — Do you imply that all volition entails result [volition being moral action] ? If you deny, then your proposition is not universally valid. If you do imply that volition entails result, then you are committed to this — that volition which is indeterminate as to moral result entails moral result ; that volition which is inoperative and

1 See preceding note. 2

266

Is Sound a Mental Phenomenon ?

XII. 2.

therefore indeterminate as to moral result entails such result, whether such volition be exercised in any one of the three spheres of life, or in that which is not included in them. 1 ... All of this you must deny. ... [2] For do

you not hold that resultant or inoperative volition, which is indeterminate as to moral result, cannot be said to entail result ? Where then is your universal proposition ?

[3] M. — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One : £ I declare, bhikkhus, that there can he no annulment of voluntary deeds done and accumulated, without experience of the results thereof, he it in this life or in the after-life ’ ?

Wherefore all action surely entails result.

8. Of Sound as Result [■ of Karma], Controverted Point. — That sound is a result of karma.

From the Commentary. — Here again some, like the Mahasanghikas, from carelessly interpreting such passages as, ‘ He by the doing, the accumulating, the augmenting, the abundance of that karma, is gifted with the voice of a Brahma god,' have adopted this view. The argument shows that ‘ result of karnaa ’ is a term applying to mental states only, which have been transmitted by karma, hut does not apply to material things. The retinue, for instance, attending a Superman is not a v i p a k a, or specific result of karma. 3

[1] Th. — [Now what can rightly be predicated of a pleasant, painful, or neutral ; it is conjoined with feeling
 * result of karma ’ ?] Such a result is a matter of feeling,

1 Dhammasangani, § 583.

2 Anguttara-Nik., v. 292 ff.

3 But the pleasure derived from well-being of this kind is vip ak a. V i p a. k a is essentially a subjective phenomenon, subjective experience, emotional and intellectual. Sound, as object, is something ‘other,’ or external. The importance of speech-sounds for thought doubtless provoked the exceptional position claimed by the heterodox for sound. Sadda means both sound and word; hence, without a qualifying context, sadda means as much vocal sound as sound in general.

467.

Are Sense-Organs Results of Karma?

267

of these three kinds ; it is conjoined with mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, thought ; it goes with a mental object ; with it go adverting, ideating, co-ordinated applica- tion, attention, volition, anticipation, aiming. Is sound anything of this kind ? x Is it not rather the opposite '?

[2] Now mental contact is result of karma, and of mental contact it is right to predicate any of the fore- going characteristics, and wrong not to. But the opposite holds with regard to sound.

[3] M. — But if I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ He through haring u-rought, having accumu- lated, having piled up, having increased, such karma, becomes reborn with the voice of a Brahma god, like that of the karavlka bird’? 1 2 Hence surely sound 3 is a specific result of karma.

4. Of the Sense-Organs.

Controverted Point. — That the sense-organs are results of karma.

From the Commentary. —'Koto again it is a Mahasanghika belief that, because the sense-organs have arisen through the doing of past actions, therefore they are results (understood as subjective or mental). Of them the sixth, or co-ordinating, sense may at times be such a result, but not the others.

[1-4] The argument folloivs that of the previous dialogue verbatim, the * sixth sense’ (mari’dyatana) being omitted.

1 In the PTS edition the reply should here be, N a h ’ e v a g vattabbe.

2 Blgha Nikdya, iii. 173.

3 Though, the sense-organs are well produced through karma, they are not designated as vip aka’s. — Corny.

2G8

Of the Seven-Rebirths' -Limit

XII. 5.

5. Of the Seven-Rebirths' -Limit. 1

Controverted Point. — That he who is said to be liable to seven more rebirths at most is assured of final salvation 2 only at the end of the seven-rebirths’ interval. 2

From the Commentary. — This is a belief held, for instance, by the Uttarapathakas. The Theravadin’s object is to show that there is no such immutably fixed order. There is only (1) the ‘ true order ’ of the Ariyan Path, and (2) the * false order,’ 4 to which belong the five heinous crimes entailing inevitable retribution in the very next existence.

[1] Th. — Is such an one capable of murdering mother, father, or Arahant, of shedding with malign heart a Tatha- gata’s blood, of creating schism ? You deny. . ..

[2] And is he incapable of penetrating Truth during the interval? You deny. Then he cannot possibly become guilty of those heinous crimes, which admit of no inter- vening rebirth without retribution. You now assent, ad- mitting that he is incapable of that penetration. Then you imply that he may commit those crimes, which of such a man you deny.

[8] Is there a fixed order of things 5 (among the Paths) by which the seven-rebirths’-limit man is bound to go through all the seven ? You deny. Then your proposition cannot hold. Do you in other words hold that there are applications of mindfulness, supreme efforts, steps to potency, controlling powers, forces, factors of enlighten- ment, by [culture in] which the seven-births’-limit person is destined to go through all seven ?

¥

1 That is, seven at the outside, possibly fewer. See I. 4.

2 I.e., in the Ariyan fourfold Path and its climax. On niyato see Y. 4 ; cf. VI. 1.

3 According to the Burmese translation of the text, the question turns on whether such a person is subjectively assured of his own state, or whether he must go through his last seven lives before he becomes so assured ? The Commentary paraphrases -paramata by -p ar am at Sy a, and the Br. translator takes this as either instru- mental or locative. The sense is the s am e.

4 Cf. I. 3.

B On niyrnia and niyama, see Appendix : Assurance.

470.

Is it immutably fixed?

269

[4] Is not the opposite the ease ? And how then can you maintain your proposition ?

[5] You maintain that such a person is not so destined except by the fixed order of the First, or Stream-winner’s Path. But are all who enter on that Path destined to go through all the seven rebirths ?

[6] U. — You say I am wrong ; nevertheless you must admit that the person in question is a seven-birth s’ -limit person ? Surely then my proposition stands ? . ..

6. Sequel to the Foregoing.

[1] U. — Again, if you maintain it is wrong to say that the k o 1 a n k o 1 a, 1 or one ranking in the First Path next above him of the seven rebirths’ limit, is assured of salvation by his rank, 2 1 ask, Does not his rank itself [guarantee that he shall attain] ?

[2] And does not the next higher rank in the First Path, that of eka - blj in, or ‘ one-seeder,’ also guarantee final salvation ?

„ 7. Of Murder.

Controverted Point. — That a person who has attained to sound views 3 may yet designedly commit murder.

From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that, since a person who has attained to sound views has not entirely put

1 Explained by Buddhaghosa, commenting on Anguttara-Nik., i. 233, as meaning ‘a goer from family (kula) to family,’ ‘ kula here standing for b h a v a ’ (rebirth). See above, p. 77, n. 3.

2 Burmese translators give alternative renderings — in or by his rank — for kolankolata.

3 Ditthisampanno puggalo, a technical term of religious life, wherein the word di^thi no longer means erroneous opinion, but the opposite. Such an one is still a learner (sekha), but has put away all but the last fetters and residual lust, hate, and nescience, and is incapable, so the Buddha taught, of any of the misdeeds or of the irreverence mentioned above. — Sayyutta-NiTc., ii. 43 f. ; vi. s.v. I) it t hi ; Angnttara-Nik., iii. 488 f.

270

Of Murder

XII. 7.

away enmity, and since he who takes life has enmity in his heart, therefore one who thinks rightly may yet commit wilful murder.

[1] Th. — Then you imply that he may designedly com- mit [any murder, even the worst, to witj matricide, parri- cide, Arahanticide, or with enmity at heart may wound a Tathagata, or create schism in the Order. . ..

[2] You imply, moreover, that [since he may commit such a deed] he can have no reverence for Master, Doctrine, Order, or Training, [8] while you know, on the other hand, that such a person feels just the opposite.

[4] You imply, moreover, that such a person may defile 1 Buddha shrines, desecrate them, spit on them, behave as an infidel in presence of them ? 2 3

[5] But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ Just as the ocean, bhiJckhus, remains of the same nature, and passes not beyond the shore, just so is the body of precepts which I have established for those ivlw are hearers of my word, and ■which they their lives long do not pass beyond ’ ? 8

Hence it is not right to say that a person who has attained to sound views may designedly deprive a living creature of life.

8. Of Evil Tendency. 4 * * *

Controverted Point. — That for a person holding sound views evil tendencies are eliminated.

From the Commentary. — This view is due to the lack of making proper distinction, by such as the Uttarapathakas, between an evil

1 See Vin. Texts, iii. 277, n. 3.

Apabyamato, Br. as a b y ak a t o, Br. translation : abyasa- kato. The Burmese scholar, U. Pandi, suggests we should read apabyakato, by which he understands ‘blasphemously.’ The Commentary on 8ar>yutta-Nih., i. 226, only remarks : apabyamato karitya abyamato katva.

3 Vin. Texts, iii. 303. *

4 Duggati denotes evil destiny, and connotes the sense-desires

of beings involved therein. The orthodox position is, that one who

holds sound views may still possess sense-desires which may involve

such a destiny.

478.

Of Evil Tendency

271

destiny and the natural desires concerning objects of sense felt by those who are involved in such a destiny.

[1-4] Tli. — But you concede that such a person [though safe as to his destiny] may still get infatuated with any purgatorial objects of sense, 1 may commit fornication with females that are not human, whether demons, animals, or fairies ; may keep worldly possessions, such as goats and sheep, poultry and swine, elephants, cattle, horses and mules, partridges, quails, peacocks and pheasants. 2 If you assent to all this, your proposition cannot stand. Moreover, you cannot possibly admit all this in the ease of an Arahant. Contrariwise, you repudiate it for him, while you admit (as you must) that it may prove true for one who has [merely] sound views.

[5] TJ. — Then if I am wrong, you imply that the person holding sound views may yet be reborn in purgatory, in the animal kingdom, in the realm of the Petas ? If you deny, you must also retract your contradiction. 3

9. Of Him ivho has reached the Seventh Rebirth}

Controverted Point. — That for a person in the seventh rebirth evil tendencies are eliminated.

The text gives only the opponents rejoinder, similar to § 5 in the foregoing.

1 In PTS edition [1] the reply to the second question should also be A manta.

2 See above, IV. 1. [5].

3 The Commentary finds the rejoinder inconclusive, because 'the question refers to the tanha which may entail purgatorial retribu- tion, but not to the tanha for purgatorial objects of desire.

4 Sattamabhavika, or Sattamaka, terms which we have not met elsewhere. See XII. 5.